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vAbstract
This thesis is a general defence of a context-dependent description theory of reference with
special regards to indexical reference on the basis of a truth-conditional theory of meaning. It
consists of two parts. In the first part, the roots of the Frege-Russell view are laid out and
contrasted with various aspects of direct reference theory and the New Theory of Reference.
Two description-based accounts of the reference of proper names, nominal and external descrip-
tion theory, are defended against various known counter-arguments such as Kripke’s circularity
objection and the Church-Langford translation test. It is shown how the resulting analysis of
de dicto belief ascriptions can be made compositional, but also argued that compositionality
is not mandatory. The second part deals with forms of indexical and non-indexical context-
dependence. Taking into account a range of typological data, referential features of indexical
expressions like their egocentricity, token-reflexivity, and the vagueness of spatial and temporal
indexicals are laid out. Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives is then reformulated, but following
Cresswell (1990) it is argued that full quantification over modal indices is needed. Various in-
dicators and demonstratives are analyzed on the basis of a description theory of reference in
a variant of first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory and two sorts of
reified contexts. Examples analyzed include: I, now, here, actually, we, the former president, the
left entrance, context-shifting indexicals, and demonstratives like Japanese are. Finally, essential
indexicality is addressed and it is conceded that description theory cannot deal with attitudes
de se. In defense of indirect reference it is argued that the cognitive phenomena underlying
essential indexicality, as for example I-thoughts, aren’t aspects of the public meaning of natural
language expressions and that speaking of a ‘language of thinking’ or ‘reference in thinking’ are
unfitting metaphors for general semiotic reasons.
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Résumé
Afhandlingen forsvarer en kontekstafhængig beskrivelsesteori om reference med specielt hensyn
til indeksikalske udtryk og på baggrund af sandhedskonditional betydningsteori. Afhandlingen
består af to dele. I den første del, fremstilles rødderne i Frege–Russell synspunkt og kontra-
steres med forskellige aspekter af direkte reference teori og den Nye Teori om Reference. To
beskrivelsesbaserede ansatser af egenavnes reference, nominal og extern beskrivelsesteori, bli-
ver forsvaret imod kendte modargumenter, som for eksempel Kripke’s cirkularitetsindvending
og Church-Langford-oversættelsestesten. Det vises, hvordan den derfra resulterende analyse af
de dicto meningstilskrivelser kan laves kompositionel, men der argumenteres også for, at kom-
positionalitet ikke er nødvendig. Den anden del beskæftiger sig med former af indeksikalsk og
ikke-indeksikalsk kontekstafhængighed. Med henblik på data fra forskellige sproger fremstilles
referentielle egenskaber af indeksikalske udtryk som egocentricitet, token-refleksivitet, og vag-
heden af rumlige og temporale indikatorer. Således bliver Kaplan’s Logik for Demonstrativer
reformuleret, men med henvisning til Cresswell (1990) argumenteres der for, at der er behov
for fuld kvantifikation over modale indekser. Forskellige indikatorer og demonstrativer bliver
analyseret på basis af en beskrivelsesteori om reference med brug af en variant af førsteordens
prædikatslogik med ikke-traditionel prædikationsteori og to slags af reificerede kontekster. In-
deksikalske udtryk, som bliver analyseret, er for eksempel: now, here, actually, we, the former
president, the left entrance, kontekstskiftende (context-shifting) indikatorer, og demonstrativer
som Japansk are. Endelig bliver væsentlig indeksikalitet diskuteret, og det observeres, at beskri-
velsesteori ikke kan bruges på de se holdninger. Til forsvar for indirekte reference argumenteres
der for, at de kognitive fænomener, som ligger til grund for væsentlig indexikalitet, for eksempel
Jeg-tanker, ikke er aspekter af offentlig betydning af naturligsproglige udtryk, og at tale om et
‘tænkningens sprog’ eller ‘reference i taenkning’ er upassende metaforer af almindelige semioti-
ske grunde.
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1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY
1.1 Introduction
This work is a general defense of a context-dependent description theory of reference, a variant of
indirect reference theory, on the basis of truth-conditional meaning theory. The following central
theses will be defended:
P Thesis 1. Speaker reference by means of singular terms can be analyzed adequately by means of
formal definite descriptions (iota terms or iota quantifiers) in the scope of rational belief operators.
P Thesis 2. Identifying reference, i.e. successful identification of the referent of a singular term by a
speaker or at least the speaker’s ability to do so, is not generally a requirement by virtue of linguistic
competence.
P Thesis 3. Semantic reference can both be analyzed adequately in a Millian way, i.e. according
to direct reference theory, and by using rigidified formal definite descriptions.
P Thesis 4. The objective, linguistic meaning of a proper name is the complex, rigidified property
of being called such-and-such plus possibly some defining properties that are fixed by experts. The
corresponding description theories NDT and EDT are explanatory and descriptively adequate.
P Thesis 5. The subjective meaning of a proper name for some speaker is the complex property of
being called such-and-such plus possibly some identification criteria the speaker associates with this
name.
P Thesis 6. Indexicals in the narrow sense are egocentric and in the broad sense are object-centric.
P Thesis 7. Indexicals can be analyzed by means of formal definite descriptions that depend on the
context of utterance or a reported context in case of shifters.
P Thesis 8. Indexicals in thinking are trivially essential, but corresponding readings of subject
uses of «I» and other essential indexicals are highly stipulative. Essential indexicality is a matter of
episodal thinking and not an aspect of the meaning of natural language expressions.
So in a nutshell this is a critique on Kripkean direct reference theory. However, none of
the above theses implies that direct reference theory is wrong and it is nowhere to be argued for
such a strong claim in the following chapters. The purpose of this work is rather to clarify various
notions of indexical and non-indexical reference and context-dependence and thereby reveal that
alleged tensions between direct and indirect reference theory are the symptom of talking cross
purpose rather than the symptom of a deep philosophical problem.
The argumentation is divided into two parts. The first part, to which this chapter belongs, is
about non-indexical reference. In this part any kind of context-dependence is ignored—not just
the one elicited by indexicals. In the second part about indexicals, context-dependence is taken
into consideration—primarily that of indexicals, but also dependence on the broader conversa-
tional context. This separation is done for expository purposes. During the whole first part it
ought be taken into account that later—in chapters 7 and 8—proper names and definite descrip-
tions will generally be evaluated with respect to the conversational context.
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The present chapter 1 is introductory to the first part on reference and covers the following
topics: notational conventions, truth-conditional semantics as the background of the investiga-
tion, the tension between empirical versus ideal language perspective, and the notions of speaker
reference, semantic reference, and extralinguistic reference as well as various aspects thereof.
The purpose of this is to situate the following chapters in their methodological and meaning
theoretical background and to provide some terminology to work with.
Chapter 2 has two main goals. The first one is to introduce indirect reference theory by
example of comparing Frege’s and Russell’s quite similar views on proper names. Description
theory based on Russell’s Name Claim can be considered the Russellian branch of indirect refer-
ence theory. It will be adopted in favor of a Fregean theory, because Fregean senses make too
strong ontological presumptions. Variants of description theory, such as Searle’s bundle theory,
are also discussed. The second goal of the chapter is to explore the role of identifying reference
and establish Thesis 2.
Chapter 3 introduces Kripke’s well-known arguments against description theory, his rigidity
thesis and the New Theory of reference. Some of the early replies to the Kripkean challenge
to description theory are outlined: the wide scope theory and descriptions rigidified by means
of an actuality operator. These are defended against some recent attacks on descriptivism by
Soames (2002). Given the vast amount of informal arguments that Soames launches against de-
scription theory, this defense has to remain sketchy. The intention of the second half of chapter
3 is, however, only to make description theory plausible. In later chapters this position will be
strengthened by giving concrete examples of analyses based on description theory.
The part on non-indexical reference ends with chapter 4, in which two versions of indirect
reference theory are laid out: nominal description theory (NDT) based on (Bach 1981, 1987;
Loar 1976; Jacobson 1990) and what will be called external description theory (EDT). Argu-
ments for Thesis 1 and Thesis 3–5 are given, where the focus is on speaker reference. Many views
introduced in this chapter are non-standard; they result from a shift in perspective that gives the
process of analyzing natural language expressions by translating them into a formal language a
more prominent role than usual. The resulting analysis of de dicto belief ascriptions is prima
facie non-compositional, but it is shown by example how it could be made compositional if this
was deemed necessary.
The second part brings indexicality and context-dependence into play. Chapter 5 is a general
introduction to indexicals, who in the current terminology comprise indicators and demonstra-
tives. As noted by Bühler (1934) and others, the main feature of indexicals is their egocentricity.
Taking data given by Schlenker into account, some context-shifting indexicals (‘shifters’) have to
be considered object-centric rather than egocentric, but otherwise they work the same way as
egocentric indexicals (Thesis 6). The main domains of indexicality are: person, temporal, spatial,
and modal domain. Examples of indexical uses are given for each of them. Reference by means
of indexicals is explained by resorting to utterance-based reference rules, and finally indexical
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY
reference is compared to non-indexical reference. As opposed to proper names, indexicals have
a rich descriptive content which is commonly used for the purpose of attempting to identify their
referent in concrete contexts of utterance. They can be regarded as strictly rigid shortcuts for
definite descriptions.
After this informal introduction, some more technical issues of analyzing indexicals in logi-
cal languages are addressed. This is unavoidable, since Kaplan’s account of indexical reference
based on direct reference theory has had tremendous influence on the philosophy of language.
A reformulation of Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives of (Kaplan 1989) is thus given in chapter
6. The formalism, called DIML, is introduced and some example analyses are given. It is also
shown how diagonalization can be used for expressing the subjective meaning of terms and how
minimal extensions of DIML deal with shifters. These accounts remain unsatisfactory, though,
because unmodified double-index frameworks have some limitations. One principal limitation
is established by Cresswell’s argument in (Cresswell 1990), which says that full quantification
over indices is needed in order to analyze a natural fragment of English.
In the light of Cresswell’s argument, an alternative formalism called FOLC is introduced in
chapter 7. This is just first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory and some
minor non-standard features to enhance readability. In FOLC, contexts of utterance are reified
into the object language, and some designated parameters for the current context of utterance
and the conversational context are kept during evaluation of formulas. Various indexicals are
analyzed in this framework on the basis of description theory. Among them are: basic tenses ac-
cording to Comrie (1985), the indicators «I», «now», «here», «actually», «yesterday», «the former
president», «we», «the left entrance», the demonstratives «this», «that», «kore», «sore», «are», and
examples of shifters. The purpose of this exercise is not to advocate FOLC as a general frame-
work, for which it isn’t intended, or to claim that the analyses given are descriptively adequate
in each and every respect, but to show by example how the rich descriptive content of indexicals
can be taken for an analysis of their truth-conditional content that is reasonably fine-grained and
reflects how indexical reference works. This establishes Thesis 7 by plausibility and refutes the
converse claim.
Chapter 8 finally addresses some mainly philosophical issues that can broadly be subsumed
under the phrase the subjective meaning of indexicals. First, ways to express non-rigid readings
of indexicals in FOLC are explored in analogy to the respective analysis of de dicto readings of
proper names given in chapter 4. Although no natural language expressions correspond directly
to them, they can be taken to encode speaker reference by means of indexicals. A big challenge
to any description theory of reference is, however, the problem of essential indexicals laid out
by Castañeda (1967), Perry (1979) and others, which is the topic of the final sections. After
the standard arguments for essential indexicals and de se attitudes have been reformulated,
their relevance for linguistic theory is challenged by a series of arguments pro Thesis 8. The
argument boils down to this: In thinking some indexicals are irreducible and self-reference in
thinking is identification free. But examples of persistent tokens and general considerations
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about the connection between language and episodal thinking strongly suggest that semantic
reference of indexicals is never infallible, whereas it is hard to see why any allegedly infallible
mode of speaker reference by means of an indexical ought to be considered a matter of semantic
competence.
1.2 Chapter Overview
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.3 just lists some notational
conventions that are assumed throughout the book. Then, in section 1.4, the meaning theo-
retical background of the investigation will be outlined. This involves a commitment to truth-
conditional meaning theory. Two different perspectives on language are laid out in section 1.4.2:
ideal language versus empirical perspective. This distinction is crucial in evaluating other di-
chotomies like semantic versus speaker reference. The rest of the chapter is devoted to termino-
logically introducing various aspects of reference. In section 1.5.1, characterizations of speaker
reference and semantic reference (denotation) are given and special cases like equivocation and
conflation are named in section 1.5.2. Section 1.5.3 introduces the distinction between the pre-
supposed number of referents of a term and the actual number of its referents. Finally, in section
1.5.4 these notions will be generalized.
1.3 Notational Conventions
The following notational conventions are used:
Integers. The set of integers without 0 is denoted N. The set of integers including 0 is denoted
N0.
Metavariables. Sets for syntactic entities like TERM are also used as metavariables for their
elements, for example VAR can be a mnemonic for the sets of variables of a language or be
a mnemonic for any element of that set; what is meant can be deduced from the context.
Other metavariables are introduced explicitly.
Powerset. The power set, i.e. the set of all subsets, of a set A is written ℘(A).
Cartesian Product. For two sets A,B, the Cartesian product is written A×B. The n-ary product
of a set with itself is written An, which is the same as A1 × · · · ×An (n ∈ N).
Functions. Functions are specified in two alternate ways. First, f : A → B specifies a function
f from set A to set B. Second, BA specifies a function from A to B, where the name of the
function has to be given elsewhere.
Definitions. (a) Definitions by abbreviation are given in an EBNF -style notation, as for ex-
ample in lhs := rhs1 and lhs := rhs1 | rhs2. These context-free grammar rules can be
recursive, as for example in a := b and b := c | a. In some linguistic examples, → is used
instead of :=. (b) Non-abbreviative definitions are marked as such in the text or it should
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be clear from the context that the respective clause is a definition, and an ordinary equality
sign = will be used in such a definition.
Logical Notation. Unless defined explicitly or noted otherwise, standard first-order predicate
logic with operator-argument style syntax, capital letter predicates, x, y, z and optional
indices as variables, and a, b, c and optional indices as constants is assumed. The follow-
ing symbols are used for the standard truth-functional logical connectives, where common
names are given in parentheses: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction; adjunction), ⊃ (mate-
rial implication; subjunction), ≡ (material equivalence; bisubjunction), ¬ (truth-functional
negation; outer negation; negation). Standard quantifier symbols used are ∃ for FOL exis-
tential quantification, ∀ for FOL universal quantification, and ∃! for the FOL-definable there
is exactly one quantifier, except where otherwise noted. In first-order modal logic, these
symbols are used for quantifiers relativized to an existence predicate, whereas starred vari-
ants like ∃∗ and ∀∗ are used for quantification over the full domain.
Substitution Operator. A[φ/ψ] is the formula obtained from A by substituting all occurrences
of φ that are free in A by ψ, where an occurrence of φ is free in A iff it is not the case that
this occurrence of φ is a variable bound by a quantifier in A.
A formulation of first-order, constant-domain normal modal logic (FOML), that will be used
at various places, can be found in Appendix A.
1.4 Background and Methodological Remarks
1.4.1 Meaning Theory: The Background
Reference in general concerns the relations between expressions of a language, speakers of that
language, and the world. Considerations about such relations only make sense as part of a
theory of meaning. As there is a vast number of concurring approaches to meaning and a vast
number of opinions about the meaning of «meaning», this investigation has to be restricted to
only a limited number of aspects of meaning, simply for reasons of space and conciseness. The
following distinctions will be used. Let a meaning constituting entity be an entity that in relation
to a corresponding source language expression contributes to the meaning of another, usually
larger expression of the source language. What counts as a meaning constituting entity of course
depends on the underlying concept of meaning and on the aspects of meaning that the theory
is bound to describe and explain. If a theory focuses on at most one aspect of meaning, it is a
single aspect theory (SAT). Likewise, a theory that is bound to describe or explain two aspects
of meaning is a dual aspect theory (DAT).1 There is no principal reason why there shouldn’t be
triple, quatruple, or quintuple aspect theories of meaning, but this investigation only deals with
two such aspects. The first one is truth-conditional meaning. Early Wittgenstein explains the idea
that is central to this aspect of meaning:
1This term is also used for an epiphenomenalist position on the Mind–Body problem. The two usages have nothing to
do with each other.
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“To understand a proposition means to know what is the case, if it is true. (One
can therefore understand it without knowing whether it is true or not.) One under-
stands it if one understands its constituent parts.” (Tractatus, 4.024)
Following this line of thinking, a specification of meaning constituting elements that encodes
the contribution of lexical items to the truth conditions of an utterance in a certain conversa-
tional context will be regarded a specification of the truth-conditional role of these items, and
these meaning constituting elements themselves will be called the truth-conditional content of
the lexical items in question. At sentence level, the truth conditional content of a lexical item
must contribute to the truth-conditional content of the other lexical items that together form a
sentence in a given conversational context in a way that allows accounting for the truth or false-
hood of the complete utterance. A theory that deals with truth-conditional content is a truth-
conditional theory of meaning. Following the tradition of truth-conditional semantics, whose
origins can be found in the works of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle, an ideal
and fully competent speaker needs to implicitly know the truth conditional content of expres-
sions he uses.2 However, reference and particularly reference by means of indexical expressions
lives in a certain tension with truth-conditional content in single aspect theories. Phenomena
like referential opacity and essential indexicality suggest that there is another aspect of meaning
that has to be considered relevant for a general theory of meaning but is not fully covered by
truth-conditional content. This more controversial aspect of meaning is the cognitive role of ex-
pressions, and the meaning-constituting elements that specify this role is the cognitive content of
these expressions. The cognitive role of expressions is connected to the behavior of speakers that
use them, either because it serves in explaining a speaker’s understanding of expressions or be-
cause it accounts for the transcendental conditions of the use of linguistic expressions. However
it may be spelled out in detail, a theory of meaning that specifies the cognitive role of expressions
is also a cognitive theory of meaning.3 In the following, the cognitive role of expressions will be
considered in addition to their truth-conditional content whenever this is necessary to adequately
represent philosophical arguments. When cognitive content will come into play, however, this
only happens on the background and in contrast with the truth-conditional component of the
theory. A truth-conditional approach to meaning, that basically follows the above Wittgenstein
quote, will be assumed throughout this thesis, and neither will any fundamental, external cri-
tique on truth-conditional semantics be considered nor will alternative semantic frameworks like
representational meaning theory, as for example in (Fodor 1987), be taken into account.
The most salient criterion in dealing with truth-conditional content is the substitutability of
expressions salva veritate. In a negative formulation, this criterion says that two expressions
do not have the same truth-conditional content if a sentence containing the first expression can
have a different truth-value than the sentence that is obtained by substituting in this sentence
2Hereby, the underlying notion of an ideal, competent speaker is based on the distinction between a speaker’s linguis-
tic competence and his actual performance that Chomsky (1965) first stipulated for the syntactic domain. Cf. (Cresswell
1982).
3See (McGinn 1982) for a discussion of cognitive roles in DATs. McGinn argues for a DAT in which the two com-
ponents are autonomous, but this shall not be presumed in the current terminology. Cf. LePore and Loewer (1986) for
critique on McGinn’s view.
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an occurrence of the first expression by the second one. At least for sentences that don’t contain
any indexicals, this criterion is so natural that Cresswell (1982, p. 69) calls it the Most Certain
Principle (MCP). Unfortunately, it is much more difficult to find a similar criterion for the cogni-
tive content of expressions, and the notion of cognitive content is problematic per se, because it
is inherently vulnerable to objections based on a rejection of behaviorism. In order to become
relevant for an explanation of behavior, cognitive content must somehow represent individual,
mental representations that can play a role in episodal thinking. But entities like ideas, men-
tal images, or perceptual presentations are problematic in many respects. Nevertheless, many
arguments in the philosophy of language, like for example the irreducibility thesis that will be
discussed in chapter 8, seem to depend on entities that encode presentations in thinking that
are relevant to a speaker’s behavior regardless of their role in the specification of general truth-
conditions. Whenever the cognitive role of expressions in that sense comes into play, this will be
made explicit.
1.4.2 Empirical versus Ideal Language Perspective
Historically, truth-conditional meaning theory has evolved from a logical analysis of language
that was originally motivated more by philosophical than by linguistic considerations. Analysis
of language as a philosophical discipline has often been strongly connected to new develop-
ments in logic and often had the purpose of clarifying and correcting philosophical arguments.
Works like (Frege 1892, 1918), (Russell 1905, 1940, 1963), (Wittgenstein 1921), or (Carnap
1928b, a, 1934) represent this tradition. They are driven by the idea that a formal analysis of
natural languages purifies them from their deficiencies and ultimately leads to an ideal logical
language that can serve as a proper foundation of all sciences.4 This position will from now
on be called ideal language perspective. There’s another perspective on the relation between
formal systems and natural languages that is ultimately the result of the Chomskian Revolution
in linguistics initiated by (Chomsky 1957, 1965). In this view, a formal treatment of natural
languages must yield a descriptively and explanatory adequate model of how language works.
Montague (1974b, a) has brought this tradition from syntax to semantics. Much of the work that
is done by linguists in formal semantics nowadays is following this tradition. From now on, it
will be called empirical perspective on natural languages, because in the end it must rely on the
acquisition and appropriate modeling of empirical data about the actual use and understanding
of a certain natural language.
There is a tension between these two perspectives, because there doesn’t seem to be any
clearcut borderline between the actual use and understanding of a natural language and the
correct ways of representing knowledge (in a philosophical, epistemically motivated sense of «to
know») about the world by means of language and drawing truth-preserving conclusions from
this knowledge. From a logical point of view, one might reject a certain linguistic phenomenon
as a deficiency of natural language. If so, the logical analysis can easily become inadequate
4Logical languages are formal languages that allow an adequate representation of premises and the drawing of truth-
preserving conclusions from them. Natural languages are languages that have been or are spoken by speakers as a
mother tongue, such as English, French, Tagalog, or Warlpiri. When speaking about languages, usually not just the set
of strings produced by a grammar will be meant, but also their interpretation.
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for describing this phenomenon, simply because the logical language will not be intended to
serve this descriptive purpose. Conversely, one might try to deal with some data for descriptive
purposes with which it would make no sense to deal from a strictly logical point of view. Three
examples will illustrate this point. The first example is the Liar Paradox. There is no doubt that
a liar sentence can easily be expressed in English by uttering 1.1.
(1.1) This sentence is false.
From a purely descriptive point of view this utterance must have a meaning. But from a
truth-conditional point of view it is doubtful whether it has any truth-conditional content at all,
although it consists of meaningful expressions of the English language. From an ideal language
perspective, 1.1 should be excluded from logical analysis. This is desirable from a logical point
of view in order to maintain consistency. From a more empirical perspective, on the other hand,
it can at least under certain circumstances make sense to include liar sentences into a model of
the English language, simply because they can be uttered and each of their constituent parts is
meaningful.
The fact that certain phenomena that occur in natural languages are ignored doesn’t for itself
justify the claim that logical analysis is prescriptive. Any theory involves a decent amount of
idealization and therefore excludes or simplifies certain phenomena. There are, however, cases
in which logical analysis is prescriptive in a very straightforward manner. Consider, as a second
example, contrastivity as it is presupposed by the word «but» in 1.2.
(1.2) Ravens are birds but they are black.
(1.3) Ravens are birds and they are black.
From an ideal language perspective both sentences have the same truth-conditions, which
can be used as an argument for the pragmatic nature of the contrastivity requirement that is
violated in 1.2. This point of view is implicitly prescriptive, since it is based on general logical
considerations and it is hard to come up with any independent criteria to support it. There are
alternative viewpoints, for example the following meaning rule could be given for a contrastive
use of «but».
r
AbutB
z
=


1 if
r
A ⊃ Usually¬B
z
= 1 and
r
A ∧B
z
= 1
0 otherwise
(1.4)
Given a suitable interpretation of Usually, and given that the fact that ravens are birds
doesn’t imply that they are usually not black, this rule would make 1.2 false.5 On the other
hand, one may defend just as well the point of view that «but» has the same truth-conditions
as «and», and that 1.2 is only pragmatically unacceptable. There may be descriptive criteria for
deciding which analysis is more adequate, but at least the position that «but» and «and» have
5JUsually¬BK = 1 alone would suffice, but the idea not adequately represented by material implication is that
Usually¬B should follow from the meaning of A, so the redundancy in the above definition serves an illustrative
purpose.
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the same truth-conditional content has a strong prescriptive flavor. Following the ideal language
perspective, someone might assert that the contrastivity requirement of «but» is not a matter
of truth-conditional content at all. This person could argue that the Usually operator in 1.4
indicates this, because what follows only usually is not what follows logically, is not strictly
truth-preserving, and therefore is of no interest to the logician. Both views are viable alternatives,
because the term truth-conditions allows for narrow or broad, more or less strict interpretations.
A tension between ideal language perspective and empirical perspective is even more obvious
in the third example. Consider what Strawson (1950) calls existence presuppositions and their
failure. Such cases will here be called violations of the presupposition of number. This uncommon
name is chosen, because in the possibilist view adopted here there are objects that don’t actually
exist, for example Superman, but still can be counted. According to possibilism, one may talk
veridically about non-existent objects, and non-denotation and non-existence therefore have to
be kept apart. The following example illustrates a violation of the number presupposition.
(1.5) The present king of France is bald.
Russell (1905) argues that such a sentence must be false, if there is no present king of France,
whereas Strawson (1950, 1964) argues that in this case an utterance of 1.5 doesn’t have a truth
value. From a mostly empirical perspective, this question must finally be decided by finding out
how speakers’ reactions differ in such cases in comparison to, say, utterances that are obviously
false in a certain context, but do not violate any presupposition of number. Then it will be a
matter of criteria like how fine-grained the analysis is supposed to be, how different kinds of
speaker reactions can be classified, or what the theory is bound to explain in general, whether
there will be two truth values or another value is added, a partial logic is used, or whether a
completely different framework has to be used.
From an ideal language perspective, however, there can be motivations for maintaining bi-
valence that are completely independent from actual natural language use. For example, only
bivalence might be considered being logically correct, or someone might argue that any third
value cannot be a genuine truth-value. Such arguments don’t need to rely on empirical data
and involve a prescriptive component. It is hard to exactly determine this prescriptive aspect,
but it must somehow involve the claim that only bivalent logical systems are logically correct,
and that therefore an ideal language must be bivalent. Correctness in this context cannot mean
pure mathematical correctness, since intuitionist and many-valued logical systems can be correct
in that sense as well and it cannot mean the same as descriptive adequacy in this case either.
Being logically correct in the context of arguing for bivalence rather means that a formal system
that doesn’t preserve bivalence isn’t the right one—in a prescriptive sense.6 Prescriptive require-
ments understood in this sense are not normative requirements. The way in which correctness
comes into play in the strife for an ideal language doesn’t have much to do with normative
sentences like «You ought to pay your debts». The prescription doesn’t say that you should use
a bivalent logical system, but rather says that you would be wrong if you didn’t use one, and
6If there was fundamental and continuing disagreement about whether 2 + 2 is equal to 4, and consistent alternative
ways of obtaining different results, then elementary arithmetics would be prescriptive as well. But neither of those
premises hold.
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wrong in this case cannot be understood in a moral sense but must be understood in the sense
of being mistaken. Notice that being mistaken taken from the ideal language perspective doesn’t
mean that the theory is descriptively inadequate. Prescriptive requirements of the ideal language
perspective don’t concern the data, but rather concern the methodology.
The tension between the empirical and the ideal language perspective plays a role in chapters
2, 4, 5, and 8.
1.5 The Notion of Reference
1.5.1 The Multiple Uses of «Reference»
The term «reference» is a highly equivocal philosophical terminus technicus. A singular term
may be said to refer to a particular object. Understood in this way, singular reference is at least
a dyadic relation between terms of a language and objects in the world. This usage dates from
a translation of Frege’s use of «Bedeutung» (meaning).7 Some authors prefer the term «deno-
tation» or «designation».8 In another terminology a speaker is said to refer to some particular,
when he uses a singular term. For example, Strawson writes:
“‘Mentioning’, or ‘referring’, is not something an expression does; it is something
that some one can use an expression to do.” (Strawson 1950, p. 326)
Understood in this way, singular reference is at least a triadic relation between speakers of
a language, terms of a language used by speakers, and objects in the world. Finally, the term
«reference» is sometimes also used in a sense that doesn’t seem to involve any kind of language
at all. A person or, more generally speaking, any kind of agent (persons, animals, computer
programs, . . . ) might be said to refer to some particular when the agent interacts with that
particular in a meaningful, intelligent, or otherwise distinguished way. To avoid equivocations,
the terminology has to be fixed. This will involve the use of some set theory and first-order
predicate logic, but there is nothing ‘deep’ in the use of formalism here; it just makes it a bit
easier to see what is said of what. With respect to some formal or natural language under
consideration, the following sets need to be distinguished. Dom is the set of all objects, Exp is
the set of all expressions, Trm is the set of all singular terms, Agt is the domain of agents, Spk is
the set of speakers, and Spk ⊆ Agt ⊂ Dom and Trm ⊆ Exp ⊂ Dom. The following distinctions
can then be made.
P Ref 1 (Extralinguistic Reference). Extralinguistic reference is a relation between agents and
objects.
Notation: E(x, y) where x ∈ Agt and y ∈ Dom.
P Ref 2 (Speaker Reference). Speaker reference is a relation between speakers of some language,
terms of that language, and objects.
Notation: R(x, y, z) where x ∈ Spk, y ∈ Trm, and z ∈ Dom.
7See (Frege 1892).
8Black translates «Bedeutung» as «reference» (Frege 1980), whereas Church (1956) translates it as «denotation».
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P Ref 3 (Semantic Reference, Denotation). Semantic reference or denotation is a relation between
terms of some language and objects.
Notation: D(x, y) where x ∈ Trm and y ∈ Dom
Any of these relations might have more argument places in a specific theory of reference, but
what counts here is that they differ in their minimal number of arguments. As an example to
motivate the distinctions, consider a robot manipulating colored blocks and pyramids such as
the SHRDLU system of (Winograd 1972). Suppose that upon the request «Take the red block!»
the system takes a blue block. Suppose further that to the question «Which block did you take?»
it answers «The red block.» Apparently the system makes a linguistic error, but let’s suppose the
error is systematic. Despite this little deficiency the robot has to refer extralinguistically to the
blue block in order to be able to successfully grab the blue block. But unlike the quite successful
real system, the system in the present example is not a competent speaker of the demonstrated
fragment of English, since it speaker-refers to the blue block by using the definite description «the
red block». Still in the given situation the term «the red block» denotes or semantically refers
to the red block, if there is one. Extralinguistic reference could be a useful notion even if the
system would not be able to deal with a fragment of English, for example for describing planned
actions as in moving a robot arm to the blue block and lifting it up. The other two notions need
not coincide, as the example shows, and it will be addressed later whether and in what way they
depend on each other and whether and for which sorts of terms they need to coincide in case of
an ideal competent speaker.
As a terminological choice, (Ref 1)–(Ref 3) ought not be controversial. Some people might
disagree with conflating «denotation» and «semantic reference» as in (Ref 3). The latter term is
for example used by Kripke (1977) in a reply to Donnellan (1966), whereas the former is used
by Mill (1843) and (Russell 1905). There doesn’t seem to be any clear distinction between
«denotation» and «semantic reference» in the literature, and conflating both of them seems to
reflect common usage better than drawing a sharp line between them.9 When extralinguistic ref-
erence, speaker reference, and semantic reference are considered relations, this admits a number
of cases that might not be thought of at first glance. For example, speaker reference and semantic
reference could be partial with respect to singular terms, i.e. not every singular term must be
required to denote an object, and not every speaker must be required to refer to an object when
he uses a singular term. Two singular terms might denote one object, or one singular term might
denote two or more objects, and analogous cases may occur for speaker- and extralinguistic ref-
erence. Purportedly deviant cases are allowed and no special restrictions will be assumed unless
further noted.
1.5.2 Equivocation, Co-Extensionality, and Conflation
The simple terminology introduced so far allows for the following characterizations:
9Cf. Lyons (1977, pp. 174-6). According to Lyons reference is utterance-dependent, whereas Mill’s denotation is not,
but this is, like the above characterizations, just one suggestion among many. Bear in mind that context-dependency is
excluded for the time being. To take it into account, it is only necessary to switch from sentences to utterances, terms
qua type to terms qua token (used for communication), and so on.
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(a)
d1
t
d2
(b)
t1
d
t2
Figure 1.1: (a) Equivocation and (b) Co-Extensionality.
P Ref 4 (Equivocation of a Singular Term). A singular term t is equivocal iff. t denotes more than
one object.
∃x∃y
(
D(t, x) ∧D(t, y) ∧ (x 6= y)
)
The fact that a singular term is equivocal is an equivocation, and a language that admits equiv-
ocations is equivocal or said to contain equivocations. A singular term is n-times equivocal if it
denotes n objects, where n > 1.
P Ref 5 (Equivocation by a Speaker). A speaker a commits an equivocation in using a singular
term t iff. a refers to more than one objects by means of t.
∃x∃y
(
R(a, t, x) ∧R(a, t, y) ∧ (x 6= y)
)
From an ideal language perspective, any equivocation is a fallacy. From an empirical perspec-
tive, singular terms satisfying the above conditions can also be ambiguous, in case of which the
fact that the term denotes more than one objects is taken as a feature rather than a deficiency of
natural language. Many ambiguous expressions in natural languages are homophonic variants
of expressions that from a diachronic perspective have different origins. In the following, either
the attribute equivocal or ambiguous may be used depending on the perspective. The opposite
phenomenon is co-extensionality and, as a fallacy on behalf of the speaker, conflation.
P Ref 6 (Co-Extensionality of Singular Terms). Two or more singular terms t1, . . . , tn are co-
extensional iff. t1, . . . , tn denote the same object.
∀x∀y
(
(D(ti, x) ∧D(tj , y)) ⊃ (x = y)
)
where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n
P Ref 7 (Conflation of Singular Terms). A speaker a is conflating two or more singular terms
t1, . . . , tn iff. a refers to the same object in using t1, . . . , tn and t1, . . . , tn are not co-extensional.
∀x∀y
(
(R(a, ti, x) ∧R(a, tj , y)) ⊃ (x = y)
)
where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n
The attributes co-referential and co-extensional will be considered synonyms as far as singular
terms are concerned. (Ref 1)–(Ref 7) are terminological characterizations and clarifications
rather than definitions. The same holds for the terminological characterizations in the following
sections.
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1.5.3 Singular and Individual Terms, Empty Singular Terms
What are singular terms? Singular terms are sometimes characterized as denoting one object as
opposed to many, and proper names are often mentioned as paradigmatic examples of singular
terms. In formal languages, individual constants traditionally play the same role. However, the
claim that each proper name denotes one and only one object is blatantly wrong if it is taken
literally, since many proper names are equivocal.10 Consider the following example.
(1.6) Peter is hungry.
There are plenty of persons called «Peter» and even a combination of first name, middle
names, and last name like in «Peter Henry Smith» will sometimes not denote exactly one person.
A similar problem arises when a proper name doesn’t denote an object. Quine (1960, §20)
also points out the trivial fact that singular terms cannot be distinguished from general terms
by taking into account their actual referents, since for example a singular term like «Pegasus»
may be empty, whereas a general term like «natural satellite of the earth» may refer to exactly
one object. The source of such problems is that the two parts of a singular term’s number
presupposition, i.e. the uniqueness condition that a proper name denotes at most one object and
the condition that it has to denote at least one object, are prescriptive requirements of a language,
but there is no guarantee that this requirement is actually fulfilled.11 When a speaker in a natural
language uses a proper name, he presupposes that there is a referent of that name and that there
is only one such referent.12 In formal languages, on the contrary, the denotation relation has
to be modeled explicitly, and so the uniqueness condition can easily be required to be satisfied.
On the other hand it is of course possible to construct a formal language in which neither the
uniqueness condition has to be fulfilled nor a singular term has to denote. So a distinction has
to be made between the prescriptive purpose of an expression, the role it is supposed to fulfill,
and the role it actually fulfills. Singular terms can be classified into singular terms that denote
nothing, singular terms that denote one object, and singular terms that denote more than one
object. However, a singular term is a term that is required to only denote one object, whereas
a general term is a term that is required to denote more than one objects. These requirements
are prescriptive in a weak sense of «to require», namely that they can be violated by not fulfilling
them. The following terminology will be used.
P Ref 8 (Empty Singular Term). A singular term t is an empty singular term iff t doesn’t denote
an object.
¬∃xD(t, x)
P Ref 9 (Empty Speaker Reference). A speaker reference of speaker a by means of a singular term
t is empty iff. there is no object that a refers to by means of t.
¬∃xR(a, t, x)
10See for example (Castañeda 1989, pp. 25), (Perry 1997b, pp. 9).
11Using slightly different terminology, this is pointed out by Wessel (1998, pp. 313-6).
12For an actualist there is means that the referent must actually exist, whereas for the possibilist the quantifier is only
a means of counting and objects that don’t actually exist might also be countable. Possibilism is assumed throughout this
work.
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P Ref 10 (Individual Term). A singular term t is an individual term iff t denotes exactly one object.
∃!xD(t, x)
P Ref 11 (Individual Speaker Reference). A speaker a refers individually by means of a singular
term t iff. there’s exactly one object a refers to in using t.
∃!xR(a, t, x)
(Ref 8) reflects common terminology, (Ref 10) is based on the German terminology of Wessel
(1998). (Ref 10) and (Ref 11) represent the analogous cases when speaker reference is con-
cerned.
1.5.4 Generalizations
The notions in the previous sections can be generalized to arbitrary referential expressions. The
idea behind these generalizations is that linguistic rules require referential expressions to fulfill a
numerical requirement, whereas of course the world itself, the current state of affairs determine
whether this requirement is fulfilled or not. The prescriptive requirement is the presupposition
of number, whereas the latter is the actual number of referents. A violation occurs whenever the
presupposition of number doesn’t match the actual number of referents. This violation is a case
of presupposition failure. Likewise, a referential expression is n-referential if its purpose is to refer
to n-individuals, where n is either a natural number or a general condition on natural numbers
like n > 0 or n < 1.13 Thus, singular terms are 1-referential, referential expressions marked by
the dual number are 2-referential, and referential expressions marked by the plural number are
under normal circumstances n > 1-referential.
Now let an expression with a referential quotient n
m
be an expression that has n actual refer-
ents but presupposesm referents. Thus, a 01 expression is an empty singular term, a
1
1 expression
is an individual term, and an n1 expression where n > 1 is an equivocal singular term. One may
then classify various violations of number presuppositions by means of their referential quotient.
P Ref 12 (Referential Saturation and Undersaturation).
An expression with referential quotient q is referentially (a) empty iff q = 0, (b) saturated iff q = 1,
(c) unsaturated iff q < 1, and (d) oversaturated iff q > 1.
Likewise, the semantic reference of an expression can be called empty, saturated, unsaturated,
and oversaturated respectively, and the attribute referentially can be dropped for brevity. Let’s
further say that a speaker refers in an n
m
way by using a referential expression iff the expression
is m-referential, but the speaker refers to n objects in using the expression, and assume formu-
lations for speaker reference that are analogous to the above ones. Based on this terminology,
equivocation, conflation, and co-extensionality can be generalized as follows.
13Regarding natural languages, it is an empirical question whether complex conditions like 1 < n < 4 are needed. It
seems to be a reasonable hypothesis that there are no more conditions than being equal to, greater than, or smaller than
a certain number.
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P Ref 13 (Equivocation).
Referentially oversaturated expressions are equivocal.
P Ref 14 (Speaker Equivocation).
A speaker a commits an equivocation by means of an expression t if he refers by means of t in an n
m
way and n > m.
P Ref 15 (Co-Extensionality).
Two or more expressions t1, . . . , tn are co-extensional iff they denote the same objects.
P Ref 16 (Co-Extensional Use).
A speaker a is using two or more expressions t1, . . . , tn co-extensionally iff a refers to the same
objects in using t1, . . . , tn.
P Ref 17 (Conflation).
A speaker a conflates two or more expressions t1, . . . , tn iff t1, . . . , tn are not co-extensional and a
uses t1, . . . , tn co-extensionally.
These generalizations will hardly be used, because the majority of examples in the following
chapters will only involve the use of singular terms. However, it must be kept in mind that there
are many n > 1-referential expressions to which the above generalizations apply, for example
«we» and «they
−−→
».
Chapter 2
Indirect Reference
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2.1 Chapter Overview
In the last chapter, speaker reference and semantic reference have only been introduced as re-
lations, but these relations have not been specified in detail. This can hardly qualify as a sat-
isfactory account of reference. In this and the following chapters a closer look will be taken at
genuine philosophical theories of reference, where any matters related to context-dependency are
suppressed until chapter 5.
There are two main strands of such theories. According to the indirect reference view refer-
ence must always be mediated by some sort of meaning. This is also sometimes referred to as
the Frege–Russell view on reference, as it goes back to the work of Frege (1892, 1918) and Rus-
sell (1905).1 Russellian descendants of the indirect reference theory are also called description
theories of reference. The opposite view is naturally called direct reference, and the corresponding
theory of reference is commonly called the New Theory of Reference.
In this chapter, indirect reference is addressed. The New Theory of Reference will be outlined
and contrasted with the indirect reference view in the next chapter 3. The exposition of the
main ideas underlying the indirect reference view is somewhat biased. It emphasizes attractive
features of indirect reference, whereas the powerful and well-established attacks on this point of
view by Kripke and his followers are saved for the next chapter. Section 2.2 lays out the origins of
indirect reference, and section 2.3 provides an overview of variants of description theory. Various
motivations for description theory are given in section 2.4, and finally, in section 2.5, it will be
argued for Thesis 2 that speakers aren’t generally required by virtue of linguistic competence to
be able to successfully identify the semantic referent of a singular term.
2.2 Original Proposals: Frege and Russell
According to the indirect reference view, the denotation relation or the relation of speaker ref-
erence always involve some kind of mediation by some kind of meaning. But what kind of
mediation, what kind of meaning, and mediation between what? There are many answers that
could be given to any of those questions, but in the literature some kind of ‘standard views’ on
indirect reference have evolved, based on Frege’s and Russell’s otherwise quite differing views
on natural language. Before we delve into this Frege–Russell view, a word of caution is in place.
The ‘standard views’ on reference commonly attributed to authors like Frege or Russell from a
macroscopic perspective do not always coincide exactly with what the authors have actually sug-
gested when their work is put under the magnifying glass. There’s always a trade-off between
brevity and exegetical correctness. This should be kept in mind, especially since for lack of space
the following expository sections have to remain sketchy; references to more detailed literature
will be given whenever it deems necessary.
The articles in which the basic ideas underlying indirect reference have first been formulated,
i.e. (Frege 1892, 1918) and (Russell 1905), belong to some of the most influential and contro-
versial texts in the philosophy of language. The idea that some or all singular terms in natural
1Cf. (Kripke 1981, pp. 27-29).
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languages have a meaning that determines their semantic referent is simple and straightforward,
but has had tremendous impact on the formation of semantic, epistemological, and even ontolog-
ical theory in analytic philosophy of the 20th century.2 As the following comparison will show,
Frege and Russell held very similar views on the reference of proper names, albeit they differ
with many other respects.
2.2.1 Russell’s Analysis of Proper Names
Russell (1905) proposed a description theory of proper names in reply to Frege (1892) and
Meinong (1971). Russell’s description theory is based on the following claims.
P DTR 1 (Proper Names). There are two sorts of proper names:
1. Logical Proper Names: Logical proper names denote their referents directly.
2. Ordinary Proper Names: Proper names in natural languages usually are hidden, abbreviated
definite descriptions.
It should be noted that Russell doesn’t customarily talk about logical versus ordinary proper
names, since hidden descriptions in his opinion aren’t strictly speaking proper names at all. Leav-
ing this terminological matter aside, the above theses can be found in (Russell 1905, 1971, 1963).
Let us now take a closer look at the second thesis that Lycan (2000) calls the Name Claim.3 Rus-
sell analyzes definite descriptions the following way:
P DTR 2 (Definite Descriptions). A sentence or utterance containing a definite description, i.e. one
of the form «the A is B», is analyzed in three parts:
1. (Non-Emptiness Condition) There exists an x such that A(x), and for this x:
2. (Uniqueness Condition) There is at most one x such that A(x).
3. (Body) It is the case that B(x).
The non-emptiness and the uniqueness condition taken together make the number presuppo-
sition. Formally, Russellian definite descriptions can be introduced in various ways, but as they
are first-order definable it is best to introduce them by abbreviation. The following abbreviation
defines a quantifier that comes quite close to Russell’s original proposal in (Russell 1905).
ιVAR1WFF1WFF2
:= ∃VAR1
(
WFF1 ∧ ∀VAR2(WFF1[VAR1/VAR2]
⊃ VAR1 = VAR2) ∧WFF2
)
for new VAR2
(2.1)
2Cf. (Searle 1958, p. 169).
3See (Lycan 2000, pp. 38–40).
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Natural Language: English Formal Language: FOL
Peter is hungry
analysis
−−−−−→ ιx(Fx)(Gx)
Figure 2.1: Analysis as a translation from natural language to formal language.
Instead of a quantifier, Russell also uses the so-called iota operator that yields the single object
that satisfies a possibly complex property. Since talking of objects is only meaningful when the
terms in question occur in a larger, well-formed formula, the use of a iota quantifier and the use
of a iota operator boil down to the same. However, it is easier to deal with scoping issues if an
abbreviation as a quantifier is used, if no other scoping mechanism like λ-abstraction is available.
Therefore, subsequent examples will be formulated using the quantifier abbreviated by 2.1, here
called iota quantifier. When in the following there will be talk about formal definite descriptions,
this is meant to be apply to iota terms built by a iota operator, but is also meant to apply, in a
derived sense, to the restriction part of iota quantifier expressions, i.e. to formula schemes like
ιxA(x)(. . . ). This is a sloppy way of talking, since a part of an abbreviation is strictly speaking
meaningless, but makes sense, because an expression of the form ιxAB can be read as the x,
that uniquely is A, satisfies B. The attribute «definite» will sometimes be dropped when it is clear
that a definite description and not a bare description without uniqueness condition is meant.
There are three crude arguments against Russell’s description analysis of proper names that
can be rejected in a jiffy. First, as Lycan (2000) points out, Russell’s Name Claim must be consid-
ered separately from his analysis of natural language definite descriptions.4 The role of context is
suppressed in this chapter, but even if definite descriptions are taken as context-dependent, there
are examples of natural language determiner phrases using the definite article that don’t express
a uniqueness condition, such as a generic use of the German determiner «der» in «der Wal ist
ein Säugetier» (The wale is a mammal; ‘wales are mammals’). This doesn’t affect an analysis of
proper names as definite descriptions, since the idea of this analysis is that a definite description
in some formal language is used for encoding the truth-conditional content of a proper name,
and hence the (formal) definite description is chosen to be unique in order for the analysis to be
correct. Related to this a second point needs to be clarified. There’s a dangerous equivocation in
the use of «definite description». On one hand, the phrase can be used for a iota term or—in the
above derived sense—part of a iota quantifier, and on the other hand it is used for certain natural
language expressions, such as English phrases starting with «the». This can lead to the erroneous
and nonsensical view that Russell suggested to replace proper names with natural language def-
inite descriptions, for example to replace English proper names with English phrases of the form
the A. This cannot be adequate from a truth-conditional point of view, since proper names and
definite descriptions fulfill different linguistic roles, for example regarding rigidity (see chapter
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3). Instead, the Name Claim must be understood as an analysis in the sense of a translation of
natural language expressions into expressions of an ideal language, as illustrated in figure 2.1.
Third, it isn’t compelling to claim that description theory is inadequate as an analysis of
proper names, because many proper names are equivocal. A referentially oversaturated proper
name can only be understood fully by eliminating the equivocation. For example, in a situation
in which two people are named «Peter», the truth-conditional content of
(2.2) Peter is hungry.
is definitely not that both of the persons called «Peter» are hungry. The speaker refers to only
one of them when he uses «Peter», and whatever iota expression is used as the formal equivalent
of this proper name must likewise conform with the uniqueness condition in a given context. The
fact that a speaker might be smart enough to temporarily delay the ascription of the property
of being hungry to one object or temporarily ascribe it to more than one object and later, when
the referent has been singled out, adjust his internal presentation of what has been said doesn’t
justify dropping the uniqueness condition from a truth conditional perspective.5
Let us now turn briefly to Russell’s notion of logical proper names, which actually belongs to
chapter 3 and is only mentioned here for the sake of completeness. Russell discusses this view
in (Russell 1963), where he claims that a person sometimes can be in direct acquaintance with
sense data or universals. This special epistemic mode of access can be expressed as a relation of
the person to a so-called Russellian singular proposition. According to (Russell 1963), a singular
proposition is a collection consisting of the object itself, for example a universal or an individual
sense datum, and the property ascribed to this object. Formally, such a proposition is sometimes
written as an ordered pair 〈a, P 〉 containing the object a and the property P , but this notation can
be misleading, since Russell (1963) emphasizes that a person cannot be in direct acquaintance
with a concrete particular, i.e. a concrete spatio-temporally extended object in physicalist space.6
Following Russell in this respect, direct acquaintance therefore can play no role in a theory
about reference of natural language expressions, and proper names in natural languages have
to be analyzed as descriptions.7 Only indexical expressions, egocentric particulars in Russell’s
terminology, can be means of direct speaker reference, and all of these expressions are reducible
to one: this−−→.
8 The suggestion to analyze indexicals as directly referential expressions has been
readopted later by Kaplan (1988, 1989, 1990b) and will laid out in chapter 6. In any case
ordinary proper names according to Russell are definite descriptions in disguise.
4See (Lycan 2000, p. 37-49).
5From a merely cognitive perspective, on the other hand, it might make sense to drop it. Castañeda (1990b) argues
for this view. Cf. section 4.5.6.
6See (Russell 1963, p. 155); (Russell 1971, pp. 198; 200-3). Following Quine (1948), one may say that logic is
ontologically neutral and whatever we quantify over exists in some way. A constant like a can denote a property moment
or sense datum. However, usually more object-like entities are associated with the use of a constant. It is also doubtful
whether logic is indeed ontologically neutral to a sufficient degree. For example, standard, out-of-the-box first order
logic doesn’t provide ways to build particulars out of property moments or other special means that can be necessary to
make alternative ontologies like trope theory, process ontologies, or property theory work.
7As Evans (1982, p. 44) notes, Russell is primarily concerned with thinking and not with the meaning of public
language expressions, but since acquaintance is a very restricted mode of epistemic access in thinking, it can a fortiori
hardly play a role in the analysis of meaning in public language.
8See (Russell 1963, p. 162, N.B. fn.2), (Russell 1966, pp. 107-8).
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2.2.2 Frege on Sense and Reference
Since Frege’s views on proper names is based on his theory of meaning, a brief summary of it is
given in this section. As is well known, Frege proposed a dyadic meaning theory by making a
distinction between Bedeutung and Sinn. Bedeutung is usually translated as reference, referent, or
denotation, and Sinn is often translated with meaning or Fregean sense. These translation prac-
tices are the result of deliberate choices by early adopters of Frege’s work like Russell (1905) and
Church (1956).9 Despite some exegetical concerns, the widely accepted translations of Bedeu-
tung into (both semantic and speaker) referent and of Sinn into Fregean sense or meaning will be
used from now on.10 The Frege to be presented here is so-to-say the folk-Frege, as he has been
perceived by many philosophers of language, whereas more thoroughgoing Frege-interpretations
can for example be found in (Dummett 1981, 1991) and (Baker and Hacker 1984). A few
historical remarks have to be made in this context. Frege revolutionized Aristotelian logic by
introducing quantifiers into his Begriffsschrift (concept writing) and thus can with full right be
regarded as one of the founders of modern logic. Unfortunately, he has never presented a for-
mal system that directly encodes his sense versus reference distinction. Therefore, his views on
sense and reference have to be extracted from his sparse, more general and colloquial writings
that don’t deal directly with the Begriffsschrift and the foundations of mathematics. It is also not
without irony that long after Frege’s death the sense versus reference distinction was revived to
a large extent with the goal of accounting for phenomena that Frege himself considered defi-
ciencies of natural language, whereas the ideal language perspective that Frege advertised and
endorsed during his whole lifetime plays only a marginal role in contemporary philosophy.
There is an equivocation in Frege’s use of Bedeutung that makes it hard to translate. On one
hand, he uses it to refer to the semantic referent itself, i.e. in case of a singular term an object,
allowing for a‘standard’ translation as it has been proposed above. On the other hand, Bedeutung
can also come in two flavors depending on the way it is used: a customary use triggers the gerade
(even) reference and a non-customary use triggers the ungerade (odd) reference.11 In this case,
he uses the notion in a functional way. The even reference of an expression, understood in a
functional way, yields the customary semantic referent, i.e. an object, whereas the odd reference
is a Fregean sense, namely the Fregean sense of the expression when it is used in the customary
way. Some simple graphics should make these distinctions sufficiently clear. Figure 2.2a depicts
a Frege-Triangle that results from the customary use of an expression, whereas in figure 2.2b the
same expression has odd reference.
Frege uses senses in combination with the customary/indirect use and even/odd reference
distinction to explain a variety of special phenomena that are related to the interpretation of nat-
ural language, such as referential opacity in attitude ascriptions,12 informativity and the cognitive
9Russell (1905, p. 483) and Church (1956, p. 4; fn. 7) translate bedeuten as denote, while Black translates it as refer
(Frege 1980).
10A rather dubious point about these translations is that ger. Bedeutung is not all that different from eng. meaning, and
by some general exegetical principle of charity one ought to assume that Frege has chosen the term deliberately and by
intention. Beaney (1997, pp. 36-46) discusses this problem in more detail.
11See (Frege 1994b, p. 43: orig. pag. 28).
12See (Frege 1994b, pp. 51-2: orig. pag. 37-8).
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(a)
sense1
term referent1
(b)
sense2
term referent2=sense1
referent1 (now irrelevant)
Figure 2.2: (a) Customary, direct use versus (b) non-customary, indirect use of an expression
according to Frege.
role of singular terms,13 presuppositions,14 sentence mood,15 or the nature of judgements16. In
the following chapters only referential opacity and informativity/cognitive role of singular terms
will play a role apart truth-conditional content and the following characterization of Frege’s
sense–reference distinction only comprises some of its aspects.
P Fre 1 (Semantic Aspects of Sense and Reference). 1. A sense determines the referent(s) of
the expression of which it is a sense.
2. The senses of subexpressions are combined in a regular way to the senses of the whole expres-
sion in which they occur.17 (Compositionality)
3. A complete sentence customarily refers to a truth-value (true or false).18
4. The sense of a complete sentence is grasped as a thought.
These aspects make Fregean senses meaning-constituting entities for the truth-conditional
content and, indirectly by the notion of grasping thoughts, for the cognitive role of an expression.
A number of restrictions have to hold between expressions, senses, and referents:
13See (Frege 1994b, pp. 40-3: orig. pag. 25-28; 47: orig. pag. 32), (Frege 1986, p. 38-9: orig. pag. 65-6).
14See (Frege 1994b, pp. 47: orig. pag. 32-3; 54-5: orig. pag. 39-41; 59-62: orig. pag. 44-8).
15See (Frege 1994b, p. 53: orig. pag. 38-9).
16See (Frege 1994b, pp. 50: orig. pag. 35-6; 58: orig. pag. 43).
17See e.g. (Frege 1994a); cf. (Dummett 1981, pp. 152-9). It is, however, exegetically doubtful whether Frege ever
endorsed such a principle and which form thereof. Cf. section 4.6.2 of chapter 4.
18See (Frege 1994b, p. 48: orig. pag. 34); cf. (Dummett 1981, pp. 180-6).
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(a) e s a (b)
s1
e a
s2
(c)
s1 a
e
s2 b
(d)
e1 s1
a
e2 s2
(e)
e1
s a
e2
*(f)
a
s
b
Figure 2.3: Some relations between expressions e, Fregean senses s and referents a, b. (*=not
allowed)
P Fre 2 (Sense and Reference). 1. If two expressions don’t have the same referent, they cannot
have the same sense.19
2. Two different senses can have the same referent.20
3. One sense always has the same referent, if there is one.
4. An expression has one or more Fregean senses.21
5. An expression can have a sense but no semantic referent.22
Figure 2.3 depicts some of the combinations that are admitted by these rules and one case (f)
that isn’t admitted. There is no general agreement on all of these restrictions in the literature on
Frege and among Neo-Fregeans. Only principles (Fre 2.1), (Fre 2.2), and (Fre 2.3) are relatively
uncontroversial. The first one is crucial to Frege’s theory. In combination with (Fre 1.3) and
19Cf. (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 290).
20See e.g. (Frege 1994b, p. 41: orig. pag. 26-7), (Frege 1969, pp. 208-12).
21See (Frege 1994b, p. 42: orig. pag. 27).
22See (Frege 1994b, pp. 42: orig. pag. 28; 47: orig. pag. 32-3); cf. (Dummett 1981, pp. 160-71), (Baker and Hacker
1984, p. 290).
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(Fre 1.2), principle (Fre 2.1) ensures that senses indeed represent truth-conditional content;
it is a general version of the MCP that was mentioned in section 1.4.1 of chapter 1. Without
principle (Fre 2.2), a theory with Fregean senses would hardly be more expressive than a theory
without them. If (Fre 2.3) wouldn’t hold, then the Fregean sense of a singular term could itself
be ambiguous, equivocal, or indexical. If so, a Fregean sense wouldn’t solely determine the
semantic referent and therefore couldn’t represent the complete truth-conditional content of the
term.
The remaining principles are more or less controversial. Since Frege considered it a defi-
ciency of natural language that an expression might have more than one sense,23 some formal
reconstructions of Frege’s theory restrict (Fre 2.4) such that each expression must have exactly
one or no more than one Fregean sense.24 (Fre 2.5) is also sometimes rejected in general.25
Frege doesn’t have much to say about the case when an expression has no Fregean sense at all.
Perhaps, as an imperfection of natural language, completely meaningless expressions might oc-
cur, but they can hardly play a role in a meaning theory.26 Finally it must be noted that (Fre 1.1)
has also been challenged. As Evans (1982, 1990) emphasizes, Frege considered a sense as the
epistemic way in which the referent of a singular term is being given to a speaker.27 If this is the
only way in which Fregean senses ought to be viewed, as Evans urges, then it is strictly speaking
false to claim that they determine the referent. Evans adopts Frege’s ideal language perspective,
but not the passages in which Frege talks about imperfections of natural language, and so his
rejection of (Fre 2.5) and (Fre 1.1) leads to an ideal-language centered interpretation—Evans
doesn’t really deny this.28 His interpretation may be called Evans–Frege in order to set it apart
from a more liberal interpretation that allows for (Fre 2.5) and (Fre 1.1).
2.2.3 Frege on Proper Names
First of all, something like logical proper names doesn’t exist in Frege’s theory. According to
Frege, any kind of reference is mediated by a Fregean sense, i.e. by meaning in the present
terminology. Apart from this difference, Frege and Russell have quite similar positions regarding
proper names. This can be seen in a famous footnote in which Frege writes:
“Bei einem Eigennamen wie ‘Aristoteles’ können freilich die Meinungen über den
Sinn auseinandergehen. Man könnte z.B. als solchen annehmen: der Schüler Platos
and Lehrer Alexanders des Großen. Wer dies tut, wird mit dem Satze ‘Aristoteles war
23See (Frege 1994b, p. 42 fn.2).
24See e.g. (Church 1956, p. 7-8). Frege himself doesn’t seem to allow (Fre 2.4) just before the footnote (Frege 1994b,
p. 42: orig. pag. 27), but discusses cases when speakers grasp different senses of the same proper name in (Frege 1986,
pp. 38-9: orig. pag. 65-6). Notice that a theory, according to which each expression has exactly one Fregean sense isn’t
more expressive than a quotational analysis that discards Fregean senses all together.
25See (Church 1956, p. 7), and especially (Evans 1982, p. 22-33) and (Evans 1990).
26There is an obvious problem of accounting for the cognitive significance of purportedly meaningless expressions like
Meinong’s round square when at the meantime both sorts of content in a DAT are to be explained and described by the
same meaning-constituting entity. This problem shall not be pursued further.
27See (Evans 1982, ch.1).
28See (Evans 1982, p. 14; 17).
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aus Stagira gebürtig’ einen anderen Sinn verbinden als einer, der als Sinn dieses Na-
mens annähme: der aus Stagira gebürtige Lehrer Alexanders des Großen. Solange nur
die Bedeutung diesselbe bleibt, lassen sich diese Schwankungen des Sinnes ertragen,
wiewohl auch sie in dem Lehrgebäude einer beweisenden Wissenschaft zu vermeiden
sind und in einer vollkommenen Sprache nicht vorkommen dürfen.” (Frege 1994b,
p. 42; fn. 2 orig. pag. 28)29
So the meaning of a proper name can be given by a definite description that has the same
Fregean sense. Furthermore, two speakers might associate different Fregean senses with the
same proper name, which is an imperfection of language. As long as these Fregean senses de-
termine the same referent, they represent the same truth-conditional content. A similar example
can be found at the end of the Gustav Lauben passage in (Frege 1986, p. 39; orig. pag. 65-
6). However, in this passage Frege also points out that if two speakers associate with the same
proper name two different Fregean senses that determine the same referent, then they don’t
speak the same language, as long as they don’t know that these different senses determine the
same referent. In an ideal language the users of a proper name would always associate one and
the same sense with a given proper name.
2.2.4 A Brief Comparison of Russell and Frege
The differences between Russell’s and Frege’s views on proper names are small.30 Russell al-
lows singular propositions as meaning-constituting entities with which a person can be in direct
epistemic connection via acquaintance, whereas Frege considers this form of direct reference im-
possible. As he points out in a letter to Russell, an object like the Mont Blanc “[. . . ] cannot itself
be a component part of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4,000 metres high.” (Frege
and Russell 1988, p. 56)31 Frege’s ontology of senses is strictly homogeneous, as in his opinion
all senses belong to an ontic realm of their own, whereas Russell’s ontology is heterogeneous in
the sense that he allows collections containing entities of such a different sort as properties and
objects.32 Russell’s reply to Frege is thus: “We do not assert the thought, for this is a private
psychological matter: we assert the object of the thought, and this is, to my mind, a certain
complex (an objective proposition, one might say) in which Mont Blanc is itself a component
part.” (Russell 1988, p. 57)33 Russell (1905) seems to commit some use–mention errors and
the relevant passages are hard to understand, but his critique on Fregean senses seems to boil
29“In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ opinions as to the sense may differ. It might, for instance,
be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach
another sense to the sentence ‘Aristotle was born in Stagira’ than will a man who takes as the sense of the name: the
teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of
sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought
not to occur in a perfect language.” (Frege 1980, p. 58; fn.)
30See also (Kaplan 1975) for a formal comparison of Church’s Frege reconstruction with Russell’s views.
31Cf. Frege’s letter to Philip Jourdain (1914) cited by Evans (1982, pp. 14-5).
32See also (Frege 1986, pp. 40-3: orig. pag. 66-9); cf. (Dummett 1981, pp. 91-3).
33In this reply, Russell doesn’t seem to be aware that thoughts in Frege’s terminology are already objective entities.
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Figure 2.4: Using an expression to explain meaning itself (a), versus using an expression to
explain what an expression means (b). A line indicates the connection of an expression with its
Fregean sense, whereas an arrow a← b indicates that b is an explication of a.
down to the following.34 Fregean senses cannot be characterized in a satisfying way, since any
explication of a Fregean sense can only be provided by using expressions, which in turn have a
sense that has to be explained, and so on. Figure 2.4 illustrates the resulting problem.
If meanings are entities of their own, i.e. Fregean senses, then they have to be explicated and
described by natural language expressions as anything else is explained. So in an explication
like (a) in the figure, the higher-order sense s2 would have to determine the lower-order sense
s1, but then s2 is left unexplicated and cannot match the meaning of the explanandum s1. An
infinite regress is the result: An explication of a sense presumes a higher-order sense, which in
turn would have to be explicated using an expression with a sense of even higher-order, and
so on. This leaves Fregean senses inexplicable. The correct way to provide the meaning of an
expression is to provide paraphrases in the way it is depicted as case (b) in the figure. If so,
Fregean senses become mere stipulations, because they cannot be explicated directly. Although
it doesn’t necessarily affect the feasibility of modern, formal reformulations of Frege’s theory, this
circle argument is a serious objection that must be taken for granted. Various authors agree that
Frege indeed has to assume an infinite hierarchy of senses.35 As a general circularity objection
this critique is weak in light of the fact that, no matter which model of explication (a) or (b) is
assumed, it is a basic hermeneutic principle that an exhaustive explication of what an expression
means can never be given by paraphrase. It is fair to assume that Russell has been aware of
this problem and his critique in (Russell 1905) isn’t intended to be a variant of a fundamental
hermeneutic circle argument; he rather points out that any actual explanation of meaning is
given by expressions, and thus meanings seem to be redundant if they are thought of as entities
on their own that belong to a “third realm” (Frege). For Russell, providing or explicating the
34See Linsky (1967, p. 7-8) and (Linsky 1983, pp. 69-70) for more on use–mention errors. The following argument is
based on (Russell 1905, pp. 485-7). It is admittedly hard to retrieve it literally from what Russell writes in this passage,
but hopefully comes close to what he had in mind.
35See Carnap (1970), (Linsky 1967, pp. 44-6).
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meaning of an expression is done by demonstration or by providing other expressions, and in
case of doing logical analysis this is done by providing expressions of a formal language.
Apart from this controversy, which is ultimately about the ontological nature of meaning-
constituting entities, Frege and Russell vastly agree on the meaning of singular terms such as
proper names, except that Russell also adheres to a limited version of direct reference. Frege
explicates the Fregean sense of a proper name by providing definite descriptions with the same
sense.36 Russell explicates the meaning of an ordinary proper name by translating it into a
quantified expression of a formal language, whose restriction is interpreted as a complex pred-
icate that the semantic referent has to satisfy uniquely. According to both views, proper names
have an objective meaning, be it called a unary property or a Fregean sense, and this meaning
determines the semantic referent. In both theories, different speakers may associate different
meanings with one and the same proper name, and different meanings may determine one and
the same semantic referent. Likewise, differences in the cognitive significance of proper names
may be explained by differences in meaning, insofar as it is grasped, for example, when it is said
that two speakers don’t fully understand each other, because they don’t realize that the meanings
associated with a proper name determine one and the same semantic referent.
The fact that Frege and Russell basically share the same views on proper names doesn’t mean
that a choice between their approaches is arbitrary. According to Frege, Fregean senses neither
belong to actuality, i.e. the ‘outside world’ or the totality of what can be Given to someone, nor
belong to internal, episodal thinking as a matter of empirical psychology. They belong to a third
ontic realm. This is probably the part of Frege’s theory that other philosophers have found the
least appealing. Furthermore, Frege never presented a formal account of his sense–reference
distinction, and it is far from clear in what sense modern reconstructions of Frege’s theory in
intensional logics really reflect his ideas. In contrast to this, formal definite descriptions (iota
expressions) are first-order definable and don’t presume any special ontology. Therefore, Russel-
lian descriptions will from now on be preferred as a realization of the indirect reference view.
Formal definite descriptions (iota expressions), as they will be used in the following chapters, are
only a vehicle to express the indirect reference view, though. What counts is the underlying idea
that speaker reference involves a speaker’s attempt to identify the referent of a singular term by
means of some of its properties.
2.3 Other Variants of Indirect Reference and Discussion
A vast number of positions can be subsumed under the label indirect reference or Frege–Russell
view. One influential variant, Searle’s cluster view in (Searle 1958), will be sketched in the next
section. Other possible variants of description theory will merely be listed to get some working
taxonomy and in order to make it clear that there is no such thing as the theory of indirect refer-
ence or the description theory. Some variants aren’t very useful, and it would be futile to take a
36As Dummett (1981, pp. 97-8; 110-1) notes, Frege is forced to talk this way, but there is no reason to assume that
he held the view that any proper name has the same sense as some corresponding complex description. See also (Burge
2005, p. 224). This point can be conceded, but this makes the senses of names without corresponding description only
more mysterious than those of names that can be explicated.
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close look at all of them. What will turn out to be crucial is the role of identifying reference, which
in the current terminology means that a speaker successfully identifies the semantic reference of
a term or is at least able to do so in a given situation. This will be addressed in more detail in
section 2.5.
2.3.1 Searle’s Cluster Theory
After motivating the indirect reference view, Searle (1958) observes that it has some puzzling
features. First, if the meaning of a proper name can be given by a description that determines
its semantic referent, then certain statements about the semantic referent would be analytic.
In the implausible case that the description was complete, this would even have the effect that
certain false statements about the semantic referent would be contradictory.37 Second, a proper
name doesn’t seem to have the linguistic function of specifying certain characteristics of an object
like definite descriptions do. It is not the purpose of proper names to assert that the referent has
certain properties.38 Searle continues in pointing out that the necessary and sufficient conditions
for applying a proper name don’t involve providing identity criteria for the semantic referent of
the proper name. Conversely, “[. . . ] the looseness of the criteria for proper names is a necessary
condition for isolating the referring function from the describing function of language.” (Searle
1958, p. 172)
The variant of indirect reference that results from this view has been called the cluster theory
of proper names.39 According to it, the definite description representing the meaning of a proper
name is a large disjunction of properties that are commonly attributed to the semantic referent of
the name, and a speaker that refers to an object by means of the name will only loosely associate
some of the disjuncts with the name.40 In this view, speaker reference is given a clear priority
over semantic reference. The meaning of a proper name is a loose cluster of properties, but if
it makes sense at all to say that this cluster determines the semantic referent, then it can do so
only in a likewise vague way. Aristotle is the person that satisfies some properties in the cluster,
perhaps the majority of them, but the uses of «Aristotle» by various speakers don’t specify exactly
which of those properties would determine Aristotle. In fact, there might not be any properties
in the cluster that determine an object uniquely. Searle (1958) leaves it open how to implement
cluster theory formally. His point of view has many similarities with prototype theory which
has been used in cognitive linguistics to account for various ‘fuzzy’ phenomena of language like
the lexical categorization of color predicates.41 In the context of truth-conditional semantics,
such approaches are problematic. Either the cluster uniquely identifies the semantic referent of
a name, which turns the account into the original Frege–Russell analysis, or it cannot serve as a
complete specification of the truth-conditional content of that name.
37See (Searle 1958, pp. 168-70).
38See (Searle 1958, p. 170-1).
39See e.g. (Devitt and Sterelny 1999, p. 50), (Lycan 2000, p. 42-3). It is also sometimes called bundle theory.
40See (Searle 1958, p. 172-3).
41See (Taylor 1989) for an overview.
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2.3.2 Other Non-Modal Variants of Description Theory
There are various ways to interpret or deliberately modify description theory without switching
to a cluster theory. Alternative interpretations of Frege are possible because he regards certain
cases like empty proper names as deficiencies of language. Depending on the weighting of the
ideal language versus the empirical perspective, in the broadest sense Fregean accountsmay differ
from each other considerably. The same holds for in the broadest sense Russellian accounts, i.e.
variants of the description theory.42 Description theories can differ in a number of respects,
and the following list summarizes some of them. The language that is being analyzed, which is
usually a natural language like English, Tagalog, or Warlpiri, is called source language and the
formal language used for the analysis is called target language.
1. Expression–Meaning Axis
(a) Trivial Description Theory
A proper name of the source language is analyzed as one definite description of the
target language.
(b) Varying Description Theory
A proper name of the source language is analyzed as one out of several alternative
definite descriptions of the target language. The alternative definite descriptions are
co-extensional with each other.
2. Particular–General Axis (Context Dimension)
(a) Context-Dependent Description Theory
Definite descriptions of the target language may denote different objects depending
on the conversational context.
(b) Context-Independent Description Theory
Definite descriptions of the target language always denote the same object indepen-
dently of a conversational context, or the target language doesn’t encode conversa-
tional contexts at all.
3. Individual–Public Axis
(a) Matching Description Theory
In order to understand a proper name of the source language, a speaker must have
implicit knowledge of the meaning of the definite description that determines the
semantic referent of the proper name.
(b) Non-Matching Description Theory
In order to understand a proper name of the source language, a speaker must have
implicit knowledge of the meaning of some definite description of the target language,
42This is not to be confused with the use of Russellian in the attribute Neo-Russellian, which is unfortunately sometimes
used for the so-calledMillian view that will be discussed in the next chapter. This use of Russellian goes back to Russellian
propositions and direct acquaintance, not the Name Claim.
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but this expression doesn’t need to be one that determines the semantic referent of
the proper name.
4. Objective–Subjective Axis
(a) Identifying Description Theory
In order to understand a proper name of the source language, a speaker must be
able to successfully identify the semantic referent that is determined by the definite
description of the target language corresponding to the proper name, by virtue of
implicitly knowing the meaning of an appropriate definite description of the target
language.
(b) Non-Identifying Description Theory
In order to understand a proper name of the source language, a speaker must implic-
itly know the meaning of an appropriate definite description, but doesn’t need to be
able to determine the semantic referent of the proper name.
5. Content–Form Axis
(a) Restricted Description Theory
Only a certain sort of descriptively adequate definite descriptions of the target lan-
guage are suitable candidates for an analysis of some proper name of the source lan-
guage.
(b) Unrestricted Description Theory
In principle, any sort of descriptively adequate definite description of the target lan-
guage can be a candidate for the analysis of some proper name.
The individual–public and objective–subjective axes only concern speaker reference, and not
all axes permit the same number of variants. Some combinations aren’t very interesting. For
example, a trivial, matching, context-independent description theory just says that every speaker
must associate the same meaning with a proper name in any context. The approaches that will
be defended in chapter 4 and later are varying,43 non-matching, non-identifying, restricted and,
starting from chapter 5, context-dependent.
2.4 Motivations for Indirect Reference
So far, not much has been said about the motivation for indirect reference theory. Frege’s and
Russell’s main reasons for adopting indirect reference were epistemic. When direct acquaintance
plays no role or is rejected, a speaker has to find out whether the referent of a proper name,
or any other referential expression whatsoever, exists and which object given in experience is
that referent. This principally requires the speaker to identify the referent by means of certain
properties it is supposed to have. But there is also less foundational reasons more closely tied
43Regarding speaker reference. Concerning semantic reference, what will be called nominal description theory is
trivial, while what will be called external description theory may vary depending on the nature of linguistic labor division.
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to the meaning of natural language expressions. Indirect reference serves in explaining various
features of reference that might seem puzzling at first glance, especially if a clear distinction
between speaker reference and semantic reference isn’t made. Some of them are quickly sum-
marized in the following paragraphs. First, an example is given, then the corresponding problem
is formulated, and finally the answer suggested by the indirect reference position is outlined.
2.4.1 Cognitive Significance of Co-Extensional Proper Names
(2.3) a. Hesperus = Phosphorus
b. The Morning Star is equal to the Evening Star.
(2.4) Hesperus = Hesperus
This is the canonical example based on (Frege 1994b) that can be found nearly everywhere.44
The corresponding problem called Frege’s Puzzle is: How can two co-extensional proper names
have different cognitive significance to one and the same (or different) speakers at the same oc-
casion of their use? Since the semantic referent of «Hesperus» and «Phosphorus» is one and the
same object, it cannot serve in explaining why a speaker might find 2.3 informative, while a sen-
tence like 2.4 may be considered uninformative. One obvious answer is given by the quotational
analysis. In this view 2.3 are interpreted as asserting that «Hesperus» and «Phosphorus» have
the same semantic referent, whereas 2.4 is interpreted as asserting the more obvious fact that
the two occurrences (tokens) of «Hesperus» have the same referent. Frege endorses this analysis
in his early work on the Begriffsschrift, but later rejects it because the connection between sign
and semantic referent is arbitrary.45 In contrast to this, the indirect reference view explains the
difference in cognitive significance between 2.3 and 2.4 by pointing out that (a) «Hesperus» and
«Phosphorus» have different meaning, which a speaker has to grasp in order to understand any
of the names, or that (b) a competent speaker may associate different meanings with «Hesperus»
and «Phosphorus» respectively in his episodal thinking.
At this place it must be mentioned that cognitive significance and informativity of an utter-
ance are not the same. Utterances can be informative to someone in a number of ways that are
in no direct connection to their literal meaning. Think for example of so-called traffic analysis
as a way of attacking cryptographic systems. An utterance can always be informative in a way
that cannot be conveyed by what it literally means, because a recipient might at any time take
any features of the utterance situation into account. Informativity is a rather broad, pragmatic
term, that can for example be made precise on grounds of information theory, but it will not be
used further here. In contrast to this, the cognitive significance of an expression is an aspect of
its meaning.
2.4.2 Referential Opacity of Proper Names in Attitude Ascriptions
(2.5) Peter believes that Hesperus appears in the evening.
44See (Frege 1994b, pp. 40-2; orig. pag. 25-8).
45See (Frege 1994b, p. 40-1: orig. pag. 26); cf. (Dummett 1981, p. 544), (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 220; 280-1).
This only holds for discursive and non-natural signs; see section 8.4.3.
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(2.6) Peter believes that Phosphorus appears in the evening.
The problem with such examples is that, if «Hesperus» and «Phosphorus» are co-extensional,
then they have to be substitutable salva veritate. However, it has been asserted on numerous
occasions that an utterance like 2.5 might be true, whereas in the same conversational context
an utterance like 2.6 would be false, or vice versa. Variants and refinements of this problem
are known under various labels like double vision problems, the problem intensional contexts, the
problem of propositional attitudes, the problem of propositional content, the problem of blocked
substitutability of co-referential expressions, just to mention a few. Following Quine (1956), from
now on the term referential opacity will be used. There are two basic positions regarding refer-
ential opacity. According to the first position, both 2.5 and 2.6 must have the same truth-value,
and two co-extensional proper names are intersubstitutable salva veritate. Still, in a given con-
versational context and relative to the belief states of the discourse participants, the uses of
some co-extensional substitute name might be pragmatically inappropriate. This is the prag-
matic view on referential opacity.46 A more common position is to acknowledge that 2.5 and
2.6 have a reading under which they can differ in truth-value. This is the semantic view on ref-
erential opacity. Given this position, compositionality requires «Hesperus» and «Phosphorus» to
differ in truth-conditional content in such a reading, and thus the semantic referent cannot in
general represent the truth-conditional content of a singular term. Such readings, according to
which terms are referentially opaque, will generally be called de dicto readings, as opposed to de
re readings of attitude ascriptions in which terms work the same way as outside of an attitude
ascription. Yet another referentially opaque interpretation of terms in attitude ascriptions, de se
readings, will be addressed in chapter 8.
Frege’s approach to attitude verbs is one way to solve this problem. Outside the scope of an
attitude verb a sentence denotes a truth-value, whereas within the scope of certain attitude verbs
like «to believe», a sentence denotes its meaning, i.e. its ordinary Fregean sense, which by the
compositionality principle consists of the meanings (Fregean senses) of its parts.47 Description
theory provides basically the same explanation, as far as singular terms like proper names are
concerned. According to description theory, a proper name may have a referentially opaque
reading within the scope of an attitude verb, because the attitude holder doesn’t need to associate
the same meaning, which is in this case represented as a definite description in a formal language
of analysis, with two co-extensional proper names. Recall that even in a fixed description theory,
two co-extensional proper names may be analyzed by two different descriptions. Another, more
common way to solve the problem of referential opacity using description theory is as follows.
Utterances like 2.5 are regarded as being semantically ambiguous between a wide scope de re
reading and a narrow scope de dicto reading. In the wide scope reading, the proper name is
evaluated without being affected by the meaning of to believe, thus can be said to lie outside
the priority scope of the attitude verb, whereas in the narrow scope reading the proper name is
semantically dependent on the meaning of the attitude verb. How this can be done formally will
be shown in chapter 4.
46It has for example been defended by Salmon (1986, 1989).
47See (Frege 1994b, p. 51-2); cf. (Dummett 1981, pp. 186-92).
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2.4.3 Synthetic Identity Statements Involving Co-Extensional Proper Names
(2.3) a. Hesperus = Phosphorus
b. The Morning Star is equal to the Evening Star.
(2.4) Hesperus = Hesperus
Related to the previous points is the epistemic issue of synthetic versus analytic statements
involving co-extensional proper names. Frege (1994b) starts by claiming that an identity state-
ment like 2.3 is synthetic in the Kantian sense, because it may expand our knowledge of the
world, whereas a statement like 2.4 is analytic, in the sense that the truth of the identity state-
ment would follow from the linguistic rules that govern the use of «Hesperus» and «=».48 Since
Quine (1964) has challenged this Neo-Kantian analytic–synthetic distinction, its popularity has
declined. Nevertheless, given that literal meaning is an idealization, the distinction can be main-
tained, and if this is done, then indirect reference can be used to explain an epistemic difference
between 2.3 and 2.4. A description theory can be used to explain the analytic–synthetic differ-
ence in the same manner as it is used to explain differences in cognitive significance simpliciter.
This can for example be done by stipulating that in the same conversational context a speaker
must associate the same meaning with the same proper name, but may associate different mean-
ings with different proper names. Since in the Frege–Russell view the meaning determines the
semantic referent, it seems plausible to assume that in the first case the speaker implicitly knows
that the one meaning of the two occurrences of the same proper name in 2.4 determines one
and the same semantic referent, if there is one at all, no matter whether the speaker is able to
identify this referent or not. Conversely, it would require successful identification of the seman-
tic referent by means of the meanings of «Hesperus» and «Phosphorus», in order to confirm the
identity expressed by 2.3.
2.4.4 Cognitive and Truth-Conditional Content of Proper Names for Non-
Existent Entities
(2.7) Odysseus is an ancient Greek hero.
(2.8) Superman is an ancient Greek hero.
(2.9) Superman can fly.
(2.10) Odysseus can fly.
If proper names had no independent meaning apart from their denotation, as a crude direct
reference theory would presume, then one would expect proper names for non-existent entities
to be substitutable for each other at least in any context that is not referentially opaque. But
even in non-embedded, assertive utterances, it sometimes seems rather odd to substitute one
48See (Frege 1994b, p. 40; orig. pag. 25-6); cf. on Frege (Searle 1958, p. 166-7), on Russell (Linsky 1967, p. 65-6).
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such name for another. For example, even if it is assumed that neither Odysseus nor Superman
actually exist, it seems to be clear that 2.7 means something different than 2.8 and 2.9 something
different than 2.10.
If a sort of representational meaning is considered, as it may be encoded by cognitive content
in a DAT, this judgment is independent from the debate about possibilism and actualism. Even an
actualist that considers all of the utterance false, because neither Superman nor Odysseus exist,
would have to concede that 2.7 means something different from 2.8. Even though an actualist
has the option of claiming that the truth-conditional content of «Odysseus» and «Superman»
must be the same—an entity that must guarantee the contribution of falsity to the main clause
no matter how it is formally represented—, that in this sense they say the same, he must concede
that their cognitive content in a DAT differs.49 A possibilist, on the other hand, will, presuming
that the common views about Odysseus and Superman are veridical, consider 2.7 and 2.9 true
and consider 2.8 and 2.10 false, although neither Odysseus nor Superman exists. If this is indeed
the case, then the two proper names must differ in truth-conditional content as well. Arguably,
the problem is more pressing for the actualist, since the possibilist can resort to the view that
the different proper names refer to different possibilia. But modest possibilists, as opposed to
full-flavored Meinongians, will still have to concede that some proper names might be empty. For
example, if a mathematician uses the name «Fluffy» for the round square he has been dreaming
of last night, then the proper name «Fluffy» will be empty for the modest possibilist and the
actualist alike, but it still seems to have a different meaning than a proper name «Tuffy» invented
by a physicist as a name for the electron with integer spin that he was thinking about yesterday
after he had consumed a bottle of wine.
In a description theory of reference, different descriptions associated with different proper
names account for their difference in meaning, be that meaning truth-conditionally relevant,
cognitively relevant, or both.
2.4.5 Psychological and Epistemological Aspects of Speaker Reference
Indirect reference supports to some extent psycholinguistic hypotheses about the way speaker
reference is realized in episodal thinking. Consider for example 2.11.
(2.11) Alice: Who is John Smith?
Bob: That’s the guy with a beard wearing that purple t-shirt.
When someone asks, who the bearer of some proper name is, he will expect to be given a
description of that person in reply. Likewise, we often use a proper name competently without
having ever made acquaintance with its bearer. These facts provide some good evidence that
proper names in thinking act as some kind of placeholders that are connected to a mental rep-
resentation of a description of the bearer of the proper name. In a concrete situation, a speaker
49What is said can also be called propositional content, but here talk about propositions is generally avoided and instead
formal expressions of the target language, i.e. the formal language of analysis, are themselves regarded as meaning-
constituting entities, as long as they are taken as expressions that can be evaluated in the target language relative to an
intended model of the target language that is built in conformance with the interpretation of the corresponding source
language expression.
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may try to identify the bearer of the name by means of (the mental representation of) the de-
scription that is associated with a proper name, and if this identification is successful, it has to be
unique relative to what the speaker believes to be the case in the given situation. Suppose that Alice
believes John Smith to be a 40-year old computer scientist wearing glasses. If one and only one
person in the given situation appears to Alice like being a 40-year old computer scientist wearing
glasses, for example because there is only one person wearing glasses, then she will not ask a
question like in 2.11. If on the other hand she believes this information to be incomplete, then
she may ask a question like in 2.11. If she accepts and trusts the answer, she may add the de-
scription to her internal ‘database’ and use the additional information to purportedly identify the
bearer of the name. Of course, in many other cases Alice might not be interested in identifying
the bearer of the proper name.
This view on the (armchair) psychology of speaker reference is rather compelling, because it
fits quite well with our everyday understanding of proper names prior to any theorizing about
them.50
2.5 On Identifying Reference
It will now be argued in favor of Thesis 2 that successful identification of the semantic referent
of a proper name is not generally a requirement by virtue of linguistic competence. This thesis is
related to some traditional ‘big’ philosophical questions: Is it feasible to have an ideal language
in which all reference is indirect, i.e. in which there are no singular terms? As Quine (1950)
shows, it is technically possible to have a logic without singular terms, i.e. in this case without
individual constants,51 but this technical answer isn’t satisfying, especially since Quine (1960)
also shows, vice versa, how to explain variables away. A more satisfying answer would require
investigating the transcendental conditions of epistemic access to particulars. Is it possible to
be in infallible, direct acquaintance with particulars, as for example sense-data reductionists
claim? These questions will not be dwelled upon further, because our current interest is in the
connection of identifying reference with the use of linguistic expressions and not in foundational
issues. Examples will show that identifying reference sometimes is required on behalf of the
speaker, but that it is not required by virtue of semantic competence (Thesis 2). While certain
epistemic situations are such that the ability to identify the referent of a proper name can be
expected by other discourse participants, this ability is not required at all in other situations, and
may sometimes be required or not required by virtue of mainly non-linguistic conventions. The
term identifying reference is here sometimes used in a bit sloppy way. In the first place the notion
says that a speaker has to be able to successfully identify the semantic referent of a proper name
on the basis of his implicit knowledge of the descriptive meaning of that name. But sometimes
it will also just be used to express the fact that a speaker has successfully identified the semantic
referent by means of certain criteria. What is meant should be clear from the context. What is
never meant by identifying reference is the mere attempt of a speaker to identify the semantic
referent, i.e. the act of identifying it. This will always be called an attempt to identify the
50See (Searle 1958, p. 168).
51See (Quine 1972, p. 230-4).
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referent. The term identifying reference is also used by Strawson (1964), but in a very different
sense than the one assumed here. Strawson writes:
“I have explained identifying reference – or the central case of identifying refer-
ence – as essentially involving a presumption, on the speaker’s part, of the possession
by the audience of identifying knowledge of a particular item. Identifying knowl-
edge is knowledge of a particular item distinguished, in one or another sense, by the
audience from any other.” (Strawson 1964, p. 79)
Although related with the present use through Strawson’s notion of identifying knowledge,
this terminology is much more pragmatic in nature and not used here. In order to get a better
grasp of the role of identifying reference, as it is understood here, it is helpful to first take a
look at Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions
in (Donnellan 1966) and then transfer this to the description analysis of proper names.
2.5.1 Donnellan on Definite Descriptions
Among others, Donnellan (1966) discusses the following example.
(2.12) Who is the man drinking martini? (Donnellan 1966, p. 287)
Used referentially, as Donnellan calls it, one may get the desired answer even if there is
only water in the glass of the person the question is about. On the other hand, Donnellan
argues, definite descriptions can also be used attributively. If the description in 2.12 is used
attributively, the speaker wants to find the one man that is drinking martini, whoever that is.
Conversely, the speaker has a specific person in mind if he uses the description referentially.
According to Donnellan, the referential use of a definite description doesn’t require it to be
referentially saturated. As Kripke (1977) points out, this can be granted but doesn’t count as
a good argument against semantic reference. Taken literally, an assertive sentence containing a
definite description that doesn’t denote in the given situation must be false or, following Strawson
(1950, 1964), without truth-value. Only because the sender and the recipient make the same
mistake can communication be successful, and in such a case a question like 2.12 can have the
effect of getting the desired answer.52 But such cases are clearly accidental, and Kripke (1977)
argues convincingly that successful communication on the basis of mistaken speaker references
can hardly serve as the basis of a semantic distinction.53 Donnellan’s examples in (Donnellan
1966) can, however, be taken to support Thesis 2. They indicate that it is not a matter of
linguistic competence whether the object that a speaker believes to be the referent of some
definite description turns out to be the actual semantic referent or not. The speaker who utters
2.12 in the described situation may perhaps be criticized for lack of competence about drinks,
but not for lack of competence of the English language.
52The term «speaker» is here mostly used in the sense of speaker-hearer. The speaker in the narrow sense is the sender,
and the recipient is any kind of speaker who interprets an utterance; this doesn’t have to be the addressee.
53Cf. (Kripke 1981, p. 25, fn. 3).
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2.5.2 Transfer to Proper Names
If description theory is the right approach, then one would expect the above point also to hold for
speaker reference by means of proper names. However, there are scenarios that seem to speak
clearly in favor of identifying reference.54 Consider for example the following dialog.
(2.13) Situation: Alice and Bob both believe that Debora is called «Carol».
Alice: Carol is drunk.
Bob: Yes, but you can only recognize it from what she says.
In this particular conversational context the communication between Alice and Bob is suc-
cessful. But given the fact that Debora is actually called «Debora» and not «Carol», claiming that
successful identification of the referent is not required in this case would be odd. Conversely,
it seems that Alice in the above conversational situation is not a fully competent speaker, if for
example she points at Debora when she’s being asked who is called «Carol». So it seems that
identifying reference in this case is required on behalf of the sender, though perhaps not on
behalf of the recipient.
Yet other cases speak against this view. Consider for example the following question.
(2.14) Alice: Who is Carol?
Bob: The girl wearing a blue dress and having a slurred speech.
A speaker asking a who-question might only associate a rather minimal description with
«Carol». For example, Alice’s question in 2.14 can be paraphrased as 2.15.
(2.15) Alice: Who is the person called «Carol»?
In this case, Alice only associates a property such as being called «Carol» with the proper
name «Carol» that has no value for identifying reference under normal circumstances, unless the
people are wearing name tags. Donnellan (1970) gives a similar, even stronger example:
“Suppose a child is gotten up from sleep at a party and introduced to someone
as ‘Tom’, who then says a few words to the child. Later the child says to his parents,
‘Tom is a nice man’.” (Donnellan 1970, p. 434)
The child doesn’t need to be able to successfully identify Tom by virtue of using «Tom» com-
petently. Suppose, on the other hand, the dialog in example 2.14 continues and Bob associates
with «Carol» a complex property like being a drunk girl wearing a blue dress, but in fact there are
two girls that wear a blue dress and appear to be drunk in the given situation. In this case, other
discourse participants will feel entitled to require Bob to be able to give justice to his answer
by pointing out, either verbally or non-verbally, which of the two women he has meant. In al-
most all imaginable epistemic situations in which the epistemic agent is perceiving the objects in
54Note that it would be plain wrong to claim that linguistic competence is generally not a matter of a person’s epistemic
connection to the ‘outside’ world, since for example implicit knowledge of the truth-conditional content of «green»
requires a speaker to have the ability to decide green objects from red ones under normal circumstances.
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question, identification ought to be feasible, simply because under normal circumstances people
are quite capable of discriminating macroscopic objects from each other when they experience
them through their senses. However, in other situations, for example when it is not possible to
identify the semantic referents of a proper name or an individual speaker is not capable of doing
so, actual successful identification cannot be expected and the ability to successfully identify the
semantic referent might not be expected either. To look at another example, consider a situation
in which Alice is to utter 2.16 while scanning through customs documents. In this case, she
might not be required to be able to identify the ship in question, simply because this is not part
of her job.
(2.16) Alice: The RMS St. Helena has a capacity of 128 passengers.
This is an example of a requirement on behalf of the speaker or lack thereof that is a matter
of mainly extralinguistic conventions. Depending on the obligations of her job, Alice might or
might not be required to be able to identify the RMS St. Helena when she uses «RMS St. Helena».
2.5.3 Concluding Remarks
The above examples and similar ones confirm Thesis 2. There is certainly a range of require-
ments on a speaker to identify the semantic referent of a proper name; their strength depends
on the epistemic and the social context. But these requirements are only to a very small extent
linguistic in the case of proper names. If some ability to successfully recognize the semantic
referent is expected, as in example 2.13, then it is for example expected because the given con-
versational context epistemically supports the successful identification of the semantic referent
to a high degree and other discourse participants expect a speaker to be able to successfully
identify the semantic referent of a proper name the more they believe themselves that they could
do so, if they were in the same epistemic position as that speaker. But requirements that arises
out of mutual expectations based on the features of the particular utterance situation and may fur-
ther depend on the conversational and the broader social context aren’t requirements by virtue
of linguistic competence. Examples like 2.16 show this quite clearly. It is not always possible
to clearly decide between linguistic and extralinguistic conventions, because linguistic labor di-
vision argued for by Burge (1979a, 1982) and others also applies to proper names. When for
example a history professor is all the time using the name «George Washington» but unable to
recognize George Washington on a one-dollar bill something in his use of the name and his ex-
pert status is odd—presuming that the professor doesn’t suffer from impaired vision. But there
is no doubt that many other speakers that are unable to recognize George Washington use the
name competently.
Things look different if they are considered from a genuine epistemic and therefore more
skeptic perspective. Implicitly knowing the complete truth-conditions of an utterance requires
the cognitive ability of an ideal epistemic agent to decide in any given situation of the epistemic
input whether it falsifies a given utterance, confirms it, or does neither of it. This must include
the cognitive ability of the agent to decide of any given object whether it is or isn’t the bearer
of a proper name. For if the agent wasn’t able to decide which object was the bearer of some
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proper name, he couldn’t decide of the whole epistemic input whether it confirms, falsifies, or
is irrelevant to an utterance containing the proper name. Identifying reference is required for
falsification and confirmation and thus strictly speaking part of the truth-conditional content of
an utterance. From an epistemological, ideal language perspective identifying reference is clearly
required.
So reference exemplifies the tension between ideal language view and the empirical perspec-
tive on language. Linguistic competence doesn’t presume identifying reference, but the originally
epistemic motivation for doing truth-conditional semantics does require identifying reference.
Indirect reference can deal with both views, but not at the same time. A varying description
theory without identifying reference can exploit a possible mismatch between the literal mean-
ing of a proper name and the meaning that a particular speaker associates with it, in order to
account for the various phenomena that are related to the cognitive role of that name. A fixed
or varying description theory that requires identifying reference encodes by virtue of the mean-
ing of a proper name conditions of epistemic access to the bearer of that name. As description
theories, both views have in common that they take the meaning of a proper name as the result
of translating, in a rule-governed way, a proper name from some natural source language into
some definite description in some formal target language.
Chapter 3
Direct Reference
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3.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, the theory of direct reference is laid out and the main arguments in favor of
rigid designation and against description theories are summarized. The New Theory of Reference
based on (Kripke 1981) is outlined. Kripke’s main arguments are based on modal considera-
tions within the framework of normal modal logic with a possible world semantics. According
to his modal argument, names are rigid designators, whereas definite descriptions need not be
rigid, and therefore cannot represent the meaning of proper names. The Kripkean challenge to
the descriptivist is then to explain how descriptivism is still feasible, if definite descriptions are
non-rigid by default, and some of the descriptivists’ answers to this challenge will be defended
in the last part of this chapter.
The chapter is organized as follows. Rigid designation and Kripke’s original arguments in
favor of the New Theory of Reference are described in section 3.2. Another aspect of direct
reference is laid out in section 3.3. Under the labelMillian view on reference this aspect comprises
any way of looking at reference as a connection between a speaker and an object that is in some
way immediate in thinking, during the act of referring to to the object or in the specification
of truth-conditional and cognitive content. Section 3.4 finally addresses the ongoing debate on
the question whether a modal form of descriptivism, i.e. a theory of descriptions that explicitly
deals with rigidity in a modal logical setting, is feasible or not. Some of the known arguments
against description theory will be discussed critically. Although no decisive argument in favor
of descriptivism is given in this section, it will at least be made plausible that some forms of
descriptivism can peacefully live together with Kripke’s rigidity thesis.
3.2 Direct Reference and Rigidity
As the name suggests, direct reference theory assumes that it is at least under certain circum-
stances and by means of certain expressions possible to refer to objects without any mediation
through meaning or Fregean senses. The original and main arguments in favor of direct refer-
ence in (Kripke 1972) are centered around the concept of a rigid designator in modal contexts,
which will be sketched in the following section.
There are some aspects of (Kripke 1972) that will not be addressed here at all. For example,
Kripke propagates an epistemic notion of a contingent apriori, but it would lead too far apart
to discuss this epistemological issue.1 For lack of space Kripke’s controversial thesis that natural
kind terms are rigid won’t be addressed either.
1An exposition of Kripke’s apriori and a critique on it can be found in (Kupffer 2004).
3.2. DIRECT REFERENCE AND RIGIDITY 43
3.2.1 Rigid Designation and Kripke’s Modal Argument
The notion of rigid designation is intrinsically tied to Kripke-style possible world semantics for
normal modal logics, insofar as possible worlds in this framework stand for arbitrary counterfac-
tual situations.2 Kripke gives the following informal definition of a rigid designator:
“Let’s call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the
same object, a non-rigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. [. . . ] A rigid
designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.” (Kripke 1981, p. 48)
So a rigid designator is a term that in any counterfactual situation semantically refers to the
same object, if this object exists in that situation, and a strongly rigid designator is a term that is
a rigid designator and whose semantic referent exists in any counterfactual situation, i.e. exists
necessarily. Given that, Kripke’s central tenets are:
P Kri 1 (Rigidity Thesis). Names are rigid designators.3
P Kri 2 (Refutation of Description Theory). A description or cluster theory of proper names is
incompatible with the fact that names are rigid designators.4
What is the main argument for these theses? Among many others, Kripke discusses the
following example.
(3.1) Aristotle was fond of dogs. (Kripke 1981, p. 6)
(3.2) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs. (Kripke 1981, p. 7)
Assuming that Aristotle was indeed the last great philosopher of antiquity, this definite de-
scription is actually co-extensional with «Aristotle». However, as Kripke points out, under some
counterfactual circumstances the last great philosopher of antiquity could have been someone
else than Aristotle, but it is impossible for Aristotle to not having been Aristotle. Kripke’s point
is subtle. He admits that Aristotle could have been called differently than «Aristotle» in some
counterfactual situation, just as the last great philosopher of antiquity could have been some-
one else than Aristotle. But Kripke argues that Aristotle could not have been someone else than
Aristotle, and therefore «Aristotle» denotes Aristotle in every possible world (state of affairs)
in which Aristotle exists. Hence, the proper name «Aristotle» is a rigid designator, whereas a
co-extensional definite description doesn’t need to be rigid. At least in their customary reading,
definite descriptions are non-rigid. Kripke generalizes from the various examples he discusses
and claims that this distinction holds for any proper name in natural language and any definite
description in natural language. While there might be uses of definite descriptions that are rigid,
definite descriptions are non-rigid in general, whereas proper names are always rigid.
2See (Kripke 1981, pp. 9-10; 15-20). Strictly speaking, possible worlds aren’t the same as (possible) situations, since
the former are ‘bigger’ then the latter in the sense that they correspond to maximally consistent sets formulas. A possible
world makes either a formula A or its negation ¬A true, which is a requirement that may be dropped for possible
situations. Cf. (Gärdenfors 1988, p. 25). For the current purpose, the difference doesn’t matter.
3See (Kripke 1981, p. 48-9).
4See (Kripke 1981, pp. 10-2; 57).
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If Kripke’s argument is correct and modalities are taken into account, the alleged rigidity
of proper names has consequences for their truth-conditional role. A necessary condition of
understanding the truth-conditions of an utterance is to grasp the conditions under which it
would be true and the conditions under which conditions it would be false. This boils down to
being able to decide of any counterfactual situation whether a given utterance would be true in
this situation or false, or, as one may add, it cannot be clearly decided whether it is true or false.
So given that they are rigid, the truth-conditional content of proper names in a modal setting
must be different from that of any non-rigid definite description that in fact is co-extensional
with that name in the actual world.
Kripke’s main argument can be made more explicit by including the modal component into
the examples. Consider the following utterances.
(3.3) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.
(3.4) The last great philosopher of antiquity might not have been Aristotle.
Taken literally, example 3.3 is necessarily false. Only in some non-literal reading, accord-
ing to which the second occurrence of «Aristotle» is interpreted as the property of being called
«Aristotle», example 3.3 may be judged as being true.5 Conversely to this, under any canonical
way of understanding «might», example 3.4 is true, because it is perfectly conceivable that some
other philosopher than Aristotle would have been the last great philosopher of antiquity. Kripke
(1981) backs up his claims with many more examples of this kind. His argumentation strategy is
to first give examples of the different interpretations of proper names and definite descriptions
with respect to counterfactual situations, and then generalize these examples to any kind of def-
inite descriptions and proper names. Although the generalizing step is an empirical induction,
the overall argument is rather plausible. There is not much reason to doubt that examples similar
to the above one can be constructed for any other kind of genuine proper names and definite
descriptions. Special cases like rare descriptive uses of proper names don’t falsify the thesis that
in their common uses, given some canonical interpretation, ordinary proper names are rigid.
3.2.2 Rigid Designation as a Formal Notion
Rigid designators can be defined precisely in normal first-order modal logic (FOML). This is in-
structive for two reasons. First, although he doesn’t introduce formal definitions explicitly in
(Kripke 1981) because he wants to support his thesis by ‘intuitive’ modal considerations that
are independent of any formal framework, Kripke certainly has a formal definition of rigid des-
ignators in mind when he discusses rigid designation.6 Second, it will turn out to be useful to
have formal and informal characterizations of rigid designators later in this chapter in the discus-
sion of rigidified description theory. The version of FOML assumed in the following definitions is
5Example 3.3 is pragmatically marked to an extent that some speakers might consider it non-true (in the sense of
neither true nor false), senseless, or inappropriate. The reason for this is that it violates Grice’s Cooperative Principle
(Grice 1975), because the utterance is necessarily false. By pragmatic recovery strategies, the non-literal reading will
then be computed as the preferred reading. For Kripke’s argument only the fact matters that the utterance is necessarily
false.
6See (Kripke 1981, p.15, fn. 16).
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multi-modal normal modal logic with relational constant-domain semantics, where the following
non-standard symbols are used: E is the existence predicate, ♦pi and pi are diamond and box
modalities with modality index pi, ∀∗ and ∃∗ are possibilist quantifiers ranging over all objects
(actual objects and possibilia), and ∀ and ∃ are quantifiers relativized to the existence predicate.
Moreover, J.KMg (w) is a function interpreting both formulas and terms with respect to a model
M , assignment g, and world w. (See Appendix A for the complete specification.) In this version
of FOML, rigid and strongly rigid designators can be defined semantically as follows.
P Kri 3 (FOML Rigid Designator).
A term t is a rigid designator with respect to some modality pi iff for all w, u ∈W such that wRpiu:
if JEtKM (u) = 1 then JtKM (w) = JtKM (u), for any modelM .
P Kri 4 (FOML Strongly Rigid Designator).
A term t is a strongly rigid designator with respect to some modality pi iff t is a rigid designator with
respect to pi and for all w ∈W : JEtKM (w) = 1, for any modelM .
Like in the informal case, a term is non-rigid if it is not rigid. Definitions similar to the above
ones could also be given by syntactic schemes like formula 3.5 and formula 3.6 respectively.7
∀∗ x
(
t = x ⊃ pi(Et ⊃ t = x)
)
(3.5)
∀∗ x
(
t = x ⊃ pi(Et ∧ t = x)
)
(3.6)
All of the above definitions are compatible with a certain conception of actualism, according
to which no statements can come out true in some world if the semantic referent of a singular
term in the respective statement doesn’t exist at that world. However, since for the actualist
denotation and existence coincide, (Kri 3) has to additionally require that the referent of the
term exists in the actual world, i.e. JEtKM (w) = 1 must hold if a strict actualist position is
adopted. If on the other hand a possibilist position is adopted, then it is possible to make a
veridical assertion about something which doesn’t exist. In this case, there is an alternative view
on rigid designation according to which the definition becomes independent from existence.
(Kri 5) reflects this and is probably the simplest way to characterize rigid designators.
P Kri 5 (FOML Possibilist Rigid Designator).
A term is a possibilist rigid designator with respect to some modality pi iff for all w, u ∈ W such
that wRpiu: JtKM (w) = JtKM (u), for any modelM .
If a version of FOML is used in which terms are allowed not to denote, and thus JtKM (w)
can be undefined for some possible world w, then the above definitions have to be modified
accordingly to ensure that t at the respective world denotes.8 With respect to non-denoting
7The definitions do not amount to the exactly same conditions on frames, since for example the semantic definition of
strongly rigid designators stipulates existence of the semantic referent in all worlds, even inaccessible ones, whereas the
corresponding syntactic scheme stipulates existence in worlds accessible from the actual one. However, the definitions
will coincide for all practical purposes in all symmetric Rpi-frames, because in these frames pi Et ⊃ Et holds, and
furthermore any completely inaccessible worlds are irrelevant, because they can be eliminated from a model without
affecting validity and satisfiability of formulas.
8See FOMLι in Appendix A for a system with non-denoting terms.
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terms, there is a further formal distinction that can be made. Terms that denote the same object
in all worlds in which it exists, and thus are rigid but additionally don’t denote anything in any
world in which this object doesn’t exists are called persistently rigid designators, whereas terms
satisfying (Kri 5) and denoting in any world are also known as obstinately rigid designators.9
3.2.3 The New Theory of Reference
Apart from his critique on description and cluster theories of reference, Kripke also gives a pos-
itive account of reference, which will henceforth be called the New Theory of Reference.10 It is
based on the following claims.11
P Kri 6 (Fixing of Semantic Reference). The reference of a proper name is initially fixed by (a)
ostension or (b) by a definite description in an act of naming or baptism.
P Kri 7 (Determination of Semantic Reference). The uses of a proper name are connected with
the original act of baptism by virtue of causal chains. In the beginning of a causal chain is the initial
act of baptism, and a use of a proper name semantically refers to the object that was fixed as its
referent in this initial act.
The purpose of the second point is to naturalize the notion of denotation in order to explain
why proper names are rigid. According to the New Theory of Reference, a proper name has
no meaning in the sense of some description or cluster of properties that the user of the proper
name needs to implicitly know or associate with he proper name in order to understand it or
use the name correctly by virtue of linguistic competence. In order to understand a proper name
or use it correctly, a speaker only has to intend to use it as an expression that denotes the same
object as in the original act of fixing its reference. A speaker acquires a proper name by observing
uses of the name by other speakers, which ultimately means that there is a causal connection
between his use of the name and the use of the name from which the speaker has learned his
use. Likewise, a speaker that acquires a proper name during the initial act of baptism is in
a causal connection with the proper name and its referent. Equivocal proper names are then
homonymous but different from each other, because they have different historical causal chains
linking them back to different objects in different acts of baptism. Figure 3.1 illustrates a causal
chain.
A causal chain of uses of a proper name is not something abstract, but rather something that
is fully determined by processes of the actual world at various stages in time. Since the causal
chain of a name is fully determined by the actual course of history of the world, it explains why
proper names are rigid while at the same time not requiring the speaker to implicitly know any
meaning of the proper name. The proper name itself is meaningless, except for the fact that it
rigidly denotes the semantic referent.
Why does Kripke not just say that a proper name semantically refers under any counterfactual
circumstances to the referent that has actually been baptized? The answer is that, according
9See (Stanley 2001, p. 556-7).
10Kripke (1981) doesn’t really consider his suggestions a full-fledged theory of reference (Kripke 1981, pp. 93-5; 97),
but it has later been dubbed that way.
11See (Kripke 1981, pp. 96-7, N.B. fn. 42; 135-9); cf. (Soames 2002, pp. 4-5).
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Figure 3.1: All 15 uses of a proper name t are causally linked to an initial act of baptism that
fixes the referent a.
to Kripke, a description like the person that is actually called «Aristotle» would be circular for
explaining the reference of «Aristotle». He formulates the following principle:
“(C) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties
which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in a
way that is ultimately impossible to eliminate.” (Kripke 1981, p. 68)
Formulated in the above way this principle is not controversial, but it can be interpreted in
controversial ways. In chapter 4 it will be argued against Kripke (1981, pp. 68-73) that this
principle doesn’t preclude nominal description theory (Bach 1987) based on the properties of
being called such-and-such. However, one of the strong points of the New Theory of Reference
is undoubtedly that it accounts for the fact that proper names are rigid designators (descriptive
adequacy) and provides an explanation why they are rigid (explanatory adequacy). Furthermore,
Kripke’s suggestion is compatible with certain empirical observations, for example that in many
cases speakers aren’t aware of any description of the referent of a proper name when they use
the name, that in many conversational situations in which proper names are used identifying
reference doesn’t seem to play any role, and that proper names many times seem to act as
mere placeholders similar to the role of variables in logic. Kripke’s suggestions also fit very well
together with and have partly inspired arguments in favor of semantic externalism, such as the
ones in (Putnam 1975) and (Burge 1979a). However, it should be noted that there is—up
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to the time of this writing and to the author’s knowledge—no formal implementation of the
New Theory of Reference that in fact represents causal chains between uses of proper names
originating from a shared act of baptism. The only thing that is encountered in one or another
form in formal implementations is rigidity conditions like (Kri 3), (Kri 4), or (Kri 5).
3.3 Direct Reference as Immediacy of Reference
The New Theory of Reference and Kripke’s arguments against description and cluster theories
supports another position that can be subsumed under the label direct reference. According
to this position, the referent itself is the semantic content of rigid terms. The referent itself is
thought of as representing the truth-conditional content of a proper name, and it can likewise
also determine the cognitive content of a proper name or another rigid term. A speaker can have
a form of direct epistemic or cognitive access to a particular, and the particular itself in a sense
fixes the content of his thoughts. This way of looking at direct reference will be laid out in the
following sections.
3.3.1 Millianism, Semantic Reference, and Rigidity
The position that proper names have no descriptive meaning on their own is already expressed
by Mill (1843), who formulates it in the following way:
“Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by
them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individ-
uals.” (Mill 1994, p. 135)
Thus, this position is also known as the Millian view on proper names. Accordingly, a spec-
ification of truth-conditional or cognitive content is labeled Millian or de re if it involves direct
reference to objects, for example by the use of constants. Several remarks are in place about
Millianism as a view on reference.
First, as far as only semantic reference is concerned, Mill’s position merely constates that
the linguistic purpose of a proper name is to denote an object and not to assert of that object
that it has a certain property. Semantic reference supports the Millian view simply by virtue of
the fact that it is an idealization from the way that speakers actually refer to objects by means
of a certain kind of referential expression. Notice further that, if semantic reference serves as
a corrigens that allows one to assert that a speaker’s reference fails, as in example 2.13 on
page 38, then semantic reference trivially cannot be the sum of all speaker references by means
of the respective term. The relation between speaker reference and semantic reference must
be considered an instance of Chomsky’s originally syntactic distinction of performance versus
competence in the semantic domain. Given that, a semantic argument against description theory
that is based on the possibility of failure of identifying reference is prone to a petitio principii.
While the purporter of indirect reference will insist that there must be some description or cluster
that represents the actualmeaning of a referential expression and may be determined by complex
social processes, it will always be possible that an individual speaker may fail to identify the
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semantic referent by means of this description or cluster even if he associates it correctly with
the referential term in question.
Second, as argued in section 2.5, identifying reference is not generally a requirement on
behalf of the speaker by virtue of linguistic competence. This suggests that the Millian view is
more adequate than any indirect reference view in order to deal with semantic reference, but
only because it already stipulates semantic reference as an idealization, whereas the motivation
of a purporter of indirect reference is rather to describe and explicate speaker reference prior to
drawing the connection to a derived and idealized notion of semantic reference. In that sense
Millianism versus the indirect reference view is a linguistic reoccurrence of the realism versus
anti-realism debate found in continental epistemology prior to the linguistic turn.
Third, Millianism alone doesn’t entail the rigidity thesis but is merely compatible with it,
although Kripke and others at some occasions seem to suggest the entailment thesis.12 As Martí
(2003) points out, if a proper name simply names its semantic referent, then it may still be
considered as naming another referent in other, counterfactual situations.13 Correspondingly, it
is a matter of choice whether individual constants in first-order modal logic are implemented
as rigid or as non-rigid terms.14 That English proper names are rigid is a contingent fact of the
English language and not a consequence of the Millian view. For suppose it was a consequence of
the Millian view; then any formal or informal implementation of the Millian view in which proper
names or their formal counterparts were non-rigid would be inconsistent, but this is clearly not
the case. Direct reference may nevertheless be understood as including both the rigidity thesis
and the Millian view on proper names, since the rigidity thesis is compatible with the Millian
view on proper names, whereas Kripke’s modal arguments show that the rigidity thesis is by
default incompatible with non-modal description theories.15
3.3.2 Millianism and Speaker Reference
Let us now turn to the aspect of immediacy, which in the present context is a metaphor for
any kind of ‘direct’ cognitive connection with some object. This aspect of Millian specifications is
generally problematic. If Millianism is indeed trivially adequate for describing semantic reference
up to being a formulation of semantic reference, then one would expect it to raise descriptive and
explanatory difficulties whenever speaker reference matters for truth-conditional or cognitive
content respectively. This has been recognized by all purporters of the Millian doctrine including
Kripke (1979) himself. Exactly in which cases speaker reference matters, and which aspects
thereof, is controversial, as it depends on a variety of factors like (i) the underlying theory
of what an utterance expresses, of what is said by an utterance, (ii) whether the pragmatic or
the semantic view on referential opacity is adopted,16 (iii) the status of speaker reference in
the underlying theory of meaning, and (iv) the criteria for determining the cognitive role of
expressions in a dual aspect theory.
12See e.g. (Kripke 1981, pp. 26-34), (Recanati 1993, p. 12).
13See (Martí 2003, p. 168-70).
14In Appendix A they are by default non-rigid and have to be made rigid by imposing rigidity conditions.
15See (Kri 2) on page 43.
16See section 2.4 in chapter 2.
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Millianism can make the distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference much
in the same way as it has been done in chapter 1 and thus can account for identifying reference
and its failure. A Millian analysis of speaker reference amounts to stipulating a direct connection
between a speaker and some particular when the speaker uses or interprets a given referential
term. In which way such a connection can be direct and whether the directness/immediacy
metaphor makes sense at all is not clear, though. An example of a relational analysis of belief
illustrates the problem faced by the Millian. Consider example 3.7.
(3.7) Alice believes that Bob loves Carol.
Accounting for the de dicto reading of such attitude ascriptions is obviously difficult, because
it is a logical law that co-extensional expressions can be substituted salva veritate in any con-
text.17 A feasible Millian solution is to use constants that are non-rigid in the scope of belief
operators, but rigid in the scope of alethic modal operators. This relativized rigidity will be im-
plemented in the next chapter, where it will also be shown that direct and indirect reference
aren’t far apart with respect to this interplay between doxastic and alethic modalities. A deeper
problem for Millianism is in specifying cognitive content in a suitable way. Whatever the pre-
sentation of an object in a speaker’s cognition may be, or however it may be best described,
such a presentation cannot be the object itself, since objects aren’t in our head and objects have
infinitely many properties, but immanent presentations of objects in cognition must be finite.18
While description theory at least tries to account for this fact and is by default compatible with
it, Millianism by default doesn’t account for it. As a remedy, Millian specifications of content
have to be augmented by additional entities akin to Fregean senses, in order to be able to deal
with the assorted phenomena that in a broad sense have to do with speaker reference. This has
resulted in mixed, genuine dual aspect theories in which, unlike to Frege’s original approach,
truth-conditional content and cognitive content of expressions are represented by different sorts
of meaning-constituting entities and referential expressions sometimes not only contribute a bare
particular to the representation of semantic content in question, but also some mode of presen-
tation.19 For example, Recanati (1993) distinguishes between wide and narrow content, where
the former represents what an utterance expresses, i.e. what is said, and is analyzed in terms of
singular propositions, but narrow content includes what Recanati calls linguistic modes of presen-
tation and represents the content of the attitude a speaker may hold towards an utterance.20
In this context a related problem concerning de re readings of attitude ascriptions must be
mentioned: Quine’s Ortcutt puzzle in (Quine 1956). Ralph believes for good reasons that Ortcutt
is a spy, but doesn’t believe that the man he has seen at the beach is a spy, even though Ortcutt
actually is the man Ralph has seen at the beach. If an attitude holder’s acquaintance with the
referent through his senses is a necessary condition for attributing de re belief to him, Ralph’s
attitude towards Ortcutt, the man at the beach, can be de re, but then his belief system would be
17It has occasionally been denied that co-referential terms are substitutable salva veritate in any context, but in the
present view this is regarded a logical error. In the present view—following Frege, Russell, and many others—any such
alleged blocked substitutability arises from insufficient logical analysis.
18Cf. on finiteness of cognitive content (Castañeda 1990a, p. 739). Cf. section 8.4 of chapter 8.
19Cf. (Ackerman 1979b, p. 58).
20See (Recanati 1993, Ch.3).
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inconsistent. According to Quine (1956) this is an undesirable point of view, because it would
incorrectly indicate that Ralph was irrational. One solution proposed by Kaplan (1968) is to
regard the de re belief in question as a a de dicto belief about the object under the respective
acquaintance relation. But in the present point of view, de re just means involving the object
independently of any epistemic way to access it, and a description analysis of a proper name can
be de re by giving the iota quantifier wide scope with respect to the belief operator just like a
Millian analysis. Following Marcus (1981), in Quine’s puzzle Ralph is considered not to have a
genuine de re belief at all, because nobody can believe de re in an inconsistency. The attribute «de
re» is thus understood as involving no referential opacity of any terms in an attitude ascription
whatsoever. This is in contrast to the more common point of view that, following Quine, the
Ortcutt puzzle reveals that de re belief needs to be revised. So in the present view both Millians
and descriptivists can attribute bare de re belief, which is based on the semantic reference of
all the terms in the belief ascription. The Millian may for example use Russellian propositions
and the descriptivist may use iota expressions with wide scope in regards to the doxastic modal
operator.21 However, the Millian faces the problem posed by the Ortcutt example for other
notions of belief as well.
One problem with enriching a Millian specification in order to get a more ‘fine-grained’ spec-
ification of cognitive content is a hidden equivocation in the notion of cognitive content itself.
It will be argued in the next chapter that the way in which mixed theories deal with cognitive
content is misleading; from a descriptivist point of view, the crucial point is not that of getting a
specification of content that is ‘fine-grained’ enough, but rather that speaker reference from an
epistemic point of view involves a speaker’s attempt to identify the semantic referent by means of
certain properties he believes it to have.22 For now it suffices to notice that bare Millianism and
speaker reference live in a tension, because cognitive or epistemic access to a particular has to
be described as a relation between an agent and some finite presentation of the object. Suppose
an object itself is thought to constitute part of the representation of meaning in the formal lan-
guage, or more precisely speaking, a directly referential term like an individual constant is used
in the formal language of analysis for the specification of some kind of cognitive content, and
further assume that this representation is not augmented by some additional Fregean mode of
presentation or alike. Then this representation has two rather undesirable characteristics. First,
it cannot account for and doesn’t encode dispositions of the speaker to use certain, but not other
referential expressions in order to speaker refer to the object in question, since there is no path
back from the referent to the referring expression. Second, the representation doesn’t presume
that the referent of the directly referential expression in question has certain properties by means
of which it is purportedly identified by the speaker prior to asserting something about it, since
an object has all the properties it has and not some properties that someone ascribes to it. Both
characteristics make bare Millianism problematic. On the other hand, Millianism has its strength
in being compatible with the rigidity thesis. Non-modal descriptivism isn’t compatible with the
rigidity thesis, and therefore has to be revised.
21The technical details will be discussed below and in the next chapter.
22See section 4.3.1.
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3.4 Direct versus Indirect Reference
In this section, the indirect reference view will be defended against the Kripkean challenge.
This could be achieved by a general attack on modality like the one by Quine (1976). Such
foundational, external critique will not be considered further. There are less fundamental ways
to defend indirect reference that will be outlined now. This is done in two parts. First, ways to
adjust description theory in order to deal with rigidity are summarized in section 3.4.1. Then, in
section 3.4.2, some known critique on these positions is addressed and at least partially refuted.
3.4.1 Some Known Defences of Description Theory
The replies to Kripke that are going to be outlined in the following paragraphs are description
theories that make the description itself rigid in one way or the other. Although they differ in the
technical apparatus used, they boil down to the same underlying idea. If a rigid term denotes the
object that it actually denotes in all possible worlds in which this object exists, then any definite
description that is a suitable analysis of this term must pick out the very same actual semantic
referent in those worlds as well. These theories will henceforth be subsumed under the label
modal description theories.
Essential Properties
Perhaps the simplest descriptivist reply to the Kripkean challenge is already anticipated in (Kripke
1981). The definite description determining the semantic referent of a rigid term must involve
an essential property. But which one? The most straightforward suggestion is to simply analyze
a proper name like «Aristotle» by a stipulated unary property Aristotelize that is true of Aristotle
and only Aristotle in any possible world in which Aristotle exists. This solution is highly tech-
nical, stipulative, and not very satisfying. In Kripke’s opinion, it also falls prey to the circularity
prohibition (C), because there doesn’t seem to be any way to further explicate the meaning of
such a property without resorting to the name «Aristotle» and the fact that this name is rigid.
The circularity prohibition would even be violated in cases of abstract mathematical objects. For
example, a property like being number 9 may be an essential property, if the common judgment
is correct that mathematical statements are necessarily true, but still one would have to explain
the semantic reference of «9». Stipulating essential properties for empirical objects is even less
appealing, because it leads to an undesirable form of metaphysical essentialism. What, one may
ask, would the essence of Aristotle be? In the light of Kripke’s modal arguments, it can at least
be said that the candidate for such a property cannot be any kind of experiential property or
quality. It generally doesn’t convince to merely stipulate an essential property and subsequently
eliminate all rigid terms by definite descriptions in same the way in which Quine (1950) sug-
gests to eliminate all individual constants in first-order predicate logic,23 as long as there are no
plausible, non-circular candidates for a suitable essential property. There are similar, inherently
quotational properties like being called «Aristotle» that can be used, as long as they are rigidified
23See (Quine 1972, p. 230-4).
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in some suitable way (see below), and in fact will be used in the next chapter, but using more or
less mysterious properties like being Aristotle or Aristotelize will not be considered any further.
Rigidified Descriptions
Although there doesn’t seem to be any natural (non-logical) property or even quality of em-
pirical objects that is essential, some sophisticated formal mechanisms have been suggested as
candidates to ensure that a definite description is rigid. One common suggestion is to rigidify a
definite description by means of an actuality operator.
One of the first suggestions of this kind can be found in (Plantinga 1978), who proposes the
following. Suppose P is a unique property of the actual Aristotle, as it would be used according
to non-modal description theory to determine the semantic referent. Then one may build a
complex property Pα, which Plantinga calls “α-transform of P ”.24 Hereby, α is an index for
the actual world, and the α-transform of a property P is read (schematically) as being-P -in-α.
It is obvious that any such property is not contingent and picks out the same individual in all
possible worlds in which the object exists that uniquely satisfies P in the actual world.25 Burge
(1979b) makes a similar suggestion in order to defend Frege’s original theory against the claim
that he couldn’t explicate the sense of a proper name by a definite description, because definite
descriptions are non-rigid. Burge suggests an operator@ that evaluates its argument always with
respect to the actual world.26 He has a specific operator in mind that in a double-index theory
(see chapter 6) picks out the actual world even if an utterance is made under counterfactual
circumstances (Burge 2005, p. 230: fn. 15a); in the following section, a simpler operator will
do in order to illustrate how such an operator works in ordinary FOML.27
Implementing an Actuality Operator
A simple way to implement an actuality operator is to add a designated actual world to the model
and make the operator jump back to this world during evaluation like in the following definition.
P ML 1 (Actuality Operator). An actuality-augmented FOML model M = 〈W,R, J.K , w0〉 with
designated point of evaluation consists of a standard FOML model augmented by some w0 ∈W . An
actuality operator is added to the language by the following rules.
Syntax WFF :=@WFF
Semantics J@WFFKMg (w) = JWFFKMg (w0)
24See (Plantinga 1978, p. 132).
25Another proposal based on Plantinga’s can be found in (Ackerman 1979b, a).
26See (Burge 2005, pp. 229-30).
27His operator allows Burge to evade some critique based on considering utterances made under counterfactual cir-
cumstances. Such an operator can be added to a double-index theory based on a designated index, the same way as
below in FOML, but this is not necessary in the present view, because such a critique can be dismissed on general grounds.
Arguments based on the meaning of source language expressions in non-actual utterance contexts are pointless. There is
no way to ensure in such contexts that the same language is spoken as in actual ones. Even fictitious utterances have
to be considered as if actual. In the target language non-actual contexts of utterance may occur, for example because of
diagonalization, but this is then the result of analyzing an actual source language expression.
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The iota quantifier introduced in formula 2.1 on page 19 of the last chapter can be reused in
the modal setting without major changes. There are, however, subtle, yet important differences
in the semantics of such an abbreviated quantifier or a corresponding iota operator that have to
be taken into account. The normal modal logic used throughout this chapter (see Appendix A)
implements a constant-domain semantics, in which one domain is given for all worlds and the
quantifiers ∃∗ and ∀∗ range over all objects in this domain. To obtain the same expressivity as
in versions of FOML that use a varying-domain semantics, i.e. models with a domain function
that assigns to each world its own domain over which the actualist quantifiers range, ∃ and ∀
have to be introduced as abbreviated quantifiers that are relativized to an existence predicate
E. Depending on which quantifiers are used in its abbreviation, the iota quantifier behaves
differently. Let’s first take a look at the version of the iota quantifier that is relativized, here
denoted by the same symbol ιas in the non-modal case of the last chapter. Then formula 3.8
expands to 3.9.

ιx[@Gx]Fx (3.8)
 ∃∗ x[Ex ∧@Gx ∧ ∀∗ y(@Gy ⊃ x = y) ∧ Fx] (3.9)
This formula has the reading that in all -accessible worlds wi there exists an object that in
the actual world uniquely has propertyG and this object has property F in wi. A more expressive
quantifier can be obtained by using the non-relativized possibilist quantifiers, here denoted by
the symbol ι∗. Then formula 3.10 expands to 3.11.

ι∗ x[@Gx]Fx (3.10)
 ∃∗ x[@Gx ∧ ∀∗ y(@Gy ⊃ x = y) ∧ Fx] (3.11)
This formula has the reading that in all -accessible worlds wi the object that is uniquely G in
the actual world (whether it exists anywhere or not) is F in wi. Using the same non-relativized
quantifier, we can also express formula 3.9 as 3.12, and furthermore get formula 3.13 as an
additional candidate expanding to 3.14.

ι∗ x[Ex ∧@Gx]Fx (3.12)
 ι∗ x[@(Ex ∧Gx)]Fx (3.13)
 ∃∗ x[@(Ex ∧Gx) ∧ ∀∗ y(@(Ey ∧Gy) ⊃ x = y) ∧ Fx] (3.14)
Formula 3.14 has the reading that in all -accessible worlds wi the object that exists and is
uniquely G in the actual world is F in wi. Finally, existence can be stipulated both in the actual
world and in all accessible worlds. This is done in formula 3.15 which expands to 3.16.

ι∗ x[Ex ∧@(Ex ∧Gx)]Fx (3.15)
 ∃∗ x[Ex ∧@(Ex ∧Gx) ∧ ∀∗ y((Ey ∧@(Ey ∧Gy)) ⊃ x = y) ∧ Fx] (3.16)
This formula has the reading that in all -accessible worlds wi the object that exists in those
worlds and in the actual world, and that is uniquely G in the actual world, is F in wi. The obvious
question is now, which version and reading yields the desired rigidified description analysis of
proper names.
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There is no definite answer to this question, as it depends on whether actualism or possibilism
is adopted and which version of rigid designation is purported. Recall that an actualist denies
that veridical statements can be made about objects that don’t exist. So a strict actualist is likely
to favor an analysis like 3.16 or 3.8, where the latter analysis follows (Kri 3). A possibilist, on
the other hand, might opt for 3.10 following (Kri 5), but he might also have reasons to endorse
any of the other analyses. Since a whole range of alternative definitions of rigid designators can
be found in the literature, there are no clear-cut ‘intuitions’ about the question which of them
catches the correct semantics of proper names with respect to metaphysical (alethic) modalities.
Perhaps this is rather a question about interpreting metaphysical modalities than a genuinely
semantical question. In any case, it can be said that the rigidified description analysis allows us
to formally encode various analyses of proper names as rigid designators. It has to be noted,
though, that none of the above examples encodes condition (Kri 4), because the global existence
presupposition expressed in this condition cannot be expressed as part of the restriction of the
iota quantifier.
Let us finally take a look at an example of a rigidified description analysis, where the modest
actualist notion of rigidity exemplified by formula 3.8 is presumed. Consider examples 3.3 and
3.4 again.
(3.3) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.
(3.4) The last great philosopher of antiquity might not have been Aristotle.
These examples are analyzed as 3.17 and 3.18 respectively:
♦ ιx[@Gx] ιy[@Gy](x 6= y) (3.17)
♦
ιx[Gx] ιy[@Gy](x 6= y) (3.18)
It is easy to see that 3.17 is false in any model with designated evaluation point, whereas
3.18 is true in some such models. The analysis encodes the correct truth-conditions.
The Wide Scope Theory
Wide scope description theory exploits the notion of priority scope. Whenever an expression
contains a proper name that is within the scope of modal expressions, the proper name must
be analyzed as a definite description that has wide priority scope over the modal expression
and therefore is evaluated independently of this expression. An example of such an analysis is
illustrated in figure 3.2, where the role of tense is ignored.
As the figure shows, the wide scope theory operates at the level of logical analysis and is
in the spirit of Russell’s original view on proper names. Expressions in a source language are
translated into expressions of the target language, which is a process of philosophical, logical, or
semantic analysis. The following formulation makes this explicit.
P WDT 1. (Wide Scope Description Theory) Proper names in the source language are analyzed
as definite descriptions that have widest possible scope with respect to any modal operators in the
corresponding expression of the target language.
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It is possible that Aristotle was fond of dogs.
M, g,w  ιx(Fx)(♦Gx)
analysis
binding
Figure 3.2: Wide scope analysis of an English sentence.
∀∗ x
(
t = x ⊃ (Et ⊃ t = x)
)
∀∗ x
(
ιy(Gy)(y = x) ⊃ ιy(Gy)(Ey ⊃ y = x)
)
Figure 3.3: Wide scope translation of one expression into another expression of FOML.
In the above example, the source language is English, but it could just as well be any other
formal or natural language that contains expressions that may with reasonable justification be
called proper names (and the same way for any other kind of rigid expressions that are to be
analyzed). The target language can be any language that is deemed adequate for representing
the truth-conditional or cognitive content of the whole expression to be analyzed in a philosoph-
ically, logically, or semantically satisfying manner. In the example, the target language is FOML,
which itself has been given a relational semantics, but it could just as well have been plain set
theory or any other kind of sound logical representation. Figure 3.3 illustrates an analysis of a
FOML expression containing a supposedly rigid constant t into an expression of the target lan-
guage FOML itself (some irrelevant mappings are left out). Often—though not in the version
of FOML used here—individual constants already are rigid designators, and so mapping them
to quantifier expressions with wide scope would be quite pointless. The example is in another
sense a redundant application of the wide scope theory. First-order modal logic is already an
ideal logical language that can be given various well-defined semantics, and there doesn’t seem
to be any need to analyze any of its expressions. Nevertheless, figure 3.3 illustrates a correct
application of the wide scope theory. It has been deliberately chosen in order to emphasize that
the wide scope theory can be regarded a way of analyzing expressions of an arbitrary language
by means of wide scope descriptions of another or the same language.
3.4.2 Pro and Contra Modal Description Theory
It has already been acknowledged that the essential property approach isn’t a feasible solution
without specifying exactly which properties would be likely candidates for rigidifying descrip-
tions. But the wide scope analysis or descriptions rigidified by an actuality operator catch rigid-
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ity quite well. However, both theories have been criticized by purporters of the New Theory
of Reference. Kripke (1981) himself mounts one of these attacks in his preface to the second
edition of Naming and Necessity, and Soames (2002, Ch. 2) extends and enriches this critique.
It will be argued in the following paragraphs that the main arguments used in criticizing modal
description theories don’t really grip. However, lack of space prevents to address all arguments
that have been mounted in the literature against indirect reference of proper names and other
rigid expressions, and only some of them will be discussed in the following paragraphs as exam-
ples. The purpose of this procedure is not to finally disprove all conceivable arguments against
modal description theories, which would be an infeasible and nonconstructive task, but to make
it plausible that modal description theory isn’t generally incompatible with the rigidity thesis, as
long as the process of logical and semantic analysis is taken seriously.
Two Arguments against the Wide Scope Theory
The first argument to consider is targeted against the wide scope theory and can already be
found in (Kripke 1981). Consider examples 3.1 and 3.2 again, here repeated for convenience.
(3.1) Aristotle was fond of dogs.
(3.2) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs.
Ignoring the fact that tense is sometimes analyzed as a sort of modality as well, these exam-
ples don’t contain any modal expressions. Nevertheless, as Kripke claims, «Artistotle» in 3.1 is
a rigid designator, whereas the description in 3.2 is non-rigid. If the utterance 3.1 is evaluated
with respect to some counterfactual circumstances, «Aristotle» still refers to the actual Aristotle,
but if 3.2 is evaluated with respect to some counterfactual circumstances, the description would
refer to whoever was the last great philosopher of antiquity under that circumstances. According
to Kripke, the notion of scope isn’t applicable in this example at all.28
Another, more rigorous argument against the wide scope theory can be found, among many
others, in (Soames 2002). It is based on the following statements:
“P1. The proposition that if n is F, then something is both F and G=the proposition
that if G is F, then something is both F and G. [. . . ]
P2. The proposition that if the G is F, then something is both F and G is a neces-
sary truth [((the x : Gx)Fx) ⊃ ∃y(Fy&Gy)]. [. . . ]
C. The proposition that if n is F, then something is both F and G is a necessary truth
[Fn ⊃ ∃y(Fy&Gy)]. [. . . ]
C’. The G is such that the proposition that if it is F, then something is both F and
G is a necessary truth (the x : Gx)[Fx ⊃ ∃y(Fy&Gy)].” (Soames 2002, p. 29/30)
28See (Kripke 1981, p. 11-2). A similar version of this argument can be found in (Everett 2005, pp· 109-11).
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For comparison, here is a formal version of these statements, where only 3.19 is an interpre-
tation and the other formulas are provided by Soames:
[Fn ⊃ ∃x(Fx ∧Gx)] ≡ [ ιxGxFx ⊃ ∃x(Fx ∧Gx)] (3.19)
[ ιxGxFx ⊃ ∃x(Fx ∧Gx)] (3.20)
[Fn ⊃ ∃x(Fx ∧Gx)] (3.21)
ιxGx[Fx ⊃ ∃x(Fx ∧Gx)] (3.22)
Soames argues as follows. From premises P1 (3.19) and P2 (3.20) conclusion C (3.21) should
follow, but the wide scope analysis only allows conclusion C’ (3.22). The wide scope analysis is
inadequate, because it mischaracterizes a valid conclusion as an invalid one.
Some Counter-Arguments
Kripke’s argument can be refuted by pointing out that it is impossible to evaluate anything with
respect to counterfactual circumstances without formulating those counterfactual circumstances,
but whenever these circumstances are formulated the notion of scope is applicable. Kripke’s
position concerning the above argument is incoherent with the way he argues against modal
realism, in course of which he emphasizes at various occasions that possible worlds aren’t given
qualitatively, that we don’t find out anything about them like in a scientific discovery, but that
they are given by our descriptions of counterfactual circumstances.29 In fact, the claim that
counterfactual circumstances could be given in any other way than by specifying them would be
uttermost senseless, since anything that is given in another way than by linguistic description,
or at least by intelligible imagination in thinking, must be actually given, and is therefore not
counterfactual.30
Tackling Soames’ argument is more complicated. Sosa (2001) mounts an attack on a variant
of the above argument in (Soames 1998). Sosa’s attack is based on the observation that the
wide scope theory predicts that Soames’ informal formulation of premise P2 is systematically
ambiguous, and that therefore the conclusion C cannot be drawn in general. However, there
is a deeper problem with the argument and similar ones against wide scope theories. Soames
doesn’t provide any formula representing P1, but gives in his notation (3.20), (3.21), and (3.22).
It may be argued that this doesn’t matter, as he doesn’t provide any formal system anyway, but
it is nevertheless revealing. Consider our attempt to give a formal account of P1 in comparison
with Soames’ informal version of the premise. Unless the square brackets in formula 3.19 are
interpreted as operators taking a formula and yielding a proposition (whatever that may be), for
which there is no evidence in the use of the other formulas Soames gives, the identity expressed
in the informal version P1 has to be interpreted as equivalence. However, if the doctrine of the
wide scope analysis is understood properly, it says that proper names in English or any other
29See (Kripke 1981, pp. 44; 49-50).
30Hereby «intelligible imagination» is understood as some kind of conceiving or imagining in cognition that can in
principle—following Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument—be formulated in public language. Perhaps some peo-
ple have the ability to intellectually apprehend counterfactual situations in a way that cannot be expressed in public
language, but such mysticism shall not interest us here any further.
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source language under consideration have to be analyzed as definite descriptions with wide scope.
If n in 3.21 and 3.21 above is part of the language of analysis, then it cannot be a proper name
of English, but will presumably be a constant, which could be rigid or non-rigid or something
else entirely, depending on the semantics it has been given. The closest equivalent to English
proper names that is available in normal modal logic would be a rigid constant.31 However, if
n in the formal part was a rigid constant standing for an English proper name, then the formal
argument simply compares rigid constants with wide scope descriptions. The difference between
them is known: In order for a wide scope description to denote, there must be exactly one object
in the actual world that satisfies some property, whereas a rigid constant denotes this object
without the help of such a property. If on the other hand 3.20–3.22 are provided for the purpose
of clarification only, and the main argument is based on P1, P2, and the apparently differing
conclusions C’ and C, then one may ask what exactly propositions and their identity conditions
are, apart from being formal specifications of semantic content that belong to the target side of
the analysis.
So there is a certain discrepancy between informal formulations and their formal counter-
parts. Soames (2002) generally assumes that propositions are the truth-conditional content of
sentences or utterances, but in many of his arguments considers them independently from their
specification using set-theory or some logical language.32 However, consider for example the
standard technical notion of propositions as sets of possible worlds. Then, given the presumption
that G is true of exactly the same object of the actual world that is also denoted by n, formulas
C and C’ express the same ‘propositions’, i.e. are true in the same set of possible worlds.33 To
be fair, there are some indications that Soames’ has a particular framework based on Russellian
propositions as specifications of semantic content in mind, in which 3.21 and 3.22 might not be
equivalent under the assumption that the iota quantifier’s restriction determines the same object
in the actual world as the rigid constant n does. But Soames seems to suggest that his considera-
tions on propositions are independent of the formal framework used and yet they aren’t. Another
difference between Soames’ and the present approach is in the role given to logical analysis. In
the present view, the wide scope theory maps sentences of a natural language that contain proper
names into appropriate specifications of their truth-conditional content that don’t contain proper
names or any other rigid and directly referring expressions, and this analysis takes place under
the assumption that for any object that a proper name denotes, there is a corresponding unique
property determining this object in any given context of use of the proper name. Therefore, in the
analysis of a sentence, in the way a proposition is specified, a proper name can no longer oc-
cur, once the wide scope analysis has been applied. Under a purely Millian view one does not
have to make the assumption that there is a unique property, particularly not the one that the
descriptivist may presume. But if this assumption was dropped, then the anti-descriptivist argu-
ment would become a sort of a petitio principii. The wide scope theorist doesn’t deny that the
description analysis presumes a unique property of the referent and that the Millian view prima
31Note that 3.21 is not an interpretation, but provided by Soames.
32See (Soames 2002, p. 4; 28).
33This is proved in Appendix B.I.
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facie doesn’t have to make such an assumption.34 The wide scope theorist only claims that a
wide scope analysis of proper names can specify the same truth-conditional content as a Millian
analysis under this assumption.
An Argument against Rigidified Descriptions
Among others, Soames (2002) gives the following argument against rigidified description theo-
ries:
“P1. It is possible to believe that Aristotle was a philosopher without believing any-
thing about the actual world Aw. [. . . ]
P2. Necessarily, one believes that the actual F was a philosopher iff one believes
of the actual world, Aw, that the unique thing that was F in it was a philosopher.
C1. It is not the case that, necessarily, one believes that Aristotle was a philoso-
pher iff one believes that the actual F was a philosopher.
P3. If the content of Aristotle, as used in a context C, were identical with the content
of the actual F, as used in C, then (i) the contents of (propositions expressed by)
Aristotle was G and The actual F was G in C would be the same; (ii) the proposi-
tions expressed by α believes that Aristotle was G and α believes that the actual F
was G, in C, would be necessarily equivalent; and (iii) C1 would be false.
C2. The content of Aristotle, as used in a context, is not the same as the content
of the actual F as used in that context.” (Soames 2002, pp. 43-4)
Some Counter-Arguments
First, it should be noted that P2 in Soames’ argument above is ambiguous and doesn’t hold
if it is read as follows: Necessarily( one believes that the actual F was a philosopher iff one
believes of the actual world, Aw, that the unique thing that was F in Aw was a philosopher
in Aw). This only holds if F (x) implies that x is a philosopher, but doesn’t hold in general.
Instead, the right hand side must be read in such a way that one believes of the actual world
Aw, that the unique thing that was F in Aw was a philosopher in all worlds compatible with the
respective person’s beliefs. In a footnote, Soames argues that propositions should be thought of
as Russellian singular propositions that contain the actual world whenever they correspond to a
formula containing an actuality operator, and he further stipulates that the believer in such a case
must be in direct acquaintance with the actual world.35 So Soames seems to suggest that in his
conception of propositions as representations of truth-conditional and in this case also cognitive
34The Millian cannot deny, however, that if «Aristotle» denotes Aristotle, then there is (or was) someone called «Aristo-
tle», and there are many more trivial unique properties of referents that can be constructed. Therefore the caveat prima
facie.
35See (Soames 2002, pp. 327-30).
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content the proposition that Aristotle was a philosopher wouldn’t need to contain the actual
world, whereas the equivalence in P2 would make sure that the rigidified description analysis
would yield a proposition that would contain the actual world and would presume acquaintance
with the actual world as an object of belief.
Several objections can be made against this account. First, let us assume that the proposition
that represents the object of relational belief indeed contains the actual world, if the sentence
embedded by the attitude verb «to believe» contains a description that has been rigidified by
an actuality operator. This specification of content is clearly Millian with respect to the actual
world. Why then would a descriptivist need to accept this analysis? It seems that, according
to the indirect reference theorist, what holds of proper names should also hold of sentential
adverbs like «actually» and the actual world can ever only be given by description. Second, it
is generally not sensible to assume acquaintance with any world and particularly not with the
actual world. As opposed to a situation, a world is a maximal truth-maker, the complete state and
history of the universe by virtue of which all true non-modal statements are made true. Just as
complete acquaintance with a particular empirical object is practically not feasible, because it has
infinitely many properties, a fortiori complete acquaintance with the actual world is not feasible.
If at all, a person can only be acquainted with a small part of the actual world. So it seems
that Soames analysis not only presupposes Millianism, but even presupposes an implausible
account of it. Third, Soames argues further that his argument would also go through, if no use
was made of a notion of acquaintance with the actual world. Still, it may be objected that a
rigidified description only puts part of the semantics of a proper name into the object language
that the analysis of a proper name as rigid constant stipulates in the interpretation rules for rigid
constants. The constraints expressed by a wide scope description, by a description rigidified by
an actuality operator, and by a rigid constant are the same, because the specifications themselves
are logically equivalent to each other under the assumption that the unary predicate used in the
descriptions actually denotes the same object as the constant.
To illustrate this point further, let us take a look at ways to formalize Soames’ argument in the
current FOML setting. For simplicity, the role of contexts are ignored in the following example.
P1 may be represented as follows, where 0 is the S5 modality for metaphysical necessity and
1 is used to symbolize the modality for belief in KD45.
It is possible that: M, g,w0  1 Pn and ¬w0R1w0 (3.23)
Since the T-principle p ⊃ p doesn’t hold for belief, 3.23 is acceptable and ought to catch
Soames’ intention, as long as «it is possible that» here is simply understood as the claim that
there is a model such that the condition holds. But what about the second premise and the
alleged conclusion? Without a notion of believing something of the actual world in the sense
of being in direct acquaintance with the actual world (as a whole), which has been rejected
above, the second premise cannot be formalized properly. Let us therefore move to the alleged
conclusion C1. It seems that this can be given as follows, where this time the iota operator is
used (as defined in Appendix A):
M, g,w0  ¬0[1 Pn ≡ 1 P (ιx(@Fx))] (3.24)
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Just like in a wide scope analysis, there is an additional assumption of the rigidified de-
scription analysis that has to be made explicit: that there is a unary property that picks out the
semantic referent of a proper name in the actual world. And thus, if n is regarded a rigid con-
stant that is the correct analysis of a proper name in question, the following assumption must
hold as well:
M, g,w0  n = ιx@Fx (3.25)
Given this assumption and the assumption that n is rigid, 3.24 is a contradiction in the current
FOML setting, because any FOML formula containing a rigid constant n is equivalent to the
corresponding formula containing a iota term ιx@Px instead of n, as long as n = ιx@Px
holds in the actual world.36 So Soames’ argument doesn’t apply to the rigidified description
analysis presented in section 3.4.1, because under this analysis C1 doesn’t follow from P1 and
P2.
It is not denied here that Soames’ argument may hold for the sorts of propositions he pre-
sumes, and on the basis of this view the above attempts to formalize parts of the argument might
be considered inadequate. However, it cannot be argued against the rigidified description anal-
ysis by arguing that some way of providing the formal semantics of rigidified descriptions makes
formulas containing them non-equivalent to corresponding formulas containing rigid constants,
if there are at the same time more or less standard ways to provide the formal semantics of rigid-
ified descriptions that don’t have this undesirable property. Soames would have to show why his
way of implementing rigidified descriptions is appropriate and the above one isn’t. Since his way
doesn’t seem to yield the intended truth-conditions, as argued by Soames himself, it is hard to
see how this argument could be made.
3.4.3 Further Literature
The literature on the debate between modal descriptivists and Millians is vast and so the reader
is referred to the following publications for more information. Early defences of description
theory and indirect reference on the basis of his ideal verificationism can be found in the work
of Michael Dummett, see for example (Dummett 1981, 1991). Jackson (1998) also defends
description theory in general. Recent defences of specific variants of description theory can be
found in (Geurts 1997), (Stanley 1999, 2001), (Sosa 2001), (Nelson 2002), and (Hunter
2005). Abbott (2002) challenges some of the linguistic theses defended by Geurts (1997) about
the nearness of proper names to definite NPs, who replies to this critique in (Geurts 2002).
Arguments against Nelson (2002) and Stanley (2001) supporting Soames (1998, 2002) can be
found in (Everett 2005). Other sophisticated arguments against the wide scope analysis can be
found in (Caplan 2005).
3.4.4 Concluding Remarks
Although not all of the various arguments against rigidified descriptions could be addressed in
the previous sections, it has at least be made plausible that descriptivism can deal with the chal-
36This is proved in Appendix B.II.
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lenges raised by Kripke and his successors. However, there’s one aspect of Soames’ critique that
applies to all versions of rigidified descriptions discussed so far. As Soames notes, in versions
of description theory based on so-called double-index theories like the Logic of Demonstratives
of Kaplan (1989) the semantic content of a rigidified description, i.e. its truth-conditional or
cognitive content, does no longer contain any descriptive criteria and is therefore Millian in na-
ture.37 This remark also applies to the ways to rigidify descriptions that have been presented
here. Since wide scope descriptions, descriptions rigidified by an actuality operator, and rigid
constants in a more or less standard modal logical framework specify the same truth-conditional
content, because they are equivalent to each other under the premise that the respective descrip-
tion determines the same referent in the actual world as the respective rigid constant denotes,
rigid constants can be used as an alternative way to specify the semantic content of a proper
name. But specifications of semantic content that use rigid constants are Millian and don’t en-
code any way in which a referent is being given to a speaker or a thinking person in her cognition.
With that regard the conflict between descriptivists and purporters of direct reference is rather
artificial. In order to maintain the original motivations for indirect reference, the descriptivist
has to loosen rigidity a bit with respect to doxastic modalities, either in the target language or,
preferably, in the syntax–semantics interface. This will be the topic of the next chapter.
37See (Soames 2002, pp. 49-50). Double-index theories will be addressed in chapter 6.
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4.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, a description theory of reference is outlined that preserves the original motivation
for indirect reference theory while being compatible with the rigidity thesis. Context-dependence
is ignored for the time being; as the subsequent chapters will show it can be added without sub-
stantially changing the underlying concept of reference. In order to make the argumentative
goals of the subsequent sections clear, an outline of the proposed descriptivist account of refer-
ence is first given in section 4.2. Section 4.3 then addresses the meaning theoretical background
of the proposal. The main goal of this section is to show that cognitive content is best regarded
as the attribution of a de dicto attitude that may be obtained from an utterance by a Kripkean
disquotation principle in case of the sender and by assuming acceptance of the utterance in case
of a recipient. The consequences of this for the account of speaker reference are discussed in sec-
tion 4.4, in which arguments for Thesis 1 are given. The resulting account of reference separates
definite descriptions encoding speaker reference from definite descriptions encoding semantic
reference much in the same way as Neo-Fregeans distinguish between the referent and its mode
of being given. As will be argued, descriptions encoding speaker reference and semantic refer-
ence by means of a proper name need to have at least one common denominator: the property
of being called by that name (Thesis 5). This nominal description theory is defended against the
circularity objection, but it is also pointed out, pro Thesis 3 and 4, that other kind of descriptive
content can be assumed as the objective, public meaning of a proper name, because semantic
reference is the result of an idealization from actual speaker references. In section 4.5 the role of
identification criteria for speaker reference will be discussed and the notion of relativized rigid-
ity will be introduced to deal with nested modalities. Proper names are rigid with respect to
metaphysical modalities, but not rigid with respect to doxastic modalities under de dicto inter-
pretation. Finally, section 4.6 will deal with more formal aspects of the account: How it can
be implemented and whether it is compositional. The conclusion at the end of this section will
be that a description theory that preserves the original motivations of indirect reference theory
and adequately deals with the rigidity thesis can be implemented compositionally in the target
language, but that compositionality in this case isn’t really desirable.
4.2 Outline of the Proposal
The version of descriptivism that will be argued for boils down to the following claims. A speaker
associates two different criteria with a proper name. The first criterion is the property of being
called by that name. This property comprises all linguistic conventions governing the use of
proper names in general and must be associated by virtue linguistic competence; it is a minimal
part of the linguistic meaning of the proper name. In ordinary epistemic situations, this property
alone doesn’t suffice for the purpose of identifying the semantic referent. The second criterion
is the properties that according to the speaker’s beliefs determine the purported referent of the
proper name. These identification criteria aren’t part of the linguistic meaning of a proper name,
but can be individual to each speaker. Speaker reference by means of a proper name can be
analyzed by the use of a formal definite description φ comprising the property of being called by
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Figure 4.1: A dual aspect theory that identifies cognitive and truth-conditional content.
the respective name and the identification criteria the speaker associates with that name, within a
formal attribution of belief to that speaker. This description is rigid in relation to any subsequent
modalities but non-rigid with respect to the doxastic modality representing the formal belief
attribution. Semantic reference of a proper name can be analyzed by the use of a formal definite
description ψ comprising only the property of being called by that name (nominal description
theory). Since it is an idealization from actual speaker references, it may be said to additionally
comprise certain properties of the semantic referent (external description theory). In both cases,
the description must be rigid with respect to doxastic and alethic modalities for the purpose
of analyzing semantic reference. Successful identification of the referent of a proper name by
a speaker can be formulated as the condition that the semantic referent picked out by ψ is
identical to the doxastic referent picked out by φ. The formal attributions of belief that are used
in the target language for analyzing speaker reference correspond with the result of analyzing
de dicto readings of belief ascriptions in the source language, but this correspondence is only an
approximation.
4.3 Meaning Theoretical Background
The main purpose of a theory of reference is to give an explanation and description of denotation
and speaker reference. In the present case this is done on the background of a dual aspect theory
of meaning, where semantic singular reference is related to the truth-conditional role of singular
terms and speaker reference is related to the truth-conditional and the cognitive role of singular
terms. In the following subsections, the nature of this relation will be clarified.
4.3.1 Genuine Dual Aspect Theories
Consider the Fregean meaning theory depicted in figure 4.1. This is a dual aspect theory in which
cognitive and truth-conditional content are represented by the same sort of meaning-constituting
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Figure 4.2: A dual aspect theory that separates cognitive from truth-conditional content.
entities. As has been sketched in section 3.3.2 of chapter 3, the direct reference view has prob-
lems with such a theory, because it is hard to adequately deal with speaker reference in a purely
Millian fashion. As a remedy, dual aspect approaches that separate the truth-conditional role
from the cognitive role of expressions have been mentioned briefly in the last chapter. These ap-
proaches are illustrated in figure 4.2. Such theories may be called genuine dual aspect theories and
are also known as mixed theories.1 In this kind of theory the cognitive content of an utterance for
the sender or a recipient of the utterance doesn’t need to be identical with the truth-conditional
content of the utterance. This independent notion of cognitive content then accounts for in-
formativity puzzles, referential opacity, and related phenomena. To explain speaker reference,
one may for example assume that the truth-conditional content of a singular term is enriched
by a mode of presentation, i.e. specification of the way in which the referent is given to the
speaker. Although there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong in principle with these approaches,
they obfuscate the different nature of the aspects in question. While truth-conditional content
is a specification of public, general meaning, cognitive content always depends on a person and
her prior beliefs.
4.3.2 The Role of Disquotation
One relatively weak objection to genuine dual aspect theories has some similarities with the
circularity objection against Fregean senses mentioned in section 2.2.4 of chapter 2. Consider
the cognitive and truth-conditional content of an utterance in comparison with the respective
contents of a belief ascription embedding the sentence taken in the same conversational context,
as in the following examples.
1Mixed approaches are for example advocated in (Richard 1990) or (Crimmins 1992).
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(4.1) Alice: Bob loves Carol.
(4.2) Alice believes that Bob loves Carol.
We may call the cognitive and truth-conditional content of 4.1 CG1 and TC1 respectively,
and the contents expressed and conveyed by 4.2 CG2 and TC2 respectively. So TC2 encodes the
truth-conditions of the whole utterance of 4.2. These truth-conditions are the conditions under
which Alice believes that Bob loves Carol, i.e. they are the state of affairs that have to be the
case when Alice holds the attitude of believing towards the love of Bob to Carol, or, to put it
simpler, when Alice believes that Bob loves Carol. But then a specification of TC2 encodes at
least to some extent what CG1 encodes, as long as cognitive content is taken to represent what
is relevant for the behavior of a speaker. After all, it is the beliefs and various similar attitudes
of a person that are relevant for her behavior. So it seems that CG1 conveyed by utterance 4.1
corresponds with the state of affairs expressed by 4.2 either taken de re or de dicto. A notion of
cognitive content understood in this way would be redundant.
In the above form this argument is weak. A belief ascription taken de dicto is analyzed as
a relation between a person and the cognitive content of the embedded sentence, just as in the
original Fregean picture a sentence embedded by an attitude verb would have the Fregean sense
as its odd reference. But then the truth-conditions of the whole belief ascription, the state of
affairs described by the ascription, are more specific than the cognitive content, simply because
the cognitive content is a specification of the relatum, of what is sometimes called the ‘object of
belief’, in a relational analysis of the belief ascription in its de dicto reading. Hence, there isn’t
any mismatch. A special, non-Millian form of content is needed in order to account for the refer-
ential opacity of de dicto belief ascriptions, whereas the analysis of the whole ascription makes
use of this notion in order to give the truth-conditions for one specific reading of one specific
attitude. Understood in this way, cognitive content is simply the relatum of de dicto belief in an
ambiguity theory of belief like for example that of Frege, whereas truth-conditional content is
the relatum of de re belief. This counter-argument is certainly correct, but then cognitive content
cannot be taken to encode any relevance for behavior, since it is only part of the specification
of an attitude, but doesn’t specify the attitude itself. Cognitive content understood in this way
cannot be part of literal meaning either. It is derived by Kripke’s famous language-dependent
principle of disquotation first stated in (Kripke 1979). He formulates it the following way.
P Kri 8 (Principle of Disquotation). “If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents
to ‘p’, then he believes that p.” (Kripke 1979, p. 112-3; orig. in double quotes)
Kripke also discusses the following stronger version of the principle.
P Kri 9 (Strong Principle of Disquotation). “A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be
disposed to sincere reflective assent to ‘p’ if and only if he believes that p.” (Kripke 1979, p. 113)
At least if the derived belief is taken as de dicto belief these principles are not very contro-
versial.2 Directly corresponding to disquotation on the side of the recipient is acceptance, i.e. the
2Kripke uses them to derive de re belief in order to point out the problems with the Millian view described in the last
chapter.
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case when a hearer adds the meaning of a given utterance to his belief system, in the simplest
case without having to revise or retract other beliefs.3
On the basis of the above disquotation principles, one may argue against the notion of cogni-
tive content of a genuine dual aspect theory as follows. Disquotation only works insofar as it is
limited to normal, sincere speakers and assertive utterances. There is no reason to assume that
an assertive utterance has another literal meaning if it is uttered by a non-normal or lying speaker
than it has if it is uttered by a sincere and honest speaker. So a belief derived from an utterance
by disquotation isn’t conveyed by an utterance in the same way as the utterance expresses a fact
or has a certain meaning; it is only conveyed under certain normal conditions. But if cognitive
content serves as a relatum in de dicto analyzes of belief ascriptions, a mismatch would arise if a
sentence would express cognitive content with respect to a speaker independently of a de dicto
belief ascription. For consider utterance 4.3 and 4.4 in the same conversational context.
(4.3) Alice: Bob loves Carol.
(4.4) Alice believes that Bob doesn’t love Carol. (de dicto)
Suppose that 4.4 is true. The fact that 4.3 is a lie or at least an attempted lie doesn’t affect the
literal meaning of 4.3. But then some cognitive content for Alice that can be directly derived from
4.3, from the utterance alone, will be the converse of what Alice actually believes. Examples like
this show that cognitive content of utterances is not a feature of literal meaning, but rather must
be a pragmatic notion that is based on previous beliefs of the respective discourse participant.
For it is not clear what the purpose of some literal cognitive content of 4.3 would be, given that
Alice’s belief state, part of which is expressed by 4.4, is relevant for her actions and behavioral
dispositions and not anything derived from her utterance taken literally.4 The same applies to
the case when the receiver seems to accept the utterance, but doesn’t really accept it. The literal
meaning of an utterance isn’t determined by the sender’s or any receiver’s attitudes towards the
utterance, but the respective behaviorally relevant cognitive content of an utterance must match
those attitudes to some degree.
4.3.3 Dual Aspect Theory Revised
The above considerations don’t show that genuine dual aspect theories fail, since it is anyway rel-
ative to the descriptive goals of the meaning theory what counts as a relevant aspect of meaning.
For example, an idiolectal, purely representational, and cognitivist meaning theory will likely be
based on a primitive notion of cognitive content and at least prima facie there is no problem with
3Gärdenfors (1988) calls the simplest case that doesn’t involve any revision of other beliefs expansion. Here the less
technical term acceptance of the utterance will be used, which comprises silent belief revision/retraction by the recipient,
too. Cf. (Gärdenfors 1988, Ch. 3).
4Not all, but only truth-asserting attitudes allow one to draw a connection between holding the attitude and behavioral
dispositions of terms used in ascribing the attitude, as it is done when belief ascriptions are read de dicto. A truth-
asserting attitude is one that requires the holder of the attitude to believe that she holds the attitude. Note that this is
quite different from saying that the attitude must be reflexive, for example «to doubt» is not reflexive but truth-asserting,
and entirely different from saying that a verb is factive, for example «to believe» is not factive but truth-asserting in its
de dicto reading. Cf. (Rast 2002, p. 66).
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Figure 4.3: Truth-conditional versus cognitive content in the revised dual aspect theory.
this in general. However, the above considerations show that genuine dual aspect theories are
misleading in a truth-conditional setting. The picture drawn in figure 4.2 on page 68 is inad-
equate, because—trivial as this may sound—cognitive content can only be determined relative
to someone interpreting an utterance. Any notion of cognitive content that doesn’t depend on
a certain person will of course be inadequate for describing an aspect of that person’s linguistic
or extralinguistic behavior. A more appropriate picture is drawn in figure 4.3. In this picture,
BELIEVE stands for a belief predicate or operator in some formal language of analysis, but it is
left open which language. The target language itself can for example consist of set theoretical
expressions that have no further interpretation or of a logical language that is interpreted in
some appropriate way. The exact implementation and formal semantics of the belief predicate
or operator is dictated by descriptive and explanatory goals of the notion of the cognitive role in
the respective meaning theory and possibly other factors. As an approximation that will be as-
sumed from now on, the attitude used to describe the cognitive significance of linguistic material
is considered to correspond systematically with the result of analyzing natural language belief
ascriptions taken in their de dicto reading. Thus, for example the cognitive significance of 4.3
obtained by disquotation under normal circumstances will formally be specified in the same way
as the truth-conditional content of 4.5 in de dicto reading.
(4.5) Alice believes that Bob loves Carol. (de dicto)
The difference between the truth-conditional content of the embedded sentence and the cog-
nitive content of the embedded sentence in 4.5 under this assumption lies in whatever distin-
guishes the de re analysis of 4.5 from its de dicto analysis. There is an equivocation to watch out
for. Suppose the following formula of a putative and unspecified formal target language with
respect to some intended model was the result of analyzing 4.5.
(4.6) BELIEVE(Alice, love(Bob, Carol))
In the somewhat misleading sense mentioned in the last section, love(Bob, Carol)—be it
given a proof theoretical or a relational semantics—is a specification of the cognitive content
of 4.3 for Alice in intended target language models. In another sense, the whole formula with
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respect to the way it is interpreted represents the cognitive content of the utterance, since rel-
evance for Alice’s behavior is only encoded if the whole formula is true in the intended target
language model.5 The term cognitive content will from now on be used for the whole attitude
attribution, i.e. for a specification of semantic content that encodes relevance for behavior. For
the relatum of the attitude that is part of this content, the term partial cognitive content may be
used.
It must be stressed that identifying the belief attribution that encodes cognitive content with
the result of analyzing de dicto readings of belief ascriptions may only be a rough approximation
and the feasibility of such an identification depends on the philosophical interpretation of de
dicto readings and the explanatory role of cognitive content in linguistic theory. De dicto belief
indicates utterance dispositions of the believer and therefore is an obvious choice for describing
the cognitive significance of linguistic expressions to a speaker that the notion of cognitive con-
tent is customarily supposed to encode. Ultimately, this choice depends on the empirical criteria
used for determining the cognitive content of utterances as opposed to the empirical criteria used
for finding out in which cases de dicto readings of belief ascriptions seem to disallow the substi-
tution of co-referential expressions in the embedded sentence salva veritate. If for example the
notion of cognitive content was mainly intended to account for the informativity of utterances,
then it would perhaps be more desirable to provide a quotational analysis according to which
cognitive content is encoded by a formal attitude attribution with a reading like utterance u is
informative to degree i for speaker a.6 The notion of cognitive content and talk about the cog-
nitive significance of expressions comprises different aspects that are all in one way or another
relevant for the linguistic behavior of a speaker and explanations thereof, but a more detailed
look may reveal that not all of these aspects can be caught by the same kind of attitude involving
the same kind of partial cognitive content. Nevertheless, a correspondence of de dicto belief with
the attitude used to encode cognitive content will from now on presumed, and in this view par-
tial cognitive content is the object of belief in a relational analysis of de dicto belief ascriptions.
By this assumption we restrict the notion of cognitive significance to the kind of relevance of
expressions for linguistic behavior that is elicited by de dicto readings of belief ascriptions. One
criterion for such readings, and perhaps the only one, is whether the respective believer accepts
a certain linguistic expression as purportedly truth-preserving substitute for another expression
or not.
4.4 Towards a Theory of Indirect Reference
The discussion of the last section has concerned meaning theory in general. Partial cognitive
content is a form of subjective meaning. Mates (1950) discusses attitude ascriptions in which
general terms seemingly cannot be substituted salva veritate, even if they are customarily consid-
ered being synonymous. Such phenomena are known asMates’ Puzzle. They are the general term
5Alice in the formal language analysis should be mapped to Alice and not to Bob, Bob to Bob and not to Alice, and
so on. In examples like the above it is always assumed that the expressions of the target language have their intended
reading.
6Cf. section 2.4 of chapter 2.
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analogue to what has been discussed under the label of referential opacity for singular terms. If
in the examples described by Mates (1950) the substitution of synonymous general terms for
each other can indeed change the truth-value of the whole belief ascription, which may be called
the semantic view on Mates’ puzzle, then this would justify stipulating a subjective meaning for
general terms. It is, however, doubtful whether a fully competent speaker can associate a sub-
jective meaning with a general term without thereby loosing the privilege of being a competent
speaker. In the context of a theory of reference, this question can be left open. As far as only
reference of singular terms are concerned, the arguments forwarded in the last section lead to
a revised picture which will be laid out in the following subsections. The argumentation will
proceed as follows. First, it will be argued that the indirect reference view doesn’t for itself solve
the problem of accounting for the truth-conditional and cognitive content of referential terms.
The indirect reference theorist faces basically the same problems as the Millian. It will how-
ever turn out that once semantic and speaker reference are properly kept apart from each other,
descriptivism becomes a viable alternative to Millian accounts that are ‘enhanced’ by modes of
presentations or similar derivative partial cognitive content. The proposals NDT and EDT to be
made in this section will be a bit simplified. The full account will be given in section 4.5.
4.4.1 The Problem of Rigidity for Descriptivism
As has been laid out in chapter 2, the original motivation of the indirect reference theorist is to
account for cognitive and epistemic aspects of speaker reference. This approach is based on the
assumption that in case identifying reference fails the referent referred to by a speaker and the
actual semantic referent differ from each other. The purported entity of which a speaker believes
that a proper name or another referential expression refers to will from now on be called doxastic
referent. Given that, let us return to the issue raised at the end of last chapter. Does the wide
scope theory or descriptions rigidified by an actuality operator preserve the original motivation
of the indirect reference theorist? As already suggested, the answer is a straightforward: No.
The descriptivist endorsing rigidified descriptions faces the same problems as the Millian, if his
version of rigidified descriptions yields specifications of semantic content that are equivalent to
those of the Millian. Consider 4.7, where1 is interpreted as a doxastic KD45 modality encoding
rational belief.
M, g,w0  1
ιx[@Gx]Fx (4.7)
The evaluation of @Gx jumps back from all worlds accessible by the R1 relation to the actual
world. It is hard to see how this representation could be read as encoding genuine speaker ref-
erence without presuming identifying reference. If a speaker associates a rigidified description
with a proper name, then the actuality operator in the description ensures that the description
determines the actual referent of that name and not any doxastic referent. Thus, from an epis-
temic point of view, a speaker cannot ‘apply’ a rigidified description in order to determine the
referent. Anyone who tries to determine an object by means of certain identification criteria will
assume that the object actually satisfies those criteria uniquely, but the crucial point is of course
that he might be wrong in determining the actual object by means of those criteria at any time.
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That identifying reference is not a requirement on behalf of speaker competence has already
been shown in section 2.5 of chapter 2.
4.4.2 Referential Multiplicity
Given the possibility that identifying reference can fail, the problem for the indirect reference
theorist is basically the same problem as that for the purporter of direct reference. While the
direct reference theorist will enrich or replace the truth-conditional content of the proper name,
i.e. a Millian specification of the referent itself, by some cognitive content in order to deal ad-
equately with referential opacity, the indirect reference theorist has to change his analysis of
proper names as well. The indirect reference theorist is forced to assume two descriptions as
analysis of a proper name whenever the result of this analysis occurs within an attitude attribu-
tion that corresponds with a natural language attitude ascription that can be taken de re or de
dicto, as de dicto readings are the linguistic symptom of failed identifying reference. One de-
scription encodes semantic reference and must be rigid, whereas the other description encodes
speaker reference and can only be rigid with respect to metaphysical modalities but not with
respect to a doxastic modality that encodes an attitude of the respective speaker. A simplified,
yet concrete example will illustrate this point of view. Consider 4.8, where tense is ignored.
(4.8) Bob believes that Aristotle was fond of dogs.
The de re reading of this example may be analyzed as 4.7 on page 73. The de dicto reading
of the example, on the other hand, may be analyzed as follows.
M, g,w0  1
ιxGxFx (4.9)
According to 4.9, «Aristotle» is not rigid with respect to the doxastic modality encoding Bob’s
rational belief. Both analyses make use of a property that the respective referent must uniquely
satisfy, but in case of semantic reference, the descriptive content of the proper name is evaluated
independently of Bob’s belief, whereas in case of speaker reference it has to depend on his prior
beliefs. In the latter case, ιxGx might determine an object in the worlds that are compatible with
Bob’s belief that is different from what the same definite description determines if it is evaluated
with respect to the actual world. Here is another example based on Frege’s morning star–evening
star example:7
(4.10) Bob believes that Hesperus isn’t identical with Phosphorus.
(4.11) Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.
These sentences may tentatively be analyzed as follows.
M, g,w0  1
ιx[Hx] ιy[Py](x 6= y) (4.12)
M, g,w0  1
ιx[@Hx] ιy[@Py](x 6= y) (4.13)
7Cf. section 2.4 in chapter 2.
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M, g,w0 
ιx[@Hx] ιy[@Py](x = y) (4.14)
If 4.11 is mapped to 4.14 and holds inM , then the de re reading 4.13 of 4.10 cannot be true
in M .8 However, the de dicto reading 4.12 may come out true in the same model M , because
Bob might believe that the two descriptions determine two different objects. In other words,
one object that exists in the actual world is split up into two different objects in the worlds that
are compatible with a person’s beliefs. Likewise, a person may be uncertain about the identity
of Hesperus and Phosphorus, just in case in some belief worlds Hesperus and Phosphorus are
identical while in others they aren’t. This way of looking at referential opacity goes back to
Hintikka (1962), who has coined the term referential multiplicity for it.9
The Millian can make this analysis by using non-rigid constants, but he looses the epistemic
aspects that are encoded by formal definite descriptions. Within the scope of a doxastic modality,
the formal definite description corresponding to a proper name represents the properties by
means of which the respective attitude holder is enabled to identify the semantic referent of
the proper name, if he succeeds to do so. Identifying reference then holds under the following
condition.
M, g,w0 
ιx[@Px] ιy[1 Py](x = y) (4.15)
4.4.3 Modeling Speaker Reference with Definite Descriptions
So far, the analysis doesn’t catch all of the descriptivist’s motivations. According to the view
on indirect reference laid out in chapter 2 a speaker associates some meaning with a proper
name, but there is no requirement that this meaning must be shared and public. Recall that
Frege considered it a desideratum that every speaker associates the same Fregean sense with a
disambiguated proper name but conceded that this goal isn’t reached by natural languages.10
Different speakers may associate different descriptions with a proper name, simply because they
might have different opinions about the referent of that name. So it must be taken as a sim-
plification that in the examples 4.9 and 4.7 or 4.14 and 4.12 the referent is determined by the
respective same unary property.
This leads to the question, whether the descriptions used in analyzing reference of different
speakers by means of a proper name must have something in common. This is then the descrip-
tive meaning of that name, as it would occur in the rigidified description determining the name’s
semantic referent. What, in other words, is the common denominator that all speakers using
a certain proper name must associate with that name? Descriptivists have given differing an-
swers to this question leading to various restricted description theories.11 In the following, two
answers will be considered. The first answer is that because of Kripke’s epistemic and semantic
arguments, which boil down to the claim that a speaker doesn’t have to believe of an object to
have a certain property just by virtue of using a name that semantically refers to it, only one
8The actuality operator is of course redundant in 4.14, but has been added for reasons of systematicity.
9See (Hintikka 1962, pp. 138-141).
10See section 2.2.3 of chapter 2.
11Cf. section 2.3.2 and the literature mentioned in section 3.4.3.
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property can be assumed by virtue of speaker competence: the property of being the bearer of
that name. Bach (1981, 1987), who is also one of its most vigorous defenders, calls this nominal
description theory (NDT).12 According to this view, a competent speakeri using «Aristotle» must
at least presume silently that whoever this name refers to is called «Aristotle» in hisi speaker com-
munity. Users and interpreters of the name «Aristotle» might disagree about almost any other
property of Aristotle, but they can hardly disagree about the fact that he is called «Aristotle» in
their own speaker community. The second answer is that some criteria have to be presumed
as the meaning of a proper name, but that these criteria don’t have to be known by speakers
by virtue of their competence. This is essentially classical description theory suitably rigidified
accompanied by a sort of social externalism, according to which the ‘objective’ meaning of a
proper name that determines its semantic referent may be fixed by experts or social processes.
It will from now on be called external description theory (EDT). This view must also minimally
include the property of being called such-and-such, since implicit knowledge of this property is a
requirement by virtue of linguistic competence and it should therefore also enter the description
used for semantic reference.
In the light of the last chapter both views seem to be irreconcilable with Kripke’s modal,
epistemic, and semantic arguments, but this is not the case, since semantic reference is an ide-
alization from actual speaker references. The required degree of this idealization depends not
on linguistic factors, but on the purpose of the notion of semantic reference. If one doesn’t want
to explain identifying reference and failures thereof, epistemic aspects of speaker reference, or
referential opacity, one is free to use Millian specifications of truth-conditional content in a single
aspect theory. If one wants to assert that there must be some intersubjective criteria determin-
ing the semantic referent if the notion of semantic reference is to make sense at all, then he
will likely subscribe to the rigidified description view. For a Kripkean can only point out the
obvious and trivial fact that a proper name semantically refers to whatever has been given that
name, which is completely pointless and unusable for identifying purposes. Required by virtue
of speaker competence is only, as smallest common denominator, the property of being called
such-and-such.13 This minimal view on semantic reference propagated by NDT is illustrated in
figure 4.4, where A(x) abbreviates the property of being called «Aristotle». This position differs
from that in (Bach 1987), because in the current view speaker reference is strictly separated
from semantic reference.
4.5 Objections and Refinements
Some issues that have been suppressed in the last section will be addressed now. First it will be
briefly pointed out why Kripkean epistemic and semantic arguments don’t apply to EDT, then the
circularity objection against EDT and NDT will be dismissed by pointing out that being called
such-and-such doesn’t presuppose a theory of reference, third the role of identification criteria
12See (Bach 1981, p. 371), (Bach 1987, pp. 135). Bach remarks that NDT has first briefly been considered by Russell
(1919) and later been revived by Loar (1976). Jacobson (1990, pp. 387-8) also defends NDT.
13Bach and other purporters of NDT might disagree, but being called such-and-such and being the bearer of the
respective names are in the following considered the same property.
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Figure 4.4: Using descriptions to specify semantic reference and speaker reference of someone’s
use of the name «Aristotle», where A(x) is read as x is called «Aristotle». (simplified view)
will be clarified in section 4.5.4, nested modalities are taken into consideration in section 4.5.5,
and a summary of the proposed description account of reference will be given in section 4.5.6.
4.5.1 Defense Against Epistemic and Semantic Arguments
Kripke’s epistemic argument can be summarized as follows. Description theory predicts that
certain statements are analytic. If further analyticity is conflated with the epistemic notion of
a relative apriori, like Kripke and some of his followers do, these statements would also be
apriori relative to the language in question. But these predictions, so the argument, are implau-
sible. Kripke’s semantic argument is relying on semantic ‘intuitions’ about the meaning of proper
names. It boils down to the claim that speakers often cannot and don’t have to be able to pro-
vide a definite description as the meaning of a proper name.14 Given the considerations of the
previous sections, none of these arguments is a sound objection to NDT or EDT.
Let us turn to the epistemic argument first. Since EDT comprises NDT, it suffices to show that
the argument doesn’t apply to EDT. Consider now the following utterance, where tense will be
ignored.
(4.16) Aristotle wrote the Nicomachean Ethics.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that being the writer of the Nicomachean Ethics, N(x),
would be the stipulated property for determining semantic reference of «Aristotle» in combina-
tion with the property A(x) of being called «Aristotle». The analysis is thus:
M, g,w0 
ιx@(Ax ∧Nx)Nx (4.17)
14See (Kripke 1981, pp. 78-85).
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If a person called «Aristotle» has existed and written the Nicomachean Ethics, then 4.17 is
indeed analytic.15 The EDT descriptivist will not consider this implausible, because associating
the property N with «Aristotle» in this account isn’t required by virtue of linguistic competence,
and a speaker referring to Aristotle could assume completely different identification criteria.
(Notice that if someone else wrote the Nicomachean Ethics 4.17 was false.) Consider now an
analysis of speaker reference by means of «Aristotle», where 1 is a doxastic modal operator
encoding rational belief and I is the speaker’s identification criterion.
M, g,w0  1
ιx(Ax ∧ Ix)Ix (4.18)
If the description indeed denotes in the worlds compatible with the respective speaker’s be-
lief, then this speaker indeed believes that the referent of the analyzed proper name satisfies
the presumed identification criteria. If for example Bob believes that Aristotle is the greatest
philosopher of the Antique, then he will indeed believe that the person called «Aristotle», who
is the greatest philosopher of the Antique, is the greatest philosopher of the Antique. Again,
the descriptivist will not consider this implausible. Any kind of apriori knowledge can, however,
not be derived from such beliefs, because this would require establishing the existence of the
semantic referent and identifying reference, neither of which can be done apriori.16
The semantic argument, on the other hand, may be a plausible objection to some versions of
description theory but doesn’t really grip in the present case. The only property that EDT and
NDT require by virtue of linguistic competence is the property of being called by the respective
name, and it seems quite reasonable to assume that whoever competently uses a proper name
like «Aristotle» must associate with that name the property of being called «Aristotle». It is an
uttermost trivial requirement on a speaker to implicitly know that the semantic referent of a
proper name, if it exists, has the property of being called by that name. Of course, Aristotle is
called «Aristotle» in my speaker community—whoever he is. Unless the speaker is also able to
identify the semantic referent, this implicit knowledge just amounts to knowing the conventions
governing the use of proper names. It could be objected to EDT, though, that if it doesn’t require
a speaker to associate the stipulated properties with a given proper name by virtue of linguistic
competence, then they simply aren’t a matter of meaning. To some extent this critique is justified,
and NDT is favorable as a minimal theory. On the other hand, the social externalism presumed
by EDT seems reasonable at least for some proper names, for example those of famous or well-
known people or places. Some experts’ identification criteria in this view ideally coincide with
the criteria that determine the semantic referent of a proper name, but this is not a general
requirement on behalf of any speaker. In this view, the objective meaning of a proper name may
remain external to a speaker’s cognition.17
15There’s no knowledge expressed in 4.17 and so an a priori doesn’t play a role and implementing a priori versus a
posteriori knowledge is far from being trivial. If this is done, then certain statements like 4.16 will be knowable a priori
(relative to a language), but there is nothing wrong with that from a descriptivist’s point of view.
16That is not to say that the existence of any kind of objects must be established a posteriori. The existence of
mathematical objects can be established apriori, but «Aristotle» in this case isn’t the name of a mathematical object and
according to NDT this fact is part of the property of being called «Aristotle».
17Cf. (Burge 1979b).
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4.5.2 Defense Against the Circularity Objection
Both Kripke and his followers have claimed that NDT violates the circularity prohibition.18 As
the invention of the wheel has shown, circularity is not always a bad thing. However, as Bach
argues in (Bach 1981, pp. 379-80) and (Bach 1987, pp. 159-61), nominal description theory
isn’t circular anyway. Since Bach argues on the background of an intentional, pragmatic theory
of reference19 that is not assumed here, not all of his arguments can be transfered directly to
the present case, but his main argument doesn’t hinge on the particular theory of reference he
defends. Bach points out that NDT simply isn’t a theory of reference in the strict sense, but
merely a “[. . . ] modest theory of the modest meaning of names.” (Bach 1987, p. 161) In his
postscript to Thought and Reference he further clarifies:
“I take bearing a certain name to be a matter of convention, rather like having a
certain license number. [. . .We] can immediately understand a sentence containing a
name we have never heard before, so that understanding a name as a linguistic item
does not require knowing who its (intended) bearer is.” (Bach 1994, p. 8)
Except for the appendix “intended”, which is important in Bach’s intentional framework, this
is also the basic defense against the circularity objection to be mounted here. Consider for a
moment what it means to be called by a certain name in a speaker community. For a person this
can for example mean to react in a certain way to the proper name of which she is the bearer.
For example, Alice will recognize the name «Alice» when she hears or reads it and reacts in a way
that depends on the situation and the speech act, in which her name was used. She might have
been called in the literal sense of the word by someone shouting at her, which in languages like
Latin requires the vocative case. As a result of this linguistic action, Alice might turn around. Just
as well, Alice might find her full name on a bill and therefore assume that she has to pay it. Being
called by a certain name in the first instance only means that the bearer of the name is aware of
certain linguistic conventions governing the use of proper names and being able to recognize
her own name. Furthermore it means that another speaker, say Bob, is also able to understand
the property of being called «Alice» in this way, and in fact must be able to do so prior to any
competent use of the name. Bob knows by virtue of knowing that «Alice» is a proper name, that
whenever he shouts «Alice», Alice will react in a way that will often be different from the way
in which other people will react, at least when she has no particular disinterest in meeting Bob.
Likewise, Bob knows, by virtue of implicitly knowing that «Alice» is an English proper name, that
Alice has to pay a bill if her full name is written at the respective place on the bill and if other
non-linguistic conventions are fulfilled. Bob implicitly knows these facts as a competent user of
English proper names irrespectively of any identification criteria or other beliefs about the bearer
of the proper name.
This way of understanding the property of being called such-and-such neither presupposes
semantic reference nor speaker reference, nor does it explain how the reference of a term is fixed
18See 3.2.3 of chapter 3; cf. (Devitt 1981, pp. 21-3).
19See (Bach 1987, Ch.3). In particular, his background theory is not compatible with the current considerations
because according to him reference is generally a four-place relation including the audience and it is based on a speaker’s
communicative intentions (Bach 1987, p. 52). Intentions play no role in the current proposal.
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in an initial act of baptism. The property is rather understood as a set of general conventions
about the use of expressions for naming objects.20 These conventions comprise ways to react to a
name when you’re the bearer of that name and ways of labeling objects with a name, for example
by printing the name on them or by wearing name tags, or listing names in phone books, yellow
pages, or Who’s Who dictionaries. Being called such-and-such also comprises morphosyntactic
features of a name, for example that it can appear as a grammatical subject, that it is inflected
in a certain way, etc., and semanto-pragmatic features, for example that «Alice» is canonically
associated with female humans, whereas «A17161781788» doesn’t have this association and by
default assumption may rather be the proper name of an artifact, that anyone who competently
uses the name implicitly knows that it ought to refer to exactly one referent in a given situation
of its use, and so on. It is also part of the linguistic competence of the user of a proper name that
it is interpreted as a rigid term, i.e. a competent user of a proper name implicitly knows that it
must be interpreted independently of a specification of counterfactual circumstances.
Why do Kripke and some of his followers believe that a thorough explanation of the con-
ventions governing the use of names violates the circularity prohibition? Perhaps some of them
think, as they focus solely on semantic reference, that implicitly knowing or associating the
property of being called such-and-such presumes identifying reference. This is, however, not the
case. Conversely, the linguistic conventions that are bundled in the property of being called such-
and-such have no significant value in identifying the semantic referent of a name in canonical
situations. The fact that a specific proper name like «Alice» refers to its semantic referent Alice in
a given conversational context, this very fact itself is not part of the linguistic conventions. It is
not part of these conventions in the same way as the truth of a sentence isn’t part of its meaning.
Besides, if using the property of being called «Alice» violated the circularity prohibition, then it
wouldn’t be clear why using the proper name «Alice» in a specification of the causal chain that
leads back to Alice’s initial baptism wouldn’t violate this condition either.
So if being called such-and-such is indeed non-circular, then one may ask what else the prop-
erty comprises. Does it also include a description of the ostensive act that initially fixed the
reference of a proper name? The answer is: No. The way in which the semantic reference
initially was fixed cannot be part of the linguistic conventions governing the use of the proper
name in question, because this way is highly context-dependent and there is no evidence that
the definite description or description of the ostensive act used in the initial baptism is transmit-
ted from speaker to speaker as part of learning the use of a proper name. It is not part of the
linguistic conventions of the use of «Alice» in general that her mother used the following phrase
to name Alice right after her birth: “This newborn baby of mine in front of me shall be called
«Alice».”—as opposed to, say, the phrase “She’s called «Alice»” or just answering “«Alice»” to the
question “What’s her name?” It is part of the linguistic conventions governing the use of a proper
name that it can and has to be used in a certain way in an act of baptizing but it is not part of
those conventions how its referent was determined during this act.
20This is also pointed out by (Recanati 1993, pp. 135-67) though on the basis of distinguishing linguistic and psycho-
logical modes of presentation.
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4.5.3 Defense Against the Church-Langford Translation Test
The Church-Langford translation test has to be mentioned as another possible objection to NDT.
Church (1950) originally devised this test against the notion of intensional isomorphy in (Carnap
1947).21 The test requires that the translation of a sentence into another language has to convey
the same meaning as the original sentence. Take the following two sentences.
(4.19) Carol believes that Alice is hungry.
(4.20) Carole croit qu’Alice a faim.
According to NDT, a de dicto analysis of 4.19 makes use of the property of being called «Alice»
in the English speaker community, whereas the translation 4.20 of 4.19 into French makes use
of the property of being called «Alice» (or «Adelais») in French. The de dicto readings of the two
sentences have different truth-conditions and furthermore an attempt to translate the analysis of
4.19 from modal logic to French wouldn’t yield 4.20, but something like 4.21.
(4.21) Carole croit que la personne, qui s’appelle «Alice» en Anglais, a faim.
The reply to this argument from an NDT or EDT perspective is that an appropriate analysis of
de dicto belief ascriptions may not pass the Church-Langford translation test, because the main
criterion for ascribing de dicto belief is the utterance dispositions of the speaker of a certain lan-
guage, which are for example revealed by his acceptance or rejection of co-extensional substitute
expressions.22 So NDT simply rejects the Church-Langford translation test as an adequacy crite-
rion for analyses of de dicto belief ascriptions. In this view, 4.21 is indeed a correct paraphrasing
of the de dicto reading of 4.19.
4.5.4 The Role of Identification Criteria
Linguistic conventions governing the use of a proper name barely play a role for identifying ref-
erence. Certain heuristic inferences can be drawn from certain kinds of proper names, but these
inferences only indicate with some probability that the referent of the proper name has a certain
property. For example, many English proper names for persons conventionally convey informa-
tion about the sex of their referent. Proper names for artifacts, for example serial numbers, can
usually not be used as a proper name for a person. German proper names of ships always have
the grammatical gender feminine. So for example a speaker of German interpreting «Die Kaiser
Wilhelm» will know that this is likely the proper name of a ship, because the partially descriptive
proper name «Kaiser Wilhelm» bears the grammatical gender masculine, but the article «die» is
feminine. Certain proper names of pets are inappropriate or even prohibited in some countries as
proper names for persons. And from the phonological structure of a name, a speaker can make
inferences about the ethnic origin of the referent that may be more or less accurate depending on
ethnographic factors. Such language-specific inferences one may draw from a proper name are
easily exhausted and generally error-prone. In canonical cases they will not suffice to serve as
21Cf. (Linsky 1983, Ch. 1).
22Cf. (Richard 1997, pp. 206-7).
82 CHAPTER 4. A DESCRIPTION THEORY OF REFERENCE
the sole criterion used for identifying the semantic referent in situations that require identifying
reference.
From the NDT point of view, the only linguistic requirement on the use of a proper name is the
property of being called by that name, which comprises the linguistic conventions governing the
use of that name. But for identification purposes, the speaker will usually have to rely on his prior
beliefs about the referent of that name in addition to those conventions.23 That is the reason why
a number of identification criteria I1 . . . In have been stipulated in figure 4.4. These criteria may
vary from speaker to speaker and in the descriptive version of indirect reference proposed here
they fulfill the role of partial cognitive content. They aren’t part of objective meaning, but from an
epistemic point of view are the conditions for successfully identifying the semantic referent. So
formula 4.15 doesn’t indicate the whole picture. Whenever a speaker tries to identify the referent
of a proper name like «Aristotle», he associates a property A(x) with the reading the object called
«Aristotle» by virtue of being a competent speaker but additionally associates whatever criteria
he deems sufficient for identifying the referent of the proper name. The conjunction of those
criteria is then determining the doxastic referent. The semantic referent, on the other hand, is
determined by ιx@Ax. The revised condition for identifying reference is thus 4.22.
M, g,w0 
ιx[@Ax] ιy[1Ay ∧ I1y ∧ · · · ∧ Iny](x = y) (4.22)
The condition itself isn’t empirical. It is a transcendental condition for identifying reference.
However, which identification criteria a speaker uses—consciously or subconsciously, implicitly
or explicitly—in a given situation is a wholly empirical matter. One source of unease that philoso-
phers might have with description theory in general is the simplicity of the definite descriptions
that are usually assumed in examples. In reality the identification criteria that play a role in
a condition like 4.22 may be so complicated that they cannot even be formulated by experts.
Consider for example how people recognize human faces. Although advances in automated face
recognition have been made, finding the exact conditions for recognizing a person by means of
features of her face under varying external conditions is far from being trivial.
4.5.5 The Problem of Nested Modalities
The description analysis of reference given so far is incomplete, because it doesn’t take nested
modalities into account. In this section, the analysis will be extended to adequately deal with
nested modalities. Consider the following rather artificial examples 4.23–4.28.
(4.23) It is necessary that it is necessary that Bob loves Carol.
(4.24) It is necessary that Alice believes that Bob loves Carol.
(4.25) Alice believes that she believes that Bob loves Carol.
(4.26) Alice believes that Bob believes that Alice loves Carol.
(4.27) Alice believes that it is necessary that Bob loves Carol.
23Only usually instead of always, because referents are sometimes labeled with a name tag.
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(4.28) It is possible that Alice believes that it is necessary that Bob loves Carol.
One thing to note is that there don’t seem to be any clear-cut ‘intuitions’ as to how exactly
nested modalities ought to be interpreted. When exactly does a person believe that she believes
something? When exactly does a person believe that something is necessarily the case? If it is
necessary that it is necessary that something is the case, does it follow then, that this is necessarily
the case? Answers to these questions depend on philosophical interpretation rather than on prior
semantic competence.
However, certain interpretations of proper names in nested modalities are favorable over
others. Kripke’s doctrines suggest that a proper name or any other rigid term is always evaluated
with respect to the actual world. If on the other hand a doxastic modality representing a de dicto
reading is involved, then a term in the priority scope of such a modality is evaluated with respect
to the worlds reachable by evaluating the doxastic modality. It further is plausible to assume that
this rule is only valid for the first occurrence of a doxastic modal operator, no matter how many
metaphysical or doxastic modalities further embed the term. For example, a de dicto reading of
the second occurrence of «Alice» in 4.26, according to which the use of that name would have to
be interpreted with respect to Bob’s belief system, can hardly be constructed. If at all, referential
opacity in this example must depend on Alice’s speaker reference and not on Bob’s. Furthermore,
it seems reasonable to assume that «Bob» and «Carol» in examples like 4.27 or 4.28 are rigid with
respect to any metaphysical modalities that are themselves embedded into the belief ascription.
Otherwise Alice wouldn’t interpret them as rigid terms, which might disqualify her as a fully
competent speaker. So the interpretation of a proper name that is embedded into a de dicto
belief ascription will reflect the respective speaker reference of the respective attitude holder
but apart from that will remain rigid with respect to any subsequent metaphysical or doxastic
modalities. The analysis of a proper name in a de dicto belief ascription is rigid with respect to
the worlds that are accessed by evaluating the first doxastic modality instead of being rigid with
respect to the actual world. This behavior of singular terms in de dicto readings will from now
on be called relativized rigidity and be taken as interpretation guideline for proper names.
4.5.6 Summary
Under the assumption that competent speakers might fail to identify the semantic referent of
an expression, but might under usual circumstances not deviate too far in their interpretation
of general terms from the public language meaning of these terms, a dual aspect theory only
has to consider the cognitive role of referential expressions like proper names in addition to and
possibly deviating from the truth-conditional role of natural language expressions. If the notion
of cognitive role is intended to comprise an aspect of meaning relevant for behavior and behav-
ioral dispositions and in particular is relevant for dispositions to accept or reject co-referential
substitute expression, then the cognitive role of referential terms can be encoded by appropri-
ate formal attitude attributions. It has been stipulated for simplicity that attitude attributions
encoding cognitive content after disquotation or acceptance systematically correspond with at-
titude attributions that result from the analysis of corresponding de dicto readings of attitude
ascriptions. The cognitive content of an utterance for a speaker A is then the result of analyzing
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the embedding of the utterance into a belief ascription of the form A believes that read de dicto.
The partial cognitive content of a proper name, on the other hand, is the identification criteria a
speaker associates with that name in conjunction with the property of being called by that name.
These criteria in a formal belief attribution determine the speaker referent of the corresponding
name, which is a doxastic object that might in fact not exist. In contrast to that, the truth-
conditional content of a proper name doesn’t have to include any identification criteria at all. It
may be encoded by a rigidified definite description that only makes use of the property of being
called such-and-such, or alternatively may be encoded the Millian way by a rigid constant. The
following schemes summarize these positions, where } is used to symbolize relativized rigidity
and 1 is a doxastic modality. A is the property of being called such-and-such and a requirement
by linguistic competence, I1 . . . In are identification criteria. M1 ∧ Mk symbolize some ideal,
objective meaning. (Dependency on the conversational context is ignored.)
P Ref 18 (NDT Scheme).
Semantic Reference: . . . ιx@Ax . . .
Speaker Reference: 1 . . . ιx}(Ax ∧ I1x ∧ · · · ∧ Inx) . . .
P Ref 19 (EDT Scheme).
Semantic Reference: . . . ιx@(Ax ∧M1x ∧ · · · ∧Mkx) . . .
Speaker Reference: 1 . . . ιx}(Ax ∧ I1x ∧ · · · ∧ Inx) . . .
In dependence of varying degrees of idealization and given an intended interpretation of
the properties involved, NDT and EDT are descriptively and explanatory adequate theories of
reference. However, from a technical point of view M1, . . .Mk and I1, . . . , In are dispensable,
because the interpretation of A can be chosen such that it expresses a complex property that
comprises these criteria outside and inside the scope of a doxastic modality respectively in addi-
tion to the property of being called such and such. This allows for a simplified view, according to
which speaker reference boils down to 1 . . . ιx}Ax . . . and semantic reference boils down to
. . . ιx@Ax . . . for both NDT and EDT. This view is descriptively adequate, but not fully explana-
tory adequate, because it doesn’t explicitly discern the components that constitute the complex
property used in determining the referent. Taking the taxonomy of section 2.3.2 in chapter
2, NDT and EDT are varying, non-matching, non-identifying, restricted description theories of
speaker reference. To this in later chapters context-dependency will be added and the simplified
view will be adopted. Although there are many differences as well, this view has some simi-
larities with the restricted-variable/retrieval view of Castañeda (1990b). In Castañeda’s theory,
proper names are sortal variables of quantification, working as follows:
“The sort determined by a proper name is a nominalistic sort of the type being
called such and such. The central roles of proper names are their pragmatic and semi-
otic roles of organizing beliefs and causing revisions, expansions and combinations
of memory files. They are used in the retrieval of believed information.” (Castañeda
1990b, p. 37)
A similar idea underlies the above branches of description theory. A speaker using or inter-
preting a proper name will consider, on the basis of his previous beliefs, the (doxastic) referent
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of that name to have certain properties, some of which he might use as identification criteria in
case the situation supports and demands identifying reference. A speaker’s attempt to identify
the semantic referent of the proper name in a given conversational context is always made by
means of the properties that the referent is purported to have in the speaker’s opinion. In con-
trast to Castañeda’s theory, in the present view the property of being called such and such must
already ensure uniqueness of the semantic referent within a given conversational context and
names are analyzed by means of iota expressions instead of being free variables of quantification
sorted by the property of being called such and such.24
Some remarks are also in place about what has not been argued for. It has not been argued
for the claim that genuine dual aspect theories are inadequate for principal reasons. It has also
not been argued for the claim that modal logic is the recommended tool for providing the seman-
tics of attitude ascriptions. Limited expressivity, the problem of logical omniscience, and over-
and undergeneration make normal modal logics undesirable for this task, unless only highly ide-
alized, rational belief and knowledge is considered.25 Furthermore, the talk about ‘associating’
identification criteria or a definite description with a proper name must not be taken too literally.
The empirical process of conceiving something (or nothing) as something with such-and-such
properties is a matter of physics, psychology, and neurophysiology, but no doxastic object can be
conceived as having no property at all. Identification criteria must be thought of as being part
of a transcendental condition for identifying reference and the talk about associating them must
not be understood as a cognitive process a speaker is aware of. They may be implicit and become
only explicit, once a speaker becomes aware of them, is able to express them linguistically, and
also has a reason to do so. This sets apart the present view from what Castañeda (1990b) calls
the Formulable Local Description View, according to which a speaker referring to an object by
means of a proper name must always be able to produce an appropriate source language definite
description on demand.26 The utterance dispositions that are at the core of referential opacity
are only encoded indirectly in the present account, insofar as a speaker may sometimes be able to
make the identification criteria he associates with a proper name explicit. This can for example
happen when a speaker realizes that two co-referential proper names are indeed co-referential
or when he believes that some proper name is referentially under- or oversaturated and demands
clarification. Moreover, it has not been argued for the view that constants should be discarded
in general or that proper names cannot be analyzed as rigid constants. In fact, the NDT analysis
of semantic reference of a proper name spells out in the object language what a Millian analy-
24In Castañeda’s view, proper names are count nouns and singular reference is entirely a pragmatic phenomenon.
Given that many names are ambiguous or rather equivocal, this seems on one hand justified. On the other hand, many
apparent counter-examples to assuming uniqueness of semantic reference, like “Some Greta Bergmans are excellent
business women” (Castañeda 1990b, p. 28) or “Are you the Castañeda?” (Castañeda 1990b, p. 33), can be analyzed
in the present view as well, as long as a proper distinction between these descriptive uses and the normal naming uses
of proper names is made by the syntax–semantics interface. This can for example be done by having separate lexicon
entries or by binding the description only by a iota quantifier when there is no other quantifier/determiner in the NP.
25See (Robbins 2004) for a concise summary of the main problems. Cf. section 8.3.4 of chapter 8. It must be
mentioned, though, that in the present view rational KD45 belief is an adequate notion of belief for epistemological and
other ideal-language centered purposes, and that most of its purported deficiencies are in fact desirable features, but this
is just the author’s personal opinion and will not be backed up here.
26See (Castañeda 1990b, p. 39).
86 CHAPTER 4. A DESCRIPTION THEORY OF REFERENCE
sis assumes by the interpretation rules for rigid constants in the meta language. Millianism is
descriptively adequate with respect to semantic reference. Finally, the question whether EDT or
NDT should be adopted will be left open. Given the idealized nature of semantic reference it
seems that this question cannot be given any decisive answer.
4.6 Implementing Description Theory
In this section, ways to implement the proposed theory of reference in normal first-order modal
logic will be outlined. Only NDT will be assumed in the following, but the proposals work
the same way with EDT. As before, for the sake of simplicity first-order modal logic is used
for illustration. In a more realistic semantic framework, higher-order logic or frameworks with
similar expressivity are nearly unavoidable and using a syntactic formalism other than the simple
phrase-structure grammar below is unavoidable.27 For merely showing that description theories
of reference can be implemented, the technical machinery used in this section will be more than
enough.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. First, ways to implement the given
approach including relativized rigidity will be discussed in section 4.6.1. Then it will be shown
in section 4.6.2 that this analysis is prima facie not compositional, that it can be made composi-
tional, but that making it compositional isn’t desirable.
4.6.1 Implementing Relativized Rigidity
Implementing relativized rigidity in first-order modal logic poses no special problems. Analyses
with relativized rigid terms can be expressed by giving iota quantifiers the appropriate scope, by
borrowing some operators from hybrid logic (HYL), or by defining a special relativized actuality
operator. It must be kept in mind, though, that whatever trickery is done in normal first-order
modal logic can also be done in first-order predicate logic with explicit quantification over worlds
and each predicate having an additional argument for a world variable or constant. Since there
is no general difference in expressivity between first-order modal logic and first-order predicate
logic, the above mentioned operators are nothing more than notational tools.
The examples in the following sections will make use of some conventions. The unary prop-
erties A,B,C are used to express the property of being called «Alice», «Bob», and «Carol» respec-
tively. IAB will be used for the identification criteria Alice associates with the proper name «Bob»,
and so on for other combinations of speakers and names.
Some Changes to FOML
Some minor changes to the fairly standard formulation of constant domain first-order modal
logic of Appendix A will be convenient.
27The latter is unavoidable since Shieber (1985) has shown that some languages such as Swiss German and Dutch are
mildly context-sensitive. The former is nearly unavoidable, since there are natural higher-order quantifiers like «most»
and since formalizing higher-order talk in a first-order language generally requires heavy reification that is hard to justify.
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First, the logic is made four-sorted in order to facilitate the definitions in the following ex-
amples. Instead of one set of variables and one set of constants, we now use the sets DVAR,
SVAR, NVAR, WVAR containing variables for ordinary objects, speakers, source language
names, and worlds respectively. Likewise, DCON, SCON, NCON, WCON contain constants
for ordinary objects, speakers, source language names, and worlds. Variables or constants for
source language names bear the superscript n, those for speakers bear superscript s, those
for worlds bear superscript w, and those for other objects bear the superscript d. Further-
more, DTERM = DVAR ∪ DCON and likewise for the other sorts. The domain D of a model
M = 〈W,R,D, J.K〉 is then partitioned into three subsets,
D = Ds ∪Dn ∪Dd (4.29)
The set Ds is a set of speakers or agents, Dn is a set of names of the source language, whose
purpose will be explained below in the section on compositionality, and Dd is a set of objects
other than speakers. The set of possible worlds is already given in the model as W . All of these
sets have to be non-empty, but their elements will only be specified in examples when variables
of the respective kind are in fact used. Since all of the examples of the following paragraphs
will be about speakers, the superscript of variables for speakers may be left out. Metavariables
are written in the same way as before by using the names of the sets containing instances of the
respective expressions. The following must then hold for any assignment g:
g(WVAR) ∈ W (4.30)
g(SVAR) ∈ Ds (4.31)
g(NVAR) ∈ Dn (4.32)
g(DVAR) ∈ Dd (4.33)
It is further assumed that constants are sorted in the same way, and that, if FOMLι is used
as a basis, any iota term has the same sort as the variable that it binds. So for example STERM
stands for any term that will denote an element in Ds, if it denotes at all.
Second, we will from now on assume that doxastic modalities are based on triadic instead
of dyadic accessibility relations. In addition to a modality index, doxastic modal operators will
from now on also have an argument place for a singular term. Therefore, the set of accessibility
relations R in a model will from now on consist of two different sets of accessibility relations.
R = Rmod ∪Rdox (4.34)
Rmod ⊆ ℘(W ×W ) (4.35)
Rdox ⊆ ℘(W ×W × S) (4.36)
The revised syntax and semantics of a doxastic modal operator is then given by the following
rules, whereMID stands for a modality index (see Appendix A).
WFF := STERM,MIDWFF (4.37)
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JSTERM,MIDWFFKMg (w) =


1 if for RdoxMID ∈ R
dox in all u ∈W such that
RdoxMID(w, u, JSTERMKMg (w)) :
JWFFKMg (u) = 1
0 otherwise
(4.38)
The definitions for other modalities remain the same and modal indices number both kinds
of modalities consecutively. If only one kind of doxastic modality per speaker is relevant, the
modal index will be left out completely. This definition has to be adjusted accordingly if the un-
derlying logic allows non-denoting terms, as in FOMLι in Appendix A. In case JSTERMKMg (w)
is undefined in such a system the whole belief attribution must be false. Triadic doxastic modal-
ities make examples more compositional and thus more realistic, since they allow us to drop the
rather artificial assumption that a matrix sentence of the form A believes that. . . is just mapped
to one operator simpliciter. The subject-NP of such sentences now explicitly appears in the cor-
responding expression of the target language.
Relativized Rigidity Using HYL Operators
The syntax of FOML is augmented by the following rule.
WFF := ↓WVAR WFF |@WTERM WFF (4.39)
These operators have the following semantics.
J↓WVAR WFFKMg (w) = JWFFKMh (w), (4.40)
where h ≈WVAR g such that h(WVAR) = w
J@WTERM WFFKMg (w) = JWFFKMg (JWTERMKMg (w)) (4.41)
Given these two operators, the downarrow binder and the at-operator, it is easy to express
relativized rigidity. Consider one of the examples given for nested modalities.
(4.27) Alice believes that it is necessary that Bob loves Carol.
Formula 4.42 expresses the de dicto reading of this belief ascription in some model. For
comparison, the de re reading is given in formula 4.43, where @ without subscript is just the
ordinary actuality operator assuming the model is augmented by a designated actual world w0.
M, g,w0 
ιx[@Ax]x ↓ xw 0 ιy[@xw(By ∧ I
A
By)] (4.42)
ιz[@xw(Cz ∧ I
A
C z)]P (y, z)
M, g,w0 
ιx[@Ax]x0 ιy[@By] ιz[@Cz]P (y, z) (4.43)
Relativized Rigidity and the Wide Scope Theory
Just like it was feasible to express non-relativized rigidity by wide scope descriptions without
any need for an actuality operator, relativized rigidity can be expressed in first-order modal logic
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without any need for additional modifications. In this respect, the operators introduced above are
redundant. It suffices to adjust the wide scope interpretation rule for proper names. According
to (WDT 1) on page 55 of the last chapter the wide scope theory says that proper names of
the source language are analyzed as formal definite descriptions that have widest possible scope
over any modal operators in the target language. This definition has to be adjusted in order to
account for relativized rigidity.
P WDT 2. (Relativized Wide Scope Description Theory) A proper name n in the source language is
analyzed as a definite description that (a) is within the priority scope of the leftmost doxastic modal
operator with de dicto interpretation if n occurs in the sentence embedded by the natural language
expression that corresponds to , and (b) has widest possible scope with respect to any other modal
operator and without violating condition (a).
This rule only accounts for natural language expressions containing modal operators and
belief ascriptions, but of course the derivation of attitude ascriptions by disquotation or under
the assumption of utterance acceptance works analogously. We simply give any proper name
whose subjective meaning we are interested in an interpretation that is enriched by the respective
person’s identification criteria for the name and ensure that the resulting definite description
has widest scope up to the doxastic modality expressing that person’s belief or similar attitude.
Following this doctrine the de dicto reading of example 4.27 can simply be written down as
formula 4.44:
M, g,w  ιx[Ax]x
ιy[By ∧ IABy]
ιz[Cz ∧ IAC z]0 P (y, z) (4.44)
Relativized Rigidity Using a Relativized Actuality Operator
The wide scope approach seems to have a major drawback. Like the non-relativized wide scope
analysis it introduces a positional dependency that has no equivalent in the surface syntax of
the corresponding natural language expressions. English proper names simply occur where they
are required to occur by the syntax of the embedded sentence. Likewise, when using hybrid
logic operators we have to ‘mark’ the first occurrence of a doxastic modality with the downarrow
binder. These features of the analyses can complicate the syntax–semantics interface in a formal
grammar. As it seems, the burden on the syntax–semantics interface can be lowered by defining
a relativized actuality operator and suitably redefining doxastic modal operators. It will later
be argued that the gain in utility by introducing such an operator is only marginal, but it is
helpful to see why. The definition of a relativized actuality operator is straightforward and has a
dynamic flavor. A storage parameter ν is used that behaves as follows. At the start of evaluating
each formula, a special value undefined is assigned to the storage. Later during evaluation a
conditional value assignment operator← can be used to update the value once as follows.
ν ← w =


w if ν = undefined
ν otherwise
(4.45)
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Truth in a model is relativized to ν and we use the assignment operator to store any depen-
dence on the first doxastic modal operator as follows.
JSTERM,MID WFFKMg,ν (w) =


1 if for RdoxMID ∈ R
dox in all u ∈W such that
RdoxMID(w, u, JSTERMKMg,ν (w)) :
JWFFKMg,ν′ (u) = 1,
where ν′ = ν ← u
0 otherwise
(4.46)
Given these preliminaries, defining a relativized actuality operator is straightforward. The
following definition assumes that models are augmented by a designated actual world w0.
Syntax. WFF := }WFF (4.47)
Semantics. J}WFFKMg,ν (w) =


JWFFKMg,ν (w0) if ν = undefined
JWFFKMg,ν (ν) otherwise (4.48)
Strictly speaking, this apparatus requires truth in a model to be reformulated in a dynamic
way, similar to formulations of truth-functional connectives in dynamic predicate logic. Evalu-
ation must strictly proceed from left to right, but since this is the default way in which logical
formalisms are read, a suitable reformulation of the definitions in Appendix A will from now on
be assumed.28 Using the above operator, formula 4.49 expresses the de dicto reading of 4.27
using the iota quantifier and formula 4.50 does the same using the iota operator.
M, g,w0, ν 
ιx[}Ax]x0
ιy[}(By ∧ IABy)]
ιz[}(Cz ∧ IAC z)]P (y, z) (4.49)
M, g,w0, ν  ιx}Ax0 P (ιy[}(By ∧ I
A
By)], ιz[}(Cz ∧ I
A
C z)]) (4.50)
4.6.2 Compositionality
One objection that may be raised against the proposed analysis is that it is not compositional.
Whether this is a sound and strong objection depends on the presumed kind of compositionality
and of course also on the foundational question whether compositionality always should hold or
not. These questions will be briefly addressed in the following paragraphs. The purpose of the
following discussion is to point out in which sense the suggested analysis is compositional and
in which sense it is not. An exhaustive discussion of compositionality is beyond the scope of the
following sections and can for example be found in (Janssen 1986, 1996), (Partee 1984), or
(Blackburn 2001).
Characterization of Compositionality
Compositionality has also been called the Frege Principle and already been formulated as (Fre 1.2)
on page 23. Compared to recent accounts of compositionality, (Fre 1.2) is quite liberal; it only
28How this can be done formally is exemplified by the ‘dynamic’ variant of first-order predicate logic in chapter 7.
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says that the senses of subexpressions are combined in a regular manner to form the sense of
a whole expression. It is hard to extract more on that matter from Frege’s work and it has in
fact been argued that Frege might never have endorsed compositionality as it has been under-
stood more recently.29 Contemporary characterizations of compositionality can be found in the
literature in almost identical formulations like the following one.
P PCF 1. The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and its
syntactic mode of composition.30
This adds the syntactic mode of composition to (Fre 1.2). Compositionality understood in this
way concerns the relation between some concrete specification of the syntax of the source lan-
guage and some concrete specification of the way in which semantic content is composed. To get
the highest degree of precision, a purely formal compositionality principle has been formulated
first by Montague (1974b) and since then various algebraic formulations of compositionality
have been proposed.31 For current purposes, the above characterization will do, as long as it is
accompanied by the following informal test for non-compositionality.
P PCF 2. The relation between syntactic combination and semantic composition is non-compositional
when two expressions with the same meaning “[. . . ] nevertheless yield results with different mean-
ings when a particular syntactic operation is applied to them.” (Westerståhl 1998, p. 636)
Evaluation of the Proposal
The theory of indirect reference with relativized rigidity proposed above consists of two ma-
jor parts and it is helpful to consider them separately. The first part is the implementation of
relativized rigidity itself, whereas the second part is the identification criteria with which the
analysis of proper names is supplemented in de dicto belief attributions. For the time being, let
us consider only the first part and compare the following analyses of example 4.27.
M, g,w0 
ιx[@Ax]x ↓ xw 0 ιy[@xw By]
ιz[@xw Cz]P (y, z) (4.51)
M, g,w0 
ιxAxx
ιyBy ιzCz0 P (y, z) (4.52)
M, g,w0, ν 
ιx}Axx0
ιy}By ιz}CzP (y, z) (4.53)
They are the hybrid logic operator, wide scope, and relativized actuality operator analyses re-
spectively taken without identification criteria. Now consider the context-free grammar in figure
4.5, but ignore the semantic construction rules (I1)–(I8) for the time being. Among infinitely
many other sentences this grammar generates example 4.27, here repeated for convenience:
(4.27) Alice believes that it is necessary that Bob loves Carol.
29See (Janssen 1986, 1996, 2001).
30See (Pagin 2003, p. 291), (Partee 1984, p. 281), (Pagin and Westerståhl 2001, p. 1), (Pelletier 2003, p. 153).
31See for example (Janssen 1986), (Janssen 1996), (Hendriks 2001).
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(S1) S → NP VP | VC0 CP
(I1) JSK = JNPK(JVPK) | JVC0K(JCPK)
(S2) CP → C S
(I2) JCPK = JCK(JSK)
(S3) VP → V2 NP | VC CP
(I3) JVPK = JNPK(JV2K) | JVCK(JCPK)
(S4) VC0 → it is necessary
(I4) JVC0K = 〈À.0 À〉
(S5) VC → believes
(I5) JVCK = 〈À.〈Á.Á À〉〉
(S6) V2 → loves
(I6) JV2K = 〈À.〈Á.P (Á,À)〉〉
(S7) NP → Alice | Bob | Carol
(I7) JNPK = 〈À. ιx}AxÀ(x)〉 | 〈À. ιy}ByÀ(y)〉 | 〈À. ιz}AzÀ(z)〉
(S8) C → that
(I8) JCK = 〈À.À〉
Figure 4.5: A context-free toy grammar with semantic construction.
If we assume a mode of semantic composition that corresponds directly with the syntax rules
in figure 4.5, then the first two approaches aren’t compositional. Analysis 4.51 isn’t composi-
tional, because the meaning of the proper names within the scope of the belief operator depends
on the world variable xw introduced by the downarrow operator. If on the other hand only rule
S→ VC0 CP is applied to analyze a simpler sentence like «it is necessary that Bob loves Carol» ,
then rule VP → VC CP plays no role in derivation. Consequently, the meaning of an embedded
proper name would have to depend on the actual world to account for rigidity, either by bind-
ing it using the downarrow operator or by using the ordinary @ operator. But then the same
syntactic construction rules in the derivation of the embedded sentence yield different semantic
content of proper names in these two cases, which is non-compositional according to (PCF 2).
Likewise, the scope of the iota quantifiers for «Bob» and «Carol» in formula 4.52 is determined
in dependence of the de dicto belief ascriptions in which the source language names occur. If
the same proper names would be nested into two belief ascriptions, their meaning ought only
depend on the first one, but the second belief ascription would be composed in correspondence
to the same syntactic rule VP → VC CP. This again would be a case that falls prey to (PCF 2).
Analysis 4.53 taken as it stands is compositional, though. To see this, consider the semantic con-
struction rules (I1)–(I8) given below each phrase structure rule in figure 4.5. These rules can be
interpreted as applications of a simple rewrite system. Let A[n/B] be the formula obtained from
A by substituting all occurrences of the circled number n by the formula or term B. A simple
4.6. IMPLEMENTING DESCRIPTION THEORY 93
rewrite operation 99K is then defined by the following rule.
〈n.A〉(B) 99K A[n/B] (4.54)
To see how this rule works in combination with the grammar in figure 4.5, take a look at a
derivation of the following utterance.
(4.55) Alice loves Bob.
The syntactic derivation tree results from application of rules (S1a), (S3a) and lexical in-
sertion rules (S6), (S7a), and (S7b). The corresponding semantic construction is computed as
follows. Formula 4.57 is obtained from 4.56 by (I1a), 4.58 by (I3a), and 4.59 by lexical insertion
(I7a/b) and (I6). The rest is applications of rewrite rule 4.54 as the arrows indicate.
S (4.56)
JNP K(JV P K) (4.57)
JNP K(JNP K(JV 2K)) (4.58)
〈À. ιx}AxÀ(x)〉
(
〈À. ιy}ByÀ(y)〉
(
〈À.〈Á.P (Á,À)〉〉
))
(4.59)
99K
ιx}Ax〈À. ιy}ByÀ(y)〉
(
〈À.〈Á.P (Á,À)〉〉
)
(x) (4.60)
99K
ιx}Ax ιy}By〈À.〈Á.P (Á,À)〉〉(y)(x) (4.61)
99K ιx}Ax ιy}By〈Á.P (Á, y)〉(x) (4.62)
99K
ιx}Ax ιy}ByP (x, y) (4.63)
Figure 4.6 depicts the derivation and semantic construction of example 4.27 with nested
modalities. The relation between syntax rules and semantic construction is compositional in this
grammar because to each syntax rule corresponds a semantic derivation step that combines only
the partial meaning schemes of the respective subexpressions. Although the whole grammar is
a rather primitive affair, the derivation tree in 4.6 has some interesting features that should be
mentioned for clarity.
[1] The complementizer «that» is analyzed as meaningless expression. Although this expres-
sion would probably have some meaning in a more elaborate grammar based on a real-world
grammar formalism—for example it could be an operator that changes the semantic type of its
argument—meaningless expressions don’t violate and shouldn’t violate compositionality. Oth-
erwise the grammarian would be prohibited to analyze the syntax of expressions that have no
truth-conditional content.
[2] The phrase «it is necessary» is not analyzed further. As a general rule, compositionality
isn’t violated if some syntactically compound expression is not given any internal syntactic struc-
ture, as long as the way in which the corresponding meaning constituting entities are constructed
doesn’t make use of any internal structure either. There are boundaries to the usefulness of such
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ιx}Ax〈Á.Á0 ιy}By ιz}CzP (y, z)〉(x)
99K ιx}Axx0
ιy}By ιz}CzP (y, z)
NP
Alice
〈À. ιx}AxÀ(x)〉
VP
〈Á.Á0 ιy}By ιz}CzP (y, z)〉
VC
believes
〈À.〈Á.Á À〉〉
CP
0
ιy}By ιz}CzP (y, z)
C
that
〈À.À〉
S
0
ιy}By ιz}CzP (y, z)
VC0
it is necessary
〈À.0 À〉
CP
ιy}By ιz}CzP (y, z)
C
that
〈À.À〉
S
ιy}By ιz}Cz〈Á.P (Á, z)〉(y)
99K ιy}By ιz}CzP (y, z)
NP
Bob
〈À. ιy}ByÀ(y)〉
VP
ιz}Cz〈À.〈Á.P (Á,À)〉〉(z)
99K
ιz}Cz〈Á.P (Á, z)〉
V2
loves
〈À.〈Á.P (Á,À)〉〉
NP
Carol
〈À. ιz}CzÀ(z)〉
Figure 4.6: An example derivation tree with semantic construction.
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procedure that are dictated both by the goals of the syntactician and the goals of the semanti-
cist. A theory that just enumerates sentences and their meaning would be useless, although it
may be considered compositional. There is no doubt that in a real-world grammar an expletive
use of «it» like in «it is necessary that Bob loves Carol» ought to be given internal structure and
correspondingly be given some meaning.32 But phraseologisms like «it is raining cats and dogs»
still ought to be allowed in the grammar without violating compositionality.
[3] The example shows that the syntactic head may deviate from the semantic head without
violating compositionality. In the example, the direct object NP is ‘applied’ to the V2, i.e. in this
case the semantic scheme of the V2 fills the argument slot of the semantic scheme of the NP,
although according to the traditional syntactic analysis the verb is the syntactic head of the verb
phrase, as the category names V2 and VP in the example suggest.33
It is now time to ask why the analysis using the relativized actuality operator appears to be
more compositional than the other analyses. The reason is obviously that the semantics of the op-
erator has been defined in a way that the same meaning scheme can be given for a proper name
outside a de dicto belief ascription as inside of it without having to tweak the syntax. This is,
however, partly a Pyrrhic victory. Since all approaches analyze a proper name that occurs in a de
re belief ascription differently from the same proper name if it occurs in a de dicto ascription, se-
mantic construction involving a proper name always depends on the question whether this name
occurs inside a de re or inside a de dicto belief ascription. Without further modifications to the
grammar or the way truth-conditional content is constructed, the complete proposal is therefore
non-compositional, although the above partial analysis is compositional. Furthermore, if identi-
fication criteria are taken into account as well, the resulting analysis will be non-compositional
with respect to canonical grammars for basically the same reasons. The analysis of a proper
name in the proposed account not only depends on the kind of belief ascription in which they
occur, if they occur in one, but also on the respective believer. Writing complex predicates as IAB ,
ICB , and so on, has not been more than a notational shortcut. Fully implemented, an analysis of
a proper name reflecting a speaker reference by means of that name has to be a function from
the set of speakers and the set of rigid terms of the source language into expressions of the target
language. The two dependencies that obstruct compositionality are illustrated in figure 4.7.
Assuming only de dicto readings of attitude ascriptions and ignoring identification criteria
can make sense, though. As mentioned before, an analysis based on terms like ιx}Ax is de-
scriptively adequate for dicto belief ascriptions, though not fully explanatory adequate. As an
example, suppose Alice believes (de dicto) that Hesperus is not identical with Phosphorus. This
can be analyzed as follows.
M, g,w0 
ιx[}Ax]x,1
ιy[}Hy] ιz[}Pz](y 6= z) (4.64)
32Meaning not necessarily as an entity on its own, but rather similar to the way anaphoric expressions have a meaning.
The result of the construction should amount to the result of the semantic construction of the base case «that Bob loves
Carol is necessary».
33That is not to say that it isn’t desirable to hold syntactic and semantic head as much as possible in parallel. But such
a desideratum doesn’t result from compositionality itself.
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S
NP VP
VC CP
C S
NP
semantic referent
± de dicto
Figure 4.7: Dependencies of the full analysis of attitude ascriptions.
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Suppose we have the following partial specification of a model.
M = 〈W,R,D, J.K , w0〉 (4.65)
W = {w0, w1} (4.66)
D = {a, b, c, d} (4.67)
JAKMg (w0) = {a} (4.68)
JHKMg (w0) = JP KMg (w0) = {b} (4.69)
JHKMg (w1) = {c} (4.70)
JP KMg (w1) = {d} (4.71)
〈w0, w1, a〉 ∈ R
dox
1 (4.72)
Then formula 4.64 is true in that model even though Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical,
and the analysis is compositional with respect to reasonable modes of syntactic and semantic
composition. Finally it must be mentioned that the proposed view of cognitive content as de
dicto belief attributions is prima facie non-compositional in a trivial way, since it depends on the
application of a disquotation principle or on the assumption of acceptance. Neither the sender
nor the recipient of an utterance nor any of their beliefs are part of the literal meaning of an
utterance, and of course the cognitive content of an utterance with respect to one speaker can
differ from the cognitive content of the same utterance with respect to another speaker. Thus,
insofar as cognitive content is—incorrectly—regarded as the cognitive content of an utterance
simpliciter, it is of course highly non-compositional. But it has already been argued in section
4.3 that cognitive content is not an aspect of utterances simpliciter. How could it be if cognitive
content is always the content of someone thinking?
Making the Analysis Compositional
Compositionality is a means to keep syntax and semantics in parallel and therefore has great
potential to facilitate semantic construction and to enhance the maintainability of formal gram-
mars. There can hardly be any doubt that compositionality is in general desirable. The question
is, however, whether this also means that it is desirable in every particular case. As will be ar-
gued, the present example shows that maintaining compositionality at any price can complicate
the semantics without bringing any significant benefits. In order to make this point, a composi-
tional version of the proposed analysis first has to be given. In order to find a compositional ver-
sion, it is helpful to recall why the proposed analysis is by default non-compositional. Semantic
construction of meaning constituting entities in the analysis depends on linguistic material that
isn’t part of the constituent structure determined by syntactic construction rules at that point in
the derivation, but is located at a higher node in the derivation tree. This case is illustrated in
general in figure 4.8. Suppose B in the tree contributes an entity f to the semantic composition
of D and E, but a replacement node B’ of B in the otherwise same configuration contributes an
entity g to the semantic composition of D and E, such that the semantic values of C are different
in each case. Then semantic construction is non-compositional in relation to the derivation tree,
since the syntactic mode of composition in both cases maps D and E to the same node C. Janssen
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A
B C
D E
Figure 4.8: A derivational configuration leading to non-compositionality when D or E semanti-
cally depend on A or B.
(1996) mentions several strategies to turn a non-compositional analysis into a compositional
one.34 One of them is to introduce new meanings, and this method works in a situation like the
one depicted in figure 4.8, as long as the linear precedence of the nodes is preserved to some ex-
tent by target language syntax and semantic evaluation, i.e. as long as the meaning-constituting
entity corresponding to B precedes that of C and semantic evaluation is from left to right. Given
that, the truth-conditional content of B, D, E has to be modified such that the entity f introduced
by B becomes a parameter according to which the truth-conditional content of D and E is evalu-
ated. As a result, the whole derivation becomes compositional, since the parameter is now part
of the meaning of both D and E. This method may be called parameterization.
This technique can be applied to the dependency of de dicto belief ascriptions on the attitude
holder. For simplicity, the other dependency on the feature ±de dicto is ignored and only de
dicto readings of attitude ascriptions are assumed, as it can be analyzed in a similar fashion. The
desired compositionalization requires a lot of additional technical apparatus. For clarity, let SRC
be the set of expressions of the source language and TRG be the set of terms or formulas of the
target language. Recall that the set of speakers Ds and the set of proper names Dn of the source
language are subsets of a domain of a target language model. For the proper names we have
Dn ⊂ SRC and Dn ⊂ D, i.e. they are syntactic objects of the source language and semantic
objects of the target language. Let now F ⊂ TRG be a set of open formulas of the target
language, in which the only free variable is x. A naming function fn : Ds × Dn → F is then
defined. This function yields an open formula for a given speaker and source language name,
and this formula will be used in forming the definite description that the speaker associates
with a given source language name. Notice that by the sorting convention introduced at the
34See (Janssen 1996, p. 20-1).
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beginning of this section, there’s a set NCON ⊂ TRG of constants of the target language that
denote elements in Dn. It is further stipulated that there is a special alien element nature ∈ Ds,
whose purpose will be laid out below. The syntax of the target language FOML is then enriched
by the following operator:
WFF := θSVAR(NCON) (4.73)
This θ-operator takes a speaker variable and a constant denoting a source language name and
yields an open formula. In addition to the use of ν for the relativized actuality operator, truth in
a model is relativized to another storage variable s that holds a speaker in Ds. At the beginning
of evaluation of a formula that corresponds to a natural language sentence, the special value
nature is assigned to s. A conditional assignment operation is then defined on s that works as
follows.
s←[ a =


a if s = nature
s otherwise
(4.74)
Analogous to the way the relativized actuality operator has been defined, the idea behind the
above definition is that the speaker bound to the person argument place of the first occurrence
of a doxastic modal operator will be assigned to s, but any subsequent assignment will have no
effect. The semantics of θ-expressions and a suitably revised interpretation of doxastic modal
operators is given by the following rules.
JθSVAR(NCON)KMg,ν,s (w) =


1 if for A := fn
(
s, JNCONKMg,ν,s (w))[x/SVAR] :
JAKMg,ν,s (w) = 1
0 otherwise
(4.75)
JSTERM,MID WFFKMg,ν,s (w) =


1 if for s′ = s←[ JSTERMKMg,ν,s (w), ν′ = ν ← w,
and RdoxMID ∈ R
dox in all u ∈ W such that
RdoxMID(w, u) : JWFFKMg,ν′,s′ (u) = 1
0 otherwise
(4.76)
Once again, if non-denoting terms are allowed appropriate precautions have to be taken,
but this case will be ignored here for the sake if simplicity. Like in the previous example of
the relativized actuality operator, evaluation order matters and the definition of truth in a model
must be dynamic. To see how the parameterized analysis works, let us take a look at an example.
To make it more readable, pAliceq, pBobq, and pCarolq are used as mnemonic constant symbols
that are elements of NCON. In the lexicon of the toy grammar, the entries for proper names
have to be changed as follows.
(4.77)
NP → Alice
JNPK = 〈À. ιxθx(pAliceq)À(x)〉
(4.78)
NP → Bob
JNPK = 〈À. ιyθy(pBobq)À(y)〉
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(4.79)
NP → Carol
JNPK = 〈À. ιzθz(pCarolq)À(z)〉
In each case, the name function fn during evaluation of the θ operator yields the identifica-
tion criteria that the respective attitude holder (or nature itself) stored in s associates with the
corresponding English proper name.35 Now suppose the following intended interpretations and
definitions of the naming function fn, where irrelevant parameters are left out and only the part
of fn is specified that is relevant for the example.
Jιx@AxKMg = a (4.80)
JpAliceqKM = «Alice» (4.81)
JpBobqKM = «Bob» (4.82)
JpCarolqKM = «Carol» (4.83)
fn(nature, «Alice») = @Ax (4.84)
fn(a, «Alice») = }(Ax ∧ IAAx) (4.85)
fn(a, «Bob») = }(Bx ∧ IABx) (4.86)
fn(a, «Carol») = }(Cx ∧ IACx) (4.87)
Consider now example 4.27 again, which is repeated here for convenience.
(4.27) Alice believes that it is necessary that Bob loves Carol.
Using the toy grammar with the revised lexicon, the derivation tree will look the same as the
one in figure 4.6 except for changes due to the entries for proper names. The result of semantic
construction is the following formula.
ιxθx(pAliceq)x0
ιyθy(pBobq) ιzθz(pCarolq)P (y, z) (4.88)
Given the definitions above and a domain D = {a, b, c} consisting of Alice, Bob, and Carol, this
formula will in the intended model be equivalent to the following desired formula.
ιx[@Ax]x0 ιy[}(Ay ∧ IABy)]
ιz[}(Cz ∧ IAC z)]P (y, z) (4.89)
As long as the s parameter is considered part of the meaning, the analysis is compositional
at all stages. If on the other hand s wasn’t considered part of the meaning, then any other
parameter couldn’t be considered part of the meaning either. Then natural languages would be
non-compositional, because the analysis of context-dependency of indexicals requires context
parameters and the modal index is a parameter as well. The parameterization technique can
be generalized to work on any number of dependencies like the above ones by increasing the
number of parameters and defining suitable operators that store and retrieve values.
35Notice that instead of using target language constants like pAliceq the definitions could be modified to use definite
descriptions, but this is not necessary, because θ-expressions simply yield open formulas that represent part of the condi-
tions of a speaker’s reference without encoding any cognitive processes or making any claim about how a speaker would
‘associate’ a definite description with a proper name. Bear in mind that we are using the target language to describe and
explain speaker reference by means of expressions of the source language.
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Is Compositionality Needed?
A striking feature of the above compositional analysis is that it is ugly without offering any
advantages. It is a typical example of abusing logical formalism. The only reason why it has
been provided was to make the following points clear. First, the claim that a certain analysis is
non-compositional is nonsense unless it is accompanied by a concrete specification of a formal
grammar and the corresponding meaning-constituting entities and the corresponding semantic
construction method. Second, with respect to a grammar that generates crude but acceptable
syntactic structures like the one in figure 4.6, de dicto attitude ascriptions can be analyzed com-
positionally in accordance with the proposed description theory of reference. From a logical
point of view, on the other hand, the wide scope theory is sufficient and desirable for analyzing
de dicto readings of belief ascriptions. Taken from a logical and ideal language perspective, it
seems even more desirable to adopt the pragmatic view on attitude ascriptions and not to con-
sider referential opacity relevant for truth or falsity of attitude ascriptions at all. This seemingly
radical position is not further defended here and the simplified NDT view is assumed from now
on, but in chapter 8 it will be argued in favor of adopting a pragmatic view on de se attitudes.
Third, proviso the fact that syntax is autonomous and cannot be changed arbitrarily, making an
analysis compositional at any price can be done by tweaking the semantics—as exemplified by
the parameterization technique—, but the resulting formalism doesn’t need to have any advan-
tages. In light of the previous examples, it seems better to deal with such semantic construction
issues at the level of the source language grammar than to tweak the target language used to
specify meaning-constituting entities or these entities themselves. Compositionality is neither
needed nor desirable in the present case. It should also be noticed that strict compositionality of
the above kind isn’t a pressing issue in unification-based grammar formalisms, because in these
formalisms features can be ‘passed up’ to delay final semantic composition until all the necessary
information is available.
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106 CHAPTER 5. INDEXICALS
5.1 Chapter Overview
So far all phenomena of context-dependence have deliberately been excluded. Now it is time to
address them. In this chapter, indexical reference is investigated and compared with reference by
means of non-indexical expressions such as proper names and definite descriptions. According to
the terminology to be introduced in section 5.2.1 the class of indexicals comprises indicators such
as «I», «now», and «here» and demonstratives such as «this» and «that». After a concise summary
of the research on indexicals in section 5.2.2 and the exclusion of certain phenomena in section
5.2.3, an overview of indexicals and their dimensions is given in section 5.3. The dimension
are: person, i.e. the role of discourse participants, space, time, modality, and others. On the
basis of examples, indexical reference will then be described informally in a large section 5.4.
Description theory can deal nicely with indexicals, because many if not most of them have a lot of
descriptive content. Special features that set indexicals apart from non-indexical expressions are
their token-reflexivity and, connected with this, their egocentricity or at least object-centricity.
Ways to formulate informal token-reflexive and egocentric reference rules and the problematic
features of such reference rules will be discussed in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.4.3. It will then be
argued in section 5.4.4 that two different notions of context have to be distinguished. The context
of utterance determines the semantic reference of indexicals, whereas the conversational context
is crucial for fixing ambiguity, vagueness, and broad versus narrow readings in dependence of the
background assumptions of the discourse participants. The behavior of indexicals with respect
to modal expressions is investigated in section 5.4.5, and, following Kaplan (1989) and others,
indexicals will be categorized as rigid expressions, with only few potential exceptions. This,
it is argued, is a consequence of their token-reflexivity. Finally, indexical and non-indexical
reference are compared in section 5.4.8. This will provide the basis for their formal treatment.
The examples given in this chapter suffice to confirm Thesis 6.
5.2 Introduction
5.2.1 Terminology
There is no generally agreed upon taxonomy of indexical expressions. In the philosophical lit-
erature, the term indexicals is commonly used for expressions like «I», «you», «here», or «now»,
whose referent depends on features of the context of utterance.1 The term demonstratives is
commonly used for expressions like «this−−→» or «that−−→», whose semantic referent isn’t fixed by their
utterance alone but who additionally require an accompanying pointing gesture or a similar way
of determining their semantic referent by non-verbal means. The terminology found in the lit-
erature varies: Kaplan (1989) mainly uses demonstratives,2 Russell (1966) talks about egocentric
particulars, other authors like Kamlah and Lorenzen (1973) or Goodman (1967) prefer indica-
tors, Reichenbach (1947) calls indexicals and demonstratives token reflexive words, Jespersen
1According to Perry (2005, p. 314-5), the term index is used by Peirce, but not in the sense presumed here.
2He considers the terminological choice to use demonstratives in a general sense “poor usage”, though (Kaplan 1989,
p. 489).
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(1922) and Jacobson (1990) call them shifters, Bar-Hillel (1954) talks of indexical expressions,
whereas Bühler (1934), Fillmore (1997), and many contemporary linguists speak of deictica and
deictics. Expressions that depend on the inner-linguistic (endophoric) context, i.e. on what has
been said so far, are called anaphora if they depend on an antecedent in the discourse context
and cataphora if they depend on the subsequent inner-linguistic context, i.e. what will be said.
The following taxonomy will from now on be used as a working basis. Indicators such as
«I», «now», or «here» are egocentric or object-centric expressions whose semantic referent can
only be determined by taking extralinguistic features of the context of utterance into account.
Demonstratives are egocentric expressions whose semantic referent can only be determined by
taking an extralinguistic pointing gesture into account.3 Anaphora are expressions whose seman-
tic referent can only be determined by taking into account their antecedent, i.e. an expression
uttered in the discourse before, whereas cataphora are expressions whose semantic referent can
only be determined by taking into account their subsequent, i.e. an expression that will be ut-
tered. Both indicators and demonstratives will be called indexicals, and both anaphora (in the
narrow sense) and cataphora will in a sloppy way be called anaphoric expressions when the dif-
ferences don’t matter. This taxonomy is a trade-off between exactness and common usage. The
term «indexicals» is commonly used in the philosophical literature for indicators, but since «de-
ictica» would be misleading as a generic name for indicators and demonstratives alike, as this
term has a strong demonstrative connotation, indexicals are taken to subsume indicators and
demonstratives.4 Notice that sometimes the adjective indexical is used for the property of being
an indicator and sometimes it is used for the property of being an indexical expression in general.
This unfortunate equivocation can hardly be avoided, because indicative is already in use for the
indicative mood. The term deixis is here understood as the demonstrative use of expressions and
as the use of a pointing gesture in particular, whereas indexicality is understood as the general
phenomenon of egocentric or object-centric context-dependence that will be laid out below.5 As
opposed to common practice, anaphoric expressions will not be considered indexical, although
they are mentioned and discussed in relation to them whenever this deems appropriate. It will
be argued in section 5.4.4 that the endophoric context involved in the resolution of anaphoric
expressions is conceptually different from the exophoric context of utterance according to which
the referents of indexical expressions are fixed.
Here are a few English examples to illustrate the above distinctions.
Indicators
(5.1) I am here now.
(5.2) You are drunk.
3Cf. (Kaplan 1989, pp. 490-1).
4Ancient Greek (grc) deiknymi: I show, point, point out.
5One may object that this makes Thesis 6 true by definition, but that’s a bit picky. To content the purist, we may say
that Thesis 6 holds for what is commonly called indexicals, no matter how they are characterized here. The point is
just that egocentricity/centricity is a better criterion for deciding indexicals from non-indexical expressions than context-
dependency alone.
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(5.3) We are drunk.
(5.4) Yesterday it has rained and tomorrow it will rain as well.
(5.5) To the left youpl see the Dome.
Notational convention: Syntactic or semantic features like the plural form in 5.5 are some-
times indicated by superscripts.
Demonstratives
(5.6) This−−→ is Alice.
(5.7) This−−→1 is different from that−−→, but this−→2 isn’t.
(5.8) A: Where is the station? B: Overthere−−−−−−→.
Notational convention: Demonstrative uses of expressions are marked with an arrow. Differ-
ent occurrences (tokens) of the same expression are marked by numeric indices.
Anaphoric Expressions
(5.9) Alice loves Bobi, but hei loves Carolj. Shej loves himi, too. (anaphora)
(5.10) Iti is sad [that it rains]i. (cataphora)
(5.11) Although shei doesn’t know yet, Alicei will win the lottery. (cataphora)
Notational convention: Anaphoric expressions bear the same letter index as their antecedent
or subsequent.
5.2.2 Brief Historical Overview
There are at least two traditions of research on indexical expressions that until recently have
remained relatively independent of each other. Works like (Brugmann 1904, 1909, 1917), (Jes-
persen 1922), and (Bühler 1934) exemplify a linguistic tradition, where early publications
like that of Brugmann only deal with indexicals in Indo-European languages from a diachronic
perspective. Bühler (1934), one of the founders of modern cognitive linguistics, provides a sys-
tematic treatment of indexicals and argues on the basis of his organon model of language that
by their appellative function they draw the attention of the recipient to the referent in relation
to the deictic center I–here–now.6 The corresponding concepts of egocentricity and centricity in
general are relevant for truth-conditional treatments of indexicals and set indexical expressions
apart from other context-dependent expressions. More recent general discussions of indexical
expressions can be found in (Fillmore 1972), Lyons (1977), and Levinson (1983). In combina-
tion with data in the typological literature the linguistic line of research discusses a vast variety
6See (Bühler 1965, p. 28; pp. 102-20).
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of uses of indexicals and shows that languages can realize various non-obvious semantic features
like spatial proximity or the social status of discourse participants in a language’s inventory of
indexical expressions.
A second research tradition, that for contingent historical reasons has mostly been centered
on the English language, goes back to a general philosophical interest in the context-dependency
of indexical expressions as in (Russell 1966), (Bar-Hillel 1954), and (Reichenbach 1947). These
approaches to indexicality have as their primary goal to restrict the use of context-dependent
expressions to few occasions, for example when they are used to refer directly to sense data,
or to completely eliminate the need for indexicals in an ideal language that can serve as the
proper foundation of all sciences. Two main problems evolve out of this tradition: (1) Is an
ideal language feasible that doesn’t contain any indexicals, i.e. are indexicals in principle dis-
pensable? (2) Is there some designated mode of demonstrative or indexical reference that is
guaranteed to denote? A general shift from the ideal language perspective to an empirical per-
spective on natural languages in the second half of 20th Century has led to a third problem
introduced by Castañeda (1967) and Perry (1977, 1979): (3) Are there indexical expressions
that are irreducible, i.e. that cannot be substituted with other expressions like proper names or
definite descriptions salva veritate or without loosing expressive power? This problem, which
Perry (1979) suggestively coined the Problem of the Essential Indexical, must be considered on
the background of an affirmative answer to problem (2) and the then just evolving direct ref-
erence view. In the meantime, the problem how to formalize context-dependency of indexicals
was tackled by using so-called double-index or two-dimensional modal logics, in which truth in
a model is relativized to two indices, the context of utterance and the circumstances of evalu-
ation, instead of just the latter. The intensional Logic of Demonstratives of Kaplan (1989) has
become a de facto standard for logically analyzing indexical expressions long before its final
publication. Following Kripke (1972), it was soon recognized as an offshot of the general debate
about direct reference that Millian analyses of indexical expressions in two-dimensional modal
logics like Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives lead to similar or the same problems with cogni-
tive content and attitude ascriptions as Millian analyses of proper names. Arguments for the
rigidity of indexicals in Kaplan (1989) have thus intertwined the discussion of the philosoph-
ical problems concerning indexicals just mentioned with the general logical problems how to
account for the cognitive role of referential expressions in the direct reference view and how
to model belief. Possible solutions have been proposed, for example property-ascription the-
ory of attitudes in (Lewis 1979), structured propositions in (von Stechow 1982), (Cresswell
1985), accounts based on diagonalization in (Stalnaker 1978), (Stalnaker 1981) (and many
papers following Stalnaker more or less loosely), and alternative logical foundations like Cas-
tañeda’s version of trope theory in (Castañeda 1982), (Castañeda 1989), or situation theory
in (Barwise and Perry 1983)—just to mention a few. In the course of these developments, the
linguistic and philosophical research traditions have come closer together and are hardly sepa-
rable by now. Recent work on indexicals focuses on various issues on the borderline between
semantics and the philosophy of language, for example: the (re-)discovery of context-shifting
indexicals on the basis of typological data by Schlenker (2000, 2002, 2003), Perry’s distinction
between forms of utterance-based semantic content and cognitive aspects thereof in a continu-
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ous series of papers (Perry 1996, 1997b, a, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2005), critique on token- and
utterance-based approaches in (Predelli 2003, 2005), and the dynamic approach of (Stojanovic
2002, 2005) based on updating information states. A related debate, that has partly evolved
from philosopher’s interest in indexicals, concerns the notion of what is said and the question
how pervasive context-dependency is in general. See for example the lively debate in (Recanati
1993, 2004, 2006) versus (Cappelen and Lepore 2005, 2006).
5.2.3 More Terminology and Exclusion of Some Phenomena
Before going into the details, some terminology has to be introduced and some pragmatic phe-
nomena have to be excluded from this investigation, because they are beyond its scope.
Mixed Uses
There is a distinction between mixed and non-mixed uses of indicators and demonstratives. So
far, only examples of non-mixed uses have been given. Consider now the following utterances.
(5.12) That−−→ man has stolen my purse.
(5.13) Overthere−−−−−−→ behind the mountains is a nuclear power plant.
(5.14) We humans are carbon-based.
(5.15) You bastard have betrayed us good willing-people.
(5.16) Three hours from now we will be in Greece.
(5.17) Exactly now in two days will the plane arrive.
These examples contain demonstratives and indicators in more complex phrases, and index-
icals that are syntactically complex in this way will be called compound indexicals. In case of
demonstratives the additional descriptive component further restricts the semantic referent. It is
not any person pointed to that has stolen my purse, but the man pointed to. The power plant is
not anywhere overthere, but behind the mountains, which implicates that the power plant is not
visible from here. In case of indicators, the additional descriptive condition may either restrict
the range of possible referents like in examples 5.14 and 5.15 or determine the referent in rela-
tion to the referent of the embedded indexical. The latter is the case in examples 5.16, in which
the semantic referent is determined as a point in the future that lies three hours from the speech
time at which the utterance has occurred, and 5.17, in which the same time of the day of the
utterance is taken two days in the future. Uses of compound indicators or demonstratives of the
first kind may be called restrictive mixed uses, whereas the latter use of indicators may be called
context-relative mixed uses. This distinction should not be mixed up with another distinction that
is sometimes made between determinative and independent demonstratives; determinatives need
to be combined with a noun and independent demonstratives can or need to stand alone as a
noun phrase for syntactical reasons. For example Japanese (jpn) «kono», «sono», «ano» require
a subsequent noun, whereas «kore», «sore», «are» are noun phrases on their own. Furthermore,
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the term complex indexicals will be reserved for indexicals whose meaning is in a given analysis
composed out of several meanings usually in dependence of the deictic center.
Pure Versus Impure Uses
Another important distinction is between pure and impure uses of indexical expressions.7 It could
be objected to the taxonomy in section 5.2.1 that it doesn’t seem to be clearcut. Consider for
example the following utterances.
(5.18) You−−→, you−−→
, but not you
−−→
, are dismissed. (Levinson 1983, p. 66)
(5.19) Looking at the mess in the staff canteen: This is a shame!
(5.20) Alice waits here−−→, while we go there−−−→.
(5.21) Don’t do it now−−→, but NOW−−−→! (Levinson 1983, p. 66)
In example 5.18, the indicator «you» is used with accompanying pointing gestures in order
to single out different addressees. The exclamation in example 5.19 is made without using
a pointing gesture. Fillmore (1997, pp. 62-3) and Levinson (1983, pp. 65-6) call these uses
gestural and symbolic use respectively. Instead of following this terminology, in the following a
distinction is made between demonstrative and indexical uses of an expression as opposed to
a general classification of expressions as indicators and demonstratives according to the way
they are used canonically. For example, in utterance 5.20 the indicator «here» is used to refer
demonstratively to a place in the proximity of the place of utterance, although the expression
itself is classified as an indicator, and the same applies to «now» in example 5.21, where the
temporal sequence of uttering parts of speech and stress acts like a pointing gesture. These uses
are instances of impure uses. Such uses do not defy the distinction between demonstratives and
indicators in general, because they rely on a particular instead of an arbitrary situation of use.
Consider in contrast examples of pure uses in 5.1–5.8. In pure uses of indicators no pointing
gesture is required at all, although even an utterance of «I» may be accompanied by a pointing
gesture, and, vice versa, the pure use of a demonstrative requires a pointing gesture. In a pure use
of an indicator its referent is fully determined even if the utterance is taken out if its particular
context and just considered in an arbitrary, generic context, whereas in an impure use of an
indicator its referent can either not be fully determined relative to an arbitrary, generic context,
or it has to be interpreted canonically, i.e. as a pure use, in such a context. Correspondingly, a
competent speaker by default has to presume that the use of a demonstrative is accompanied by a
pointing gesture (in a broad sense of «gesture»), whereas the impure use can only be interpreted
by exploiting features of the particular, concrete context of utterance. Consider a single utterance
of an indexical and a demonstrative respectively, as in the following examples of pure uses.
(5.2) You are drunk.
(5.6) This−−→ is Alice.
7Cf. (Perry 1997a, pp. 395-6), (Lyons 2002, p. 307).
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Without knowing anything about the context of utterance, a competent speaker is able to tell
that the indicator in 5.2 refers to one or more persons that the speaker addresses in the context
of utterance. There is a reference rule associated with «you», according to which this indicator
semantically refers to the person addressed or, if it is a plural form, to the group addressed by
the speaker in the context of its utterance. In contrast to this, a competent speaker will not be
able to tell what the speaker refers to when using «this−−→» in example 5.6 without knowing more
about the context of utterance and the accompanying pointing gesture in particular.
Derived Uses
Apart from impure uses, there is a number of other phenomena that seem to defy a simple and
straightforward analysis of indexical expressions. First of all, there are phenomena of speaking
on behalf of someone and speaking in a narrative context. A use of «I» in example 5.22 only
refers to the actress herself in an indirect way; it rather refers to Celia, a fictional person that
comes to a living during the play.8
(5.22) Actress playing Celia: I like this place and willingly could waste my time in it.
(Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II, Scene IV)
Of course, in many narrative contexts, indicators like «I» or «you» don’t refer to the speaker
or addressee taken as bare objects, but rather to the persons of the narrated story. Likewise,
if General Jackson utters 5.23, his use of «I» might not refer to himself but to the troops he
commands.
(5.23) General Jackson pointing on the map: I am right here−−→. (Smith 1989)
The use of «here» in this example is impure and draws from conventions about map reading
that form a semiotic system on their own, and the use of «I» in this example is derived. Like in
the impure uses mentioned before, the fact that these examples are derived can easily be seen
by taking the utterances out of their context. A speaker that interprets them without knowing
the details of their context of utterance can only assume a canonical interpretation, according to
which «I» in both 5.22 and 5.23 refers to the speaker of the utterance. Related to special narrative
contexts or shifts of conventions is what Lyons (1977) calls deictic projection. He discusses the
following example and variations thereof:
(5.24) We are coming there next week. (Lyons 1977, p. 579)
As Lyons notes, although «there» is interpreted in contrast to the spatial location of the
speaker, i.e. the here of the original deictic center, the deictic center of the addressee is assumed
in the use of «coming».
Other uses are metaphoric, figurative, or, as Bühler puts it, involve Deixis am Phantasma.9
These uses can be subsumed under the label discourse deixis, i.e. cases in which an expression
8And «this place» does of course not denote the theater, but a fictional place.
9See (Bühler 1965, pp. 121-40).
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refers to a state of affairs talked about earlier or has a larger discourse fragment as antecedent—
as opposed to anaphora, whose antecedent is a single sentence-level constituent. For example,
spatial indicators like «here» or demonstratives like «there−−−→» can be used discourse-deictically to
indicate points in narrative space, as in 5.25 and 5.26.
(5.25) Here we have an interesting argument.
(5.26) There we have a conclusion that doesn’t hold.
(5.27) This is a good point.
Another derived use is a metonymy (in a broad sense) and has been discussed as deferred
ostension by Quine (1971).10 Here is an example of such a use:
(5.28) Waitress pointing to a ham sandwich: He−→’s sitting at table 20. (Miller 1982, p. 68)
11
On the basis of world-knowledge and complex conventions about serving food in restaurants,
the actual referent of the demonstrative in this case is determined by pointing to an object that
stands for the actual referent.
Excluded Phenomena
In the following sections mixed uses will be taken into account, but only insofar as it deems ap-
propriate. Impure and derived uses will in the following mostly be ignored, but in chapter 7 some
way to deal with them to some extent will be implemented. Mostly ignoring these phenomena
isn’t meant to indicate that they are not important. In the contrary, narrative use of expressions,
speaking on behalf of someone, figurative speech, and other pragmatically derived uses occur
frequently in daily written or spoken texts. They are merely excluded, because they require an
additional analysis on top of the existing analysis of canonical uses. The reference of derived cases
crucially depends on factors like the given conversational context, the topic of the conversation,
the discourse type, and so on. For example, in cases of narrative talk or speaking on behalf of
someone, the narrative context as in 5.22 could be introduced by embedding all utterances into
a modality that encodes the narrative context based on a reading like being compatible with the
story told in Shakespeare’s ‘As You Like It’, but relative to this freshly created intensional context
indexical expressions would work like in non-derived cases. Likewise, the discourse-deictic and
metonymic uses discussed in the last section depend on the broader conversational context. In
any such cases, no general linguistic rule can be given that would fix the reference independently
of the broader context that is introduced by the whole background story, be it explicitly written
down or presumed by the recipients of the text. There are two different contexts at play that
will be addressed in more detail in section 5.4.4. In non-derived, canonical uses of indexical
expressions it is possible to give the reference rule of an indicator qua type without taking any
10Cf. (Nunberg 1977, 1993, 2004), (Miller 1982).
11According to Miller, the example is originally from (Nunberg 1977). Unfortunately, Nunberg’s doctoral thesis was
not available for the present study.
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particular context of utterance into account, and the canonical use of a demonstrative has a de-
termined referent only with respect to some pointing gesture. These uses are the guideline for
finding out how indexicals work.
5.3 Dimensions of Indexicality
Indicators and demonstratives refer to objects in various dimensions. The basic dimensions are
person, space, and time, and the origin (0-point) of these dimensions is the deictic center I–here–
now (Bühler 1934). Other dimensions have been suggested in addition, for example the modal
dimension, the discourse or textual dimension, and social status. In the following sections, an
overview of lexicalized indexicals in these dimensions in particular languages will be given. This
overview is not systematic and the examples are chosen arbitrarily; its purpose is to show the
variety of uses of indexicals and their meanings in natural languages. The main lesson to be
drawn from this overview is that indexicals generally have a rich descriptive meaning.
5.3.1 The Person Dimension
One of the basic dimensions of indexicality is the discourse participants in the broad sense that
is grammaticalized in the person category. In English and other Indo-European languages this
category is distinguished into first, second, and third person. Taken in a broad sense, this dimen-
sion also includes distinctions by numerus and features like being more or less animate. As Lyons
(1977, p. 638-9) emphasizes, the third person is with many respects different from the first and
second person and defined negatively as neither speaker nor addressee. It may be further dis-
tinguished into 3rd person for discourse participants and a 4th person for mere bystanders, for
example in Samal.12 Since there can be many objects and persons that are merely talked about
but are not discourse participants and might not be present, third person pronouns cannot be
used as pure indicators, but have to be used demonstratively or anaphorically. The examples of
the following paragraphs will give a cursory overview of indexicality in the person domain.
In English, the indicator «I» refers to the speaker of the utterance, «you» to the addressee,
«youpl» to the the addressees, i.e. a group of people not including the speaker. Notice that
there is also a generic use of «you», for example in «You always ought to pay your debts» the
second person pronoun can be interpreted generically. Generic uses of pronouns like «you» or
«one» are neither indexical nor referential. The personal pronouns «he», «she», «it» can be used
anaphorically or demonstratively. «We» comes in two readings that in languages like Malay,
Tagalog, and Dieri are lexicalized separately.13 Inclusive «we» denotes a group consisting of the
speaker and the persons addressed by the speaker. Exclusive «we» denotes the speaker and his
12According to (Fillmore 1997, pp. 65-6). Samal (sml) is a Malayo-Polynesian language spoken by roughly 90,000
speakers on the Philippines (Gordon 2005).
13Malay (mly) and Tagalog (tgl) are Malayo-Polynesian languages, the former spoken in Malaysia with a population of
roughly 7 million speakers, the latter spoken on “Manila, most of Luzon, and Mindoro” with a large population of about
14 million speakers, Dieri (Diyari; dif) is a now extinct Australian language (Gordon 2005).
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group, but not any addressees. Which reading is salient in an English utterance depends on the
conversational context, as exemplified by utterances 5.29 and 5.30.
(5.29) Situation: A company CEO negotiating the pricing of products needed for production,
talking to representatives of the delivering company.
We cannot afford your offer. (exclusive reading)
(5.30) Alice to Bob: We have to wait for Carol. (inclusive reading salient)
There is also a common use of «we» that excludes the speaker, for example when a teacher
speaks to his scholars in an old-fashioned, authoritarian manner like in 5.31.
(5.31) If we don’t do our homework assignments, we will likely fail the examination. (derived
speaker-exclusive use)
In such examples only the particular conversational context makes it clear, on the basis of
world knowledge about teacher-pupil relations, that the teacher himself isn’t intending to do any
homework assignments. So this is a derived use. Finally, like in the singular case, English plural
pronouns like «they» can only be used anaphorically or demonstratively.
Notice that in English the singular third person pronouns are marked for grammatical gender.
This provides additional selectional restrictions that can be used for anaphora resolution, i.e.
finding the antecedent or subsequent of anaphoric expressions, and for additional identification
criteria in their demonstrative use, but in the latter case only if the referent has natural gender,
since otherwise the grammatical gender is idiosyncratic.14
The deictic center of indexical expressions in the person dimension generally is the speaker
who makes the utterance, but Schlenker (2000, 2002, 2003) presents some data on the basis of
which he argues that there are languages in which indexicals can be evaluated with respect to
the context of a reported speech act when they occur within the complement of a verb of indirect
speech. The following examples of Amharic utterances are taken from (Schlenker 2003), where
in the first one the 1st person pronoun and in the second one the 2nd person pronoun is shifted.15
(5.32) ˇon ˇ@gna n@-n˜n˜ y1l-all
John hero be.PF-1SO 3M.say-AUX.3M
‘John says that he is a hero.’
(Schlenker 2003, p. 68)
(5.33) m1n amt’-a 1nd-al-@-n˜n˜ al-s@mma-hu-mm
what bring.IMPER-2M COMP-say.PF-3M-1SO NEG-hear.PF-1S-NEG
‘I didn’t hear what he told me to bring.’
(lit. I didn’t hear that he said to me bring what.)
(Schlenker 2003, p. 68)
14This means that grammatical gender in languages like English or German is not a semantic, but really a grammatical
feature, as the name implies. Like in the case of proper names, grammatical features may sometimes be used heuristically
for identification purposes, although they don’t stand for properties of the referents in all cases.
15Amharic (amh) is an Afro-Asiatic language spoken mainly in Ethiopia by a total population of roughly 17.5 million
speakers (Gordon 2005).
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Schlenker takes 5.33 as evidence that no quoting is involved: “If the embedded clause had
been quoted, the original discourse should have been of the form: ‘bring what!’. But as the trans-
lation shows, this is not the correct reading (in fact, such a direct discourse would presumably
be meaningless.)” (Schlenker 2003, p. 69) Outside the scope of verbs of saying, the Amharic
first person yields the speaker of the current context of utterance, but in the scope of such verbs
it yields the speaker of the context of the reported speech act. Such indexicals will from now on
be called context-shifting indexicals or short shifters. They have been present in the typological
literature for some time, but the changes they require to logical analysis have first been pointed
out by (Schlenker 2000, 2003) and will be addressed in the next two chapters.
5.3.2 The Spatial Dimension
Another basic dimension of indexicals is space. This is here understood as the 3-dimensional
space in which canonical utterances in face-to-face communication take place. The sentence
adverb «here» denotes the place of utterance, which depending on the conversational context
can range from the very place the speaker occupies to the whole universe, as the following
examples show.
(5.34) Alice standing in the water: Here I can stand. (narrow interpretation)
(5.35) Here the laws of nature hold, but in the divine realm they are of no significance. (broad
interpretation)
«Here» can also be vague in the sense that there is not always a clear guideline from the
context of utterance that would allow one to determine the boundaries of the place of utterance.
Here is a typical example of such a case.
(5.36) It’s nice weather here.
Special or artificial features of the place of utterance can give grounds to a salient interpreta-
tion according to which the boundaries are clear, but narrow or broader interpretations are still
possible. Consider the following example.
(5.37) Sitting in the office in winter: It’s cold here.
The office or the institute or the city or country of the institute might provide more or less
clear boundaries to the interpretation of ‹here› in this example, although it is still a matter of
the conversational context which of these interpretations is most salient. Opposed to «here» is
the demonstrative «there», which in the same context of utterance denotes a place that is in
the distance of the place denoted by «here». The English demonstratives «this−−→» and «that−−→» are
also opposed to each other, though less strictly. The demonstrative «this−−→» denotes an object in the
proximity of the speaker, «that−−→» denotes an object in the proximity of the addressee, and «yonder−−−−→
»
is used for a distant object that is neither in the proximity of the speaker or the addressee. This
is similar to the 3-way system of spatial demonstratives in Japanese: «kore−−→» (this in proximity of
speaker), «sore−−→» (that in proximity of addressee), «are−→» (that neither in proximity of speaker nor
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Eipo Gloss Eipo Gloss
a- here da- here (wider area around speaker
and addressee, here and there)
ei- up there dei- very far up there
ou- down there dou- very far down there
or- across there dor- very far across there
Table 5.1: Eipo spatial demonstrative prefixes according to (Heeschen 1982, pp. 84-88).
addressee), and their adjective variants «kono−−−→», «sono−−→», «ano−−→». In other languages, more fine
grained spatial distinctions are made, for example Eipo has a cross-categorial prefix system plus
additional prefix modifier «d-» as illustrated in table 5.1.16 In some languages spatial restrictions
of demonstratives can be readily combined with other restrictions. For example, Mosel (1982)
summarizes Tolai spatial demonstratives as follows:17
“The Tolai local deictics are not only distinctive for the contrast ‘here’ and ‘there’, but
can also be marked for:
1. the level at which the indicated place is located relative to the speaker’s position,
for instance, whether it is located upwards or downwards;
2. whether the indicated place is:
(a) a place at which an action takes place (e.g. ‘they danced there’),
(b) a place where something or somebody is found (e.g. ‘he is there’),
(c) the goal of an action (e.g. ‘he came from there’),
(d) the source of an action (e.g. ‘he came from there’);
3. whether or not the place pointed at is known to the hearer.” (Mosel 1982,
p. 111)
Here is a Tolai demonstrative with its glossing:
(5.38) a
LOC
-ba
-known-to-the-hearer
-r
-there
-a
-down
‘down there at a place near you, or that you know’ (Mosel 1982, p. 127)
Such examples show that there is a reference rule associated with spatial indicators and
demonstratives that restricts the location of the object referred to or the place of the situation
(state of affair) expressed by the utterance at sentence-level. In the examples discussed so far,
16Eipo (eip) is a Papuan (Trans-New Guinean) language with a population of only 3,000 speakers as of 1987 (Gordon
2005).
17According to SIL, the correct name of the language (ksd) is Kuanua, whereas “‘Tolai’ is the name of the people.” (Gor-
don 2005, entry for ksd). It is a Malayo-Polynesian language of Papua New Guinea with about 61,000 speakers as of
1991 (Gordon 2005).
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this restriction is relative to the place of the speaker who utters the respective sentence, i.e. the
expressions discussed so far are egocentric. In the spatial domain, there are, however, also object-
centric indicators or readings thereof and different interpretations of such indicators can lead
to ambiguities. This is the case with many compound indicators that specify relations between
objects in one of the three primordial spatial axes up/down, front/back, left/right (in order of
general importance for humans).18 Take for example the the following utterances.
(5.39) Talking about a car: The right front tire is flat. (object-centric reading)
(5.40) Raise your left arm! (object-centric or egocentric reading)
(5.41) What’s that shiny object over there, just to the left of the cypress tree? (Fillmore 1997,
p. 28) (egocentric reading)
(5.42) Alice: The cat is behind the tree. (egocentric reading)
In 5.39 the right tire isn’t the tire that is located to the right of the speaker, but the tire
located to the right of the left/right axis of the car that origins from a metaphor between the
car’s appearance and the appearance of the human body and the human face in particular.19
Some authors like Fillmore (1997) classify these uses as non-deictic. In the present terminology
they are not considered indexical in the strict sense either, but still discussed and categorized
under this label taken in a broader sense. This is admittedly fuzzy terminology; it is however
justified, given that their deictic center is an object but they otherwise work analogously to
egocentric expressions. There are many relational expressions that are object-centric in that
sense: «at», «in», «on», «below», «over», «under», «beneath», «end», «edge», «corner», «top»,
«bottom», «upper», «lower», «front», etc.20 Example 5.40, on the other hand, is ambiguous
between an egocentric reading according to which the arm of the addressee that is left to the
speaker is the referent of ‹your left arm›, and the preferred object-centric reading, according to
which the left arm is picked out from the addressee’s own perspective. When an object has no
intrinsic axis, for example a ball, the potentially object-centric indicator-expressions «up» and
«down», «left» and «right», or «front» and «back» may still be usable, but are then interpreted
according to the observer axis, i.e. the direction into which both speaker and addressees look.21
This is the case in example 5.41 and 5.42.22 These readings are egocentric, but if speaker and
addressee don’t look into the same direction or are located far apart from each other and the
referents in question have no intrinsic axis, then the use of certain indexical expressions like «in
front of» can become unacceptable or they may be too ambiguous for successful communication.
If in turn there is an observer axis, then there are several possible interpretation strategies; for
example, the objects may be regarded as facing at the observers, or the objects may be regarded
as being aligned with the direction the observers look, i.e. facing away from the observers. Hill
18See (Fillmore 1997, pp. 32ff.). Cf. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) on the importance and ranking of the body axes and
the pervasiveness of spatial metaphors in everyday speech.
19See (Fillmore 1997, p. 35-6).
20Cf. Fillmore (1997, pp. 27–44).
21See (Hill 1982, p. 16).
22Cf. (Fillmore 1997, p. 66ff.).
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(1982) shows by comparing Hausa with English indexical expressions that the order in which
speakers prefer aligned to facing reading isn’t universal.23 It must finally be remarked that spatial
indexicality is also realized by case systems of various languages that are otherwise not related
to each other, for example in Hopi and Finnish.24
What do these more or less arbitrarily-chosen examples indicate? First, the spatial domain
is, by virtue of its topology, more complex than other domains. A certain degree of vagueness
is always present in the meaning of spatial indicators, and many relational indicators are am-
biguous between object-centric and egocentric readings and facing versus aligned perspective.
Second, semantic oppositions like the one between «here» and «there» must be interpreted with
respect to a context of utterance and the broader, conversational context. For example, the place
denoted by «there» is always in a certain distance from the place denoted by «here», but the
actual distance between the two places depends on the size of the place denoted by «here», and
this size can vary to a high degree. Third, spatial indicators and demonstratives have a refer-
ence rule that depends on the respective deictic center, i.e. either the location of the speaker
or of another object. This reference rule can involve various spatial and non-spatial restrictions.
Fourth, indexical expressions can be realized in various different ways and different languages
grammaticalize and lexicalize different spatial distinctions to a varying degree. Proximity to
speaker, addressee, or being distal to both are features common to many languages, though, and
any semantic distinction that isn’t lexicalized in a language can of course still be expressed by
forming a compound indexical.
5.3.3 The Temporal Dimension
The third of the basic dimensions is time and the time axis is here to be understood as a lin-
ear axis ordered by an earlier/later than relation.25 Time plays a crucial role in everyday ac-
tivities and conversations and most languages offer a broad range of temporal indicators, but
there are no non-derived, non-figurative temporal demonstratives for the obvious reason that
time is abstract and cannot be observed directly. Time is measured based on conventionalized
and culture-dependent scales that are usually based on external factors like day/nighttime shift,
moon-phases, seasons, and partitionings of these into units that arise out of practical or religious
needs. Unit indicators operate on these units relative to the time of utterance, for example «yes-
terday» and «tomorrow».26 Conversely, non-unit indicators such as «soon» or «then» don’t specify
an interval in a measurable time unit. Tenses are determinative non-unit indicators, insofar as
they specify temporal relations between events in relation to the time of utterance.
23Hausa (hau) is an African language spoken in Nigeria and other countries by roughly 24 million speakers (Gordon
2005).
24See on Hopi (hop) (Malotki 1982, pp. 226-32), on Finnish (fin) (Fillmore 1997, p. 30). Hopi is a well-known Uto-
Aztecan language of native North Americans with around 5,000 speakers but only 40 monolinguals as of 1990, Finnish
(Suomi) is a Finno-Ugric language spoken primarily in Finland by around 5 million people (Gordon 2005).
25See (Fillmore 1997, p. 47). Many of the following distinctions are also based (Fillmore 1997, pp. 45–57).
26See (Fillmore 1997, p. 48).
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The deictic center in the temporal domain is denoted by the non-unit indicator «now», and
like in the spatial dimension the extension of this expression can vary from one conversational
context to another, as the following examples show.
(5.43) Alice: What time is it? Bob: It is now 12 o’clock. (narrow reading)
(5.44) Salaries are higher now than 30 years ago. (broad reading)
In the first example, «now» refers to a vague time interval stretching around the exact time
of utterance, but whose actual length depends on possibly extralinguistic factors such as the
purpose for which Alice wants to know what time it is. The interval denoted by ‹now› in 5.44
must be taken much larger than that denoted in 5.43, because average salaries aren’t measured
every few seconds and change only in discrete units of weeks or months.27 It is often possible to
specify the range of a reading by using compound indicators, for example German «jetzt gerade»,
«jetzt eben», «gerade eben» have narrow reading denoting time intervals that start just before
the utterance, whereas «jetzt sofort», and «jetzt gleich» have narrow reading denoting intervals
that start during or just after the time of utterance.28
Common English unit indicators are for example «today», «tomorrow», «yesterday», «week»,
«year», «decade», or «century». Unit indicators are not very vague in the modern unit systems
that are widely in use nowadays and defined by experts. However, there is a certain ambiguity
caused by lazy versus pedantic reading of unit indicators. For example, four minutes past mid-
night a speaker might use «today» in communication to refer to yesterday and «yesterday» to
refer to the day before yesterday. Though quite natural, these readings are derived and based on
ad hoc unit boundaries; speakers might need to correct themselves in such cases when someone
scrutinizes further. Unit indicators can also evoke systematic ambiguities. A typical example is
English expressions like «next Thursday» in 5.45.
(5.45) We’ll meet next Thursday.
If this sentence is uttered on Monday the meeting is meant to take place on Thursday of the
same week, whereas the salient reading of «next Thursday» refers to the Thursday of the follow-
ing week when the same sentence is uttered on Wednesday. But as Fillmore (1997) remarks,
the “[. . . ] use of the words ‘next’ and ‘last’ with the positional calendric terms has speakers of
English divided into an uncountable number of subdialects, and I believe the best thing is to
leave this subject untouched.” (Fillmore 1997, p. 73)
Another important distinction made by Fillmore is between calendric versus non-calendric
uses of unit indicators.29 The following utterances exemplify this distinction.
(5.46) Last year it has in total rained less than this year. (calendric)
(5.47) I’ve been in Denmark for one year. (non-calendric)
27One may, from an ideal language perspective, insist on a narrow reading of «now» 5.44 and point out that 5.44 is
imprecise, because data about salaries is measured in larger intervals. However, such an interpretation is very restrictive;
it would favor a reading that violates pragmatic constraints like Grice’s Cooperative Principle.
28These examples were taken from (Hundt 2004).
29See (Fillmore 1997, p. 49-50).
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tSRE
Alice had gone.
Figure 5.1: An analysis of tense according to Reichenbach’s S-R-E scheme
In the first example, the interval denoted by «last year» is determined with respect to the
conventional starting and endpoints given by the calendar, whereas the prepositional phrase
«for one year» of the second example denotes the interval that stretches back a year from the
context of utterance. Both uses are egocentric, the non-calendric uses in combination with tense,
whereas calendric uses also depend on the origin of the respective coordinate system, i.e. the 0-
point of the Gregorian, the Hebrew, the Islamic, or whatever else calendar is in use.30 Sometimes
it is unclear which underlying unit system is used and then ambiguities arise, for example when
distinctions aren’t made explicit between fiscal and calendric year and month, astronomic versus
sidereal versus solar day, Newtonian versus relativistic time, and so on.
Tense determines the time interval at which the event talked about takes place in relation to
the context of utterance, some contextually determined reference time, or some narrated chain
of events. Reichenbach (1947) proposes an influential analysis of tenses, without taking aspect
into account, by distinguishing three points in linear time: the point of speech (S), point of the
event (E), and the point of reference (R).31 Figure 5.1 depicts an analysis of English pluperfect
according to Reichenbach’s scheme. In relation to the time of utterance S, a reference time
interval R is specified, and in turn the time interval E of the event talked about is determined
with respect to R. Comrie (1985) extends Reichenbach’s analysis on the basis of typological data
from various languages. Table 5.2 lists some common tenses according to Comrie. Deviating
from Comrie (1985), conjunctive and disjunctive formulations like (E < R) ∧ (S < R) and
(E = S) ∨ (E > S) are used in this list, where Comrie would write “E before R after S” and “E
not-before S” respectively.32 He also discusses cases in which more than one reference time R is
needed, the presuppositions of some tenses in some languages, and a vast range of typological
data that cannot be addressed here. Important for the present purpose is the fact that according
to his analysis some tenses determine the event time in relation to the context of utterance,
whereas relative tenses specify the event time in relation to the reference time R that is provided
by the conversational context and may but doesn’t have to be linked directly to the time of
utterance. Ultimately, even relative tenses have to be anchored either in the time of utterance,
for example when R is determined in relation to E of a main clause, or in the narrative time
30Cf. (Fillmore 1997, pp. 52-3).
31See (Reichenbach 1966, p. 288).
32He chooses his notation because it provides “. . . unified representation for this grammatical category” (Comrie 1985,
p. 127) and “. . . a disjunctive definition effectively denies the unity of representation of a single grammatical cate-
gory. . . ” (Comrie 1985, p. 124). It is not clear what exactly Comrie means by that, though, as the respective conjunctive
and disjunctive notations express exactly the same constraints, but are less ambiguous.
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Tense Analysis
present E = S
past E < S
future E > S
relative present E = R
relative past E < R
relative future E > R
pluperfect (E < R) ∧ (R < S)
future perfect (E < R) ∧ (R > S)
future in the future (E > R) ∧ (R > S)
future in the past (E > R) ∧ (R < S)
Table 5.2: Some tenses after (Comrie 1985, Ch. 6), where = expresses simultaneity, < temporal
precedence and > its converse.
introduced by previous discourse. So both kinds of tenses are indexical, but relative tenses
may be considered object-centric. Lyons (1977) notes that from a cognitive or conceptual point
of view the future is different from the past: “Futurity is never a purely temporal concept; it
necessarily includes an element of prediction or some related modal notion. . . ” (Lyons 1977,
p. 677) From a truth-conditional perspective, a modal component can however be separated from
purely temporal aspects of verb meaning, because tense analyses like that of Comrie (1985) can
be combined with an analysis of mood even if the two components cannot be distinguished
clearly from each other by morphosyntactic criteria.33
According to Schlenker (2003) and von Stechow (2003) there are context-shifters in the
temporal domain. Schlenker gives the following English example.
(5.48) a. John has told me repeatedly over the years that he was sick two days ago.
b. # John has told me repeatedly over the years that he was sick the day before
yesterday. (Schlenker 2003, p. 64)
In this example, «two days ago» is ambiguous between a non-shifting reading according to
which John was sick two days ago from the calender day of utterance every year, for example
every year two days before Christmas Eve, and a shifting reading according to which he was sick
every year two days before the day at which he uttered «I was sick two days ago». Other examples
of shifting temporal indexicals can for example be found in French «il y a deux jours» and «dans
deux jours», the Russian present tense, and Dimli.34 Moreover, it is possible to combine the
33Lyons (1977, 1982) holds the opposite opinion, but, apart from favoring Priorean tense logic, he merely seems to
suggest in (Lyons 1977, pp. 809–823) that a Reichenbach-style tense analysis may sometimes have to be mixed with an
analysis of mood. This can be agreed upon, but still the two phenomena can be considered separately, especially in their
formal analysis.
34See (Schlenker 2003), (von Stechow 2003), and (Anand and Nevins 2003, 2004). Dimli (diq) is also called Zazaki,
an Indo-Iranian language of Turkey spoken by around 1.5–2.5 million people (Gordon 2005).
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analogue of «now» with a past tense in some languages, for example «jetzt» in German can be
read as an object-centric expression in 5.49 and 5.52 below. Even though English «now» can be
used with the past tense if it is used in some narrative context, i.e. when a past story is being
told, it doesn’t seem to have a reading as a shifter in 5.53.35
(5.49) Alice war jetzt wütend.
(5.50) Alice was angry now.
(5.51) Alice was angry then.
(5.52) Alice hat Bob über die Jahre wiederholt gesagt, dass es jetzt an der Zeit sei umzuziehen.
(5.53) #? Alice has told Bob repeatedly over the years that it was now time to move.
(5.54) # Alice has told Bob repeatedly over the years that it was then time to move.
To summarize, the denotation of temporal indicators is determined with respect to the con-
text of utterance, some narrative time that has to be introduced by other means like the use of
calendric expressions, or the context of some reported speech act in indirect discourse in case of
shifters. Like spatial demonstratives, temporal indicators can be vague, ambiguous, and opposi-
tions like that between «now» and «then» have to be interpreted in a specific context on the basis
of the interpretation of «now» in that context. The linear structure of time and the lack of tem-
poral demonstratives seem to make the time dimension a bit less complicated than space. This
apparent simplicity quickly vanishes, though, once the interplay with non-indexical expressions
operating on the time axis, for example with temporal quantifiers like «every Christmas», or with
verbal aspect is also taken into consideration. In formal analysis a good deal of simplification
and idealization will be necessary to keep the whole machinery within reasonable bounds.
5.3.4 The Modal Dimension
The modal dimension is one of the less traditional and more stipulative dimensions of indexi-
cality. The deictic center in the modal dimension is often assumed to be the actual world that
is denoted by the English sentence adverb «actually» and by adverbial phrases like «in fact» or
«in reality». At least in counterfactual conditionals like 5.55, «actually» indeed seems to switch
evaluation to the actual world.
(5.55) If the men that have actually been to the moon never had been there, the Russians
would have given up their space program.
One problem of this view is that the contrast between counterfactuality and factuality is
already expressed by grammatical mood, for example in 5.55 by the present perfect indicative
versus the pluperfect subjunctive. A variety of ways to express mood in natural languages and
35One informant judged both 5.53 and 5.54 almost unacceptable, especially not if one tries to give them a shifter
reading. The same informant considered both 5.50 and 5.51 acceptable within some context introducing the past tense.
In any case, «now» and «then» are not in complementary distribution.
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corresponding types of modalities have been identified, for example conditional, imperative,
jussive, indicative, negative, optative, potential, or subjunctive.36 If some of them are considered
indexical, then because of their logical analysis according to which they specify some possible
worlds or situations in relation to the actual world or factual situation in which the utterance
takes place. Unlike person, space, and time, modality is not a real dimension, but rather a
heterogeneous theoretical construct resulting from formal analysis. This can be seen from the
fact that tenses can formally be analyzed as modal operators in tense logic, but operate on the
time dimension, and from the fact that there is talk about metaphysical necessity, possibility as
conceivability, physical or nomological possibility, possible worlds as epistemic alternatives, and
so on, and all these different notions have been considered modalities. The modal dimension
is further set apart by the fact that the deictic center of the modal domain never changes, i.e.
the modal parameter of the context of utterance is always the actual world and doesn’t change
from context of utterance to context of utterance.37 These differences set the modal dimension
apart from person (role of discourse participants), space, and time. Given these caveats about
the modal dimension, there is a reading of «actually» or «in fact» as an indexical, according to
which it has to be analyzed as an actuality operator. Here are some examples in addition to 5.55:
(5.56) The alleged policeman was actually an impostor.
(5.57) All people that are actually rich could be poor.
(5.58) Alice believes that Bob loves Carol but in fact he doesn’t love her.
In the first example, the intensional adjective «alleged» may be analyzed as a modal oper-
ator, such that the impostor is a policeman in all worlds that are compatible with his swindle,
and, so it is asserted, the actual world is not among these worlds. The modality in question
is a theoretical construct resulting from the impostor’s pretending to be such and such. In the
second example, the people that are rich in the actual world are poor in other possible worlds.
The modality in question is a theoretical construct resulting from philosophers’ musings about
metaphysical possibility or about what is conceivable. In the third example, Bob loves Carol in
all worlds that are compatible with Alice’s belief, but the actual world isn’t among them. The
modality in question is a doxastic modality resulting from the use of modal logic to analyze belief
ascriptions under the assumption of idealized, rational belief. There are other uses of «actually»
that don’t seem to have anything to do with modality in the above sense. Consider for example
the following utterance.
(5.59) Alice is actually rather drunk.
The function of «actually» in this example is pragmatic, contrasting differing standards of
drunkenness that are presumed and not made explicit. In section 7.3.4 of chapter 7 it will be
analyzed as a sort of modal operator, but not one that operates on alethic modalities. The modal
36See (Palmer 2001) for a seminal cross-linguistic overview.
37This is not to say that it wasn’t feasible to have a logic that explicitly allows reasoning about fictional utterances.
However, possibly changing both language and circumstances of evaluation at the same time is of limited use, since we
usually are interested in semantically analyzing utterances of one and the same source language.
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dimension is by far the most abstract and technical of the dimensions discussed so far and subject
to philosophical interpretation from an ideal-language perspective.
5.3.5 Other Dimensions
Levinson (1983) discusses two further dimensions of indexicality: the discourse or text and the
social status of discourse participants. Discourse deixis has already been excluded in section
5.2.3. What Levinson calls social deixis, on the other hand, is the dependence of the meaning of
expressions on the social identity or status of discourse participants in relation to the speaker’s
status. A familiar example for this is the lexical choice between two different pronouns for ad-
dressing people in many Indo-European languages (except English), such as the choice between
«Du» and «Sie» in German (deu) or between «tu» and «vous» in French (fra). Singular forms
like «Du» and «tu» are informal and the originally plural pronouns «Sie» and «vous» are formal,
where the actual politeness level expressed respectively depends on the social context. Levinson
(1983) takes social deixis as a dimension of its own and not part of the person dimension, be-
cause many languages such as Japanese, Korean, or Javanese have sophisticated built-in levels
of politeness and formality that are grammaticalized or realized by lexical choice.38 For example
traditional Japanese distinguishes pronouns “[. . . ] also with respect to sex of speaker, social sta-
tus of referent and degree of intimacy with referent [. . . ] and village Tamil has up to six singular
second person pronouns according to the degree of relative rank between speaker and addressee
(Brown & Levinson, 1978: 206).” (Levinson 1983, pp. 69-70) As Levinson points out, there are
honorifics that (a) express respect for a speaker or referent (referent honorifics), (b) honorifics
whose choice depends on the social situation as a whole (formality levels), (c) honorifics for
bystanders, and (d) honorifics like the Japanese «-go» and «o-» that honor the addressee but
occur in expressions that refer to something else.39 This indicates that social status is indeed a
dimension on its own. The deictic center in this case is the social status of the speaker in the
given social context of the utterance. However, social deixis doesn’t concern the truth-conditions
of what is said literally and can therefore be excluded from truth-conditional analysis.
5.4 Indexical Reference
After the general overview of the last section, it is now time to investigate the referential prop-
erties of indexical expressions.
38Japanese (jpn) has a population of over 122 million speakers as of 1985, Korean (kor) a language isolate (or Altaic
language; the family classification is controversial) mainly spoken in both parts of Korea by around 67 million speakers,
and Javanese (jav) is a Malayo-Polynesian language mainly spoken in Indonesia in many varieties with a total population
of around 75 million speakers (Gordon 2005).
39See (Levinson 1983, p. 90). It is perhaps more accurate to say that by honoring an object using «o-» or «-go» you
express your respect towards its owner, thereby being polite.
126 CHAPTER 5. INDEXICALS
5.4.1 Token-Reflexivity
One feature of indexicals is their token-reflexivity, which sets them apart from proper names
or descriptions and has sometimes been taken as their main characteristic.40 Token-reflexive
expressions are expressions whose semantic referent is determined by features of their physical
realization. This individual physical realization is called token and the same expression taken as
an abstract symbol is called type.41 For example, 5.60 taken as a sentence, as a linguistic symbol
as opposed to an individual physical imprint on the paper with such-and-such shape, it is an
abstract linguistic object. This type can be realized in various ways: spoken by a person, written
on paper, sprayed as a graffiti on the wall, stored in electronic form. Each of these individual
realizations of the sentence is a token.
(5.60) I’m here.
No type comes without a token and no token comes without a type in some given language,
and so the question how to define one by the other or vice versa is similar to the question what
came first: the chicken or the egg. The type-token distinction poses some semiotic riddles, but
these don’t have to be solved in order to make use of the distinction. The ability to recognize a
linguistic token as belonging to its type is a precondition for being able to use and understand
representational symbolic systems like natural languages. There is also no fundamental problems
in mentioning linguistic expressions as types one time and as tokens another time. For example,
in 5.61 the definite description «in sentence 5.60 on page 126» refers to 5.60 as a token (or to
the collection of all tokens at the place 5.60, page 126, in all prints of this text) and that the use
of «sentence» in this context is a bit sloppy, because talking of an utterance or token would be
more accurate. Likewise, it is sufficiently clear that in 5.62 sentence 5.60 is taken as a type.
(5.61) In sentence 5.60 on page 126, the last letter of the last word is printed in another font.
(5.62) Sentence 5.60 only has a fixed truth-value when it is uttered.
These examples make it clear that the ability to distinguish between type and token can be
presumed and isn’t problematic per se. Still some notational subtleties must be paid attention
to. When mentioning tokens in examples there can be several levels of abstraction involved.
Sometimes written examples like 5.60 stand for concrete spoken utterances in some imaginary
canonical situation of utterance. Single-quoted expressions for mentioning tokens, for example
‹here›, can thus be proper names for partial tokens of either the example sentence itself qua
token, for example for a part of 5.60 taken as a token, or proper names for partial tokens of
the sentence as if actually uttered in the imaginary utterance situation described. What is meant
should be clear from the context and example numbers given, and in case of mentioning several
tokens of the same type indices are used with the token-quote operator to resolve ambiguities.
For example, ‹this›2 refers to the second occurrence of «this» in an imaginary utterance made by
Alice and characterized by 5.63.
40See for example (Reichenbach 1947) and (Bar-Hillel 1954).
41The expression «expression» itself is used for both types and tokens. The use of «type» here is equivocal with other
non-related uses such as types in categorial grammar or type in the sense of sort.
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(5.63) Alice: This1 is different from this2.
It is crucial in such examples that even imaginary utterances have to be considered as possible
actual utterances, i.e. as if they were actually uttered, and not as utterances made under arbitrary
counterfactual circumstances. The latter could be utterances made in a completely different
language that is accidentally homophonic to the actual source language under consideration,
but we are interested in the meaning of the actual source language only. Imaginary utterances in
examples have to be taken as being uttered in a context whose world is the actual world, since
otherwise the use of examples would be vain. It is easy to conceive situations in which «Alice»
denotes «Bob» instead of Alice, «Bob» denotes a round square, «blue» means red, or even «and»
is interpreted as disjunction and «or» as conjunction, but these are not situations illuminating
the meaning of English expressions. Implicit changing of language can sometimes be admissible
to express a form of subjective meaning, for example in the use of diagonalization in the next
chapter, in the specification of de dicto content of indexicals of chapter 8, and to some extent
also when derived uses in narrative contexts are to be analyzed, but it is not admissible for the
purpose of characterizing canonical, public language meaning.
Consider now reference rules for indicators like the following one.
(5.64) A token of «I» denotes the speaker who has uttered the token.
This reference rules determines the semantic referent of each token of «I» in each context
of utterance. Hence, the indicator is token-reflexive. An example illustrates such an explicitly
token-reflexive analysis.
(5.65) Alice: I am hungry.
Let the name of the token that Alice utters be u. Then 5.64 can be instantiated as follows.
(5.66) Token ‹I› in u denotes the speaker of u.
Since the speaker of u is Alice, the token ‹I› uttered by Alice denotes Alice. Notice that 5.66
contains no indexical expression (apart from present tense), as ‹I› is a token-quote that must be
understood as a proper name for the token of «I» that is part of u. Following Reichenbach (1947)
and Burks (1949), Perry has emphasized the importance of token-reflexive reference rules and
the corresponding reflexive truth-conditions in publications like (Perry 2001, 2005).
5.4.2 Utterance-based Reference Rules
One problem with an explicitly token-reflexive analysis like 5.64 is that tokens are persistent and
reusable in some communicative medias.42 For example, a written note on an office door saying
5.67 can be used by person a to convey the information that a is not at his office p at time t, but
may of course be reused by b to convey the information that b is not at her office p′ at time t′.
(5.67) Sign: I’m not here now.
42Sidelle (1991) calls this the Answering Machine Paradox.
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Predelli (1998) takes examples like this as a reason to decide context of utterance from the
context of interpretation intended by the speaker. Another solution is to understand utterances
in the sense that each use of the persistent token 5.67 is an utterance of its own. In this view, an
utterance is the use of a token for communicative purposes.43 Informal reference rules can then
be given as follows.
(5.68) An utterance of «I» denotes the speaker of the utterance.
(5.69) An utterance of «now» denotes a time interval during which the utterance has been
made.
(5.70) An utterance of «here» denotes a place in the proximity of the speaker of the utterance.
Similar formulations of reference rules can be found in nearly all the literature on indica-
tors.44 There is a few clarifications in place about utterance-based reference rules.
[1] The above rules are implicitly token-reflexive, insofar as an utterance involves the use of a
token, but each person’s reuse of a token for communicative purposes is counted as a separate
utterance. The interpretation of each of these reference rules depends on conventions that may
vary with the media in which the token is realized. Some examples illustrate this. «I» on a sign
pinned to the office door usually will refer to the inhabitant of the office regardless of who has
put the sign on the door, since 5.67 would be false if I’m at my office if a now absent colleague
had put the sign on my office door three hours ago. If it is, on the other hand, a message by
someone else for the inhabitant of the office, the usual convention is to sign it, but this may vary
from office to office community; for example, by convention blue signs could used by people
from the office and yellow sticky notes for messages by other people to the inhabitants of the
office. Similar to signs on doors, «I» in a message on an answering machine will usually refer
to the inhabitant of the apartment where the machine is located even if the message is taken
from a recording of answering machine messages spoken by other persons. «I» as an electronic
sign on the computer can refer to the original speaker as in email, audio, movie messages, to the
sloppy programmer as in «I’m sorry about this bug, but your computer has just crashed», to the
individual implementation of a program, to the machine, etc. Thus, the speaker of the utterance
in a reference rule like 5.68 is not just the producer of the token, but the person or object that by
convention uses the token for communication. The same applies to other egocentric reference
rules. Sometimes the conventions governing the use of persistent tokens can allow for conflicting
interpretations. As Perry (2005) points out in reply to Predelli (1998), when persistent tokens
are used on answering machines, postcards, or notes, the time and place of utterance is some-
times interpreted as the time and place of token-perception instead of token-production.45
[2] If indexicality is just taken as context-dependence, then one might argue that reference rules
like 5.68–5.70 themselves are indexical. This is not a problem, though. Reference rules are ex-
43Cf. (Perry 1997a, pp. 592-3), (Perry 2005, p. 317-8).
44See for example (Kaplan 1989) and (Perry 1977, 1979, 1997a).
45See (Perry 2005, p. 328-33).
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plications of the linguistic meaning of indicators as far as their truth-conditional content is con-
cerned, i.e. in the case of singular indicators their semantic referent. Whether anything that can
be said with indexicals can also be said by means of context-independent expressions is a funda-
mental epistemic question that has nothing to do with reference rules. All the context-dependent
reference rule of an egocentric indicator does is to spell out the indicator’s egocentricity and its
dependence on the context of utterance by exploiting objective properties of the respective token
used: its speaker, i.e. the person using it for communicative purposes, and its temporal and spa-
tial location. An instantiated reference rule is neither egocentric nor itself token-reflexive. For
example, as already noted, 5.66 doesn’t contain any indexicals or token-reflexive expressions.
The same applies to an implicitly token-reflexive analysis, which only replaces the notion of a
token by the notion of an utterance of a token. From a realist point of view the semantic referent
of an indexical is fully determined by its instantiated reference rule in a given context of utter-
ance independently of any speaker’s attempt to identify its semantic referent.
[3] The rule for «I» is usually not vague, because the speaker of an utterance is determined by
linguistic conventions in a sufficiently clear way. The rules for «now» and «here», on the other
hand, only use descriptions, but not definite descriptions in order to account for the fact that their
semantic referents are systematically vague. It doesn’t really make sense to presume exactly one
place or exactly one time interval as the respective referent of an utterance of «here» and «now»,
although this can be stipulated for technical reasons. Formally, indicators may be analyzed in
various ways, for example as descriptions, as operators, or as open variables. However, when an
informal rule is given the use of a definite description would be misleading, since there may be
infinitely many time intervals and places that differ only slightly from each other. This is not to
say that a formal definite description can’t be used as a technical tool, but then vagueness has
either been excluded in the first place or has been incorporated into the notion of places itself. In
a technical sense, one may say that each use of «here» refers to one and only one fuzzy or vague
place, but in informal reference rules this ought to be avoided, because it only shifts the problem
from a formulation of the rule to the specification of the semantic referent.
[4] Neither explicit nor implicit token-reflexivity presumes that an indicator token semantically
refers to itself or to any other token whatsoever. Tokens of «I», «here», «now», and other index-
icals refer to the person that uses them for communication, their place and time of utterance,
and so on. It is the reference rules of indicators qua type, i.e. their linguistic meaning, that fix
the semantic referent of each use of the indicator on the basis of properties of the token used.
This clarification rules out certain objections like those in (Smith 1986), that are based on the
presumption that in a token-reflexive analysis the semantic referent of an indicator is determined
by another token-reflexive substitute expression taken as if it was uttered in the same context. It
is important to realize that implicit reference to a token in reference rules like the 5.68–5.70 may
be context-dependent, but doesn’t have to be more context-dependent than any other reference
by means of definite descriptions like «the token 5.67 on page 127» or names like «5.67».
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[5] Strict token-reflexivity mainly occurs in canonical situations of utterance. In other cases the
reference rules are modified or enriched. In case of narrative contexts or speaking on behalf of
someone the context of the actual utterance plays a subsidiary role, and indexicals in the utter-
ance must be evaluated with respect to another context of utterance introduced in dependence
of the broader conversational context. Still, indexicals in many such derived uses remain implic-
itly token-reflexive. For example, a speaker interpreting ‹I› in an utterance made by an actor in
a play must first determine the actor, i.e. the actual speaker of the actual deictic center, and on
the basis of this knowledge can determine the character played by the actor as the speaker of the
constructed, narrated context of utterance.
Given these caveats, utterance-based reference rules of indicators can be characterized as
follows.
P Ind 1 (Utterance). An utterance is the use of a linguistic token for the purpose of communicating
a message. Time, place, and speaker of an utterance are determined by conventions in relation to the
media used. In canonical utterance situations of face-to-face communication these are the location
of the token producer, the time of token production, and the producer himself.
P Ind 2 (Reference Rule of an Indicator). An indicator’s reference rule is a formulation of its lexical
meaning according to which the semantic referent of an utterance of the indicator is determined.
Following Kaplan (1989) demonstratives can be analyzed in an analogous way, if the point-
ing gesture is considered to provide restrictions of a reference rule, such that the resulting con-
structed reference rule is sufficiently complete to determine the referent of the demonstrative. In
other words, the extralinguistic pointing gesture as a type is added to the analysis in the target
language. So for example, to describe the truth-conditional content of an utterance like 5.71, the
pointing gesture accompanying ‹this› would be analyzed as a restriction in the target language
that is strong enough to uniquely determine the referent of the token.
(5.71) This−−→ is Bob.
This is an acceptable idealization, since it only rests on the assumption that pointing gestures
are intelligible, i.e. that they could in principle be expressed by linguistic means. There doesn’t
seem to be any principal reason why this shouldn’t be possible, and conversely it could be ar-
gued that if there were any such principal reason, then pointing gestures couldn’t be subjected
to scientific investigation at all—and without some foundational backup this would be an absurd
claim. So stipulating some properties in the target language that uniquely determine the seman-
tic referent of a demonstrative in the target language is justified, as long as the extralinguistic
pointing gesture uniquely determines a semantic referent. Kaplan revises this externalist view in
Afterthoughts in favor of an intention-based theory of demonstrative reference:
“I am now inclined to regard the directing intention, at least in the case of per-
ceptual demonstratives, as criterial, and to regard the demonstration as a mere exter-
nalization of this inner intention.” (Kaplan 1989, p. 582)
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This change is motivated by a desire to explain Donnellan’s referential uses of definite de-
scriptions in the same uniform way by a speaker’s intentions, even if the actual description fails
to denote.46 Attempted lies show that this view is implausible. Consider the following use of a
demonstrative.
(5.72) Situation: Alice, Bob, and Carol are on a mountain trekking tour. Alice intends to point to
the Mount Everest, but in fact points to the K2. She wants to deceive Bob and Carol. Alice:
This−−→ is the K2.
Alice’s use of «this» semantically refers to the K2, because she points to it. There is no way
to understand such examples in a way that the demonstrative would semantically refer to the
intentional object Mount Everest.47 Liars can be competent speakers just as anyone else, and
words do not change their meaning when they are used in an attempt to lie. So Kaplan’s earlier
proposal is more convincing and it will be adopted from now on:
P Ind 3 (Reference Rule of a Demonstrative).
A demonstrative’s reference rule comprises two parts:
1. a formulation of its lexical meaning, and
2. a formulation of the pointing gesture accompanying its use.
Since a pointing gesture from a cognitive point of view is an extralinguistic means to draw the
attention of the recipient to some object, it can be less explicit and less determinate the more one
object in the given context of utterance is more salient to sender and receiver than others. This is
why sometimes pointing gestures can be left out almost completely, except for alignment of sight,
but then these salience criteria have to be taken as part of the reference rule. A demonstrative
given qua type is an abstraction from an actual utterance of a respective demonstrative token.
5.4.3 On the Content of Reference Rules
One problem of formulating reference rules is to find out which aspects of the meaning of an
indexical qua type in a particular language is relevant for the truth-conditional content of its
utterance. The data of the last section suggests that a lot of semantic features can play a role
in the use of an indexical. Some of these features are troublesome for truth-conditional method
in general and elicit the amount of idealization that is presumed in generalizing speaker refer-
ences to semantic reference. Consider for example the role of animacy in the lexical choice of
demonstrative pronouns in Yidiny described by Comrie (1981):
“One reflection of animacy [in Yidiny] is in the choice of demonstrative pronouns,
where for instance ‘that’ is more likely to appear as Nunydyu- with noun phrases
46See (Kaplan 1989, pp. 582-4); cf. section 2.5, chapter 2.
47The intentional object is still needed to identify the speech act as an attempt to lie. One may try to fix the account
by stipulating the intentional object to be the K2 and the doxastic object to be the Mount Everest, but this kind of
transcendent intentional object is a residue of phenomenalist perceptual anti-realism that is of doubtful value within a
realist framework.
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higher in animacy, and is obligatory in this form with human noun phrases, but as
NuNgu- with noun phrases of lower animacy.” (Comrie 1981, p. 38)
This suggests that, vice versa, a use of Nunydyu- indicates that its referent has a higher degree
of animacy than a use of NuNgu- would indicate in the same context of utterance. But what
happens if the obligatory rule is ignored and NuNgu- is used in combination with a term denoting
a person? Does the utterance become unacceptable up to being non-true or might it be perfectly
true but highly suboptimal? In case of Yidiny this question will be hard to answer, because the
question is to a large extent empirical and Yidiny is practically extinct as of the time of this
writing.48 But the problem is of general nature. Truth-conditional method links lack of semanto-
pragmatic acceptability with non-truth (falsity or truth-value gap), but this link can under certain
circumstances turn out to be too coarse-grained. Consider, as a second example, grammatical
gender of English pronouns in the following utterance.
(5.73) Bob: She−−→ is looking for the canteen.
In case there are several possible semantic referents in the given context of utterance that are
located in the direction at which Bob points and have natural gender, the grammatical gender
feminine can be used for identification purposes, since it presupposes that the referent has corre-
sponding natural gender if it has natural gender at all.49 However, if the person Bob is pointing
to turns out to be a man at closer inspection, it is doubtful whether the original utterance is to be
judged false. The actual grade of unacceptability judged by speakers when such presupposition
violations occur presumably depends on many empirical factors like the conversational context,
the discourse type, success or failure of communication, and so on, up to the personal attitudes of
discourse participants. The notion of truth-conditional role does, however, require a theoretical
decision to either consider a given feature truth-conditionally relevant or not. In case of refer-
ential undersaturation it is clear that an utterance must be non-true, but in other cases this is
not clear. The problem is well-known in the literature on presuppositions and the debate on the
semantic versus the pragmatic nature of presuppositions is yet unresolved, although there seems
to be a certain trend towards the pragmatic direction. In the pragmatic view a presupposition
by definition has to be cancelable, and a typical cancellation test would for example be given as
follows.
(5.74) Bob: She−−→ is looking for the canteen, but in fact it’s a he.
There can hardly ever be any final criterion as to whether and to what extent such a cancel-
lation is acceptable, though, and in reality acceptability judgements come in a degree that varies
depending on the speaker, the context in which an example is presented, and the exact formu-
lation of the example. The problem is that, as opposed to the more clearcut syntactic domain,
semanto-pragmatic acceptability is always the result of active interpretation by a speaker, who
48Yidiny (yii) is an Australian (Pama-Nyungan) language that with only 12 native speakers as of 1981 is classified as
nearly extinct in (Gordon 2005).
49Feminine pronouns are in English also used for ships, planes, motorcycles and sometimes even for cars, weapons,
and tools.
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may take all available information into account she deems significant. This information is likely
to include extralinguistic features of the context of utterance, the conversational context, gen-
eral world-knowledge, and the speaker’s beliefs and inferences thereof. Moreover, evaluation of
semantic reference in retrospective must be kept apart from mutually agreeing speaker reference
that is beforehand the prerequisite to successful communication. Apart from this problem, some
features of demonstratives in particular languages—like proximity to speaker or addressee, being
located at a certain place, or animacy—don’t seem to be cancelable at all and can therefore not
be regarded being presuppositional. Concerning the formulation of reference rules this causes a
dilemma. On one hand, semantic features of indexicals from a strictly truth-conditional point of
view might not enter truth-conditional content. That for example the referent of «this−−→» is in the
proximity of the speaker whereas the referent of «that−−→» is in the proximity of the addressee might
not be relevant for the truth-conditions of the whole utterance. On the other hand, a speaker
referring by means of an indexical may make use of any extralinguistic and linguistic features of
the utterance for the purpose of identifying the semantic referent, and among those will be gram-
maticalized and lexicalized features of the indexical used. The problem what feature to include
into a reference rule is further aggravated by the fact that by virtue of linguistic competence
speakers do have to associate features such as proximity to speaker or addressee, or animacy
in Yidiny, with an indexical, even if these features turn out to be marginal for truth-conditional
content. For example, a Japanese speaker that doesn’t make any distinction in the use of «kore»,
«sore», and «are», or an English speaker that always uses «he», no matter whom he is referring
to, isn’t fully competent—and this lack of competence must be understood as a lack of implicit
knowledge of the conditions of use of linguistic expressions.
How to tackle this problem? First of all, in some cases a clear line can be drawn between
aspects of meaning that concern and those that don’t concern the truth-conditions of an utter-
ance. For example, if an utterance is marked for politeness it is not what an assertive utterance
expresses, i.e. some state of affairs, that is more or less polite, but rather the assertive speech
act used in expressing it. Therefore, politeness features don’t enter the truth-conditions of an
utterance. Following (Potts 2004), they are conventional implicatures on a level of meaning
independent from what is said. More problematic are features like animacy or spatial proximity,
as these features express properties of the referent. If such a feature can be cancelled, the kind
of meaning involved is presuppositional. If it cannot be cancelled, the kind of meaning involved
is either part of literal meaning or a conventional implicature. But in all three cases one has to
decide how truth-conditional analysis should proceed if the referent doesn’t satisfy the condition
expressed by the feature. One way to tackle this problem is to distinguish several levels of truth-
conditional content, as for example Perry (1997a, 2005) proposes. This is legitimate, since the
notion of truth-conditions itself is vague, but then the question will arise what sort of content
represents public language meaning, i.e. what is said. Discussing the notion of what is said
and the related controversy between contextualism and semantic minimalism would lead too
far apart here and is generally not very fruitful, since the level of idealization to adopt depends
on the overall explanatory goal of the theory. Regarding indexicals, however, it can at least be
said that there is good reasons to include as many features as possible into reference rules. In
comparison to the elusive nature of semantic features of proper names, bundled in the property
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of being called such and such discussed in 4.5.4 of the last chapter, it is striking that the various
criteria associated with many indexicals and particularly demonstratives cannot only be used for
identification purposes, but even have evolved as part of lexical meaning for exactly that pur-
pose. Whereas a speaker in case of proper names rests on subjective, speaker-individual criteria
for identifying the referent, a speaker using an indexical will generally have a number of criteria
at disposal that are provided by lexical meaning. The fact that selectional features of indexicals
bear an important role for identifying reference can thus be taken as an argument for including
them into the reference rule. Of course, as the discussion of proper names in previous chapters
has shown, it is always possible to dispense with descriptive meaning for dealing with semantic
reference by simply presuming a higher level of idealization. This also holds for indexicals. If
for example each context of utterance was considered to have a speaker, then «I» could be an-
alyzed to denote this speaker directly referential without taking the reference rule into account
at all. Likewise, each communicative use of a demonstrative could just be numbered and for
each context c a referent ri could be stipulated.50 However, such an account doesn’t illuminate
what a speaker has to implicitly know when using or interpreting an indexical. On one hand, the
question whether a given semantic feature is relevant for semantic reference must be decided on
the basis of acceptability judgements about cases in which the purported referent doesn’t satisfy
the feature and is therefore empirical. On the other hand, there is a certain theoretical freedom
of including more or less features into such rules, since semantic reference is constructed theo-
retically ex negativo as the ideal corrigens to individual speaker references that have gone astray.
From a description-theoretic point of view it makes sense to include as much descriptive mean-
ing of indexicals into their reference rules as is needed to explain speaker reference by means of
indexicals in the simplified view, i.e. without assuming additional identificational criteria.51
5.4.4 The Varieties of Contexts
As mentioned earlier, not only indexicals but also proper names and definite descriptions can
be context-dependent. When comparing proper names with demonstratives, there is, however,
a crucial difference in the kinds of contexts involved that has so far been presumed without
further explanation. The context according to which the referent of an indexical is fixed has
been called context of utterance, whereas the context in relation to which proper names and
definite descriptions are interpreted has been called conversational context. These two contexts
are different from each other, as for examples the following party-chitchat shows.
(5.75) Alice: Has Carol been promoted?
By the way, I’ve seen Carol at the cinema yesterday.
(5.76) Alice: Have you been promoted?
By the way, I’ve seen you at the cinema yesterday.
50This account of demonstratives is discussed and rejected by Kaplan (1989).
51The corresponding subjective interpretations of indexicals, which have no direct natural language counterpart, will
be discussed in chapter 8.
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There is a notable difference between these two pieces of discourse. In 5.75, the two oc-
currences of «Carol» in canonical circumstances must denote the same person, whereas the two
tokens of «you» in 5.76 can denote different addressees. The same applies to larger pieces of dis-
course: Within a part of discourse, the same proper name always has to denote the same object,
or the change in reference has to be marked explicitly, for example by using an expression like
«the other Carol» or a pointing gesture if applicable. The converse holds for indexicals. It is the
purpose of the indicator «you» to denote whoever is addressed in the given context of utterance,
and the referent can change from utterance to utterance or even within the same utterance as in
the example of an impure use like 5.18 on page 111.52 What holds for proper names also holds
for definite descriptions:
(5.77) Alice: Has the woman wearing the blue dress been promoted?
By the way, I’ve seen the woman wearing the blue dress at the cinema yesterday.
Apart from being marked, because an anaphora would be preferable in this example for
reasons of economy, it is clear that the second use of the definite description in canonical circum-
stances cannot be read as denoting another person than the first one unless it is accompanied by
an additional pointing gesture. If the situation in 5.76 is analyzed in more detail, the respective
addressee is picked out in two different extralinguistic ways, which could be taken to comple-
ment the indicator’s reference rule in the given context of utterance just like has been proposed
as the general way to deal with demonstratives following Kaplan (1989). It is feasible to have
differing referents in 5.75 and 5.77 as well, though, if an additional pointing gesture is assumed
or the possibility of referents changing becomes salient by feature of the context of utterance and
background knowledge of the discourse participants. Say, for example, the second Carol is well-
known to everyone and she catches the discourse participants’ attention by entering the room.
On the basis of such examples it could be argued that the ambiguity of proper names is also fixed
by the context of utterance. Although this may sometimes happen, the conventions underlying
the use of proper names and definite descriptions differ from those underlying indicators and
demonstratives. Crucial about the above examples is: It is part of the linguistic conventions of
using indexicals that they denote different semantic referents who may change within the same
conversational context, whereas it is part of the conventions of the use of proper names that they
always denote the same object in the same conversational context. Definite description are in be-
tween the two cases, insofar that they can be used referentially or attributively, and can but don’t
have to be egocentric compound indexicals. In non-narrative conversational contexts indexical
reference always requires the speaker to take into account concrete features of the context of ut-
terance, whereas non-indexical reference requires the speaker to take into account such features
only in situations in which identifying reference is expected by other discourse participants.
The context of utterance can change—paradox as it may sound—even within an utterance,
because it must be understood as the context in which an indexical token is uttered, i.e. the
concrete situation in which it is used for communication. As examples with persistent tokens
have shown, this context may be further divided into a context of token-production and a context
of interpretation, though this is normally not necessary. The conversational context, on the other
52Cf. (Perry 1997b, p. 10).
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hand, is much broader than any context of utterance and active during a larger piece of discourse.
When it changes in a way that is relevant to the interpretation of linguistic expressions during the
conversation, this change must be marked appropriately. This happens in the following example.
(5.78) Alice: Has Carol been promoted?
By the way, I’ve seen the other Carol—the one wearing the blue dress—at the cinema
yesterday.
Once a fundamental difference between the two notions of contexts involved is granted, it
can be observed that certain context-dependencies of indexicals are fixed by the conversational
context. Consider for example the following utterances.
(5.79) Alice: It’s hot here.
And there are too many people here.
The spatial range of the second token ‹here› cannot change arbitrarily. Readings of 5.79 as
5.80 or 5.81 aren’t possible, because the range of an indexical within one piece of discourse
cannot change arbitrarily once it has been fixed.
(5.80) It is hot in this room.
And there are too many people living in California.
(5.81) The climate is hot in California.
And there are too many people in this room
Still it can change if presuppositions or world-knowledge allow so, as in the following exam-
ple:
(5.82) Alice: It is hot here.
How long have you been living here?
If Alice and the addressee know that the addressee is not living at the place of the party, then
a more general reading as in here in this city will be triggered as the default assumption for to
live at some place. Such inferences depend on the common ground (Stalnaker 1978, 2002), i.e.
the set of assumptions mutually shared by the discourse participants, in combination with gen-
eral world-knowledge. Likewise, the range of ‹now› in 5.83 is determined by the conversational
context depending on the norms of exactness that obtain from Grice’s Cooperative Principle in
dependence of the topic of the conversation, the common ground, and varying social conven-
tions.
(5.83) Alice: When does Carol’s talk start?
Bob: Now.
If Alice and Bob are supervising a TV broadcast, ‹now› might have to be given a narrow read-
ing, because the discourse participants agree that in TV production time is measured in seconds
and fractions thereof. In a conversation on the university campus, on the other hand, ‹now›
might be given a broad reading according to which Carol’s talk will start in around 5 minutes or
has already started for 5 minutes. These examples motivate the following characterizations.
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P Ind 4 (Context of Utterance). The context of utterance determines the deictic center in the
respective dimension of an indexical.
P Ind 5 (Conversational Context). The conversational context determines the range of an indexical
in accordance with its reference rule and with respect to the deictic center fixed by the context of
utterance.
(Ind 4) characterizes what Perry (1997a) calls narrow context, consisting of speaker, time, and
place of utterance, that every utterance has. But the context of utterance is here also considered
to comprise other factors like pointing gestures. These are part of what Perry (1997a) calls
wide context, which consists of the narrow context plus additional factors. Since these factors
might both be concrete, perceivable features of the utterance situation or non-perceivable, non-
concrete factors like linguistic and social conventions, the wide versus narrow context distinction
must be kept apart from the above one. The context of utterance, as it is understood here,
comprises only features of a concrete situation of utterance that can in principle be perceived or
measured. This includes pointing gestures and other means of non-verbal communication. In
contrast to this, the conversational context is here understood as a heterogeneous mix consisting
of linguistic and social conventions, what has been said before, and the background knowledge
and assumptions of the discourse participants. On the basis of this distinction, anaphora are not
indexical expressions, because their reference depends on the conversational context and they
aren’t egocentric.
5.4.5 Indexicals and Rigidity
Following Kaplan (1989) indexicals are sometimes flatly assumed to be rigid, but as the discus-
sion in the last chapters has shown rigidity should always be considered in relation to the sort of
modality in question. Alethic modalities are a good starting point, as Kripke (1972) devised the
original rigidity thesis for them. The following utterance is an example of an indicator embedded
into such a modality.
(5.84) Alice: It is possible that I weren’t here now.
Conceivably, this utterance can become true, as it can be understood in the sense that Al-
ice might under some counterfactual circumstances not be located at the time and place of the
utterance. Still, «I» denotes Alice, «now» the time of utterance, and «here» the place of utter-
ance in 5.84. Thus, these indicators are rigid with respect to the alethic modality, and likewise
may be argued for other indicators. There are, however, non-rigid uses of «now», «jetzt», and
Danish «nu» with respect to alethic modalities that some speakers deem acceptable at least to
some extent. Here is a German example of a counterfactual conditional that has been judged
unacceptable by some but acceptable by other informants.
(5.85) Situation: It is 1 P.M. and the journey has just ended.
Wenn
if
der
the
Reifen
tire
nicht
not
geplatzt
blown
wäre,
would-be
dann
then
wäre
would-be
es
it
jetzt
now
12
12
Uhr.
o’clock
‘If the tire hadn’t blown, it would now be 12 o’clock.’
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It isn’t acceptable to use «here» in a similar way, and the above use of «now» seems to be
derived, standing as a shortcut for the endpoint of the counterfactual sequence of events in
comparison to the utterance time as the endpoint of the actual sequence of events. A way
to analyze such uses will be addressed in chapter 8, but given that they are highly marked,
examples like the above one are not taken to falsify the thesis that «now» is generally rigid.
Regarding other modalities, it at least hard if not impossible to quench some non-rigid read-
ings out of the indicators in utterances like the following ones:
(5.86) Every time Alice meets Bob now, she is angry.
(5.87) Anywhere Alice goes, she likes it more than here.
In order to retain egocentricity and rigidity of «now», a very broad reading of it is triggered
in 5.86, according to which the time intervals quantified over by «every time» all occur within
the time denoted by ‹now›. So this reading remains rigid, whereas the shifter readings in 5.49
and 5.50 mentioned above are non-rigid with respect to other temporal expressions. The lesson
to be drawn from these examples is that indicators are generally rigid with respect to temporal
and spatial modalities, unless another reading like that as a shifter is confirmed.
What about doxastic modalities? It can be shown by way of examples that, as opposed to
proper names, indicators cannot be given a referentially opaque reading indicating the respective
attitude holder’s speaker reference by means of the indicator. For example, in the following
utterance none of the indicators can be given a de dicto reading.
(5.88) Bob: Alice believes that I am here now.
In chapter 8 it will be shown that it is still possible to express a derived notion of cognitive
content based on formal belief attributions in which the target language analogues to the indica-
tor are interpreted non-rigidly. But there is no reading of an English belief ascription according
to which the embedded indicators would refer to whoever and whatever Alice believes to be the
speaker, time, or place of 5.88. One possible exception to this rule is belief ascriptions in which
the embedded indicator denotes the same person as the attitude holder, as in the following one.
(5.89) Alice: I believe that I am hungry.
The corresponding de se readings will be addressed in chapter 8. In the normal case, when
the attitude holder is not the speaker, no referentially opaque reading of a non-shifting indicator
can be given, and so non-shifters can be considered absolutely rigid except possibly for the first-
person case.
Let us now turn to demonstratives. According to Kaplan (1989) they are rigid as well. This
can be seen from examples like the following one.
(5.90) It is possible that this−−→ weren’t where I’m pointing at.
A situation in which the object pointed at wasn’t at the place pointed at is indeed conceivable.
If 5.90 is true, however, the demonstrative has to be interpreted rigidly, since otherwise the
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sentence would have a reading like there is a counter-factual situation in which the object pointed
at by the speaker is not at the place the speaker points at in the same situation, which would be
absurd. Likewise can be argued for other demonstratives. It is also a consequence of egocentricity
and token-reflexivity that non-shifting indicators and demonstratives are rigid with respect to
temporal modalities.
The situation is less clear when a look is taken at compound indicators. Definite descriptions
containing indicators are not rigid with respect to time, but practically always rigid with respect
to alethic, spatial, and doxastic modalities. This does, however, not seem to depend on the
fact that they contain an indicator. It rather depends on whether the definite description is
used attributively or referentially in the sense of Donnellan (1966). Consider for example the
following utterances.
(5.91) It is possible that the entrance left of you is locked.
(5.92) It is possible that the main entrance is locked.
(5.93) Alice believes that the entrance left of you is locked.
(5.94) Alice believes that the main entrance is locked.
(5.95) The president of the United States could be a woman.
(5.96) The president of your country could be a woman.
(5.97) Alice believes that the president of the United States is a woman.
(5.98) Alice believes that the president of your country is a woman.
It seems that the definite descriptions in 5.91–5.94 are preferably read as referential uses
and are rigid irrespective of whether they contain an indicator or not, whereas 5.95–5.98 are
preferably read as non-rigid attributive uses. Consider now 5.99 and 5.100.
(5.99) The entrance left of you was locked.
(5.100) The main entrance was locked.
Both definite descriptions have a rigid and a non-rigid reading. The first one can be read as
the entrance left of the addressee now, at the time of utterance or as the entrance left of the body axis
relative to where the addressee was located and facing at event time. Likewise, the description in
5.100 may pick out the entrance that is the main entrance at the time of utterance or the entrance
that was the main entrance at event time. The rules that govern the rigidity or non-rigidity of
definite descriptions are complicated. One rule of thumb that seems to hold is that the more
a situation supports identifying reference and the more identifying reference can be reasonably
expected by all discourse participants, the more a referential, rigid reading will be preferred.
This is just an hypothesis, though. What can at least be said is that compound indicators are
not always rigid. Only the non-compound indicators that these descriptions contain seem to be
rigid under all embeddings, if they are rigid in isolation in the first place. The indicator «you»
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semantically refers to the person addressed by the current speaker at the current time, world,
and place of utterance in 5.91, 5.93, 5.96, 5.98, and 5.99.
To summarize: As a good rule of thumb, canonical uses of deictic center indicators are abso-
lutely rigid, with only few exceptions: shifters depend on the context introduced by the verb of
indirect speech with regards to their domain, but are rigid otherwise, indicators in the above sort
of first-person attitude ascriptions can be interpreted in a special, non-rigid way (see chapter 8)
with regards to doxastic modalities, and there may be non-rigid uses of «now» as in 5.85 with re-
gards to alethic modalities. Indicators that are rigid with regards to some modality remain so in
compound indicators, but the rigidity of the compound indicator is in many or all cases indepen-
dent of the rigidity of the deictic center indicator it contains. In contrast to this, demonstratives
are absolutely rigid.
5.4.6 Rigidity and Token-Reflexivity
Given that non-shifting indexicals are absolutely rigid proviso the above possible exceptions,
one may ask whether there is some particular reason for this or whether this is just linguistic
coincidence. Kaplan (1989) propagates the view that direct reference involves some kind of
immediacy of speaker reference, and in his opinion indicators are rigid because they are directly
referential:
“The [reference] rules do not provide a complex which together with a circum-
stance of evaluation yields an object. They provide an object.” (Kaplan 1989, p. 495;
orig. in italics)
This formulation is problematic, since it suggests the immediacy of reference view that has
already been criticized in chapter 3. The mysterious immediacy metaphor is, however, irrele-
vant to the question of rigidity. In the present view, indicators are rigid because their linguistic
meaning is given by at least implicitly token-reflexive rules. This can be seen from proper instan-
tiations of reference rules. Consider once more example 5.84 on page 137. Compare this to the
following utterance.
(5.101) Alice: It is possible that the speaker of 5.101 weren’t the speaker of this utterance.
This utterance can be considered the result of partially analyzing utterance 5.84 by using ref-
erence rule 5.68. This example has two readings: one contradictory reading, according to which
‹this utterance› in 5.101 denotes the token 5.101 as well, and one sloppy reading, according to
which ‹this utterance› denotes the type of 5.101. Only under the sloppy reading can 5.101 be
true, and by application of Gricean maxims it will be the preferred reading. In both readings,
however, «the speaker of 5.101» is rigid, unless «5.101» denotes 5.101 as a type—but it doesn’t,
since it is the name of a token. There is a sense in which the same token can be uttered actually
and under counterfactual situations, but this is not sense in which tokens ought to be understood
in instantiations of reference rules. A reference rule determines numerically one token t1 and, in
case of an utterance based reference rule, determines the referent of one communicative use of
t1; if a token t2 of the same type T is considered that is uttered under other circumstances, then
it is another token t1 6= t2.
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5.4.7 Indexical Speaker Reference
The fact that egocentric indicators and demonstratives are absolutely rigid leads to a tension be-
tween the interpretation of attitude ascriptions containing indexicals and the epistemic success
condition for speaker reference represented by the notion of identifying reference. For proper
names it has been argued that from an epistemic point of view speaker reference cannot be
adequately described by formal definite descriptions that are rigidified by an actuality opera-
tor, since this would presume identifying reference. From an epistemic point of view successful
identification of the semantic referent by a speaker using a term may never just be presumed,
since it cannot follow from the mere use of language that there is something that satisfies cer-
tain conditions or bears a certain name. There can be no exception to this rule for indexicals.
Whenever the relevance of speaker reference for epistemic considerations is an issue, a reference
rule has to be non-rigid with respect to the first doxastic modality in question. Suppose that 
is a doxastic KD45 modality, c is an additional parameter for the context of utterance, and S is
the property of being the speaker of the utterance in the given context of utterance. How any
of this is implemented in detail will be addressed in the subsequent chapters. Now consider the
following formula.
M, g, c, w  ιxAxx
ιy[@Sy]Py (5.102)
This is an appropriate specification of the truth-conditional content of 5.104 in context c,
given that 5.103 holds under the intended reading of S as the property of being the speaker of
the utterance in c.
Jιy@SyKg (c)(w) = Bob (5.103)
(5.104) Bob: Alice believes that I am hungry.
However, formula 5.102 doesn’t indicate any way in which Alice might interpret another
utterance 5.105 in context c:
(5.105) Bob: I am hungry.
To express Alice’s speaker reference by means of ‹I› when she interprets 5.105, i.e. in this
case the way she interprets the token as the receiver of the signal, the reference rule must at
least be non-rigid, if it is not to be accompanied by additional, subjective identification criteria
as described in the last chapter. So a minimal formulation of Alice’s interpretation of 5.105 is the
following formula.
M, g, c, w  ιxAxx
ιy[Sy]Py (5.106)
Although not a common term in the literature, this can be called a de dicto analysis of Alice’s
acceptance of 5.105 on the basis of her speaker reference. In intended models, this formula
expresses that Alice must believe of whoever she believes to be the speaker of utterance 5.105
that this person is hungry, when she interprets ‹I› in 5.105 as a competent speaker correctly. Let
1 be a doxastic modality and R be a property expressing the reference rule of the indexical in
question. Then a condition for identifying indexical reference for person indexicals like «I» can
be expressed quite the same way as in case of speaker reference by means of a proper name.
M, g, c, w  ιxRx1
ιyRy(x = y) (5.107)
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More such examples will be discussed in chapter 8. For now it suffices to say that a formula
like 5.106 doesn’t reflect the truth-conditions of a corresponding belief ascription involving an
indexical, since indexicals are generally rigid.
5.4.8 Indexical vs. Non-Indexical Reference
A comparison can now be drawn between indexical and non-indexical reference. The main
feature that sets indexicals apart from proper names and definite descriptions is centricity and
in particular egocentricity. Because indexicals are egocentric or at least object-centric, their
semantic referent depends on concrete features of the context of utterance or, in the case of
shifters, the context of a reported speech act. Therefore identifying reference plays a crucial role
in indexical reference, as long as the respective domain supports it. In contrast to this, proper
names often act as mere placeholders for the semantic referent in situations in which identifying
reference is not mutually expected by discourse participants, for example when the recipient
encounters a name for the first time. This does not preclude the case that Alice may expect
of Carol that she attempts to identify the semantic referent of the name «Bob» she has used;
but however reasonable this expectation may be in the given situation, it isn’t triggered by the
linguistic conventions governing the use of that name and the linguistic meaning of the name
itself doesn’t provide many useful identificational criteria (chapter 2). The converse holds for
indexicals. Sender and receiver mutually expect identifying reference when an indexical token is
used. With this respect, egocentric non-shifting indexicals are shortcut devices that can only be
used for successful communication if the discourse participants can easily identify their referent
on the basis of the deictic center; they are shortcuts for their reference rule. As Bühler (1934)
lays out in detail, from a cognitive point of view an indexical’s purpose is to draw the receiver’s
attention to the referent. In the terms of Stojanovic (2002), they are instructions for the receiver
to test whether the given context “[. . . ] meets the descriptive conditions associated with the
indexical, before you go on to interpret the rest of the utterance.” (Stojanovic 2002, p. 127)
Reference rules and pointing gestures provide the identificational criteria needed for identifying
reference.
As for rigidity, the rule of thumb says that indexicals are absolutely rigid as long as they are
non-shifting and not compound. Proper names, on the other hand, are relatively rigid (chapter
4). They can be interpreted as rigid terms in the scope of any modality, for example in de re
attitude ascriptions, or may be interpreted as rigid terms relative to the first doxastic modality, as
in de dicto attitude ascriptions. Definite descriptions can also be interpreted rigidly, but are also
sometimes interpreted as non-rigid terms. Any referential expression can be context-dependent,
but proper names only depend on the conversational context and definite descriptions depend
on the conversational context and may depend on the context of utterance. The referent of a
non-shifting indexical is determined in relation to the context of utterance, where the interpreta-
tion of its reference rule in turn depends on the conversational context. The context of utterance
is much narrower than the conversational context; it is the concrete context of the use of indi-
vidual tokens for communication. It changes at least with each utterance made by a discourse
participant. The conversational context, on the other hand, is the context of a larger piece of dis-
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course during which the role of discourse participants and linguistic and extralinguistic norms
may change. The former is semantic, the latter is pragmatic in nature.
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Chapter 6
Indexicals in Modal Logic
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6.1 Chapter Overview
Starting from this chapter, the focus will be on concrete ways to deal with indexicals in a formal
target language. The topic of this chapter is Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives, which has become
the most prominent formal framework for dealing with the semantics of indexicals. His approach
will first be outlined in section 6.2, and afterwards a detailed reformulation of his logic will be
presented in section 6.3. Example analyses of indexicals and demonstratives in this language
and some of the philosophical issues connected with them will be discussed in section 6.4.
Kaplan’s account has become popular in philosophy for one part, because it provides an easy
way to rigidify non-rigid and de-rigidify rigid expressions while in a sense remaining compatible
with the direct reference view, and for another part, because it makes the conceptual distinction
explicit between the context of utterance and the modal indices over which modal operators
quantify. Double-index modal logic also allows one to deal to some extent with shifters and
to express a sort of subjective content of originally rigid expressions by using a diagonalization
operator. Ways to analyze shifters without heavy changes to the framework are outlined in
section 6.5. In this section it will be shown how the same trick used in chapter 4 for implementing
a relativized actuality operator can be used to analyze shifters, albeit in an inelegant fashion.
Finally, in section 6.6 some motivation is given for switching from double-index modal logic to
more expressive languages like the one that will be used in the next chapter.
6.2 Background and Motivation
The Logic of Demonstratives (LD) presented by Kaplan (1989) has become a de facto standard
for treating indexicals in a formal logical language. His paper was first officially published in
1989, but the ideas in it have been spread by lectures and as drafts during the 70ies and Kaplan
presented the formal system already in 1971.1 Kaplan’s LD and its descendants are so-called
double-index or two-dimensional intensional modal logics. The main ideas underlying these
frameworks are first that contexts are added as parameters and truth in a model is relativized
to them, and second, that expressions in the formal language have two intensions in addition to
their extension. The first intension, the character in Kaplan’s terminology, is the formal equiv-
alent to reference rules of indexicals in particular and represents the linguistic meaning of an
expression in general. In case of indexical expressions, this linguistic meaning depends on the
context of utterance and is thus formalized as a function taking a context of utterance and yield-
ing a second intension. The second intension, the content in Kaplan’s terminology, represents
meaning that can only be grasped by a speaker who has already taken into account the empirical
features of the context of utterance that determine the referent of an indexical. Contents are the
intensions known from traditional, non-contextual intensional logics; formally, they are repre-
sented as functions from worlds or other modal indices into extensions, i.e. into truth-values for
sentences, objects for individual terms, sets of objects for unary predicates, and sets of ordered
n-tuples for n-ary relations respectively. The evaluation of a formula involves two steps: the first
1See (Kaplan 1989, fn. 1).
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step maps the formula in dependence on the context of utterance into the second intension and
the second step maps this intension into truth or falsity depending on the modal index. This
explains the attribute two-dimensional that is sometimes given to Kaplanian frameworks. The
term double-index modal logic, on the other hand, comes from the fact that worlds, times, or
whatever else modal operators ‘run over’ are an index, a point of reference in logical space in
relation to which truth in a model is defined, and adding contexts as other points to which truth
is relativized are then a second kind of index. To avoid mixing up the notions, only the second
parameter, with respect to which the content is evaluated, will be called index here, namely the
modal index. Notice that a modal index in this terminology is not directly related to a modality
index. The former is an additional parameter, whereas modality indices are used for syntacti-
cally enumerating modal operators of a multi-modal system. The following scheme summarizes
evaluation in Kaplan’s framework:2
Character + Context : Content
Content + Index : Extension
As can be seen from this scheme, formally all expressions of the target language are context-
dependent, since all of them have a character. However, non-indexical expressions will according
to Kaplan have stable character, i.e. a character that within a given model yields the same content
for any given context, whereas indexicals don’t have stable character. Correspondingly, rigid
terms can be said to have stable content, i.e. their content will yield the same extension no
matter what index it is evaluated at, whereas non-rigid expressions don’t have stable content.3
Kaplan argues decidedly for the direct reference view and considers indicators as the primordial
example of directly referential expressions. In his opinion, indicators are directly referential,
because their referent is fixed and determined by the context of utterance and therefore their
content has to be stable and they are rigid. Rigidity follows from the way their referent is fixed.4
Before the details of a Kaplanian framework are laid out, some remarks about such ap-
proaches are in place, not all of which reflect Kaplan’s own opinions. An important point in
(Kaplan 1989) as opposed to generic double-index theories is his distinction between contexts
of utterance and modal indices. There are two important differences between contexts of utter-
ance and modal indices. First, contexts of utterances generally have a more fine-grained structure
than modal indices. A context of utterance must specify any reference fixers of indexicals, in-
cluding speaker, addressee, place, time, and possibly world of utterance, whereas a modal index
specifies only the objects that modal operators implicitly quantify over.5 In the simplest case of
a modal logic with one alethic modality, modal indices are just worlds. Only if temporal adverbs
or tenses are analyzed as modal operators or if expressions like «everywhere» are analyzed as
modal operators running over places will modal indices either come in different sorts or have to
be modeled in another way that reflects a more fine grained structure. A formal context, i.e. the
formal representation of a context of utterance, is an abstract entity, but it stands for a concrete
2The scheme is almost identical to the one in (Kaplan 1989, p. 506) and has only been paraphrased instead of cited
because of the slight differences in terminology.
3See (Kaplan 1989, pp. 548-50).
4In section 5.4.6 it was argued that this is the result of their token-reflexivity, but this view is not endorsed by Kaplan.
5See (Haas-Spohn 1994, pp. 26-7).
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situation in which the utterance has been made and features thereof. A modal index, on the
other hand, may stand for a whole alternative way in which the universe may have evolved. It
may be interpreted in various ways, depending on the respective modality encoded. Second, the
criteria for counting contexts of utterance and modal indices differ vastly. Two contexts must be
different from each other whenever they occur as parameters in the analysis of two utterances
of the same indexical that have different referents. The equality conditions of modal indices, on
the other hand, depend on the interpretations of the respective modal operators running over
them. Because of these differences, it is not always clear in which way a mapping or conversion
from contexts to indices or vice versa ought to be interpreted from a philosophical point of view,
even when there is no technical difficulty in implementing such a mapping.
6.3 A Double-Index Modal Logic: DIML
The following logical system called DIML is quite similar to Kaplan’s original LD, but also differs
from it in some respects. It is intended to capture Kaplan’s main ideas.6
6.3.1 Syntax
DIML will be two-sorted like Kaplan’s LD. Let DVAR be the set of object variables containing
x, y, z and their indexed variants, PVAR be the set of place variables containing p and its in-
dexed variants, and VAR be the union of these two sets. Likewise, DCON and PCON containing
sequences of one or more letters shall be the set of constants and term operators for objects and
places respectively, and let CON be their union. Then for the set of object terms DTERM the
condition (DVAR ∪ DCON) ⊆ DTERM holds, but this set may contain iota terms as well. The
place terms are in PTERMS = PVAR ∪ PCON, and as another auxiliary definition let TERM
be the union of DTERM and PTERM. Predicates are sequences of lower-case letters (except
for those already in TERM) and the set of predicates PRED will be sorted into sets PREDmn ac-
cording to the number n of elements in DTERM and subsequently the number m of elements in
PTERM they allow in argument position (n,m ∈ N0). Quantifiers are QUANT1 = {∀∗, ∃∗} and
QUANT2 = { ι∗}. The set of junctors contains the standard connectives JUN = JUN1 ∪ JUN2,
where JUN1 = {¬} and JUN2 = {∧,∨,≡,⊃}. Instead of using simple modality indices, modal
operators are defined explicitly. For current purposes, this set MOD will contain the following
expressions: ∆, ∇, , ♦, Past, Fut, Always, TwoDaysAgo, Actually, Now, and Yesterday. Given
these basic ingredients, the set WFF of well-formed formulas of DIML is defined as follows.
WFF :=JUN1WFF (6.1)
| (WFF JUN2WFF)
| PREDmn (DTERM1, . . . ,DTERMn,PTERM1, . . . ,PTERMm)
| QUANT1VARWFF | QUANT2VAR (WFF)WFF
| MODWFF
6See (Kaplan 1989, pp. 541-46) for the original LD formalism.
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To ease the discussion of examples, the operators∆ and ∇ will also be allowed to operate on
terms:
TERM := ∆TERM | ∇TERM (6.2)
Furthermore, any member of PRED00 is stipulated to be in WFF as well, since 0-place pred-
icates act like propositional constants. Be for later reference EXPR = PRED ∪ TERM ∪WFF.
Redundant parentheses and parentheses around the arguments of unary predicates may be left
out for better readability. The following special terms are used.
I ∈ DCON (6.3)
here ∈ PCON (6.4)
And the following special predicates are stipulated:
exist ∈ PRED01 (6.5)
located ∈ PRED11 (6.6)
This is more or less a standard syntax, except for the fact that some sequences of lower-case
letters may be predicates, some may be special constants, and some may be operators. However,
the sort of such expressions will always be given explicitly by rules like 6.1, and so in case of
doubt the definition can be checked.
6.3.2 Semantics
The semantics of DIML spells out in detail what has been said in the introductory section. The
basic objects of a DIML model reside in a set of contexts C, a non-empty set of modal indices I,
and a domain of objects D. In order to deal with multiple modalities but keep the indices simple
it is convenient to assume functions from modal indices to worlds W and times T respectively,
as in the following definition.
world : (C ∪ I)→W (6.7)
time : (C ∪ I)→ T (6.8)
Since contexts are more fine-grained than modal indices, some additional functions are
needed that are only defined on contexts. For the examples, we’ll need a set of speakers S,
which is a subset of the domain S ⊂ D of a given model, and the following functions:
speaker : C → S (6.9)
place : C → P (6.10)
index : C → I (6.11)
This way of dealing with contexts and modal indices is an alternative to regarding them as
n-tuples consisting of a world, a time, a place, and a speaker. To allow mappings between indices
and contexts an infix operator C will be used as follows. The expression c C w yields a context
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c′ that is the same as c except that world(c′) = w, and likewise for indices on the left hand
side and times and places respectively on the right hand side. So for example, i C time(c) is
the index i′ that is the same as i except that time(i′) = time(c). We cannot assign speakers
or groups of addressees to indices, though, since this would make no sense unless there were
modal operators that would operate on these kinds of entities. So index maps a given context
to the corresponding index that has the same world and time as the context, and ignores other
aspects of it. Times and places have to be ordered. For example, the time intervals in T have
to be partially ordered, i.e. by a temporal before–after relation that is transitive, reflexive, and
antisymmetric, in order to be usable as representations of the tense system based on Comrie
(1985) outlined in section 5.3.3 of chapter 5. For present purposes, equality = and the strict
partial ordering relation < will do for tenses. A more detailed temporal semantics would need
to take into account some additional relations dealing with the overlapping and containment of
time intervals.7 In order to deal with calendric expressions, calendric functions like day(t) have
to be stipulated, but their implementation details will be left open here. Likewise, places are
internally structured and ordered by mereological relations like part-of, but the details will be
omitted.8
Given these prerequisites, a frame of DIML is a tuple F = (C, I,D,W, T, P,R) containing a
set of contexts C, a set of modal indices I, the domain of objects D, the subsidiary sets of times
T , worlds W , and places P , and a set of accessibility relations R for each modality defined.
For each of the accessibility relations Ri ∈ R it must either be the case that Ri ⊆ (W × W )
or Ri ⊆ (T × T ) in order to account for alethic or doxastic modalities and temporal operators
in the standard way of multi-modal normal modal logic.9 A model M of DIML based on frame
F = (C, I,D,W, T, P,R) is then a tuple consisting of all the elements in F plus an interpretation
function J.K. We use the same function J.K to interpret terms, predicates, and formulas alike. We’ll
write JEXPRKMg (c)(i) for the interpretation of EXPR in model M under variable assignment g
with respect to a given context c and a modal index i. The interpretation must map expressions
into a domain that matches their syntactic sort as follows, where ASG is the set of possible
variable assignments:
J.KM : DTERM×ASG× C → DI (6.12)
J.KM : PTERM×ASG× C → P I (6.13)
J.KM : PREDmn ×ASG× C → (D1 × · · · ×Dn × P1 × · · · × Pm)I (6.14)
J.KM : WFF×ASG× C → {1, 0}I (6.15)
Notice that these conditions partly characterize two functions. Following the exposition in
the last section, the first one, J.KMg is the character, the second one J.KMg (c) the content, and the
final result J.KMg (c)(i) is the extension of the given given expression in relation to assignment
g, context c, and modal index i. Two special term interpretation rules have to be added to deal
7See (Allen 1983), (Ladkin 1987), and (van Benthem 1991).
8See (Simons 1987) and (Smith and Burkhardt 1991) for some general overviews.
9Place operators with modalities based on P × P would be possible, too, but will not be used, because place terms
are available in the object language.
6.3. A DOUBLE-INDEX MODAL LOGIC: DIML 151
with I and here respectively.
For any c ∈ C, i ∈ I :
JIKMg (c)(i) = speaker(c) (6.16)
JhereKMg (c)(i) = place(c) (6.17)
So the character of I is a function that takes a context and yields a content that is a function
that for an arbitrary modal index yields the speaker of the context, and respectively for the
place of the context and here. Furthermore, Kaplan uses special semantic rules for the existence
predicate and being located at a certain place.
For x ∈ D, p ∈ P, c ∈ C, i ∈ I :
there is a c and an i s.t. x ∈ JexistKMg (c)(i) (6.18)
〈speaker(c), place(c)〉 ∈ JlocatedKMg (c)(iC time(c)C world(c)) (6.19)
〈x, p〉 ∈ JlocatedKMg (c)(i) ⊃ x ∈ JexistKMg (c)(i) (6.20)
These constraints ensure that any object exists at some context, that the speaker of a context
is located at the place of that context, and whenever something is located at some place in some
context and given modal index, then it must also exist with respect to that context and modal
index. Two further special rules for the so-called diagonalization and dthat operators are needed:
J∆TERMKMg (c)(i) := JTERMKMg (cC world(i) C time(i)) (6.21)
J∇TERMKMg (c)(i) := JTERMKMg (c)(index(c)) (6.22)
Finally, truth in a model has to be defined for formulas, which is accomplished by the follow-
ing chunk of definitions.
(6.23) JPRED(TERM1, . . . ,TERMn)KMg (c)(i)
=


1 if 〈JTERM1KMg (c)(i), . . . , JTERMnKMg (c)(i)〉 ∈ JPREDKMg (c)(i);
0 otherwise
(6.24) J¬WFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (c)(i) = 0;
0 otherwise
(6.25) JWFF1 ∧WFF2KMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFF1KMg (c)(i) = 1 and JWFF2KMg (c)(i) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.26) J∃∗ VARWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if there’s an h ≈VAR g such that JWFFKMh (c)(i) = 1;
0 otherwise
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(6.27) J∀∗ VARWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if for all h ≈VAR g it is the case that JWFFKMh (c)(i) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.28) JWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if in all w ∈W such that R(world(i), w) :
JWFFKMg (c)(iC w) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.29) JActuallyWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (c)(iC world(c)) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.30) JNowWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (c)(iC time(c)) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.31) JAlwaysWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if for all t ∈ T : JWFFKMg (c)(iC t) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.32) JPastWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if for some t < time(c) : JWFFKMg (c)(iC t) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.33) JFutWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if for some t > time(c) : JWFFKMg (c)(iC t) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.34) JTwoDaysAgoWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (c)(iC t) = 1,
where t = day(time(i))− 2 days
(assuming calendric arithmetics);
0 otherwise
(6.35) JYesterdayWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (c)(iC t) = 1,
where t = day(time(c))− 1 day
(assuming calendric arithmetics);
0 otherwise
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(6.36) J∇WFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (c)(index(c)) = 1;
0 otherwise
(6.37) J∆WFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (c′)(i) = 1,
where c′ = (cC world(i) C time(i));
0 otherwise
(6.38) J ι∗VARWFF1WFF2KMg (c)(i)
=


1 if there’s exactly one h ≈VAR g such that
JWFF1KMh = 1, and for this h it is the case that
JWFF2KMh = 1;
0 otherwise
6.3.3 Indirect Speech and Belief Operators
The usual way of implementing indirect speech and attitudes is to make them depend on the
content of what has been said. In this view, belief and indirect speech are modal operators as in
first-order modal logic. This can either be done by adding a modal operator based on a dyadic
accessibility for each speaker or, as in chapter 4, by introducing a third place for the speaker
in the accessibility relation. Since there are only finitely many speakers, the difference doesn’t
really matter. In the following addition to DIML a triadic accessibility relation is used, where S
is a finite subset of the domain D and MOD2 is the set of modal operators taking a WFF and an
object term.
WFF :=MOD2DTERMWFF (6.39)
(6.40) JSayDTERMWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JDTERMKMg (c)(i) ∈ S and in all w ∈W such that
RSay(world(i), w, JDTERMKMg (c)(i)) :
JWFFKMg (c)(iC w) = 1;
0 otherwise
Analogous definitions for Believe and other attitudes can be assumed, which only differ in the
respective accessibility relation. As before, KD45 modality will be assumed for rational belief,
whereas RSay is a sheer K modality. Kaplan (1989) discusses adding an operator like the above
one to the object language, but also suggests a form of believe that is a relation between the
attitude holder, the content, and the character of an expression, where the character represents
cognitive content.10 Referential opacity in attitude ascriptions can to some extent be dealt with
10See (Kaplan 1989, pp. 553-7), (Kaplan 1990b, pp. 39-49).
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this. However, this account is limited for expressing cognitive content, because it cannot encode
behaviorally relevant differences between two tokens of the same type if features of their context
of utterance aren’t taken into account as an additional individuation criterion in the meantime.
6.3.4 Technical Remarks
Before entering the philosophical discussion of DIML, some mostly technical issues have to be
addressed.
[1] Since indices and contexts are mapped toW , T , P by functions, these sets are in a sense
auxiliary and the choice to make them part of a DIML frame is not mandatory. In DIML, all of
these sets are put into a frame just to be explicit, even if this involves some kind of redundancy.
Notice, however, that DIML frames in the end boil down to Kripke structures and the semantics
of DIML is traditional Kripke semantics, since accessibility relations in these frames are no more
than binary relations over sets of states in W , T , or P , or ternary relations that can be reduced
to finitely many binary relations, as there are only finitely many speakers. The fact that these
states are sorted into worlds and times doesn’t have any significant semantic effect; it merely has
to do with the way various modal operators are interpreted informally. From a purely formal
perspective the modal operators could also just run over the same set of abstract state indices.
[2] Following Haas-Spohn (1994, pp. 29-32), ∇ is called syntactic dthat operator and ∆ is
called syntactic diagonal operator.11 In contrast to definitions 6.3.2 and 6.3.2, Kaplan (1989)
uses a version of dthat that operates only on terms. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that the
diagonalization operator has originally been devised by Stalnaker (1978) for a different purpose
than the one here, namely that of manipulating propositional concepts in modeling the pragmat-
ics of beliefs shared by discourse participants.
[3] Following Kaplan with this respect, DIML is two sorted, but instead it could have been
made 1-sorted and here could have been defined as sentential operator. The question what ar-
guments a predicate should have is primarily a matter of the syntax–semantics interface, i.e. of
the mapping from source to target language, and to another part a matter of philosophical de-
liberation. If places were part of contexts, this would mean that truth in a model is relativized to
places. Hence, no placeless statement could be made. Given that a place can comprise the whole
universe plus arbitrary ethereal locations, this doesn’t seem to pose any problems, but to some
philosophers relativizing truth to places might still not be acceptable.
[4] Kaplan uses an operator the on terms that works exactly like a iota operator, and in order
to deal with empty (non-denoting) terms he introduces an alien object † that is denoted by a
term that doesn’t denote. This trick allows one to deal with non-denoting terms while avoiding
the cumbersome use of partial functions. Whether it is also legitimate and elegant is controver-
11Other symbols sometimes used are @ for dthat and † for the diagonal operator. Cf. (Van Rooji 2006, p. 32-3).
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sial; in DIML this issue is avoided by using the iota quantifier.
[5] In the version of FOML used earlier, ιwas defined by means of the existence-relativized
existential quantifier. In contrast to this, the ι∗ quantifier above is possibilist. In order to also
have an existence-relativized quantifier, the following definition is needed.
ιVAR[WFF1]WFF2 :=
ι∗ VAR[exist(VAR) ∧WFF1]WFF2 (6.41)
There is, however, a problem with this definition and operators like ∆ or ∇. The restriction
of for example ιx[∆Fx]Gx will expand to exist(x)∧∆Fx. When it is needed within the priority
scope of an operator, the existence predicate will have to be put explicitly into the quantifier
restriction.
6.4 Examples and Discussion
6.4.1 Indexicals
For the following example, let’s assume an additional operator.
(6.42) J22thFebruaryWFFKMg (c)(i)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (c)(iC t) = 1,
where t is the 22.2. of year(time(i))
(assuming calendric arithmetics);
0 otherwise
In the following examples, 6.43 faithfully reports 6.45 and analyzed as 6.44, whereas 6.45 is
mapped to 6.46 in the target language DIML. Since the day of the context c is the 27th February,
6.44 is true in M if and only if Alice said at some time in the past that she was sick on the 26th
February, whether she uses indexicals like «yesterday» or calendric expressions to convey this
information. Yesterday depends on the context and has stable content. In contrast to this, «two
days ago» is analyzed as a non-rigid expression: TwoDaysAgo depends on the index, i.e. it is
a temporal operator that picks out the day before the day of the index. So 6.48 is true in M if
and only if Alice said at some time in the past of 27th February that she was sick on the 22th
February of the year of the index, which in this case must be stipulated to be the same year as
the year of the context of utterance.
(6.43) Bob on 27th February: Alice said that she was sick yesterday.
(6.44) M, g, c, i  ιxAxPast Sayx PastYesterday sick(x)
(6.45) Alice on 27th February: I was sick yesterday.
(6.46) M, g, c, i  PastYesterday sick(I)
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(6.47) Bob on 27th February: Alice said on 22th February that she was sick two days ago.
(6.48) M, g, c, i  ιxAxPast 22thFebruary Sayx PastTwoDaysAgosick(x)
The indicator «yesterday» is rigid and «two days ago» is read as a non-rigid expression with
respect to time. It doesn’t matter whether «two days ago» can also be understood as rigid ex-
pression, since this reading could simply be mapped to a respective day before yesterday indicator
that would work like «yesterday».12
One of Kaplan’s motivations for parameterizing the context of utterance is that it allows for
distinctions in truth-conditions that are relevant from a philosophical point of view. In LD and
DIML formulas like 6.50 will be true in all contexts, whereas 6.51 might still be false.
(6.49) I exist now.
(6.50) M, g, c, i  Now exist(I)
(6.51) Necessarily I exist now.
(6.52) M, g, c, i  Now exist(I)
This is the case because of a deliberate stipulation 6.18. Another matter is whether this stip-
ulation really should hold. According to the purely token-reflexive view on indexicals it ought
not hold, because it is trivial to conceive contexts in which a token ‹I› of 6.49 doesn’t denote.
Deceased people may leave strange messages to posterity on their desk, or a random-number
generator based on radioactive decay combined with a simple context-free grammar might even-
tually produce 6.49. On the other hand, 6.18 is implicit to the utterance-based account, because
an utterance is always made by a speaker at some time. In this view 6.49 is understood in the
sense of whoever speaker utters ‹6.49› at the time of utterance exists at the time of utterance by
virtue of the fact that an utterance is uttered by someone. So Kaplan’s stipulation does make sense,
as long as it is not taken as a metaphysical claim about the existence of Cartesian Egos or some-
thing alike. All it says is that if a proper context of utterance is such that it involves an utterer,
then the utterer exists in that context. It is based on the silent, but reasonable assumption that
non-existent things like Superman cannot actually utter something.
6.4.2 Demonstratives
Following section 5.4.2 of the last chapter, the use of a demonstrative can be analyzed by taking
its pointing gesture as a definite description. This is Kaplan’s opinion with one caveat. He
emphasizes that demonstratives are rigid and that therefore the character of a demonstrative
cannot be solely given by a definite description. This theory, which he calls a Fregean theory
of demonstrations, would be inadequate, because definite descriptions don’t ensure rigidity and
the character of a singular term must be understood as a way to fix the referent, not as a way
12Kaplan uses «one day ago», but some of my informants considered a non-rigid reading of this expression very marked.
It seems also that a non-rigid reading is more preferred if the past time interval is given by a calendric expression like
«on 22nd February» than if it is given by an indexical like «last week».
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to supply a synonym.13 If the pointing gesture is abstracted into a definite description, this
description must at least be rigidified by means of ∇ dthat. To give one example in DIML:
(6.53) He−→ now lives in Princeton, New Jersey. (Kaplan 1989, p. 516)
(6.54) M, g, c, i  Now ιx[∇δ(x)][livein(x, Princeton)]
If we had the iota operator available, ‹he› in 6.53 could be analyzed as ιx∇δ(x), where δ
would be a description derived from the pointing gesture. The character of this expression
represents the meaning of this demonstrative, but meaning should in this case only be read
as the formal analogon to the pointing gesture that fixes the semantic referent of the use of the
demonstrative. Kaplan goes on to argue against the wide scope theory and in favor of the direct
reference view in a rather tricky way. He names the ‘proposition’ expressed by 6.54 and considers
it under counterfactual circumstances. Assuming Millianism, the demonstrative will remain rigid.
However, the wide scope theory cannot be applied, because no modal operator is involved.14
As laid out in detail in chapter 3, arguments like that aren’t very convincing and potentially
obfuscate the source–target language distinction. Apart from Kaplan’s endorsement of the direct
reference view and problematic features thereof, such as the immediacy of reference metaphor,
his analysis of demonstratives is fully acceptable. Following (Ind 3) of the last chapter, it could
be extended by putting the various selectional criteria of a demonstrative’s use into its respective
definite description, i.e. into the characterization of its character. This will be done in the next
chapter using a slightly different framework based on first-order predicate logic.
6.4.3 The Role of Dthat and Diagonalization
A feature of double-index theories in general is that they technically make it feasible to con-
veniently map back-and-forth between modal indices and contexts of utterance by using the
diagonalization ∆ and dthat ∇ operators. Despite watering the conceptual distinction between
contexts of utterance and modal indices, these operations have been considered important by
many philosophers of language and some epistemologists, who believe that possible world se-
mantics can give us new insights into epistemological questions. ∇ (dthat) can be used to rigid-
ify a definite description and thus to analyze Donnellan’s referential uses of definite descriptions
(Donnellan 1966), as suggested by Kaplan (1990a), but also, this time definitely not in the
spirit of Kaplan, for the heretic purpose of giving a description analysis of proper names within
a framework that also deals with indexicals. Regarding the first suggestion, take a look at the
reading according to which the description in 6.55 might be true. This can be analyzed as 6.56.
(6.55) It is possible that the president of the United States weren’t the president of the United
States.
(6.56) M, g, c, i  ♦ ιx[∇(exists(x) ∧ Px)]¬Px
13See (Kaplan 1989, pp.516-9).
14See (Kaplan 1989, p. 517).
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∇ ensures that the restriction exists(c) ∧ Px is evaluated with respect to index(c) and there-
fore rigid with respect to the modal operator. New in this view isn’t the rigidification operation
itself, but its conceptual underpinnings. The semantic referent of certain expressions depends on
the actual context of utterance and for that reason they are rigid. Regarding the second sugges-
tion, consider how the converse operation diagonalization works. Suppose Bob is unbeknown to
Alice also known under the name «Chuck» among some of his friends. Now take a look at the
following example and partial DIML evaluation, where the constants Bob and Chuck denote Bob
and are the target language analogues of «Bob» and «Chuck».
(6.57) Alice believes that Bob isn’t Chuck.
(6.58) M, g, c, i  BelieveAlice∆¬(Bob = Chuck)
m
for all w ∈W s.t. Rbelieve(world(i), w, JAliceKMg (c)(i)):
M, g, c, iC w  ∆¬(Bob = Chuck)
m
for all w ∈W s.t. Rbelieve(world(i), w, JAliceKMg (c)(i)):
M, g, cC w C time(i), iC w  ¬(Bob = Chuck)
If the constants used to represent proper names are stable with respect to indices, i.e. rigid,
but not stable with respect to characters, then it can be the case that 6.58 because of 6.59.
JBobKMg (cC w C time(i))(iC w) 6= JChuckKMg (cC w C time(i))(iC w) (6.59)
∀i : JBobKMg (c)(i) = JChuckKMg (c)(i) (6.60)
6.59 may hold even if Bob and Chuck are indeed the same person at every index 6.60 for
some c. The diagonalization operator ensures that the expressions it is applied to, i.e. in this
case constants and the equality relation where the latter ought to have stable character, are eval-
uated with respect to only those contexts that are compatible with the indices that the embedding
modal operator implicitly quantifies over, i.e. in this case the worlds accessible by Alice’s belief
relation. So diagonalization can be used to express speaker reference without having to resort
to subjective identification criteria that seemingly would make the account non-compositional.
As has been laid out in chapter 4, the corresponding effect can be achieved in a single-index
theory by using non-rigid constants, adopting the wide scope theory of proper names, or using a
relativized actuality operator. Whether the conceptual differences of these accounts to the two-
dimensional are huge or small depends on the viewpoint and cannot be judged from the formal
properties of the systems alone. On one hand, it may be argued that using diagonalization in a
double-index framework maintains the direct reference view, while at the same time being able
to deal with cases of subjective meaning and speaker reference. On the other hand, diagonalizing
rigid expressions like indicators can on equal footing be taken as support for a description theory
of reference, since a diagonalized singular term occurring in the scope of a doxastic modal opera-
tor will denote whatever object the respective attitude holder believes, fears, or hopes it denotes
according to its character, i.e. according to the formal means of representing its reference rule.
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6.5 Shifters in Double-index Modal Logic
6.5.1 Monsters
The following classification of operators or functors in double-index theories is useful.
P Definition 1 (Classification of Operators in Double-index Frameworks). In a double-index
theory an operator or functor α applied to β is. . .
1. extensional iff Jα(β)K (c)(i) ≡ Jα(β)K (c′)(j)
2. intensional iff for some c and some β: Jα(β)K (c)(i) 6= Jα(β)K (c)(j)
3. localizing iff for some c, c′ and some β: Jα(β)K (c)(i) 6= Jα(β)K (c′)(i)
4. a monster iff it is intensional and localizing,
where c, c′ are contexts and i, j are indices.
The term monster goes back to Kaplan (1989), who stipulates that these kind of operators
don’t exist in natural languages, i.e. that there are no expressions in natural languages that have
to be analyzed as monster operators. Although Kaplan doesn’t further back up this claim, it is
prima facie compelling, since the context of an utterance is an extralinguistic entity. When the
diagonalization operator is not used, the context of utterance is the actual situation in which
an utterance is made and that has concrete features like a speaker, a time, or being at a certain
location. It seems plausible to deny that there are linguistic expressions whose interpretation
changes or influences the context in which they have been uttered, and this is even more plau-
sible if the distinction between source and target language is taken seriously. Nevertheless, as
Perry and Israel (1996) point out, Kaplan’s monster prohibition is an ad hoc constraint. Finally,
Schlenker (2000) takes the data on shifters as evidence that the monster prohibition doesn’t
hold. To see why this is the case, let’s take a look at one of Schlenker’s examples:
(5.32) ˇon ˇ@gna n@-n˜n˜ y1l-all
John hero be.PF-1SO 3M.say-AUX.3M
‘John says that he is a hero.’
(Schlenker 2003, p. 68)
The Amharic equivalent of «I» must be evaluated with respect to the reported speech act
introduced by the Amharic verb of indirect speech. Since the verb is analyzed as an intensional
operator, and the shifting of the context is localizing, the resulting analysis will be monstrous.15
15There are ways to circumvent this result by using an alternative technical apparatus. See for example (von Stechow
2003). Target language restrictions such as the monster prohibition often just hold for some analysis and under certain
assumptions concerning the syntax–semantics interface.
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6.5.2 Shifters and Diagonalization
As both English and Amharic first-person indicators have to be expressible in the target language,
because the target language must be universal, not just one operator that shifts the context of
utterance can be used for analyzing the Amharic and English verbs of indirect speech. The
English verb of saying doesn’t shift the context. Moreover, just supposing that attitude verbs
unselectively change the context parameter would make very strong predictions; either all or
none indexicals would be shifted when they occur in a verb of indirect speech. According to
Anand and Nevins (2003) this is the case in Dimli, but it may not hold for other languages.
One way to alleviate this problem is to implement the verb of speech as a context binder and
introduce context variables into the object language, and this is for example done in Schlenker
(2003) and will also be done here in the next chapter. If we want to stay within the realms of
DIML some simpler mechanism is needed. Diagonalization is localizing and can therefore do the
job to some extent:
P Abbreviation 1 (Amharic First-Person Indexical in DIML).
IAmh := ∆I (6.61)
This only works as intended, as long as it is additionally stipulated that a context of utterance
whose world is compatible with what some speaker said is a context whose agent is besaid
speaker, as expressed by the following constraint.
P Constraint 1 (DIML Speaker Contexts).
∀c ∈ C ∀w ∈ W ∀x ∈ D :
RSay(w,world(c), x) ⊃ speaker(c) = x (6.62)
The following sample computation shows what is going on under the hood:
M, g, c, i  SayJohnhero(I
Amh) (6.63)
m
M, g, c, i  SayJohnhero(∆I) (6.64)
m
for all w ∈ W s.t. RSay(world(i), w, JJohnKMg (c)(i)) :
M, g, c, iC w  hero(∆I) (6.65)
m
for all w ∈ W s.t. RSay(world(i), w, JJohnKMg (c)(i)) :
〈J∆IKMg (c)(iC w)〉 ∈ JheroKMg (c)(iC w) (6.66)
m
for all w ∈ W s.t. RSay(world(i), w, JJohnKMg (c)(i)) :
〈JIKMg (cC w C time(i))(iC w)〉 ∈ JheroKMg (c)(iC w) (6.67)
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m
for all w ∈ W s.t. RSay(world(i), w, JJohnKMg (c)(i)) :
speaker(cC w C time(i)) ∈ JheroKMg (c)(iC w) (6.68)
It then follows from 6.62 that speaker(cCwCtime(i)) is John. The problem with this method
is that a stipulation like 6.62 is generally dubious, because it is a technical solution without
independent informal justification. Without going one step further and introducing contexts into
the object language, a better solution is to use some implicit binding mechanism that works the
same way as the one discussed in chapter 4.
6.5.3 Language SDML
Let language SDML be the same as DIML except for the following changes. First, J.K is redefined
to take a storage parameter ν for contexts into account, and the initial value of ν is undefined .
Conditional assignment to this operator then works analogous to the way it was done in section
4.6.1 of chapter 4.
ν ← c =


c if ν = undefined
ν otherwise
(6.69)
The Say operator pushes a designated context value onto this parameter, namely the reported
speech act. For this a function must be stipulated that yields the reported speech act in depen-
dence of the speaker reporting it, the reporting context, and the index:
rsa : S × C × I → C (6.70)
The revised operator is then:
(6.71) JSayDTERMWFFKMg,ν (c)(i)
=


1 if for ν′ = ν ← rsa(JDTERMKMg,ν (c)(i), c, i) :
in all w ∈W such that :
RSay(world(i), w, JDTERMKMg,ν (c)(i)) :
JWFFKMg,ν′ (c)(iC w) = 1;
0 otherwise
The Amharic first-person indexical then retrieves this value if available, whereas the English
one is evaluated with respect to the actual context as before.
q
IAmh
yM
g,ν
(c)(i) =


speaker(c) if ν = undefined
speaker(ν) otherwise
(6.72)
This is preferable to the diagonalization approach, as long as shifters depend on the reported
speech act introduced by the first verb of indirect speech in a sequence of nested uses of verbs of
indirect speech. This would be analogous to the way in which de dicto readings of proper names
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have been analyzed with respect to the modal index. If on the other hand this is not the case
and in nested verbs of indirect speech the respectively latest reported speech act (from left to
right, earlier to later) is relevant for the evaluation of a shifter, then the conditional assignment
operation has to be changed to an unconditional one. Which analysis is adequate is a language-
dependent, empirical question.16
6.6 Shortcomings
There are some shortcomings to the way DIML is used above. Three of them will be briefly
addressed in the following subsections, but only one of them, Cresswell’s argument, indicates an
expressive limitation of DIML itself. The others just point out in which respect the above analyses
remain too coarse-grained. There are other limitations that will not be addressed, because they
don’t concern indexicals in particular. For example, it is well known that normal modal logic
is only suitable for encoding rational belief closed under deduction, not any notion of belief.
Double-index modal logic provides an adequate analysis of indexicals up to a certain degree, just
as any kind of formal modeling of linguistic expressions only captures aspects thereof and will
invariably be based on certain idealizations.
6.6.1 Cresswell’s Argument
Cresswell (1990) argues that full quantification over modal indices is needed for any reasonable
and descriptively adequate analysis of natural language.17 He considers more and more complex
linguistic examples whose analysis would require referring back to more and more indices. Here
is one such example:
(6.73) If the economic climate had been favorable it would have been desirable that some who
are not actually rich but would then have been rich be poor. (Cresswell 1990, p. 40)
Figure 6.1 illustrates the dependencies in this example. The «then» causes evaluation to jump
back to the economically favorable worlds, whereas «actually» jumps back to the actual world.
Similar examples can be found for the spatial and temporal domain. Cresswell argues that
in principle more and more complex examples that require evaluation to jump back to previous
worlds can be constructed. A mechanism is needed in order to store n indices for later retrieval
and retrieve them later during evaluation of the target language formulas from left to right. If
formulas can be of finite, but arbitrary length (without upper bound), then denumerably infinite
many storage places for indices are needed, and this amounts, according to Cresswell (1990),
to full quantification over indices. One may object to this argument that in fact only finitely
long formulas of a certain length can be processed, and that any fixed, finite number of jumps
in evaluation can be dealt with by storing and retrieving a fixed number of indices, which is
for example possible in hybrid logic with downarrow and at operator. The problem with only
16Unfortunately, in the present case it couldn’t be decided due to lack of Amharic informants.
17Schlenker (2003, pp. 44-9) presents a shortened version of Cresswell’s argument.
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w0 actual world
w1, w
′
1, w
′′
1 , . . . economically favorable worlds
w2, w
′
2, w
′′
2 , . . . desirable worlds
∃x¬ actually rich(x)∧ then rich(x)∧ poor(x)
Figure 6.1: Evaluation dependencies of example 6.73, indicated by dotted lines.
allowing a fixed number of finitely many indices to be stored and retrieved is that it assumes an
ad hoc limit, an upper bound on the number of indices, which isn’t desirable in general. This is
comparable to using non-recursive grammars in syntax, that can only be used to parse or produce
sentences of finite length. To such grammars it can be objected that we have the competence to
parse arbitrary long finite sentences, although we lack the performance to do so. By the same
token it can be argued in favor of full quantification over indices that we have in principle the
competence to understand arbitrary complex sentences of the above kind.
6.6.2 Conversational Contexts Versus Context of Utterance
A pure double-index modal logic without additions only parameterizes contexts of utterance.
While there is nothing wrong with ignoring certain semantic or pragmatic aspects of source
language expressions, for a more adequate truth-conditional analysis some implementation of
the conversational context is desirable. As laid out in the last chapter, especially spatial indexicals
are systematically vague and at least some rudimentary mechanism should account for that. For
example, whether a use of «here» has broad or narrow reading depends on the conversational
context. If the context of utterance is taken as the concrete situation in which a token is used for
communication, then it will be unreasonable to meanwhile take the place of utterance encoded
by the context parameter to be the whole physical universe or the earth. Taking conversational
contexts explicitly into account allows for more fine-grained distinctions. Consider example 5.37
from last chapter and figure 6.2.
(5.37) Sitting in the office in winter: It’s cold here.
In the simplified view, the place of the context of utterance is blown up such that the place
denoted by ‹here› is a part of it. In a bit more detailed analysis the reference space is taken
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here
reference place
place of utterance
Figure 6.2: Place of ‹here› in terms of mereological part-of relation with and without a reference
place that is given by the conversational context.
explicitly into account and the place of utterance is understood as the place of the concrete
situation in which the utterance happens. The reference place is then considered the larger place
that depends on the conversational context, hence depends on something which remains stable
within a given discourse fragment, is at least partly shared between discourse participants, and
is not fixed for itself by the mere act of uttering something. It is easy to change DIML to take into
account an additional conversational context parameter, and so this isn’t a hard limit.
6.6.3 Selectional Features and Other Missing Ingredients
From a descriptivist point of view on reference, not expressing the descriptive conditions that
constitute the character of an indexical in the object language is a misfeature of the above def-
initions of indexicals. This point doesn’t regard the expressivity of DIML at all, but the direct
reference view that underlies it. In light of the rich descriptive content of indexicals it is desir-
able to make this more explicit in the object language than it is done by Kaplan’s notion of a
character as a function from contexts to intensions. This can be done in DIML by using ∇ dthat,
and so the issue is a matter of perspective rather than principal limitations.
6.6.4 Further Literature
Reichenbach (1947) gives a token-based account of indexicals in first-order predicate logic. (Ok-
sanen 2000) makes possible mappings between different speaker perspectives explicit, like for
6.6. SHORTCOMINGS 165
example the mapping of «I» from the first-person perspective to «he» or «she» in the third-person
perspective. Another suggestion to formally deal with indexicals with special regards to forms
of belief attributions can be found in (Richard 1983). Schlenker (2000, 2002, 2003) and von
Stechow (2002, 2003) propose complex, feature-based mechanisms to deal with indexicals and
anaphoric binding, and in order to provide a linguistic explanation for the fact that certain in-
dexicals are non-shifters, others sometimes shift, and yet others always shift. Using update logic,
Stojanovic (2002, 2005) proposes a radical departure from traditional Kaplanian accounts.
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Chapter 7
Indexicals in Predicate Logic
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7.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, indexicals will be analyzed by means of a variant of first-order predicate logic in
order to do justice to Cresswell’s argument. In support of Thesis 7 it will be shown by example
that a fine-grained analysis of indexicals can be given on the basis of a description theory of
indexical reference. The proposed variant of first-order predicate logic, called FOLC here, will
allow for analyses that are similar to those in event semantics. As opposed to the latter, FOLC
doesn’t rely on any special event mereology and the binders for modalities will be defined in
close analogy to the analogous operators in normal modal logic. Quantification over contexts of
utterance will be available in the object language, but these objects are basically placeholders
for worlds, times, and places to keep object language expressions shorter. FOLC also has a few
non-standard features: non-traditional predication theory allows one to deal with vagueness to
some extent, a conversational context and a context of utterance are introduced as designated
reference points of the interpretation function in order to fix the range of vague indexicals and
encode contextual dependencies across utterance level, and quantifiers are given unlimited bind-
ing scope for a given input. These mostly cosmetic changes will make FOLC more convenient
for analyzing indexicals than standard first-order predicate logic (FOL). However, except for the
use of non-traditional predication theory any given sequence of formulas of FOLC could also be
written down explicitly in normal first-order predicate logic.
The formal language and its interpretation will be defined in section 7.2. The common indi-
cators for the deictic center will be analyzed in section 7.3. Some examples of complex indicators
are discussed in section 7.4, some examples of demonstratives will be analyzed in section 7.5,
and finally, in section 7.6 some ways to deal with shifters in this framework will be outlined. All
of the analyses will be done from the perspective of semantic reference. Speaker reference by
means of indexicals and the related problem of essential indexicals will be addressed in chap-
ter 8.
7.2 Language FOLC
FOLC is a two-sorted predicate logic and unlike the previous formal languages will have prefix
style syntax with arguments separated by blank spaces instead of commas. This has the advan-
tage of making formulas with a lot of bound variables more readable and easier to type, though
more cumbersome to write by hand. FOLC uses non-traditional predication theory (NTPT), ac-
cording to which an inner negation is considered a sort of predication. This branch of logic goes
back to work by Sinowjew (1970) and Wessel (1989, 1998) in the 60ies and 70ies of 20th cen-
tury. The given implementation of NTPT will differ from theirs in many respects. For example,
only a simple denotational semantics will be given for FOLC, but the set-theory used in the meta
language will remain classical. This is problematic and not acceptable from a foundational point
of view, but acceptable for the purpose of doing natural language semantics.1 Another change to
1See (Wessel 1989) for an axiom system, a completeness proof, and some philosophical justification of NTPT. As
pointed out by Uwe Scheffler in a talk given on 22.3.2005 at Roskilde University, soundness and completeness can also
be proved by translating and reinterpreting all NTPT formulas as formulas of classical first-order predicate calculus.
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classical predicate logic is that binders may have maximal scope to the right. This has at least two
benefits: First, target language expressions become much easier to read, because they contain
less parentheses. Second, referential terms that are analyzed as quantifiers can be moved to the
left in the target language. In Appendix C a generic syntax–semantics interface is presented that
exploits this feature. However, for any given input sequence of formulas to the interpretation
function of FOLC it is possible to find a corresponding FOL formula in a corresponding model
that is an explicit conjunction of the FOLC sequence and in which the binders have traditional
scoping rules, and so the only change that makes FOLC non-classical is the use of NTPT.
In FOLC all predicates are relativized to a first context argument similar to the way this is
done in event semantics. However, the use of just one context argument is eye-candy in the
following sense. Part of a FOLC model will be contexts of utterance, conversational contexts,
times, places, worlds, and ordinary objects, and a number of mapping functions will be used
under the hood to retrieve the world, or some times and places associated with a given context
of utterance in a given conversational context.
7.2.1 Syntax
Let CVAR be the set of utterance context variables containing C and its numbered variants,
DVAR be the set of ordinary variables containing X, Y, Z and their numbered variants. As before,
constants can be sequences of letters like predicates and one has to consult the definition in order
to determine the syntactic sort. CCON and DCON contain constants for utterance contexts and
objects respectively. As auxiliary sets, we define CON = CCON∪DCON, VAR = CVAR∪DVAR,
CTERM = CVAR ∪ CCON and likewise for DTERM, and TERM = CTERM ∪ DTERM. This
time, the set of predicates PRED is not only sorted into subsets by their arity, but also into their
positive and inner negation form. Predicates are sequences of letters, and we say that any n-ary
predicate not starting with - is in positive form and an element in PRED+n (n ≥ 1). We then say
that for all positive forms of predicates: If A is in PRED+n , then -A is in PRED
−
n , where -A is said
to be in inner negation form. No other expressions than the ones defined by this rule are in inner
negation form. The rule ensures that every positive form has a corresponding inner negation
form. Notice further that every predicate this time has at least arity one, and this argument will
be required to be an element in CTERM. In other words, all predicates depend on a context. For
typographical reasons quantifiers and operators are written as text. QUANT1 = {all ,some,iota*}
and more quantifiers may be added when needed, while the basic quantifiers appear to take
no argument at all QUANT0 = { forall*,exists*}. This works because the binding scope of
quantifiers will be defined on a maximum sequence of formulas. Junctors are textual variants
of the standard junctors. Operators will be defined as needed and are assumed to be in OPn
for operators taking n well-formed formulas, where OP is the union of these sets, and in SOP
if they take a maximal sequence, i.e. operators consuming the whole given input at a time.
Furthermore, operators from terms to terms will be in TOP = DTOP∪CTOP. The prefix syntax
of FOLC is then given by the following grammar rules.
QHD :=(QUANT0VAR) (7.1)
| (QUANT1VARMSQ)
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WFF :=(PREDnCTERM .TERM2 . . .TERMn) (7.2)
| (JUNMSQ)
| (OPMSQ)
| QHDMSQ | (QHDMSQ)
| SOPMSQ | (SOPMSQ)
SEQ :=WFF | SEQSEQ (7.3)
MSQ :=SEQ stop (7.4)
DTERM :=(DTOPDTERM) (7.5)
CTERM :=(CTOPCTERM) (7.6)
MSQ stands for maximal sequence and we will usually not write the special stop symbol. The
purpose of this somewhat twisted way of defining the syntax is to make sure that a sequence
operator or quantifier always takes a sequence of some known, fixed length delimited by stop.
It is thus possible to define the maximal extension sequence of a formula WFFi in a maximal
sequence WFF1 . . .WFFi. . .WFFn stop as the sequence WFFi+1 . . .WFFn stop, and the length
of this sequence is n− i− 1. From this and the above definition it follows that a sequence
QHDWFF1 . . .WFFn
without surrounding parentheses is only well-formed if WFF1 . . .WFFn is the maximal ex-
tension sequence of QHD. So quantifiers may have maximal binding scope to the right, but
according to the above rules they may also be put into additional parentheses to give them lim-
ited binding scope, and the same choice can be made for fixing the priority scope of sequence
operators. The purpose of the separate quantifier head QHD definition might not be apparent
at first glance. Just as human brains can hardly survive without body, bodiless quantifier heads
should be disallowed, and this is achieved by not making a quantifier head a well-formed formula
on its own. From the syntax it follows that all predicates take a context argument. However, it
is helpful if these context arguments can sometimes be omitted and therefore we will adopt the
following convention.
P Definition 2 (Optional Argument Convention). In a given input sequenceMSQ an n-ary pred-
icate may be written without the first k arguments (k ≤ n) if no ambiguity can arise. Any such
missing argument places are completed by a variable of the respective sort in CVAR or DVAR that
must be free with respect to its position in MSQ.
This convention will mainly be used to omit the first context argument in a predicative clause.
It is by convention completed by an unbound context variable, and another, semantic convention
will later ensure that this open variable is bound to the currently active context parameter. The
first context argument will sometimes be separated from the following arguments by a dot in
order to indicate that it hasn’t been omitted. Arguments other than the first one will rarely be
left out, except in the definition of some tense binders. According to these conventions, the
following formulas are equal:
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(7.7) ( iota * X ( A l i c e X))
( iota * Y (Bob Y))
( love X Y)
(7.8) ( iota * X ( A l i c e C0 . X))
( iota * Y (Bob C0 . Y))
( love C0 . X Y)
In abbreviations, optional arguments may also be specified using square brackets. For exam-
ple, the following abbreviation could be used for model ling belief.
(7.9) ( bel ieve [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 DTERM) MSQ)
:= ( f o r a l l * CVAR2)
( implies (Rb [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 DTERM)
MSQ)
The square brackets in this definition must be read in the following way: If no utterance
context term is given to the binder, then it misses as argument to Rb as well and will thus be
completed by a free context variable; otherwise, CVAR1 will occur at first argument position of
Rb. In such abbreviations we will also allow arguments in square brackets that occur after some
other arguments. They are likewise mapped to an open variable if not present on the left hand
side, and to the left hand side variable if present.
7.2.2 Semantics
The basic ingredients of a FOLC frame is a set of utterance contexts C, a set of conversational
contexts K, a set of possible worlds W , a set of time intervals T , a set of places P , and a set of
other objectsD. Although we can only overtly quantify over the objects in C and D in the object
language, the other sets will be used implicitly in the semantics of certain expressions. A FOLC
frame also contains a set Σ of mapping functions, including the following ones:
time, utime, rtime : (C ×K)→ T (7.10)
place, rplace, uplace : (C ×K)→ P (7.11)
world : (C ×K)→W (7.12)
These functions retrieve the event, utterance, and reference time and place and the world
of a (c, k) pair respectively. There is a decent amount of overhead involved in the use of these
functions, but they simplify the object language. Binders and operators will work on the respec-
tive world, time, or place slices of a pair of utterance and conversational context, and for this
purpose the notion of a variant is needed. This is only defined with respect to utterance contexts,
because these are the ones available in the object language.
P Definition 3 (Context Variants). A time variant c′ of c for given k, written as c 'kt c′, is a
context c′ such that possibly time(c′, k) 6= time(c, k), utime(c′, k) 6= utime(c, k), or rtime(c′, k) 6=
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rtime(c, k) but any of the above place or world functions will yield the same result for c, k and
c′, k respectively. Likewise, a place variant c 'kp c
′ is a context c′ whose place functions might yield
different results, but which remains stable with respect to world and times, and a world variant
c 'kw c
′ is the c′ for which world(c′, k) might differ from world(c, k) but the other functions yield
the same result as for c.
A FOLC frame is then a structure F = (C,K,W, T, P,D,Σ), where none of the sets in it are
empty. A FOLC model based on a frame F consists of the elements of F and the interpretation
function J.KMg,k (c), which takes an expression of FOLC, a context of utterance c, a conversational
context k, an assignment g, and yields the extension of that expression with respect to the des-
ignated reference points c ∈ C and k ∈ K. The interpretation must map a syntactic sort into
the correct interpretational domain of that sort, i.e. the interpretation must satisfy the following
constraints.
J.KM : CTERM× C ×K ×ASG→ C (7.13)
J.KM : DTERM× C ×K ×ASG→ D (7.14)
J.KM : PREDn × C ×K ×ASG→ ℘(C × (C ∪D)2 × · · · × (C ∪D)n) (7.15)
J.KM : SEQ× C ×K ×ASG→ {1, 0} (7.16)
As an alternative notation to the above one,M, g, c, k  MSQ may be written. In addition to
the above constraints, the interpretation of a variable must conform to the following rule.
JVARKMg,k (c) = g(VAR) (7.17)
Furthermore, we need to put a restriction on the interpretation of positive and inner negation
forms of predicates, in order to make the inner negation work in the way it is supposed to work
in a system using non-traditional predication theory.
P Constraint 2 (Inner Negation Constraint). The extensions of the positive form of a predicate
and the inner negation form of a predicate must be distinct.
q
PRED+
yM
g,k
(c) ∩
q
PRED−
yM
g,k
(c) = ∅ (7.18)
for arbitrary given g, c, k
This is one change that makes FOLC non-traditional. Another, less significant change is to
‘dynamize’ evaluation. In order to make this work, we need another auxiliary function.
U : (WFF× (ASG ∪ C ∪K))→ (ASG ∪C ∪K) (7.19)
This can be regarded as comprising three functions that have been combined into one for
the sake of brevity. The function will be called update function. As the name suggests it will
update the assignment, the context of utterance, and the conversational context by the result of
evaluating each formula in a sequence of formulas from left to right. To get the desired mode of
function composition in the update function, the following non-standard notation will be used:
f?1(x, y)(z) = f(z, f(x, y)) (7.20)
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f?n(x, y)(z1, . . . , zn−1, zn) = f(zn, f
?n−1(x, y)(z1, . . . , zn−1)) (7.21)
Based on this notation, a writing shortcut will be used to indicate the update step for each
stage k in updating the parameter or assignment p by a sequence of formulasWFF1 . . .WFFn (1 ≤
k ≤ n):
U(WFFk, p) =


U(WFF1, p) if k = 1
U?k−1(WFF1, p)(WFF2, . . . ,WFFk) if k > 1
(7.22)
Notice that this is not a definition in the strict sense but really just a notational shortcut, since
the actual sequence of formulas isn’t given as argument to U . In the definitions of truth in a model
below, this notation is used to indicate that assignments and both sorts of context respectively
are updated by the result of updating the previous formula of the given sequence. The first case
in the definition below is special. It says that if none of the other rules apply, including those of
later definitions, then a sequence of two formulas is treated as an implicit conjunction. The other
rules are just standard first-order logic definitions that work on sequences of formulas instead of
single formulas. The update function on complex formulas is defined simultaneously with truth
in a model.
P Definition 4 (FOLC Truth-in a Model).
(7.23) Case A =WFF1WFF2 and no other rule applies
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if JWFF1KMg,k = 1
and JWFF2KMU(WFF1,g),U(WFF1,k) (U(WFF1, c)) = 1;
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(WFF2, U(WFF1, g))
U(A, c) = U(WFF2, U(WFF1, c))
U(A, k) = U(WFF2, U(WFF1, k))
(7.24) Case A = (PREDTERM1 . . .TERMn):
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if 〈JTERM1KMg,k (c), . . . , JTERMnKMg,k (c)〉 ∈ JPREDKMg,k (c)
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = g; U(A, c) = c; U(A, k) = k
(7.25) Case A = (orWFF1 . . .WFFn):
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if one or more of JWFF1KMg,k (c),
JWFF2KMU(WFF2,g),U(WFF2,k) (U(WFF2, c)), . . . ,
JWFFnKMU(WFFn,g),U(WFFn,k) (U(WFFn, c)) is 1;
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(WFFn, g); U(A, c) = U(WFFn, c); U(A, k) = U(WFFn, k)
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(7.26) Case A = (andWFF1 . . .WFFn):
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if all of JWFF1KMg,k (c),
JWFF2KMU(WFF2,g),U(WFF2,k) (U(WFF2, c)), . . . ,
JWFFnKMU(WFFn,g),U(WFFn,k) (U(WFFn, c)) are 1;
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(WFFn, g); U(A, c) = U(WFFn, c); U(A, k) = U(WFFn, k)
(7.27) Case A = (equivWFF1 . . .WFFn):
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if all of JWFF1KMg,k (c),
JWFF2KMU(WFF2,g),U(WFF2,k) (U(WFF2, c)), . . . ,
JWFFnKMU(WFFn,g),U(WFFn,k) (U(WFFn, c)) yield the same value;
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(WFFn, g); U(A, c) = U(WFFn, c); U(A, k) = U(WFFn, k)
(7.28) Case A = (impliesWFF1 . . .WFFn):
JAKMg,k (c) =


0 if JWFF1KMg,k (c) = 1
and one of JWFF2KMU(WFF2,g),U(WFF2,k) (U(WFF2, c)), . . . ,
JWFFnKMU(WFFn,g),U(WFFn,k) (U(WFFn, c)) is 0;
1 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(WFFn, g); U(A, c) = U(WFFn, c); U(A, k) = U(WFFn, k)
(7.29) Case A = (notWFF1 . . .WFFn):
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if one or more of JWFF1KMg,k (c),
JWFF2KMU(WFF2,g),U(WFF2,k) (U(WFF2, c)), . . . ,
JWFFnKMU(WFFn,g),U(WFFn,k) (U(WFFn, c)) is 0;
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(WFFn, g); U(A, c) = U(WFFn, c); U(A, k) = U(WFFn, k)
(7.30) Case A = QHDMSQ or A = (QHDMSQ),
where QHD = (forall*VAR)
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if for all h ≈VAR g : JMSQKMh,k (c) = 1
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(MSQ, h); U(A, c) = U(MSQ, c); U(A, k) = U(MSQ, k)
(7.31) Case A = QHDMSQ or A = (QHDMSQ),
where QHD = (exists*VAR)
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if there is a h ≈VAR g : JMSQKMh,k (c) = 1
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(MSQ, h); U(A, c) = U(MSQ, c); U(A, k) = U(MSQ, k)
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(7.32) Case A = QHDMSQ2 or A = (QHDMSQ2),
where QHD = (iota*VARMSQ1)
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if there is exactly one h ≈VAR g such that
JMSQ1KMh,k (c) = 1, and for this h :
JMSQ2KMh,k (c) = 1;
0 otherwise
U(A, g) = U(MSQ2, h); U(A, c) = U(MSQ2, c); U(A, k) = U(MSQ2, k)
The definitions on sequences are admittedly a bit clumsy, but the idea behind them is simple:
A parameter or assignment is updated by a sequence of formulas by taking the update of it by
the first formula as the input for updating the second formula, and so on until all formulas have
been processed from left to right.2
7.2.3 Some Technical Remarks
There is some subtle points in the above formalism. Consider a predicate rain that only takes a
context variable as argument. In a rather simple model M let K = {k}, C = {c, c1, c2, c3} and
the following be the case.
JrainKMg,k (c) = {c1, c2, c3} (7.33)
[1] The time of the rain events is not given by any of the contexts of utterance alone. It is
given by the time mapping function, which is short for event time. In the above model, it rains
at time(c1, k), time(c2, k), and time(c3, k). The same holds for the respective places. It rains
only at place(c1, k), place(c2, k), and place(c3, k). These mapping functions yield the time and
place of the described event, where event is taken in a very broad sense and doesn’t presuppose
any special event ontology, but is rather a loose way of talking about truth or falsity of formulas
relativized to times, worlds, and places. The other mapping functions retrieve values like the
reference time according to Reichenbach’s S-R-E scheme. An event’s world is retrieved by the
world function.
[2] In the same context of utterance a FOLC expression can have different truth-values, if
it is evaluated with respect to different conversational contexts. For example, time(c, k) and
time(c, k′) can yield different times. This is the case if k and k′ have different underlying cal-
endric systems or origins, or when they use different standards of precision or measurement.
The equality conditions between such different representations and the actual implementation
of time intervals (with or without margins of error, etc.) and places are left open.
[3] Conceptually, it is the context of utterance, the concrete utterance situation, that intro-
duces the time and place of the deictic center. So utime and uplace depend mainly on utterance
2As an alternative to the above rules FOLC semantics could be given by a translation function that translates FOLC
formulas, C, K, and assignments g into formulas of first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory
and functions. This would be simpler than the above definitions, but would also make additions in subsequent sections
hard to read, since these would need to be given as extensions to the translation function.
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contexts; subsidiary factors like the calendric time system in use or the way of describing places
require additional dependency on the conversational context. Likewise, utterances take place
in the actual world, and so world usually mainly depends on the given c, but since this doesn’t
hold in some narrative contexts the function also has to depend on conversational contexts. Vice
versa, for example rtime yields the reference time and so mainly depends on the conversational
context, but may still change from utterance to utterance.
[4] Most of the available mappings are never needed and only included to avoid using partial
functions. For example, if a past time is introduced by one of the tense binders below, this will
be done by putting constraints on some new time-variant c2 of a given context c1. In the same
conversational context, this c2 will then have some associated utterance time utime(c2, k), but in
reality there might not have been any utterance at the described past event, and so this time will
simply not be used and might have no reasonable informal interpretation. To avoid this overhead
the mappings could be defined as partial functions on admissible pairs c, k only, i.e. the context
pairs that can occur as designated parameters. However, this is not done here for simplicity.
[5] The c parameter will only be used on very few occasions, implicitly in a few definitions of
special predicates and by the open context variable convention. It is a designated reference point
on which egocentric expressions depend. From the fact that it is an argument to the interpreta-
tion function it ought not be deduced that the semantic value of many FOLC expressions actually
varies in dependence of it. The few predicates depending implicitly on c could be changed to hav-
ing another context variable argument place, and then only the interpretation of open variables
would have to take into account the context of utterance as a reference point. Then 7.14–7.16
could be redefined as taking no arguments in C. The k parameter, on the other hand, is more
than a designated reference point, since many predicates depend on the conversational context
because of their inherent vagueness, and there are no terms for this kind of context available in
the object language. It is also dispensable from a technical point of view: Since it will not be
shifted by operators, except for one reading of «actually» below, the parameter could be dropped
in favor of considering different models. It visually indicates when two formula sequences are
interpreted with respect to the same conversational context, and that is one reason to keep it.
From a more philosophical perspective the eliminability issue will be addressed again in section
7.7.1.
[6] Strictly speaking the inner negation form of a predicate would have to be characterized
in any intended reading, definition, or abbreviation in addition to the positive form. This will not
be done in general here, since the respective reading of the inner negation form should be clear
from the specification of the corresponding positive form. In predicates stipulated for technical
reasons, as in the definition of binders below, the corresponding inner negation form usually is
neglectable, because the binder only has a positive reading. In other cases like the existence
predicate the inner negation simply has the intended reading that the property or relation ex-
pressed by the predicate is clearly and without doubt denied of the object(s) in question in the
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given context of utterance and conversational context.
[7] Expressing all constraints and semantic rules in the object language would be desirable
from a logical point of view, but since foundational issues like defineability are not the main
concern here, semantic constraints are used in many places. The chosen mix of object-language
abbreviations and semantic rules using mapping functions is a tradeoff between ‘cleanliness’ and
readability.
7.2.4 Auxiliary Notions
In order to make practical use of FOLC, a number of auxiliary definitions and model restrictions
are needed. Before definitions are introduced, let us adopt the following useful interpretation
guideline.
P Constraint 3 (Open Context Variable Convention). A proper assignment evaluates all context
variables, that are free in a sequence of formulas given to the interpretation function, to the currently
given context parameter. By convention, only input sequences A, models, and context parameters
such that g in JAKMg,k (c) is a proper assignment are taken into account.
Moreover, the following terminological conventions will be adopted. Actual are pairs of con-
texts c, k for which world(c, k) is the actual world. Some relations and predicates can have
meaning rules that only hold if their first argument evaluates to some c such that world(c, k) is
actual in the given conversational context k. Sometimes the phrase φ according to c for some non-
actual context parameter c (in combination with the given k) will be used in order to indicate
that the interpretation of φ depends on the interpretation of the modality by whose accessibility
relation c has been reached.
Also needed is an existence predicate. This will in FOLC express existence of something at
a world, time, and some place. While in an actualist system the inner negation of the existence
predicate would have to be false as long as the term in the object argument place denotes, this
is not the case in a possibilist system. Thus, the existence predicate in FOLC has no logical
properties, i.e. it behaves just like any other predicate.
P Intended Reading 1 (Canonical Existence).
exist ∈ PRED2 (7.34)
〈c1, a〉 ∈ J exist KMg,k (c) is interpreted as: (Case 1) if c1, k are actual: in k, a exists at world(c1, k),
time(c1, k) in place(c1, k); (Case 2) c1, k are non-actual: a exists according to c1 in k.
Hereby, according to c1 can for example mean that a has to exist according to what Alice
believes in case c1 has been reached by a belief accessibility relation, or has to exist according
to what could conceivably exist if c1 has been reached by some epistemic modal accessibility
relation. There is nothing special about the corresponding relativized quantifiers:
P Abbreviation 2 (Relativized Existential Quantifier).
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( e x i s t s [CVAR] VAR) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s * VAR) ( e x i s t [CVAR] VAR) MSQ
P Abbreviation 3 (Relativized Universal Quantifier).
( f o r a l l [CVAR] VAR) MSQ
:= ( f o r a l l * VAR) ( impl ie s ( e x i s t [CVAR] VAR) MSQ)
P Abbreviation 4 (Relativized Iota Quantifier).
( iota [CVAR] VAR MSQ
1
) MSQ
2
:= ( iota * VAR ( e x i s t [CVAR] VAR) MSQ1 ) MSQ2
In addition to existence some equality predicate is needed; the following weak equality will
be used.
P Intended Reading 2 (Equality).
= ∈ PRED3 (7.35)
〈c1, a, b〉 ∈ J=KMg,k (c) (7.36)
is interpreted as: a is equal to b according to c1 in k
The symbol 6= is used for the inner negation form of this predicate. In contrast to the above
weak equality, strict identity can be defined as follows.
JidKMg,k (c) = C × {(a, a) | a ∈ (C ∪D)} (7.37)
Although in many cases = should be read as strict identity, this will not generally be presumed
here. Finally, the following abbreviation is convenient for making use of NTPT.
P Abbreviation 5 (? Symbol).
(?PRED VAR1 . . . VARn )
:= (and (not (PRED VAR1 . . . VARn ))
(not (−PRED VAR1 . . . VARn ) ) )
Informally, a predicative clause with a question mark in front of the predicate indicates that it
can neither be denied that some object has a certain property or some objects stand in a certain
relation to each other nor can this be asserted without any doubt. So this is the ‘third case’
that non-traditional predication theory allows without giving up the principle of bivalence. This
third case allows us to deal with vagueness to some extent, but it should be mentioned that
nothing in the following discussion of indexicals will hinge on non-traditional predication theory
in particular. Intuitionists can deal with vagueness in a similar fashion by giving up the principle
of bivalence, and classical predicate logic can deal with indexicals as well, though under some
higher degree of idealization.
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7.2.5 Modalities
Instead of modal operators, binders will be used. Each definition of a binder involves two steps.
First, FOLC models have to be restricted to the intended reading of the accessibility relation
of the modality in question. Second, the syntactic abbreviation as a binder is given in order to
facilitate work with the respective modality. Binders for alethic modalities are defined as follows.
P Constraint 4 (S5 Accessibility for Alethic Modalities). The accessibility relation of Pos and Nec
is Rn ∈ PRED2, where the second argument must be in CVAR as well. It is interpreted as a reflexive,
symmetric, and transitive relation, and any pair 〈c, c′〉 can only be in this relation if c 'w c′.
P Abbreviation 6 (Modal Binders). Alethic modalities are encoded as context binders.
(Nec [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( f o r a l l * CVAR2 ) ( impl ie s (Rn [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 ) MSQ)
(Pos [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s * CVAR2 ) (Rn [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 ) MSQ
The following constraints and definitions define belief as a binder based on an accessibility
relation between two contexts and a speaker.
P Definition 5 (Speakers). The set of speakers is a subset of the domain S ⊂ D.
P Constraint 5 (KD45 Belief Accessibility). The accessibility relation for believe is Rb ∈ PRED3,
where the second argument is in CVAR, the third argument is in DTERM and for the latter it must
be the case that JDTERMKM ∈ S, for any assignment and context. Belief accessibility is serial,
transitive, and Euclidean in the first two argument places, and a tuple 〈c, c′, a〉 can only be in this
relation if c 'w c′.
P Abbreviation 7 (Belief Binder). Belief is encoded as a context binder.
( b e l i e v e [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 DTERM) MSQ
:= ( f o r a l l * CVAR2 )( impl ie s (Rb [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 DTERM) MSQ)
As an example of the use of these binders, consider 7.38 and its de dicto analysis 7.39.3
(7.38) Alice: Alice believes that it is possible that Bob loves Carol.
(7.39) (iota SUBJ (Alice SUBJ)) (believe C1 SUBJ)
(iota C1 . SUBJ2 (Bob C1 SUBJ2)) (iota C1 . DO (Carol C1 DO)) (Pos C1 C2)
(love C2 SUBJ2 DO)
Other rational attitudes can be defined in the same way.
3Proper names in the following and all subsequent examples are analyzed using the existence-relativized iota quanti-
fier and thus express their existence presupposition. In cases like «Aristotle» or «Superman» this isn’t adequate, and then
iota* has to be used instead.
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7.2.6 Tense Binders
In order to examine the interplay between temporal indexicals and tense, Comrie’s tenses from
table 5.2 are needed.4 These have to be defined on some temporal ordering relations. Since the
actual implementation of time intervals and calendric dates would lead far apart, we will make
only minimal assumptions. Let x v y have the reading x is a subinterval of y, x < y have the
reading x is before y, and x > y be the converse of the latter. The following correspondences of
mapping functions with Reichenbach’s S-R-E scheme are assumed.
• The Speech Time S is given by time(c, k) of the currently active contexts c, k.
• The Event Time E is time(c, k) of a context c introduced by some existential quantifier.
• The Reference Time R is given by rtime(c, k) of the currently active contexts c, k.
Additionally, the utterance time is given by utime(c, k) of the currently active contexts c, k;
this is the time at which the actual utterance takes place. On the basis of these intended inter-
pretations the following egocentricity constraint should hold.
P Constraint 6 (Egocentricity of Time of Speech).
For any c, k :
utime(c, k) v time(c, k) (7.40)
This constraint has been given separately, because it seems to be (a) language dependent
and (b) might not hold in narrative or other non-canonical conversational contexts. Under the
assumption that it holds, the condition for the absolute present tense below will stipulate that
the time of the described event must be within the speech time and the actual utterance must
occur within the speech time as well, but the described event may or may not occur while the
utterance is made. The definitions of the other absolute tenses are likewise straightforward.
P Constraint 7 (Present).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JpresKMg,k (c) (7.41)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) v time(c, k)
P Constraint 8 (Past).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JpastKMg,k (c) (7.42)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) < time(c, k)
P Constraint 9 (Future).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JfutKMg,k (c) (7.43)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) > time(c, k)
4See page 122 of section 5.3.3, chapter 5.
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P Abbreviation 8 (Basic Absolute Tenses).
( Pres [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s * CVAR2 )
( p r e s [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 )
MSQ
( Past [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s * CVAR2 )
( pa s t [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 )
MSQ
(Fut [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s * CVAR2 )
( f u t [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 )
MSQ
The relative tenses work the same way, but on the basis of the reference time of the active
conversational context.
P Constraint 10 (Relative Present).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ J relpres KMg,k (c) (7.44)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) v rtime(c, k)
P Constraint 11 (Relative Future).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ J relfut KMg,k (c) (7.45)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) > rtime(c, k)
P Constraint 12 (Relative Past).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ J relpast KMg,k (c) (7.46)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) < rtime(c, k)
P Abbreviation 9 (Basic Relative Tenses). RelPres, RelFut, and RelPast are abbreviated as in 8 but
on the basis of Constraints 10–12.
The abbreviations of the complex tenses can be read off the table on page 122 almost directly
and are included here mainly for the sake of systematicity.
P Constraint 13 (PluPerfect).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JpluperfKMg,k (c) (7.47)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) < rtime(c, k) < time(c, k)
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P Constraint 14 (Future Perfect).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ J futperf KMg,k (c) (7.48)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) < rtime(c, k) and rtime(c, k) > time(c, k)
P Constraint 15 (Future in the Future).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ J futfut KMg,k (c) (7.49)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) > rtime(c, k) > time(c, k)
P Constraint 16 (Future in the Past).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ J futpastKMg,k (c) (7.50)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) > rtime(c, k) and rtime(c, k) < time(c, k)
P Abbreviation 10 (Complex Tense Binders). The complex tense binders PluPerf, FutPerf, FutFut,
FutPast are implemented in the same way as 8 but on the basis of Constraints 13–16.
All of these translations from Comrie’s scheme are approximations, since they don’t take into
account possible more fine-grained structure of intervals in the constraints, such as allowing or
disallowing overlapping intervals. To deal with temporal quantifier expressions like «whenever»
or «always» a larger interval depending on the conversational context is needed to constrain the
quantifier’s maximum range, but since no such expressions are analyzed in the following, this is
ignored for simplicity. For present purposes, the above schemes should suffice.
7.3 The Deictic Center
Now that the basic framework has been laid out it is time to take a look at how indexical reference
can be expressed in that language. Hereby, a descriptive theory of indexical reference will be
assumed, as it has been introduced in the previous chapters. Notice that the descriptive content
of the binders defined below is sometimes rather given by the intended interpretation of the
mapping functions and corresponding semantic rules than just by the intended interpretation of
object language predicates.
7.3.1 Now
Although languages like Burmese according to Comrie (1985) have no grammaticalized tenses
and in languages like Mandarin tense particles are often left out, temporal indexicals can, for
the sake of simplicity, be assumed to modify a time introduced by some formal tense binder,
no matter whether there is a corresponding source language expression for the tense or not.5
English «now» in this view modifies the event time introduced by the English present tense. As
in earlier definitions, we first introduce a special predicate.
5Burmese (mya) is a Sino-Tibetan language spoken by approximately 32 million speakers in Myanmar and neigh-
boring regions, Mandarin (cmn) is a Sino-Tibetan language of China with a population of approximately 873 million
speakers (Gordon 2005).
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P Constraint 17 (now Special Predicate).
now ∈ PRED2, where all arguments are in CVAR (7.51)
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JnowKMg,k (c) (7.52)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and utime(c′, k) v time(c′′, k) v time(c′, k)
N.B. the use of if instead of if and only if; the constraint is formulated as a meaning rule,
because some speakers might have a specific time interval in mind. Here is the respective binder.
P Abbreviation 11 (Jetzt Binder). ( J e t z t [CVAR0 ] . CVAR1 ) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s CVAR1 ) (now [CVAR0 ] . CVAR1 ) MSQ
This binder isn’t rigid by default and can thus be used to give a past reading of German
«jetzt», deviate past tense readings of «now», and readings of «then».6 To express restrictions on
the use of «now» in English we need a constraint on the syntax–semantics interface.
P Hypothesis 1 («now» Constraint). English «now» is analyzed as FOLC sequence (Jetzt C1 . C2),
where C1 must be bound by a present or past tense binder. Binding to a past context c in some k is
only possible when k is a narrative conversational context.
This vague hypothesis at least excludes non-rigid interpretations of «now» in combination
with future tenses and limits the past tense use of «now» to narrative contexts. A similar con-
straint for «then» could say that it may only be used in combination with the past tense, but may
not be used with a present or future tense. Such hypotheses need empirical backup, and in a
more detailed account clear criteria for deciding between narrative and non-narrative conversa-
tional contexts would have to be given in order to make Hypothesis 1 falsifiable. For the present
purpose of outlining how center indexicals work in general, these language-specific details are
omitted. What counts is that the above constraint is an empirical hypothesis.
Based on the above definitions the past tense examples 5.49–5.51 from chapter 5 (page 123)
yield the following in FOLC.
(7.53) M, g, c, k 
( iota X ( A l i c e X)) ( Past C1)(Now C1 . C2)( angry C2 . X)
This says that there is someone x called «Alice», there is a time t which is before the time
of speech determined by c and k, and x was angry at t (according to k), during which there is
a designated utterance time given by utime. The use of utime in this context is stipulative and
not imposing any logical restrictions. It doesn’t indicate that an actual utterance occurred. This
is intended, since the past use of «now» is indeed not very restricting. It just indicates a certain
designated time in the past occurring within a larger series of events. In contrast to this, in the
following canonical use of «now» with the present tense, utime must really provide the time of
utterance.
6See 5.50 and 5.51 on page 123.
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hard work no hard work
speech time
utterance
Figure 7.1: Egocentricity of «now» versus bare present tense in example 7.56.
(7.54) Alice now believes that Bob was angry.
(7.55) M, g, c, k 
( iota X ( A l i c e X))
( Pres C1)
( Je tz t C1 . C2)
( bel ieve C2 . C3 X)
( Past C3 . C4)
( iota Y (Bob Y))
( angry C4 . Y)
Notice that present tense alone by Constraint 7.40 only requires the utterance to occur during
the time of speech. In contrast to this, the use of «now» requires the utterance to occur during
event time. This allows a FOLC analysis of following sentence to become true, as illustrated in
Figure 7.1.7
(7.56) Alice works hard, but not now.
7.3.2 Here
In the spatial domain, heavier idealizations and more stipulations have to be made, since reified
places may stand for rather complicated objects in the real world like rivers, hills, rooms, cities,
palms, or universes. The conversational context determines a place given by time(c, k) in which
the event, state, or situation talked about takes place, and the space occupied by here must be
part of that space. A mereological part-of relation is needed, and p1 2 p2 will be used to denote
this relation with the reading p1 is a part of p2. This relation is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and
transitive. Even when «here» is not used, the place of utterance will often be part of the place of
the described event, as in the following example.
7Possibly the present tense in this case has a more generic reading as in Alice usually works hard, but she doesn’t work
hard now. If so, this would require an entirely different analysis. If all examples like 7.56 were to be read in this generic
way, then ordinary, non-generic present tense and «now» might eventually collapse and both be egocentric, but unless
this is shown in detail, the above analysis seems to be an adequate working assumption.
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(7.57) Situation: Alice in Copenhagen is talking on the phone to Bob in Aarhus.
Bob: How’s the weather?
Alice: It is raining.
But on the other hand the constraint is clearly not mandatory. Consider for example, the
following variation of the above dialog.
(7.58) Situation: Alice in Copenhagen is talking on the phone to Bob in Aarhus.
Bob: I’m so busy with work, I don’t even know whether the sun is shining outside or not.
Alice: It is raining. I’ve seen the weather report for Aarhus.
Such a non-egocentric reading is not possible if «here» is used, i.e. «here» is strictly egocentric.
Again, the following utterance can become true in some models.
(7.59) Alice: It is raining, but not here.
Although the mapping functions for places have been given the same names as those for
times, their role differs and depends on the domain. In the spatial domain rplace(c, k) is inter-
preted as the larger reference place in which the actual raining event occurs, whereas place(c, k) is
the place of the actual raining event. The mapping functions aren’t used in exact analogy to the
temporal domain, because in the temporal domain tense always introduces a new time variant,
and so there’s always an additional time variant available. In contrast to this, at least in English
there is no obligatory binder for places.
Given that the place of utterance is uplace(c, k), the condition for «here» is as follows.
P Constraint 18 (here Special Predicate).
here ∈ PRED2, where all arguments are in CVAR (7.60)
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JhereKMg,k (c) (7.61)
then c′ 'kp c
′′ and uplace(c, k) 2 place(c′′, k) 2 rplace(c, k)
As before, some syntactic sugar may be added for better readability.
P Abbreviation 12 (Here Binder). (Here [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s CVAR2 ) ( here [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 ) MSQ
The following example illustrates the possible difference between an utterance involving
‹here› and one without.
(7.62) Alice (in Copenhagen): It is raining here.
M, g, c, k  (Pres C1) (Here C1 . C2) (rain C2)
(7.63) Alice (in Copenhagen): It is raining.
M, g, c, k  (Pres C1) (rain C1)
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Example 7.62 expresses the spatial constraint uplace(c, k) 2 place(c2, k) 2 rplace(c, k) for
g(C2) = c2, where uplace(c, k) is the place of utterance, i.e. the concrete location of the sender.
7.63 doesn’t express this spatial constraint, because when «here» is not used it is possible that
uplace(c, k) 62 place(c, k). One remark on these places is necessary. Although in principle dis-
pensable, the reference place is a reasonable stipulation. It is the place which discourse partici-
pants have in mind and which remains stable during a larger discourse fragment. In the above
case, this could for example be Denmark. To make sense of the reference place the following
constraint has to hold.
P Constraint 19 (Reference Place).
For any c, k : place(c, k) 2 rplace(c, k) (7.64)
It can then sometimes be the required, within some fragment of discourse, that for sev-
eral subsequent utterances c1, c2, . . . , cn it holds that rplace(c1, k) = rplace(c2, k) = · · · =
rplace(cn, k). The places of the individual events described might differ, but they still have to be
within the reference place. So for example if Alice and Bob continue their conversation about
the weather (in Denmark), and Alice suddenly mentions that there was a cyclone, this utterance
can be false even if there was indeed a cyclone somewhere near Papua New-Guinea. However,
the stability requirement on rplace is pragmatic and the actual socio-linguistic rules governing
such requirements are far beyond the scope of this investigation. Still, it should be clear that if
someone says «There is no more pudding left» this rarely means that there is no more pudding
left in the known universe.
7.3.3 I
As noted in chapter 5, «I» like many other indexicals in the person domain isn’t particularly
ambiguous or vague. A mapping function speaker(c, k) : C × K → S is added to Σ, but the
result of this function will usually only change with its first argument; only in derived uses of «I»
will it depend on the conversational context. The corresponding special predicate in the object
language is based on this mapping function:
P Constraint 20 (Speaker).
Speaker ∈ PRED2, where the last argument is in DVAR (7.65)
〈c′, a〉 ∈ JSpeakerKMg,k (c) (7.66)
iff speaker(c′, k) = a
P Abbreviation 13 (I Binder). ( I [CVAR] . DVAR) MSQ
:= ( iota DVAR) ( Speaker [CVAR] . DVAR) MSQ
A typical use of this binder is as follows.
(7.67) Alice: I’m hungry.
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(7.68) M, g, c, k  (Pres C1)(I X)(hungry C1 . X)
Applying the open variable convention, this is true if speaker(c, k) is hungry in some subin-
terval of the time of speech. I could also depend on an introduced context of utterance, when
the variable at its context argument place is bound. This possibility has been admitted to ease
illustrating potentially non-rigid interpretations of «I»-tokens in section 8.2.3 of the next chapter.
7.3.4 Actually
If «actually» is read as a modal actuality operator its interpretation can’t be analogous to that of
the previous center indexicals. The actual world in the sense of the world how it has evolved in
fact, as opposed to how it could have conceivably—or in any other sense possibly—evolved, is
a matter of reality. But then, a fortiori, it should not depend on the context of utterance either,
which may change from token to token. So we face a certain dilemma. A compromise is to
implement the actuality operator using world(c, k), but at the meantime stipulate that the world
component remains stable under normal conditions in non-narrative conversational contexts.
Following the previous definitions, a special predicate actually is used.
P Constraint 21 (actually Special Predicate).
actually ∈ PRED2, where the last argument is in CVAR (7.69)
〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JactuallyKMg,k (c) (7.70)
iff c′ 'kw c
′′ and world(c′′, k) = world(c, k)
P Abbreviation 14 (Actually Binder). ( Actual ly [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( iota CVAR2 ) ( a c t u a l l y [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 ) MSQ
As mentioned in chapter 5, there is other uses of «actually». Consider for example the follow-
ing short dialog.
(7.71) Alice: Wow, this zeppelin is big!
Bob: Actually it’s quite small. The Hindenburg was 5 times larger.
This can be regarded a shift in conversational contexts. While the first utterance may be true
in some conversational context k, Bob considers this context inappropriate. «Actually» indicates
to Alice a shift from k to another conversational context k′, the one of comparing zeppelins with
other well-known zeppelins, making her original utterance false and Bob’s utterance true if Bob
is right. To express this formally, a function kontext : S × C → K is added to Σ, and then the
following operator can be used.8
P Definition 6 (Actually Operator).
Act ∈ SOP (7.72)
8The dependency on C might seem redundant at first glance, but is needed, because the same speaker might presume
differing conversational contexts at different occasions.
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For A = ActMSQ :
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if JMSQKMg,k′ (c) = 1,
where k′ = kontext(speaker(c, k), c);
0 otherwise
(7.73)
U(A, g) = U(MSQ, h);U(A, c) = U(MSQ, c);U(A, k) = U(MSQ, k′)
7.4 Complex Indicators
The complex tenses introduced above are already examples of complex indicators. Some more
examples will be given in this section. They represent a more or less arbitrary selection of com-
mon complex indicators in order to exemplify how these can be analyzed in the given framework.
7.4.1 Example: yesterday
English «yesterday» is a paradigmatic example of a complex calendric egocentric indicator. It
can be modeled in two ways: (A) Yesterday is the day before the day of the time of speech. (B)
Yesterday is the day before the day of the time of utterance. As the following example shows,
both readings are possible.
(7.74) Situation: It’s 1st March 2006, 0:06 h.
Alice: Yesterday, I was at the cinema.
According to the pedantic reading, this is true if Alice was at some cinema on 28th February,
2006. According to the preferred loose reading, this is true if Alice was at some cinema on
27th February, 2006. (B) only predicts the pedantic reading and is therefore less adequate. (A)
predicts both readings if the time of speech is taken large enough to stretch from the end of
28.2.2006 to the very beginning of 1.3.2006 and given that either the start or the end of an
interval may be taken for determining the day in question when it stretches over a calendric day
boundary.9 The following definition is therefore based on account A.
P Definition 7 (yesterday Special Predicate).
yesterday ∈ PRED2, where both arguments are in CVAR (7.75)
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JyesterdayKMg,k (c) (7.76)
then c′ 'kt c
′′, day(time(c′, k)) = day(time(c′′, k)), (7.77)
and day(time(c, k))− day(time(c′′, k)) = 1 day
Of course, modulo arithmetics based on calendric units is assumed in the above date calcula-
tions. The corresponding binder is abbreviated as usual.
9Cf. 5.3.3. In everyday speech calendric boundaries often collide with personal ad hoc boundaries that are more
appropriate in the given conversational context. Sometimes for people that stay up long the evening of the previous day
stretches into the morning of the people that have to get up early.
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P Abbreviation 15 (Yesterday Binder). ( Yesterday CVAR1 CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s * CVAR2 )( y e s t e r day CVAR1 CVAR2 ) MSQ
The analysans for «tomorrow» is the same as above except that the result of the calculation
must be −1 day. The restriction on the day of the event time leaves it open how long the event
time is or where in the day that interval is situated, since this is a matter of aspect and the kind
of event described, and not of the temporal adverb. Here is the analysis of 7.74, where the
phrase «being at the cinema» is read in a generic sense and it is assumed that place= expresses
that place(c1, k) is sufficiently similar to place(c2, k) in k for two given contexts g(C1) = c1 and
g(C2) = c2.
(7.78) M, g, c, k 
( Past C1)( Yesterday C1 C2)( I SUBJ)
( ex i s t s * C3)(Cinema C3)( p lace= C2 C3)( be C3 . SUBJ)
The expression «to be at the cinema» in this reading is a phraseologism according to which
«the cinema» has a generic reading and «to be» doesn’t mean mere existence but some activity
extended in time. The above use of (Cinema C3) might look a bit dubious. This stems from
the fact that English isn’t sorted in the same sense as FOLC is sorted into context terms and
terms for other objects. An English speaker may quantify freely over times and places just as he
may quantify over cars or socks. The strong sorting of FOLC into object and context terms is a
convenience for the user of the target language, not a feature of the source language.
7.4.2 Example: the former president
The definite description «the former president» can be read as a compound indicator saying the
one and only person that was president but is no longer president now, where the fact that this
person is no longer president is presuppositional, as it is for example preserved under negation.
Definite descriptions like this show that past time intervals are often bounded and definite; 7.79
presupposes that there is exactly one definite former president, and therefore it is also a definite
past period of presidency the speaker has in mind.
(7.79) The former president is drunk.
This can be mapped to FOLC by assuming, in the syntax–semantics interface in combination
with the lexicon, that «former» modifies a noun by using the Past and Jetzt binders NP-internally.
(7.80) M, g, c, k 
( Pres C1)
( iota SUBJ ( Past C2)( pre s ident C2 . SUBJ)
( Je tz t C3)(− pre s ident C3 . SUBJ))
( drunk C1 . SUBJ)
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There is, however, a problem with this analysis. When used with the past tense as in 7.81,
there is a reading according to which the person in question is a former president in the past,
not just a former president now.
(7.81) The former president was drunk.
This is a similar kind of reading as can be observed for «now» plus past tense. It seems to
be the indirect result of the fact that the narrative time itself is in the past, i.e. that a story is
told about some chain of events that have happened in the past, rather than «former» having
a pluperfect reading on its own. Otherwise 7.79 should have a reading according to which the
person in question had been president before some time in the past that is not mentioned and
is drunk now, but no such reading seems to be available. One solution is to make the temporal
ordering relation available in the object language.
P Definition 8 (earlier).
earlier ∈ PRED2, where the second argument is in CVAR (7.82)
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ J earlier KMg,k (c) (7.83)
then time(c′′, k) < time(c′, k)
Notice that the order of arguments is the reverse of the ordinary reading, because the first
argument is optional. 7.81 is then mapped to:
(7.84) M, g, c, k 
( Past C1)
( iota SUBJ ( ex i s t s * C2)( e a r l i e r C1 . C2)
( pr e s ident C2 . SUBJ)
(−pre s ident C1 . SUBJ))
( drunk C1 . SUBJ)
This analysis suggests that there is also a reading of 7.85 according to which the person in
question may now still be president. This reading is apparently possible in addition to the first
reading according to which the person in question is now no longer president, as in 7.80, and
will be drunk later.
(7.85) The former president will be drunk.
Only in the first reading is «the former president» egocentric.
7.4.3 Example: we
The indicator «we» is a typical example of a semantically complex indicator in the person domain.
As laid out in chapter 5, it can have inclusive or exclusive reading. To get the respective readings
in the object language, some new mapping functions in Σ have to be introduced. The following
addr function is also needed for the second person indicators.
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P Definition 9 (Addressee Function).
addr : C ×K → ℘(S) (7.86)
P Definition 10 (Speaker Group Function).
sgroup : C ×K → ℘(S) (7.87)
P Constraint 22 (Mutually Distinct Addressee and Speaker Groups).
∀c ∈ C ∀k ∈ K :
speaker(c) /∈ addr(c, k) (7.88)
addr(c, k) ∩ sgroup(c, k) = ∅ (7.89)
7.88 is not strictly necessary, because there is no English pronoun that would solely refer to
the speaker group, but added to make the abbreviations in the object language more explicit.
Once again binders will be introduced on the basis of special predicates. To decide inclusive
from exclusive reading, the Telugu pronouns «manamu» (inclusive we) and «memu» (exclusive
we) are used as symbols.10
P Definition 11 (Addressee Predicate).
Addressee ∈ PRED2, where the second argument is in DVAR (7.90)
〈c′, a〉 ∈ JAddresseeKMg,k (c) (7.91)
iff. a ∈ addr(c′, k)
P Definition 12 (SpeakerGroup Predicate).
SpeakerGroup ∈ PRED2, where the second argument is in DVAR (7.92)
〈c′, a〉 ∈ JSpeakerGroupKMg,k (c) (7.93)
iff. a ∈ sgroup(c′, k)
Here are the respective binders:
P Abbreviation 16 (Inclusive We Binder).
(Manamu [CVAR] DVAR) MSQ
:= ( f o r a l l [CVAR] DVAR)
( impl ie s (or ( Speaker [CVAR] DVAR)
( SpeakerGroup [CVAR] DVAR)
( Addr e s s e e [CVAR] DVAR))
MSQ)
10Telugu (tel) is a Dravidian language spoken by roughly 69.7 million speakers in Andhra Pradesh, India (Gordon
2005).
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P Abbreviation 17 (Exclusive We Binder).
(Memu [CVAR] DVAR) MSQ
:= ( f o r a l l [CVAR] DVAR)
( impl ie s (and (or ( Speaker [CVAR] DVAR)
( SpeakerGroup [CVAR] DVAR))
(−Addr e s s e e [CVAR] DVAR))
MSQ)
Here is an example analysis of an utterance in which the exclusive reading of ‹we› is triggered
by ‹your› and world knowledge on the basis of Gricean maxims. The possessive pronoun «your»
is analyzed, but no abbreviation is given for it.
(7.94) Alice: We will buy your company. (exclusive we)
(7.95) M, g, c, k 
( Fut C1)
(Memu SUBJ)
( iota OBJ
(company OBJ)
( f o r a l l MOD)
( implies ( Addressee MOD) (ownedBy OBJ MOD)))
(buy C1 . SUBJ OBJ)
7.4.4 Example: the left entrance
The phrase «the left entrance» is an example of a compound and complex spatial indicator:
(7.96) Alice (to Bob, both facing a building): The left entrance was locked.
This definite description is egocentric in the above example at least in its preferred reading:
It specifies a spatial relation between the speaker Alice, who isn’t mentioned in the utterance,
and the entrance. So it can be expressed as follows in an intended FOLC modelM .
(7.97) M, g, c, k 
( Past C1)
( iota C1 . SUBJ
( iota X ( Speaker X))
(and ( entrance C1 . SUBJ)( l e f tO f SUBJ X)) )
( locked C1 . SUBJ)
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At least in the above reading the definite description is non-rigid with respect to time except
for the speaker predicate. The entrance is picked out that existed then, at the event time specified
by the past tense, at the location that is now to the left side of the body axis in relation to
where the speaker is facing now, no matter whether this entrance still exists or not.11 If the
entrance no longer exists, the definite determiner requires that the former entrance must have
been introduced into discourse before, but that is another matter.
7.5 Demonstratives
As laid out in (Ind 3) on page 131, a demonstrative’s lexical meaning in combination with a
pointing gesture determines the semantic referent. There is no principal difference between the
FOLC treatment of demonstratives to the one in double-index theories. The pointing gesture
must be encoded in some way in the target language and in addition to the lexical meaning of
the respective demonstrative determines a semantic referent uniquely.
7.5.1 Example: this and that
The following utterance is a good example of the opposition between «this» and «that» and the
minimal adequacy requirement that two demonstrative tokens of the same type must be able to
have two different semantic referents. For sake of simplicity, the ellipsis and the contrastivity of
«but» will be ignored.
(5.7) This−−→1 is different from that−−→, but this−→2 isn’t.
There are several ways to deal with multiple tokens of the same type within one utterance:
1. Each token is given an index and treated like an expression of its own. This solution is
already rejected by Kaplan (1989), because it doesn’t do justice to the use of pointing
gestures.
2. The target language itself allows reference to tokens and the formulation of token-reflexive
reference rules. This is technically feasible only if definitions that lead to contradictions,
like the Liar Paradox, are excluded.
3. Each pointing gesture is stipulated in the target language. This is perhaps the most sat-
isfying account from a philosophical point of view, since it makes the extralinguistic re-
quirement explicit; properly understanding two tokens of the same demonstrative in one
utterance requires the hearer to interpret two different pointing gestures.
4. A new context of utterance is introduced with each use of the demonstrative, and the
pointing gesture is considered part of the context. This makes sense in light of the fact that
contexts of utterance are concrete situations and under canonical circumstances occur one
after the other.
11Cf. 5.4.5 of chapter 5. Notice that the above example also has a passive reading, according to which there was
someone who locked the entrance.
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utime(c,k) utime(c′,k)
time(c,k)
time(c′,k)
Figure 7.2: Example of two consecutive utterances and associated speech times.
Both the third and the fourth method can readily be used in FOLC. We will use the fourth one,
as the third has already been exemplified in DIML. To get the desired analysis, first a generic shift
operator is needed that steps the time a little bit ahead. Here is a definition that should suffice:
P Definition 13 (NewToken Shifter).
NewToken ∈ SOP (7.98)
For A = NewTokenMSQ :
JAKMg,k (c) =


1 if JMSQKMg,k (c′) = 1,
for some c′, where c 'kt c
′,
utime(c, k) < utime(c′, k),
and utime(c′, k) v time(c, k);
0 otherwise
(7.99)
U(A, g) = U(MSQ, h);U(A, c) = U(MSQ, c′);U(A, k) = U(MSQ, k) (7.100)
One example structure fulfilling this constraint in combination with Constraint 7.40 is de-
picted in Figure 7.2. Using this operator, the FOLC version of 5.7 looks complicated, but in fact
only does so because no abbreviations for the demonstratives have been given yet:
(7.101) ( Pres C1)
( iota SUBJ ( iota X ( Speaker X))
( proximal SUBJ X)
( point ingTo X SUBJ))
( iota DO ( iota X ( Speaker X))
(−proximal DO X)
( point ingTo X DO))
( 6= C1 . SUBJ DO)
NewToken
( iota C1 . SUBJ2 ( iota X ( Speaker X))
( proximal SUBJ2 X))
( point ingTo X SUBJ2))
(not ( 6= C1 . SUBJ2 DO))
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Hereby, (proximal X Y)must have the reading X is located in the vicinity of Y and (pointingTo X Y)
must have the reading X is pointing in the direction of Y. Notice further that in the above example
the new token operator has only been applied when it was necessary. Since its definition does
ensure that the new time interval is within the speech time, it could equally well have been
applied before each target language expression that is the analysis of a particular source language
token. As a third alternative, NewToken could also be made part of the abbreviation of the
respective demonstratives. Which route is chosen depends on the syntax–semantics interface
and the nature of the source language input to it. One more thing to note about 7.101 is that the
internal structure of the demonstratives in an abbreviation requires the use of new variables. So
for example the definition of «this» looks as follows.
P Abbreviation 18 (this Binder). For new, unique variable DVAR2:
( th i s [CVAR] DVAR1 ) MSQ
:= ( iota [CVAR] DVAR1
( iota DVAR2 ( Speaker DVAR2 ))
( proximal DVAR1 DVAR2 )
( po in t in gTo DVAR2 DVAR1 )) MSQ
If there were non-rigid demonstratives, then the above use of NewToken would be inade-
quate. Instead, the definition of the respective demonstrative binder would have to take optional
variables into account and a new token binder would have to be implemented that delivers a
suitable time variant based on the previous context. But demonstratives are absolutely rigid, and
so this more general mechanism isn’t needed.
7.5.2 Example: kore, sore, are
Expressing the Japanese demonstrative system can readily be done in FOLC using the means
introduced so far. «kore» can be expressed by the this binder. Consider then the following uses
of «sore» and «are»:
(7.102) Sore−−→
That
wa
TOPIC
konpyuuta
computer
desu.
COPULA+PRES+POLITE
‘That’s a computer.’
(7.103) Are−→
That
wa
TOPIC
daigaku
university
desu.
COPULA+PRES+POLITE
‘That [building] overthere is a university.’
These demonstratives can be translated directly into FOLC provided that the respective pred-
icates are given their intended meaning.
P Abbreviation 19 (sore Binder). For new, unique variables DVAR2,DVAR3:
( sore [CVAR] DVAR1 ) MSQ
:= ( iota [CVAR] DVAR1
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( iota DVAR2 ( Speaker DVAR2 ))
( po in t in gTo DVAR2 DVAR1 )
( f o r a l l DVAR3 )
( impl ie s ( Addr e s s e e DVAR3 )
( proximal DVAR1 DVAR3 ) ) )
MSQ
P Abbreviation 20 (are Binder). For new, unique variables DVAR2,DVAR3:
(are [CVAR] DVAR1 ) MSQ
:= ( iota [CVAR] DVAR1
( iota DVAR2 ( Speaker DVAR2 ))
( po in t in gTo DVAR2 DVAR1 )
(−proximal DVAR1 DVAR2 )
( f o r a l l DVAR3 )
( impl ie s ( Addr e s s e e DVAR3 )
(−proximal DVAR1 DVAR3 ) ) )
MSQ
What matters is the mutual restrictions between proximity to speaker, proximity to addressee,
and lack of proximity to both of them that are expressed by this, sore, and are in intendedmodels.
The conditions could be made stronger by putting the additional constraints into the definitions
or by imposing model constraints instead of just relying on intended readings. It is, however,
doubtful whether these constraints hold in each and every model. For the sake of demonstrating
how demonstratives work this issue can be left open. Here is the fully expanded analysis of
example 7.103:
(7.104) M, g, c, k 
( Pres C1)
( iota C1 . SUBJ
( iota X ( Speaker X))
( point ingTo X SUBJ)
(−proximal SUBJ X)
( f o r a l l Y)
( implies ( Addressee Y)
(−proximal SUBJ Y )) )
( u n i v e r s i t y C1 . SUBJ)
Under the intended interpretation in M this means, roughly speaking, that there is a time
interval at which the utterance takes place and in the contexts c1, k at that time there is exactly
one object x that the speaker of the current context is currently pointing at and which is neither
in the vicinity of the speaker nor in the vicinity of any of the addressees in the current context
of utterance, and x is a university at the time of c1, k (present) at the place of c1, k (determined
on the basis of the utterance context in the conversational context) and in the world of c1, k (the
actual world unless k is fictional).
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7.6 Shifters
Many aspects of the systems in (von Stechow 2003) and (Schlenker 2003) concern the syntax–
semantics interface. These factors will be ignored in the following paragraphs, whose purpose
is only to give examples of how to deal with shifters in FOLC. Alternative ways of dealing with
the Amharic first-person indicator will be outlined first, whereas just one analysis is given for
the subsequent examples in the temporal domain. In principle the other alternatives could be
applied to these examples, too.
7.6.1 Example: Amharic First-Person Indicator
To start with one of Schlenker’s examples, a FOLC analysis of the shifting Amharic first-person
indicator in 5.32 will be given.12 Since Amharic first-person in the above example is indexical
when it doesn’t occur in a clause embedded by a verb of saying, it cannot just be analyzed
as a plain bound variable. There are several ways to analyze such a person shifter that make
different predictions and differ in generality. First, essentially the same trick as in section 6.5.2
can be used by stipulating that the contexts compatible with what a speaker x has said are exactly
those in which x is the speaker. This solution predicts that all first-person indexicals are shifted.
Second, the respective indirect speech binder may be modified to introduce some designated
contexts with the same speaker as the referent of the subject-NP of the matrix clause, and the
first-person pronoun is made dependent on these designated contexts. This solution predicts that
in nested verbs of indirect speech a first-person shifter will be co-referential with the referent of
the last subject-NP of the matrix clause. Third, designated contexts may be introduced with full
binding. This solution is most flexible and makes the least predictions. Finally, the designated
context parameter may be shifted and conditional assignment may be used. This modal operator
approach predicts that either none or all embedded indexicals are shifted. Since the shifting
just works like a normal modal operator it will not be illustrated. The first approach will not be
illustrated either, as it just involves a non-rigid use of I accompanied by a requirement no less
dubious than Constraint 1 of the last chapter and not working with attitude verbs.
The second solution is implemented as follows.
(7.105) ( I DVAR)
:= ( iota CS . DVAR ( Speaker CS . DVAR)
Hereby, CS is a designated context variable. The abbreviation for the verb of indirect speech
then implicitly binds this variable by means of an additional accessibility relation Rs*.
(7.106) ( say [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 DTERM) MSQ
:= ( f o r a l l * CVAR2 )( f o r a l l * CS)
( implies (and (Rs [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 DTERM)
(Rs* [CVAR1 ] . CS DTERM)
( Speaker CS . DTERM ))
MSQ)
12See page 115, section 5.3.1 of chapter 5.
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Apart from being dissatisfying from a technical point of view, the built-in dependency on
the respective last indirect speech binder is likely empirically inadequate.13 In any case this is
a matter of the syntax–semantics interface. The one outlined in Appendix C can move a first-
person shifter before the second indirect speech binder and thereby fix the problem at the level
of mapping from source to target language.
The full binding solution is straightforward. Definition 13 is used without modification. The
verb of saying is analyzed as above, but binds an additional variable.
(7.107) ( say [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 CVAR3 DTERM) MSQ
:= ( f o r a l l * CVAR2 )
( f o r a l l * CVAR3 )
( implies (and (Rs [CVAR1 ] . CVAR2 DTERM)
(Rs* [CVAR1 ] . CVAR3 DTERM)
( Speaker CVAR3 . DTERM))
MSQ)
The result is then the following formula.
(7.108) M, g, c, k 
( iota SUBJ ( John SUBJ)) ( Pres C1)
( f o r a l l * C2)
( f o r a l l * C3)
( implies (and (Rs C1 . C2 SUBJ)
(Rs* C1 . C3 SUBJ)
( Speaker C3 . SUBJ))
( I C3 . SUBJ2)
( hero C2 . SUBJ2))
7.6.2 Example: Russian Present Tense
Turning to the temporal domain, the following example taken from (von Stechow 2003) involves
shifting of the Russian present tense.
(7.109) Petja
Petja
skazal,
said
cˇto
that
Miša
Misha
plakal
is-crying
(von Stechow 2003)
‘Petja said, “Misha is crying.”’
Although there could be a particular time introduced by the verb of indirect speech, it seems
that in the temporal domain shifters can simply be analyzed as non-rigid expressions. This
corresponds to the first of the above mentioned solutions and boils down to using a non-rigid
binder.
13Unfortunately, at the time of this writing no informants of shifter languages were available to get more data in order
to disconfirm or confirm this for some given language. The data in (Schlenker 2000, 2003), (von Stechow 2003), and
(Anand and Nevins 2003, 2004) doesn’t involve nested verbs of indirect speech.
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P Definition 14 (pres* Special Predicate).
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ Jpres*KMg,k (c) (7.110)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and time(c′′, k) v time(c′, k)
(7.111) ( iota SUBJ ( P e t j a SUBJ))
( Past C1)
( say C1 . C2 SUBJ)
( iota SUBJ2 (Misha SUBJ2))
( Pres * C2 . C3)
( cry C3 . SUBJ2)
7.6.3 Example: Dimli v1zeri
According to Anand and Nevins (2003), Dimli indicators shift systematically under verbs of say-
ing. In the following example, «v1zeri» (yesterday; the day before) is considered a shifter.
(7.112) Hefte
week
nayeraraver,
ago,
HEseni
Hesen.obl
m1-ra
me-at
va
said
kE
that
o
he
v1zeri
yesterday
Rojda
Rojda
paci
kiss
kErd.
did
(Anand and Nevins 2003)
‘A week ago, Hesen told me that he kissed Rojda [eight days ago].’
Here is the respective non-rigid binder:
P Definition 15 (yesterday* Special Predicate).
yesterday* ∈ PRED2, where both arguments are in CVAR (7.113)
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ Jyesterday*KMg,k (c) (7.114)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and day(time(c′, k))− day(time(c′′, k)) = 1 day
P Abbreviation 21 (Yesterday* Binder). ( Yesterday* [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 ) MSQ
:= ( e x i s t s * CVAR2 )( y e s t e r day * [CVAR1 ] CVAR2 ) MSQ
Of course, as always proper date arithmetics is assumed. The only change is that the new
predicate depends on the previous time-variant instead of the current context parameter. This is
a generalization of the previous definition, and as such desirable. Assuming suitable definitions
for «hefte nayeraraver» and «m1-ra va kE», example 7.112 may be written down in FOLC as
follows.
(7.115) M, g, c, k 
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( Past C1)
(1weekAgo C1)
( iota SUBJ (Hesen SUBJ))
( I DO)
( t e l l C1 . C2 SUBJ DO)
( Yesterday * C2 . C3)
( iota DO2 (Rojda DO2))
( k i s s C3 . SUBJ DO2)
For comparison, a verbose version of 7.112 would look as follows:
(7.116) M, g, c, k 
( ex i s t s * C1)( pas t C0 . C1)(1weekAgo C0 . C1)
( iota * SUBJ ( e x i s t C0 . SUBJ) (Hesen C0 . SUBJ))
( iota * DO ( e x i s t C0 . D0)( Speaker C0 . DO))
( f o r a l l * C2)
( implies (Rt C1 . C2 SUBJ DO)
( ex i s t s * C3)( yes te rday C2 . C3)
( iota * DO2 ( e x i s t C0 . DO2)( Rojda C0 . DO2))
( k i s s C3 . SUBJ DO2))
Hereby, ‹hefte nayeraraver› as been mapped non-compositionally to 1weekAgo, which is true
iff the time of its second argument is one week before the time of its first argument; a composi-
tional treatment of such expressions would be far too complicated in the present setting. To make
it fully clear what 7.116 expresses in intended models M , here is one more verbose, informal
paraphrase: There is a time variant c1 of c in k such that time(c1, k) < time(c, k) and time(c1, k)
is one week before time(c, k) and there is exactly one object in c, k called «HEsen»14 and there
is exactly one object in c, k that is the speaker of c, k and in all world-variants c2 of c1 that are
compatible with what Hesen told the speaker of c, k it is the case that there is a time variant of
c3 of c2 such that the day of c3, k is one day before c2, k and there is exactly one object called
«Rojda» in c, k such that Hesen kissed her (according to what he has said a week ago) at the time
of c3, k (8 days ago), place of c3, k (event place), and world of c3, k (the worlds compatible with
what Hesen told the speaker).
7.7 Simplifications and Extensions
The above examples show how the truth-conditional aspect of indexical reference can be ex-
pressed using descriptive conditions in dependency of the deictic center. Apart from Cresswell’s
argument, they could also have been given in double-index modal logic and are just a bit more
fine-grained than analyses based on direct reference theory. We will now briefly address the
questions which kind of context-dependency can be eliminated and how the framework might
be extended.
14It depends on the purpose of the analysis whether the predicate Hesen is universal or regarded to encode features
of being called «HEsen» that are specific to Dimli.
7.7. SIMPLIFICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 201
7.7.1 On the Eliminability of Context-Dependency
From a philosophical point of view, the conversational context is irreducible. Spatial and tempo-
ral indexicals are inherently vague. Particular cases of vagueness can be expressed in NTPT by
asserting that a given property can neither be ascribed to nor can it be denied of some particular,
and this can in principle happen even when all discourse participants agree on the conversa-
tional context. If for example all participants agree that the reference place associated with a
given «here»-token is Copenhagen, it can still be the case that the exact boundaries of Copen-
hagen are unclear and cannot be asserted or denied without doubt. In practice, it is often possible
to agree on some reasonable level of precision by convention. But the interpretation of speech is
an active process, and a particular speaker may at any time have reasons to interpret the spatial
or temporal range of an indexical more or less precise, and sender and receiver will always just
agree on the range of an indexical to some degree. In a particular situation it may make sense to
break or disregard conventions, or the discourse participants may be unaware that they presume
different conventions. In this sense, the conversational context cannot be eliminated. It can be
made more explicit by taking a closer look at the different notions of context it comprises, but
there is no Archimedean point which would allow one to dispense with it altogether. The deeper
reasons for this is that there are no fully competent speakers, as the competent speaker model
is an idealization based on the competence–performance distinction, that actual communication
is always a process of partial understanding each other on grounds of each other’s being in the
world (Lebenswirklichkeit), part of which is the discourse participants’ idiolects, and that literal
meaning is an idealization thereof.15 So the current position is contextualist, but in a moderate
sense, because it is not claimed that dependency on the conversational context implies that there
is not much well-established public language meaning. Many utterances have a prevalent literal,
public language meaning. For example, even though it depends on the context of utterance,
there is nothing to debate about the meaning of the following utterance.
(7.117) In a US shop, the shop owner holds up a T-shirt and utters:
This−−→ is $ 9.95.
This means that the T-shirt costs exactly 9.95 US dollar, not five cent less or more and not
Canadian dollars. Many aspects of the conversational context are a matter of public, social
conventions compatible with social externalism, and not a matter of the particular belief states
of discourse participants. In the present view, there is no doubt that your utterance can be
literally false when the police stops you while you’re driving the car, and you say:
(7.118) I’m just a bit tipsy. We didn’t drink much.
This utterance can be false, no matter howmuch you and your drunken friends might believe,
agree, and insist on it being true, because you presume a standard for drunkenness that differs
from the policeman’s.
15Philosophers’ tendency to resort to the cat is on the mat examples may be the reason why these hermeneutic truisms
are sometimes neglected. Just ask yourself what the meaning of «freedom» is—as opposed to, say, «cat»—and the
idealized nature of public language will become more apparent.
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In contrast to the conversational context, the context of utterance, as it is understood here,
can be eliminated to some extent. In a given concrete situation an egocentric indexical can be
substituted salva veritate by a co-referential non-egocentric substitute expression. For example,
‹now› uttered at 12:11h on 4th April 2005 can be substituted by «at 12:11 on 4th April, 2005»,
‹here› can be substituted by «in Copenhagen», or ‹I› uttered by Alice can be substituted by «Al-
ice». Recall from chapter 5 that instantiated reference rules are not egocentric. There are limits
to eliminating egocentricity, though. First, essential indexicals according to the common view
cannot be eliminated without loosing some of their explanatory power. This issue will be ad-
dressed in the next chapter. Second, the origin of a calendric or geographic coordinate system in
turn has to be fixed by convention up to a sufficient level of precision, though this doesn’t have
to involve the use of egocentric expressions. Even if egocentricity is eliminated, dependency on
some conventionally fixed origin of coordinate systems cannot be fully eliminated from an ideal
language.
As mentioned in 7.2.3, from a technical perspective both contexts are dispensable as param-
eters. The context of utterance can be reduced to an open variable interpretation guideline.
Dependency on the conversational context can be dropped when Definition 6 is dropped. The
reason for this is that many aspects of context-dependency this parameter comprises have been
left unanalyzed.
7.7.2 Possible Extensions
The context of utterance only determines the deictic center, whereas the conversational context
comprises many factors like the common ground, norms of exactness, standards of measurement,
or fixing semantic ambiguity in the mapping from source to target language. Some of them can
be dealt with by making conversational contexts available in the object language and putting
constraints on them that aren’t directly derived from linguistic expressions, while others, like the
common ground, require more elaborate mechanisms. In any case the two sorts of context are
orthogonal to each other. Often the context of utterance changes from utterance to utterance, as
the name implicates, but within the same conversational context. Vice versa, the conversational
context can change within the same utterance situation, for example when expressions like «ac-
tually» or phrases like «according to the Mayan calender» or «strictly speaking» are used. Perhaps
more importantly, the conversational context can also change within the speaker dimension in
a pragmatic model of communication. If means to express constraints on the conversational
context are made available, then it will become possible to describe cases of failure or success
of communication within the same model. Suppose k is Alice’s sender kontext and k′ is Bob’s
receiver kontext. Alice utters 7.119.
(7.119) Alice to Bob: It is raining.
Suppose now we can add constraints on the conversational contexts based on extralinguistic
information, which boil down to the following constraints:
rplace(c, k) = a (7.120)
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rplace(c, k′) = b (7.121)
a 6v b ∧ b 6v a (7.122)
Then it can be inferred that communication between Alice and Bob has failed. This kind of
success or failure of communication is independent from Alice’s and Bob’s non-linguistic beliefs,
as it can also occur when Alice is lying or Bob doesn’t believe that it is raining anywhere in
b. There are certainly limits to the usefulness of reified conversational contexts. Consider for
example 7.95 for 7.94 on page 192. The formula sequence represents the reading we will buy the
business enterprise owned by you, the addressee(s). But there is another reading of 7.94: We will
buy your accompaniment [your accompanying us]. English «company» is mapped to FOLC company
by the syntax–semantics interface and the conversational context could at the level of the target
language decide whether a business enterprise or some accompaniment by prostitutes or an
escort service is bought. However, in the second reading «you» doesn’t mean owned by, it rather
indicates the agentive role of the addressee(s) in the event of accompanying the buyers Alice and
her group, and it is hardly feasible to account for this difference on the basis of the conversational
context at target language level. If the possessive pronoun is given as an abbreviation, this would
require quasi-abbreviations whose expansion depends on a conversational context parameter.
Even if such quasi-abbreviations can be made to work, it seems more advisable to follow the
traditional approach and put such ambiguities into the source language lexicon as two different
target language schemes or deal with them at the level of the syntax–semantics interface.
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Chapter 8
Indexicals in Thinking
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8.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter deals entirely with the cognitive content of indexicals in the broad sense. This is nec-
essary, because the phenomenon of essential indexicality can be taken to counter and ultimately
refute any attempt to explain the reference of indexicals by resorting to any notion of identifi-
cation by means of an object’s properties. But, of course, description theory and other forms of
indirect reference theory are devised to explain speaker reference by a speaker’s attempts to iden-
tify the referent by means of certain properties, which in case of an indexical are represented by
its reference rule. Before this obvious challenge can be tackled, some more things have to be said
about the cognitive content of indexicals. In section 8.2 examples and their FOLC analyses are
considered, in which a speaker refers to a doxastic object that differs from the semantic referent.
As laid out in section 5.4.5, indexicals are strictly rigid with only few possible exceptions, and so
there are no attitude ascriptions that would directly correspond to these analyses. Still, they cor-
respond to the view on cognitive content of proper names in chapter 4 and from a descriptivist
point of view represent the subjective meaning of indexicals. Essential indexicality, the challenge
to this view, is outlined in section 8.3. The arguments in favor of essential indexicals show that
indexicals are irreducible in thinking, but in section 8.4 it is argued that indexicality plays no
role in episodal thinking and that the irreducibility of I-thoughts is a trivial consequence of their
definition. Given that even the one who utters a token of «I» or «now» might be wrong about
its referent, which can happen easily in case of persistent tokens, it is suggested that essential
indexicality and corresponding de se belief attributions ought to be dispensed with in the context
of doing truth-conditional semantics of public language expressions (Thesis 8). This leaves the
epistemic status of essential indexicals in thinking open as a problem of the philosophy of mind
that is closely related to the epistemic status of qualia.
8.2 De Dicto Cognitive Content of Indexicals in FOLC
In chapter 5 it has been argued that the cognitive content of an indexical will have to be modeled
as being non-rigid if it is bound to play a role in explanations of actions and behavior, even if it is
rigid from a linguistic perspective. In the following subsections it will be shown by example how
this can be done in FOLC. There is an important difference of the following non-rigid indexicals
to the way de dicto attitudes involving referentially opaque proper names have been analyzed in
chapter 4. While readings of referentially opaque proper names exist at least for purporters of
the semantic view on de dicto attitude ascriptions, corresponding de dicto readings of indexicals
are hard to come up with.
8.2.1 Example: now
Let us start with «now» and take a look at an example that motivates why one would be inter-
ested in some sort of cognitive content of this indexical. Suppose Alice and Bob have a short
conversation about the current time. Alice knows that Bob has a date with Carol at 13h, but she
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doesn’t want him to go there. She believes that it is already 13h, and so she decides to lie to Bob
and utters 8.1.
(8.1) Situation: It is 12h and Alice believes that it is 13h.
Alice: It is now 12 o’clock.
This is a typical situation in which the cognitive content of an indexical diverges from its rigid
interpretation with respect to the truth-conditional content of a corresponding belief ascription.
What Alice literally says is true and what Alice believes is false. To account for this fact it would
be feasible to analyze Alice’s belief state in a way that would imply that Alice was mistaken about
the referent of «13h» or the meaning of «is». However, Alice should be considered competent
with regard to these expressions in the given example; she is rather mistaken about the referent
of ‹now› in 8.1 used in combination with the present tense. As 8.2 illustrates, speaker referent
and semantic referent of ‹now› do not match.
(8.2)
subjective 13h = 12h
uttered ‹now› ‹is› ‹12 o’clock›
objective 12h = 12h
This situation and subsequent examples are set up as an attempt to lie in order to make it
clear that the intentional referent, i.e. the object the speaker intends to refer to, doesn’t have to
be the same as the speaker referent and plays only an indirect role in determining the cognitive
significance of ‹now›, although it plays a role in categorizing Alice’s speech act as a lie or attempt
to lie. To account for Alice’s speaker reference gone astray one may attempt to specify the
cognitive content of ‹now› in 8.1 for Alice by the following belief attribution, where time= checks
whether time(c2, k) is sufficiently similar to time(c3, k) in c1, k and it is assumed that g(C1) = c1,
g(C2) = c2, and so on.
(8.3) M, g, c, k 
( iota X ( A l i c e X))
( Pres C1)
( bel ieve C1 . C2 X)
( Je tz t C2 . C3)
( time= C2 . C3 13h)
To see why this isn’t adequate, let’s take a look at the variants expressed:
c 'kt c1 '
k
w c2 '
k
t c3 (8.4)
For these the following constraints hold in the example model under consideration:
time(c1, k) v time(c, k) present tense (8.5)
time(c2, k) = time(c1, k) world variant (8.6)
utime(c3, k) v time(c3, k) df. Jetzt (8.7)
time(c3, k) v time(c2, k) df. Jetzt (8.8)
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utime(c, k) = 12h assumption (8.9)
utime(c3, k) = 13h assumption (8.10)
From these, the transitivity of the subinterval relation, and the egocentricity of speech time
(Constraint 7.40 on page 180) it follows that both 12h v time(c, k) and 13h v time(c, k). This
would be acceptable in many conversational contexts. For example the conversation could be
about salaries now in comparison to salaries 30 years ago. In such a context, Alice could believe
that ‹now› denotes 13h, whereas Bob could believe that ‹now› denotes 12h without problems in
understanding each other, since the time of speech mutually assumed by both of them would be
sufficiently large. But in the present example about the time of the day, the time of speech must
be much smaller, only allowing for minor variations around 12 o’clock. Then 13 o’clock cannot
be part of that interval.
One crude way to adjust the analysis is to stipulate another predicate now* which is rela-
tivized to actual contexts but otherwise works the same as now:
P Constraint 23 (now* Special Predicate).
now* ∈ PRED2, where all arguments are in CVAR (8.11)
if 〈c′, c′′〉 ∈ JnowKMg,k (c) (8.12)
then c′ 'kt c
′′ and utime(c′, k) v time(c′′, k) v time(c′, k)
for actual c′, k; otherwise c′′ depends on the interpretation of c′ in k
The otherwise clause turns now* from a special predicate, which certain now subintervals of
the given event time satisfy, into an arbitrary predicate with the same intended interpretation,
but not expressing any logical constraint whenever its first argument leads to a non-actual c, k
pair. The analysis of the above situation then looks the same as 8.3, except that a binder Jetzt*
based on now* instead of now is used. It must be stressed, though, that there is no reading of a
belief ascription that would correspond to the use of now* for specifying the cognitive content of
‹now› in 8.1 for Alice.1
The above change also has an effect on other than doxastic modalities. Since non-actual con-
texts are those whose world(c, k) is not the actual world, the revised analysis allows to account
for non-rigid readings with regards to alethic modalities. Such readings are depicted in Figure
8.1. For example the following utterance could come out true under such an analysis:
(8.13) At 12h: It is possible that it were now 13h.
According to some understanding of «now» and «possible» this might indeed be the case.
Although highly unlikely, it is conceivable that the people who implement the official calendric
time have made a grave error that would require advancing the clock by one hour. Suppose for
example that the parliament of a small island republic has decided to switch to daylight savings
time, but the local administration has forgotten to implement the change. However, this reading
1According to Castañeda (1967) there are readings of embedded indicators and personal pronouns he calls quasi-
indicators. For reasons to be given below, the above analysis is not adequate for them.
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Figure 8.1: Deviate, non-rigid interpretations of ‹now› (a) in a counterfactual conditional, (b)
when the conversational context changes, and (c) & (d) as metaphysical statements about the
Now.
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is deviate, since it plays with the fact that under rare circumstances «possible» can be used to
indicate the arbitrariness of conventions governing the conversational context; the switching
between the two time systems ought to be modeled as a change of conversational contexts. This
is depicted as case (b) in the figure and can already be dealt with by the original Jetzt binder.
If on the other hand «possible» is understood as expressing an alethic modality, then a reading
like 8.13 can hardly become true. Cases (c) and (d) in the figure are metaphysical claims about
the philosophical Now and the nature of time that are barely understandable, if just 8.13 is used
without further explanation. A perhaps more acceptable non-rigid reading of «now» already
mentioned in section 5.4.5 of chapter 5 is in counterfactuals like «If the tire hadn’t been flat,
it would now* be 12 o’clock» (uttered at 13h). This is case (a) in the figure and might be
acceptable; if so, it is another reason for using now* instead of the original definition.
8.2.2 Example: here
The same tweaking as for «now» can be done for «here». Take for example the following situation
analogous to 8.1.
(8.14) Situation: Alice believes that she is in room 388, but in fact she is in room 386.
Alice (to Bob): Room 386 is here.
Given how difficult it can be to find the right room at certain universities this is a perfectly
conceivable situation. Suppose for example that Alice tries to lure Bob into a lecture on modal
logic in room 388 instead of attending the student session in room 386 which would involve
good music, free beer, and cookies for everyone. By using a predicate here* to obtain an analysis
of Alice’s reference to the place of room 386 using ‹here› if its first argument is reached by Alice’s
belief accessibility, the place of ‹here› becomes any part of an arbitrary place Alice has in mind.
Like in the previous case, the multiple use of the world component for various modal binders that
are interpreted in different ways would cause here* to become non-rigid with respect to alethic
modalities. This can be used for analyses that allow an utterance like 8.15 to have a reading
according to which not just «Cambridge» would be used for Oxford, but according to which in
fact the entire place of Cambridge would be at Oxford, whereas the entire place of Oxford might
have been sucked into a black hole and dispersed over several parallel universes.
(8.15) At Oxford: It is possible that here were Cambridge.
It is fruitless to speculate whether such a reading exists or not. A reading exists whenever
someone argues halfway convincingly for it, but this doesn’t mean that it makes sense or can be
used to convey any interesting information. It can be said, however, that this purported reading
of 8.15 is deviate. It is more natural to interpret the modality in 8.15 as an epistemic one, giving
the utterance a paraphrase like According to what I believe the current place of utterance is likely
called «Cambridge». In that reading ‹here› is still rigid.
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8.2.3 Example: I
Turning to the first-person indexical, matters are both more and less complicated. They are more
complicated, since so-called I-thoughts have occasionally been considered the speaker referent
of a use of «I». This view will be addressed below in section 8.3. Matters are less complicated in
the first-person case if the descriptivist position is assumed and we are merely interested in a de
dicto interpretation (disquotation, utterance acceptance) of ‹I›. Suppose Alice wants to go to a
fancy lecture on modal logic with Bob, but she would have to work instead. In a hurry she writes
the following note and inadvertently puts it on Carol’s office door instead of her own.
(8.16) Alice’s message on Carol’s office door: I’m ill. [I’ll be back tomorrow.]
This is one of the rare examples involving persistent tokens according to which a speaker is
mistaken about the referent of his use of «I». Carol could in fact be ill and back tomorrow, and
then 8.16 would be true because Carol is the referent of ‹I› in 8.16. However, Alice believes that
‹I› refers to herself. This situation is not exactly analogous to 8.1 and 8.14, though. English «I»
is a personal pronoun and not a sentential adverb like «here» or «now». It picks out exactly one
person and there is no such mechanism as a ‘person variant’ available out of the box. So the
following tentative analysis is inappropriate:
(8.17) M, g, c, k 
( iota X ( A l i c e X)) ( Pres C1)
( bel ieve C1 . C2 X)( I C2 . Y)( i l l C2 . Y)
This expresses that the current speaker x believes that there is some speaker y—whoever that
may be—that is ill in whatever present situation x has in mind.2 This doesn’t describe or explain
why or how Alice’s speaker reference is gone astray in 8.16. What in fact is needed is that Alice
believes of the current context of utterance that she is the speaker of it. Thus the following analysis
is better:
(8.18) M, g, c, k 
( iota X ( A l i c e X)) ( Pres C1)( bel ieve C1 . C2 X)
( iota Y ( SpeakerOf C2 . C1 Y)) ( i l l C2 . Y)
Hereby, SpeakerOf is a predicate with the intended reading that the person given as third
argument is the speaker of the context of utterance given as second argument according to
the modality that binds the first context argument, if it is bound. The relationship between
this predicate and the special speaker predicate is that if world(c′′, k) is the actual world, then
〈c′, a〉 ∈ JSpeakerKMg,k (c) iff. 〈c′′, c′, a〉 ∈ JSpeakerOfKMg,k (c) for any model M , assignment g, and
c, k. In situation 8.16 the actual speaker of the present context is different from the referent
believed by Alice to be determined by the SpeakerOf predicate; the former is Carol, the latter is
Alice.
2See constraint 20 and abbreviation 13 on page 186 of the last chapter.
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8.3 Essential Indexicality
Essential indexicality seemingly challenges a description-based account of indexical reference,
and why this is so will be laid out in the following sections.
8.3.1 The Irreducibility Thesis
Since the seminal works of Castañeda (1967) and Perry (1977, 1979) certain indexicals like «I» or
«now» have been considered essential. Roughly speaking, essential indexicals are irreducible in
the sense that it is not always possible to find a substitute expression that would have the same
explanatory power in the explanation of behavior as the respective indexical. This claim will
from now on be called irreducibility thesis (IR). It goes back to (Wittgenstein 1958), (Castañeda
1967), and (Shoemaker 1968). One of the best known arguments in favor of IR is Perry’s
supermarket example in (Perry 1979):
(8.19) John Perry is in a supermarket and leaves behind a trail of sugar that is pouring out a
package in his cart.
(8.20) He recognizes the trail of sugar, but doesn’t recognize that it’s himself who causes it
inadvertently.
(8.21) Perry has various thoughts:
1. Someone is making a mess.
2. He−→[pointing to himself in the mirror] is making a mess.
3. John Perry is making a mess.
4. The only bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of Mississippi is making a mess.
(8.22) Perry goes around in circles in order to find the person who produces the sugar trail
while he entertains these thoughts.
(8.23) Suddenly he realizes that it is he himself who is inadvertently pouring the sugar. He
thinks: I am making a mess.
(8.24) He cleans up the sugar.
When Perry thinks what is described in 8.21, he is temporarily being amnesiac. He just
forgot that he didn’t shave himself in the morning, forgot his name, sees himself in the mirror
without recognizing himself, and has no reasons to assume that the person he sees in the mirror
is called «John Perry» or that he is a philosopher fitting the above description. How plausible
these scenarios are doesn’t matter much to the argument, as long as they are conceivable at
all. Kaplan has a similar example. His pants are burning, while he watches himself in a mirror.
He thinks various thoughts, like His−→ pants are burning, David Kaplan’s pants are burning (while
temporarily having forgotten his name), and so on, until he realizes: My pants are burning—and
either starts to jump around in horror or calmly extinguishes the fire. Another example of Perry
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(1979) involves «now». A professor sits in his office at 12 o’clock. The fact that the professor
has some calendric substitute expression in mind for ‹now›, as he may utter it now at 12 o’clock,
doesn’t seem to explain the fact that he suddenly jumps up and goes to a meeting he believes to
be scheduled for 12 o’clock.
Let’s call arguments based on examples like these IR-type arguments. They have the following
structure. Consider a concrete example in which a speaker entertains various thoughts about
himself, the current time, or the current place of utterance, without realizing that they are about
himself, now, or the place of utterance. Take a look at the behavior or explanations of the
speaker’s behavior; they indicate that the speaker hasn’t realized that the person he’s thinking
about is himself, the time he’s thinking about is now, or the place he has in mind is here. There
is a sudden change in behavior, which is (a) explained by pointing out that the speaker just
had an appropriate I-, here-, now-thought about the given situation and/or (b) by considering
an explanation of the behavior before and after the behavioral change as it is given by the
speaker himself. Before the change, the speaker uses 3rd-person expressions to refer to himself,
or the time and place of utterance in the explanation of the given situation, afterwards he uses
an indexical like «I» or «now». Generalize the example to any situation. Regarding «I», the
generalization is for example: In any situation it is conceivable that a speaker uses any 3rd-
person expression that semantically refers to himself without realizing that it refers to herself,
i.e. without showing an I-response. Here are some conclusions one may tentatively draw from
IR-type arguments:
(8.25) I-thoughts are irreducible in the sense that they cannot be replaced by other kinds of
thoughts without possibly changing the behavioral relevance of the whole thought.
(8.26) I-thoughts are irreducible in the sense that they cannot be replaced by other kinds of
thoughts without actually changing the behavioral relevance of the whole thought.
(8.27) The cognitive content of each use of an «I»-token (a) must, or (b) may be different from
the cognitive content of any other token.
(8.28) Each use of an «I»-token is semantically irreducible in the sense that its truth-conditional
content (a) must, or (b) may be different from the token of any other expression.
To a truth-conditional single-aspect theory only 8.28 is relevant. 8.27–8.28 are relevant to
a dual aspect theory in which one aspect is the truth-conditional role and the other is the be-
haviorally relevant cognitive role of expressions. 8.25 and 8.26 become only relevant, if such a
DAT identifies the truth-conditional, the cognitive content, or both with thoughts, or at least has
the explanatory goal of directly or indirectly specifying behaviorally relevant thought contents.
8.28 will be rejected below, 8.27 will be considered in section 8.5, and it will be shown in section
8.4 that 8.25 and 8.26 hold trivially. The discussion in the following will mainly focus on «I» and
I-thoughts respectively, since IR-type arguments and underlying ‘intuitions’ in this case seem to
be stronger than in other cases.
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8.3.2 Self-Locating Belief
On the background of possible world semantics and on the basis of (Perry 1977, 1979) there is
another influential example introduced by Lewis (1979):
“Consider the case of two gods. They inhabit a certain possible world, and they
know exactly which world it is. Therefore they know every proposition that is true
at their world. Insofar as knowledge is a propositional attitude, they are omniscient.
Still I can imagine them to suffer ignorance: neither one knows which of the two
he is. They are not exactly alike. One lives on top of the tallest mountain and
throws down manna; the other lives on top of the coldest mountain and throws
down thunderbolts. Neither one knows whether he lives on the tallest mountain or
on the coldest mountain; nor whether he throws manna or thunderbolts.” (Lewis
1983, p. 139)
By proposition in this case a set of possible worlds is meant. The problem in the above
example is according to Lewis, that the two gods may have the same veridical beliefs about
all objects in the world, yet lack the proper knowledge to locate themselves within this world.
Another example of this kind can be found in Perry (1977). Rudolf Lingens suffers from amnesia
and is lost in the Stanford library; no matter how many books he reads about himself, as long
as he doesn’t realize that it is he himself they are about, he doesn’t know where he is. There
could be another person somewhere in the same world in another library that would have the
same beliefs in terms of a relation between himself and the set of possible worlds compatible
with his belief. It seems that Lingens can gain knowledge by finding out that it is he himself that
is now here at Stanford library, no matter how much descriptive knowledge he has already about
himself. Likewise, the two gods are by stipulation omniscient, and since they are omniscient the
sets of possible worlds that is compatible with their belief respectively should only contain the
world they inhabit, yet each one of them may fail to realize that it is he himself that respectively
is Zeus or Jawhe, as Lewis names them. They lack knowledge required to locate themselves in
the world they inhabit. It seems that even de dicto belief is too coarse-grained to account for the
kind of self-knowledge the two gods are lacking. Lewis speaks of de se belief for the fine-grained
belief that is needed for explaining the Zeus-Jawhe example. For Lewis, all belief is self-locating.
What is traditionally called de dicto belief involves locating oneself in logical space by deciding
the set of possible worlds into the ones that are compatible with what one believes and the ones
that aren’t, whereas Lewis’ de se belief involves locating oneself in time and space within a world.
8.3.3 Quasi-Indicators
The above puzzles concerning belief attributions are connected with belief ascriptions. Here is
some utterances that could be made in case of Perry’s supermarket scenario:
(8.29) Perry: I’m pouring sugar on the floor.
(8.30) Alice: Perry believes that he is pouring sugar on the floor.
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(8.31) Perry: I believe that I’m pouring sugar on the floor.
8.30 and 8.31 have two readings. The analogue to ‹he› of 8.30 in thinking can on one hand
be demonstrative, but on the other hand may also be an I-thought. Likewise, the analogue to ‹I›
of 8.31 in thinking can on one hand be descriptive in the sense used here, i.e. in the sense that
Perry (in thinking) would try to identify the speaker of 8.31 by virtue of the property of being the
speaker and all the factors this comprises in the given epistemic situation, but may on the other
hand be an I-thought. Based on Castañeda (1967) the latter readings, whose analogue in the
above case is an I-thought, are called quasi-indicators and marked by a star. A quasi-indicator cor-
responds, under normal circumstances and assuming fully competent speakers, to a disposition
to utter an indexical, even in cases when there’s no disposition to use a co-extensional expression
like a proper name or definite description. The pronoun «he*» in the third-person ascription 8.30
and «I» in the first-person ascription 8.31 convey an irreducible first-person reference in think-
ing. In a belief ascription, a quasi-indicative reading is only possible if the embedded pronoun
agrees with the subject of the matrix sentence. ‹I› in 8.31 can only be read as quasi-indicator,
because the ascription is in the first-person, and ‹he› can only be read as quasi-indicator, since
the ascription is in the third person. There is no linguistic evidence, apart from reading pro-
nouns and embedded indicators this way, that quasi-indicators are a distinct class of expressions
lexicalized in English, but Schlenker (2003) points out that “. . . PRO, the unpronounced subject
of an infinitive in a ‘control structure’, can only be used to report a De Se thought.” (Schlenker
2003, p. 60-1)3 So according to this thesis the following example can only be read as a de se
belief attribution.
(8.32) Alice believes to be hungry.
Schlenker (2003) further notes that in some languages such as Éwé and Gokana there is
pronouns that can only be given a quasi-indicative reading.4
8.3.4 The Connection to Notions of Belief
One problem in dealing with essential indexicals is that there is not the notion of belief; whether
a certain view on belief attributions is fruitful depends on the theoretical purpose of the notion.
For example, a way to store and query customer opinions about products in a relational database
characterizes a form of belief and possibly other attitudes.5 For the purpose of doing truth-
conditional semantics belief must be suitable to encode the truth-conditional content of belief
ascriptions, which in turn can have various readings, and for the purpose of doing epistemology
a notion of belief must be capable of adequately representing doxastic alternatives. The two latter
purposes don’t have to match. To give an example, a quotational theory of belief that deliberately
3He is referring back to Morgan (1970), Chierchia (1989), and Partee (1989), who have also defended this view. Cf.
Corazza (2004). Notably, Richard (1983) only uses PRO forms as paraphrases of de se belief.
4See (Schlenker 2000, pp. 21-2; 100-1; 140-1), (Schlenker 2003, p. 60). Gokana (gkn) is a Niger-Congo lan-
guage spoken by approximately 100000 speakers (as of 1989) in Nigeria, Éwé (ewe) is a Niger-Congo language spoken
primarily in Ghana by a total population of more than 3 million speakers (Gordon 2005).
5Computer scientists sometimes call it knowledge even if the T-principle p ⊃ p doesn’t hold.
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violates the Church-Langford translation test is adequate for dealing with de dicto and de se
belief ascriptions from a purely linguistic perspective. If the sole criterion for someone’s having
a belief is the person’s disposition to utter a certain source language expression, then belief can
simply be regarded a predicate that takes a context c, a speaker x, and term y denoting a source
language expression, and has a reading along the lines in context c, x has the disposition to assent
to y. This kind of belief is irrational in the sense that the quoted source language expression can
express a contradiction. It isn’t particularly useful for doing epistemology. On the other hand,
rational belief such as KD45 belief used throughout here encodes doxastic alternatives. Many
suggestions have been made to adjust normal modal logic in a way that retains the view that
rational belief is a relation of the believer to a set of doxastic alternatives and meanwhile solve
the above puzzles. The most obvious way to do this is to make the objects of belief more fine-
grained. Lewis (1979) property-ascription notion of de se belief does this by making properties
more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. On the basis of Lewis, von Stechow (1982, 1984)
proposes a structured proposition account, according to which objects of belief retain part of the
structure of the original source language entities.6 Another way, suggested by Stalnaker (1981),
is using centered worlds: relata of belief are sets of pairs containing an object and a world.
Attitudes modeled in situation theory (Barwise and Perry 1983) can also more fine-grained than
sets of possible worlds.
Instead of propagating a particular notion of belief, which would go far beyond the scope of
this chapter, the purpose of the following sections is to elaborate what consequences essential
indexicality has on a description theory of indexical reference on the basis of the rational KD45
belief assumed here.
8.4 Irreducibility in Thinking
In order to establish Thesis 8 it will be argued as follows: (IR 1) IR-type arguments at first glance
pose a challenge to description theories of reference, (IR 2) now and I are immune to error
through misidentification in thinking (IFRT), (IR 3) episodal thinking doesn’t involve reference
in the same way as natural languages do, because it is misleading to regard actual cognition as
manipulation of representational symbols of a language of thinking, (IR 4) there is no analogue
to natural language indexicals in episodal thinking, (IR 5) if no independent means of measuring
episodal thoughts are given, IR-type arguments in the realm of episodal thinking are vacuous.
The type of the arguments is as follows. Pro (IR 1) and pro (IR 2) are by plausibility, pro (IR 3) is
a reductio ad absurdum, pro (IR 4) is introduced by plausibility and later regarded a consequence
of (IR 3), pro (IR 5) is analytic, based on the structure of IR-type arguments.7
6Other structured proposition accounts can for example be found in (Cresswell 1985), and (Richard 1990, 1997).
7The notion of an argument is here understood in a loose sense, comprising both correct deduction steps and the
establishing of sound premises, since a purely deductive notion of this term is almost useless in practice. The attribute by
plausibility above means that there is some plausible evidence supporting a claim, whereas purely deductive arguments
might occasionally lead to rather implausible, yet correct conclusions. In a broader sense of plausible not meant here, of
course any sound and correct argument must be plausible.
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8.4.1 The Problem of IR-Type Arguments for Descriptivism
Why do IR-type arguments pose a problem for a description theory of indexical reference? The
answer is fairly obvious. Consider the supermarket example. Given the IR-type arguments it
is clear that the subjective readings of center indexicals given in section 8.2 don’t encode quasi-
indicators or ‹I› in the sense of expressing an I-thought. Take for example the following attempt to
express Perry’s sudden insight, as usual in an intended model with the readings of the predicates
indicated by their mnemonic symbols.
(8.33) M, g, c, k 
( iota SUBJ ( Per ry SUBJ)) ( Pres C1)( bel ieve C1 . C2 SUBJ)
( iota SUBJ2 ( SpeakerOf C2 . C1 SUBJ2))
( ex i s t s C2 . DO)
( sugar C2 . DO)
( s p i l l C2 . SUBJ2 DO)
There’s no reason why Perry’s I-thought ought to be in any connection with what Perry be-
lieves to be the speaker of the context of utterance. Suppose, as a remedy one would use a
predicate with the reading x is the thinker of c at the time and place of c. Even then, IR-type
arguments can be applied, since Perry might not be aware that it is he* himself who is currently
thinking. The claim is that in thinking the thinker doesn’t have to identify himself by means of
any properties, no matter to which ‘source of evidence’ they belong. A person thinking an I-
thought may be mistaken about who is currently thinking (whatever that means), his name, any
of his physical properties, and also about any evidence about himself given by proprioception.
The thesis that self-reference in thinking doesn’t need to involve self-identification in thinking
is called identification-free first-person reference in thinking (IFRT).8 At least prima facie, IFRT is
incompatible with a description theory of indexical reference (IR 1).
8.4.2 Pro IFRT in Episodal Thinking
One problem of pinning down what exactly IR and IFRT say is that there are many different
ways in which thinking, thoughts, and the related notion of cognitive content can be under-
stood. In this section, the arguments for essential indexicals will be evaluated with respect to
episodal thinking. This is understood as a person’s actual cognition insofar as it is relevant for
her behavior. Although taken from armchair psychology, this notion ought not be too contro-
versial. That people can have an I-thought is a reasonable assumption. Such a thought may for
example occur in the planning of an action that is under normal circumstances announced or
explained by means of using «I». Likewise, a person may have a now-thought, a Bob-thought, or
a this−→-thought. The focus in the following will be on I-thoughts.
There are some philosophical concepts of first-person self-reference in thinking that aren’t
meant in the current context. What for example is not meant is the feeling that it is me who
is thinking which might accompany other thoughts, or the synthetic unity of all my thoughts
8This notion is taken from (Evans 1982); cf. (Künne 1997, pp. 113-5), (Christofidou 1995).
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(synthetic I) in the Kantian tradition. What is rather meant is I-thoughts that are fully conscious
and stand on their own, like the thought: I will now press this button, just before I press the
button. Still, the main problem of evaluating IFRT with this notion of cognition is the notion
itself. Neither arguments pro nor arguments contra IFRT can be very strong as long as there
is no reliable and working theory of episodal thinking (cognition) and as long the respective
purported cognitive phenomena cannot be measured precisely. Neuroscience makes constant
advances and it is likely that in the near future it will for example be possible to predict even
complex future actions, including linguistic actions, solely by measuring brain processes. Until
these advances have been made, deliberating IFRT must remain speculative. That being said, it
nevertheless seems that the strongest positive evidence for IFRT is simply given by introspection.
There is no evidence that someone thinking about oneself, for example when planning an action,
is actually identifying or trying to identify oneself in thinking. Care has to be taken about the
notion of identification here. To identify someone or something can mean to tell it apart from all
other objects in a given context. Let’s call this weak identification. In the context of me thinking
now, this is certainly the case if I think an I-thought. If for example I think silently to myself I
ought to fill out the tax form, then I personally have no doubt that I can tell myself apart from any
other object I may be thinking of or might be perceiving at the meantime, such as the tax form
or my table. Even in cases of apparent thought insertion experienced by schizophrenic patients,
it can be argued that only the sense of agency is deranged, i.e. the person doesn’t experience
himself as the originator of the thoughts, whereas the sense of ownership remains intact, i.e. the
person still doesn’t doubt that it is she herself having the alien thoughts.9 A purporter of IFRT has
to argue more specifically that this identification is not done, achieved, the product, the causal
effect, etc. of checking whether the thinker uniquely satisfies certain properties—identification
criteria—in the given context of thinking. The corresponding identification of something as
something by means of certain criteria may be called strong identification. This is what IFRT is
directed against. Ex positivo the argument pro IFRT says that a thinker doesn’t have to strongly
identify himself in thinking by means of specific properties of himself, simply because there is
neither introspective nor external evidence for it. Ex negativo the argument pro IFRT is that
of IR, that for whatever properties one may suggest for uniquely identifying the thinker, the
thinking person may fail to recognize that it is only himself satisfying them in the given context
of thinking, but she may still have an I-thought. In other words, first-person reference in thinking
is immune to error through misidentification.10 As Christofidou (1995) points out, immunity to
error through misidentification doesn’t just mean that the respective thinker is very certain that
he is thinking, but rather means that there is no room for doubt about this.11 If on the other hand
a person would identify herself by means of checking whether she satisfies certain identification
criteria in thinking, then there would always remain room for some doubt. Despite the notorious
unclarity of the notions involved, both the positive and the negative arguments pro IFRT are
plausible, if it is assumed that identification by means of certain identification criteria may fail
9See (Künne 1997, pp. 114-5), (Gallagher 2000b); the matter is controversial, cf. (Cole et al. 2000) for a counter-
example and Gallagher’s reply (Gallagher 2000a).
10See (Shoemaker 1968, p. 556), (Frank 2005, 2006).
11See (Christofidou 1995, p. 226).
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at any time (IR 2). This assumption is reasonable, because a possibility of being in error seems
to be part of what it means to strongly identify something, in the same sense as it is an essential
part of being a rule that you may or may not follow it.
8.4.3 Are There Indexical Thoughts?
Under the presumption that IFRT holds it is tempting to consider I-thoughts themselves indexi-
cal. According to Millikan (1990) this is not the case. Millikan points out that in order to refer
to myself in thinking it is neither necessary nor possible to check that it is me who is currently
thinking and not someone else (IR 4a). As laid out in the previous chapters, indicators are
context-dependent and egocentric or at least object-centric. There is no good reason why any
of these features should also hold for I-thoughts. What would it mean for an I-thought to be
context-dependent? In analogy to the first-person indicator it could only mean that the ‘referent’
of the thought was determined by features of the context of thinking. Which features would that
be? They cannot be the person qua physical object, say Alice, because according to IFRT Alice
may successfully refer to herself in thinking while not recognizing that she is Alice, the person
she’s pointing to in the mirror. According to IFRT, Alice may be in error about any property of
herself, except perhaps the Cartesian property of currently thinking an I-thought, when she suc-
cessfully refers to herself in thinking. So it appears as if the only ‘referent’ of an I-thought could
be an I-thought. This apparent circularity of thinking results from the silent presumption that an
I-thought works analogously to «I». However, episodal thinking cannot work the same as natural
languages for principal reasons.12 The circularity problem isn’t a matter of I-thoughts, but applies
to analogues of any other referential expressions as well. Suppose Alice thinks: Bob is thirsty,
and then brings him a glass of water. If her Bob-thought would work like «Bob», she would have
to refer in thinking to Bob in order to understand her own Bob-thought. This is circular and
implausible. Alice’s Bob-thought is not a symbol that only represents Bob in Alice’s language of
thought, such that Alice would have to interpret this symbol according to the semantic reference
relation of her language of thought, it is rather a symbol that presents Bob as a doxastic object
to Alice in a way that is relevant for her subsequent action of bringing Bob a glass of water. The
presentation of Bob is neither Bob himself nor is it just a representation in the sense of being
a symbol that is conventionally associated with a value. Some crucial semiotic distinctions are
needed to resolve the circularity problem. A presentational symbol exemplifies what it means,
whereas a representational symbol merely stands for what it means. Any presentational symbol
can be regarded a representational symbol, but not vice versa. A symbol is discursive if it is rep-
resentational and not presentational. Take for example numbers. Arabic numbers are discursive
symbols. «5» doesn’t exemplify the number 5, but stands for it. In contrast to this, «.....» is a
presentational symbol, as it stands for the number 5 and the five dots exemplify this number. A
distinction between discursive and presentational symbols that is more rigid than just giving it by
example is one of the open problems in semiotics, but for current purposes this distinction should
12The following semiotic argument is not taken from (Millikan 1990). The argument has also been formulated in (Rast
2002), but it is likely not new; at least implicitly it can be found in Castañeda’s work, e.g. (Castañeda 1982, 1983, 1989).
220 CHAPTER 8. INDEXICALS IN THINKING
be clear enough.13 The crucial point is that if thoughts in episodal thinking are considered dis-
cursive symbols, then they fall prey to the above circularity objection—a modern version of the
Homunculus Problem. As long as Alice’s Bob-thought merely stands for Bob without presenting
him to her, the symbol would have to be interpreted first. But Bob himself cannot be in Alice’s
cognition, although he may causally interact with Alice, and so he must be given to her in some
way. If on the other hand, the referent of Alice’s Bob-thought was yet another discursive symbol,
then Alice would have to interpret this symbol in turn, in order to understand her own thought,
and so on. What this very general consideration shows is that, unlike language, episodal thinking
is not a discursive, but a presentational symbolic system, as long as the notion episodal thinking is
meant to comprise cognitive processes insofar as they are relevant for a person’s behavior (IR 3).
Bob is presented to Alice in a certain way. Natural languages, on the other hand, are almost
entirely discursive symbolic systems. Phenomena like onomatopoeia or iconism play a marginal
role in natural languages and if at all are only to a small extent presentational. Expressions in
natural languages usually don’t exemplify what they mean. This is the reason why speaking of a
language of thought is an inappropriate metaphor. It is easy to slip into using this metaphor, since
all presentational symbols also represent what they mean, but the metaphor misleads from the
fact that in actual cognition aspects of reality have to be encoded, have to be present to thought
processes instead of being mere symbols that stand for something else. The thesis that thoughts
themselves are indexical results from the inappropriate metaphor of regarding cognitive pro-
cesses as the use of some language of thought in a sort of inner monologue. If you will say so,
Alice’s I-thought doesn’t have a referent, it is the referent; it is a cognitive process that presents
Alice to her thinking in her thinking (IR 4b). Saying that a speaker who interprets an «I»-token
from his own first-person perspective is having a behaviorally relevant I-thought is an obfuscated
way of saying that certain processes in her episodal thinking present herself to her own thinking
in a way that other processes don’t do.14 Millikan suggests that I in thinking works analogous
to a special proper name. By drawing this analogy she suggests: An I-thought invariably stands
for the person whose thought it is in analogy to the way a proper name is supposed to invariably
stand for its semantic referent in the direct reference view. Although better suited than the claim
that I is indexical in thinking, this analogy doesn’t go very far either. The direct reference view
of proper names is appropriate whenever semantic reference is regarded a notion that presumes
a high degree of idealization from speaker reference, ignoring epistemic and cognitive aspects of
speaker reference. Still, proper names are discursive symbols. Conversely, I-thoughts stand for
nothing else than actual self-references in episodal thinking as far as they are relevant for action
and behavior. Hereby, the term «self-reference» is a tribute to common usage, but the underlying
cognitive process isn’t related to semantic reference or speaker reference.
13The distinction between presentational and discursive symbols goes back to Langer (1951, Ch. 4). She uses it in a
much broader context of cultural semiotics, and the above use of the distinction is only loosely borrowed from her.
14Even this explicans remains unsatisfying, because it suggests that something is given to something else in a mental
act of self-reference. This might suffice as a metaphor for analytical I-thoughts, but is not adequate for any broader
account of self-consciousness. As Frank (2006) points out, “. . .we’d need a theory that doesn’t explain self-consciousness
as a relation of something to something numerically different from it, i.e. that isn’t relational.” (Frank 2006, p. 7)
(transl. by myself).
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This is an argument internal to IFRT. A discursive I in thinking would invariably give room
to the possibility of error through misidentification. What kind of magic connection could ever
guarantee that an arbitrary and conventional discursive symbol denotes its semantic referent?
The answer is: none. But a presentational symbol can guarantee this connection, because it
exemplifies what it stands for. However, a folk theory of cognition as a manipulation of pre-
sentational symbols is not to be endorsed here. The point is rather that the purporters of IR
implicitly characterize I-thoughts in a way such that it seems only reasonable to regard them as
presentational symbols for the thinker to himself. Consider again Perry’s supermarket example.
There is continuous stimuli, namely the trail of sugar. The example then classifies two sorts of
responses that may be abbreviated as the various non-I-responses and I-responses. The latter
is the kind of responses that occur when John Perry realizes that it is himself who pours the
sugar on the floor. Further it is suggested that whenever an I-response occurs, there must have
occurred an I-thought in thinking as well. In other words, the occurrence of an I-thought is
considered a necessary condition for the I-response that can be externally observed. This seems
reasonable. Perhaps already today, at least in a similar experimental setting, it would be possi-
ble to measure John Perry’s brain processes precisely enough to reliably predict any I-response
and any non-I-response just before the response itself occurs. But from this point of view an
I-thought is trivial—though not its measurement or the underlying cognitive mechanisms—in
the sense that it is defined as the necessary condition for an I-response. As long as John Perry’s
I-thoughts and other thoughts like John Perry-thoughts or the only bearded philosopher in a su-
permarket-thoughts cannot be measured independently of the responses, any I-response will be
explained by the previous occurrence of an I-thought and any non-I-response will be explained
by the previous occurrence of a non-I-thought. Then, of course, IR and IFRT must hold trivially
for these kind of thoughts (IR 5).
8.5 From Thinking to Language
After this brief excursus into the Philosophy of Mind it is time to evaluate the connection between
episodal thinking and cognitive content as part of linguistic theory. In this section it will be
argued for the theses that (IR 6) ‘de se’ cognitive content of essential indexicals can be given on
the basis of rational belief, but (IR 7) this kind of content should play no role in linguistic theory.
Pro (IR 6) and pro (IR 7) will be arguments by reductio and by plausibility.
8.5.1 IR-type Arguments and Cognitive Content
What is the connection between a trivial irreducibility of I-thoughts in episodal thinking and
the meaning of an ‹I›-token? Wittgenstein (1958) suggests that there are two uses of «I», an
object use and a subject use. While the former is prone to error through misidentification, the
latter isn’t. Taking this distinction from Wittgenstein, it might be tempting to say that a subject
use of «I» refers to an irreducible I-thought. However, speaking of a subject use in this way
conflicts with the notion of semantic reference, since semantic reference is an idealization from
individual speaker references that must at least allow for communication. But (1) a recipient
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might at any time be mistaken about the referent of an «I»-token, and (2) a singular term cannot
have two semantic referents depending on the recipient or sender, if it actually has exactly one,
by virtue of the notion of semantic reference. Claiming that a token ‹I› has a different semantic
referent for the speaker than it has for the recipient would be mixing up semantic reference with
speaker reference, whereas claiming that the semantic referent of ‹I› was an I-thought would
make «I» hardly comprehensible to anyone but the respective sender and is simply not plausible.
IFRT for a subject use of «I» if at all can only hold for the sender, as there is no doubt that a
recipient might misidentify the referent of a use of «I» at any time. So a subject use of «I» is a
matter of speaker reference, if it is a matter of reference at all. The speaker referent of ‹I›1, as
understood by the sender, may be considered the sender’s I-thought in case of a subject use of
«I», whereas the speaker referent of the same token as understood by a recipient is the doxastic
object that the recipient believes to be the speaker of the context of uttering ‹I›1. Insofar as
a notion of cognitive content is bound to play a role in a dual aspect theory of meaning that
is supposed to encode the behavioral relevance of expressions, a sort of irreducible cognitive
content of ‹I› or uses of other essential indexicals will thus always be the cognitive content of the
respective token for the respective speaker (sender). If this kind of content is to be done justice
for, then an indirect theory of speaker reference isn’t applicable, because it would violate IFRT.
The above considerations cast some doubt on the usefulness of this kind of content for linguistic
theory, though. For the connection between uses of «I» and corresponding I-thoughts of the
sender is loose anyway. If a speaker had no troubles understanding «I» uttered by other persons,
yet only used his proper name for referring to himself, he would violate linguistic conventions
but still be a competent speaker. Essential indexicality ought rather be considered a matter of
extralinguistic reference than of speaker reference (IR 7). However, semantic reference, speaker
reference, and extralinguistic reference are technical notions, whose definition depends on what
the whole theory is bound to describe and explain. So one may simply insist on having a notion of
speaker-dependent cognitive content suitable for explaining the puzzles of essential indexicality.
Let the meaning-constituting entities of the target language that encode this cognitive content
be abbreviated CCs. In light of what has been said so far, these entities at least have to satisfy the
following criteria:
Granularity. CCs must be as fine-grained as episodal thoughts, insofar as these are deemed
relevant for behavior.
Immunity. CCs must not generally rely on or stipulate that the respective thinker has to identify
the referent in thinking by means of properties the referent is supposed to satisfy uniquely.
To get a better grasp of these requirements, let us stipulate some CC for an I-thought in FOLC
by imposing a condition on the referent of a subject use of «I». This is admissible only, because
the referent stipulated by the corresponding FOLC belief attribution is considered an aspect of
speaker reference by means of «I», it is a doxastic object satisfying a certain constraint, and not
claimed to be the semantic referent of an «I»-token. As a concession to the anti-descriptivist, the
subject use of «I» will be analyzed in the Millian fashion. Let I* be a special non-rigid singular
term that serves this purpose. Since terms in FOLC by default don’t depend on an additional
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context-variable like predicates, special terms have to be introduced. The syntax is augmented
by the following rule, and the members of NTERM are treated like terms.
NTERM :=(DTERMCTERM) (8.34)
The semantics of these expressions is as follows.
J(DTERMCTERM)KMg,k (c) = JDTERMKMg,k (JCTERMKMg,k (c)) (8.35)
Now I* ∈ DTERM can be added as a special non-rigid term for objects. The term makes no
existence stipulations and therefore has to be used in combination with the existence predicate
if desired. Suppose now the following utterance 8.36 involves Alice’s subject use of ‹I›, revealing
the episodal thought in 8.37.
(8.36) Alice: I am hungry.
(8.37) Alice in thinking: I am hungry.
Special ‘thought-disquotation’ of 8.36 with respect to Alice yields the following FOLC repre-
sentation, where tense is ignored.15
(8.38) M, g, c, k 
( iota SUBJ ( A l i c e SUBJ))
( bel ieve C1 SUBJ)
( e x i s t C1 . ( I * C1))
( hungry C1 . ( I * C1))
Suppose J(I* C1)KMg,k (c) = a in the evaluation in dependence of the believe binder. The
referent a of (I* C1) is a doxastic object: Alice’s presentation of herself to herself in her episodal
thinking in the given situation, her I-thought. The binder for rational belief is used as a rough
approximation for encoding episodal thinking in this case. How, then, can the above constraints
be imposed on this content in FOLC? Granularity is merely a matter of interpretation and can
therefore be stipulated as the intended reading of I*. Regarding immunity, matters are more
complicated. One way to interpret IR-type arguments is the following scheme, where φ must be
interpreted as a property that is non-trivial:16
(8.39) M, g, c, k 
( f o r a l l * C0)
( f o r a l l * X)
( implies
( SpeakerOf C0 X)
(Pos C0 . C1)
( bel ieve C1 . C2 X)
( iota C2 . Y (φ C2 . Y))
( 6= C2 . Y ( I * C2 )) )
15The use of scare quotes is certainly justified here. The notion is only used as an analogy.
16Trivial properties would for example be being identical to itself or being numerically one.
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in any intendedM and any g, c, k
Whatever formal definite description φ we choose, according to this condition Alice in 8.38
might not believe that she herself is identical to the doxastic object determined by φ according to
her belief. So whatever property φ expresses isn’t a sufficient identification criterion for Alice to
identify herself. Assuming that Alice is fully competent and using source language expressions in
a canonical way, she might thus show a non-I-response regarding the source language expression
corresponding to φ, whereas under normal circumstances Alice would express her belief 8.38 as
8.36 (IR 6). The question is, however, whether some φ still may actually identify a or not, i.e.
whether the following holds or not.
(8.40) M, g, c, k 
( f o r a l l * C0)
( f o r a l l * X)
( implies
( SpeakerOf C0 X)
(Pos C0 . C1)
( bel ieve C1 . C2 X)
( iota C0 . Y (φ C0 . Y))
( 6= C0 . Y ( I * C2 )) )
in any intendedM and any g, c, k
This condition is very strong, as it says that in any context there might in fact be no property
at all that would uniquely identify any speaker’s doxastic referent of a subject use of «I». This
doesn’t preclude the possibility that the doxastic referent actually has some properties, but none
of them suffices to uniquely determine this doxastic referent independently of the respective
speaker’s or thinking person’s beliefs. From an epistemic point of view, this kind of essentialism
is on a par with phenomenal experience or qualia.17
Comparing the two cases, it seems that principle 8.40 is too strong and only 8.39 is estab-
lished by IR-type arguments. The typical IR-type argument says that in any given situation a
speaker might show an I-response, but not have any φ-disposition, where a φ-disposition would
be either a corresponding utterance disposition to use the non-first-person-indexical and non-
quasi-indicative source language expression α to which φ corresponds in the target language
or a corresponding disposition to elicit an extralinguistic response that could reasonably be de-
scribed from a 3rd-person perspective by using α. But this means that no α would uniquely
determine the referent to which the speaker would under normal circumstances refer to by using
«I» or «now» respectively according to what the speaker believes, not according to the actual
referent of α. This is what 8.39 expresses. It only seems as if IR-type arguments would justify
8.40 as well, since by virtue of linguistic competence a speaker like Alice may be assumed to
fully understand a 3rd-party source language expression α. But even then the speaker might be
in error about the actual semantic referent of that expression.
17This connection is investigated in detail by Stalnaker (2004).
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8.5.2 Which Kind of Cognitive Content Is Needed?
It is now time to compare the role of essential indexicals to the role of speaker reference by
means of proper names in chapter 4. To do so, we take a look at two very similar utterances. The
first involves a use of «I» and the second involves the use of a proper name. Utterance acceptance
and disquotation have been interpreted de dicto in chapter 4, but it is also possible to interpret
them less fine-grained de re (Kripke 1979) or more fine-grained de se. Interpretation in this
case only means attributing beliefs to discourse participants in a given context of utterance on
the basis of reasonable assumptions about their understanding the given utterances at a chosen
level of idealization. The respective belief attributions in the target language, the corresponding
source language utterances, and paraphrases of their readings are given in the examples below.
Of course, target language formulas have to be interpreted in intended models. For simplicity
tense is ignored. Any additional identification criteria Alice or Bob might presume in using a
proper name are also ignored, i.e. simplified NDT is presumed.
(8.41) Situation: Alice is talking to Bob.
Alice: I’m hungry.
(8.42) Truth-conditional Content of 8.41 (literal meaning, ‘what is said’)
(iota X (Speaker X))(hungry X)
(8.43) Broad Cognitive Content of 8.41
I. De Re Cognitive Content
a. Disquotation de re with respect to Alice:
( iota X ( A l i c e X))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( hungry C1 . X)
Alice believes of Alice that she is hungry.
b. De re acceptance of the utterance by Bob:
( iota X (Bob X))
( iota Y ( A l i c e Y))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( hungry C1 . Y)
Bob believes of Alice that she is hungry.
II. De Dicto Cognitive Content
a. Disquotation with respect to Alice:
( iota X ( A l i c e X))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( iota C1 . Y ( SpeakerOf C1 . C0 Y))
( hungry C1 . Y)
Alice believes (de dicto) that the speaker of the current context of utterance is hungry.
b. De dicto acceptance of the utterance by Bob:
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( iota X (Bob X))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( iota C1 . Y ( SpeakerOf C1 . C0 Y))
( hungry C1 . Y)
Bob believes (de dicto) that the speaker of the current context of utterance is hungry.
(8.44) Narrow Cognitive Content of 8.41
I. De Se Cognitive Content
a. ‘Thought-Disquotation’ with respect to Alice:
( iota X ( A l i c e X))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( hungry C1 . ( I * C1))
Alice believes that she* is hungry.
b. ‘De Se acceptance’ with respect to Bob: not applicable18
Compare this with the following literal and disquotational readings of «Alice» in an otherwise
similar situation.
(8.45) Situation: Bob is talking to Alice and others.
Bob: Alice is hungry.
(8.46) Truth-conditional Content of 8.45 (literal meaning, ‘what is said’)
(iota X (Alice X))(hungry X)
(8.47) Broad Cognitive Content of 8.45
I. De Re Cognitive Content
a. De re acceptance of the utterance by Alice:
( iota X ( A l i c e X))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( hungry C1 . X)
Alice believes of Alice that she is hungry.
b. De re disquotation with respect to Bob:
( iota X (Bob X))
( iota Y ( A l i c e Y))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( hungry C1 . Y)
Bob believes of Alice that she is hungry.
18There are no principal reasons why Bob couldn’t have Alice-thoughts that are irreducible with respect to his Alice-
responses in the same trivial sense as outlined in section 8.4.3 for I-thoughts. Yet nobody ever seems to have to argued
for such entities in the context of a realist theory of meaning, and so this possibility can be ignored here.
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II. De Dicto Cognitive Content
a. De dicto acceptance of the utterance by Alice:
( iota X ( A l i c e X))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( iota C1 . Y ( A l i c e C1 . Y))
( hungry C1 . Y)
Alice believes (de dicto) that Alice is hungry.
Alice believes of the personi she believes to be called «Alice» in the given conversational
context that shei is hungry.
b. De dicto disquotation with respect to Bob:
( iota X (Bob X))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( iota C1 . Y ( A l i c e C1 . Y))
( hungry C1 . Y)
Bob believes (de dicto) that Alice is hungry.
Bob believes of the personi he believes to be called «Alice» in the given conversational
context that shei is hungry.
(8.48) Narrow Cognitive Content of 8.45
I. De Se Cognitive Content
a. De se acceptance of the utterance by Alice:
( iota X ( A l i c e X))
( bel ieve C1 X)
( hungry C1 . ( I * C1))
b. ‘Thought-Disquotation’ with respect to Bob: not applicable
Notice that de dicto disquotation of the indexical is straightforward and in direct analogy
to the respective de dicto interpretation of proper names. The discussion of IFRT has shown
that that a speaker might use «I» in a way that doesn’t involve any attempt identification of
himself, because I-thoughts in episodal thinking aren’t indexical. Nevertheless, the speaker will
have to attempt to identify himself from a third person perspective if he wants to understand
his or another person’s use of «I». This follows from examples involving persistent tokens and
is further backed up by the fact that it is, as opposed to proper names, precisely the purpose
of the reference rule of an indexical and the pointing gesture of a demonstrative to be used
as identification criteria in a given context of utterance. The question is where and how de
se readings fit into the picture. As outlined above, they link the use of linguistic expressions
to phenomena in cognition that are thought to be relevant for certain behavior. But unlike
the link between speaker reference by means of proper names and de dicto readings of belief
ascriptions, the alleged linguistic evidence for this link is sparse and problematic. Examples like
8.32 don’t have to be considered false when used for reporting a third person reference to oneself
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in thinking; they can be considered inappropriate instead, because they would usually convey
a first-person reference in thinking and don’t indicate any attempt of the subject to identify
herself by means of certain properties. The actual irreducibility occurs in actual episodal thinking
and isn’t a feature of the meaning of linguistic expressions. A receiver has to interpret PRO
as an anaphoric expression that is co-extensional with the embedding matrix subject-NP, and
his attempt to identify the semantic referent of either referential expression is fallible as any
attempt to identify something as something. If source language is under consideration a de se
interpretation is always barely indicated or suggested. The same holds for de dicto readings of
belief ascriptions, but there is a significant difference. De dicto readings of proper names reflect
the way speakers use and understand names in cases when identifying reference is expected,
they represent the fact that a speaker takes into account whatever she believes to know about
the referent of a name and the information conveyed by the sparse linguistic meaning of that
name. This also holds for de dicto readings of indexicals, and even more so, because of their
rich descriptive content. Conversely to this, a de se reading of an indexical token only reflects
one way how the respective user, i.e. the sender, may and often will understand it prior to using
it, not how he may understand it later or how the recipient may understand it. These readings
seem to have a better place in a cognitive and anti-realist semantic framework, which represents
speaker idiolects and presentations of objects to speakers in thinking right from the start.
8.5.3 Belief and Behavioral Dispositions
De dicto and de se belief attributions are attempts to formally express beliefs that the given
believer would express in certain ways, but not in others. They draw a connection between a
speaker’s belief and his behavioral dispositions. These in particular include the speaker’s lin-
guistic dispositions: utterance dispositions and more generally dispositions to accept or reject
utterances on the basis of his beliefs. Such dispositions become relevant in case an actual or
possible speaker reference by means of some expression doesn’t match the expression’s semantic
referent, i.e. in case identifying reference fails or might fail. However, not all respective for-
mal belief attributions encode any of this directly, some of them only indicate the corresponding
behavioral dispositions. A de se belief attribution in the above sense can’t be said to directly ex-
press in terms of its truth-conditions the attitude holder’s disposition to elicit an I-response. This
is only expressed indirectly, either by stipulating a special referent, such as an I- or now-thought,
or by changing the relatum of the belief relation in general (from sets of possible worlds to
structured propositions, sets of centered worlds, properties, Russellian propositions containing
additional modes of presentation, etc.) and by additionally presuming that these changes guar-
antee a disposition to elicit the corresponding response. As long as this additional presumption
isn’t required to be expressed in the formal language of analysis itself, in principle any kind of
formal belief attribution according to which the believer believes something about herself, her
location, or the current time, and with a semantics more ‘fine-grained’ than de re and de dicto
belief can be interpreted as a de se belief. For example, instead of regarding the speaker referent
of a subject use of «I» by Alice for Alice her I-thought, the referent could be taken as Alice plus
an instance of the mysterious substance thought-phlogiston representing the way of Alice’s being
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given to herself in the given situation. Both analyses are ‘fine-grained’ enough to do justice to
de se belief in the sense of being sufficiently distinct from other notions of belief; they are de-
scriptively adequate. From an explanatory point of view they remain incomplete, because they
don’t draw a direct connection between the presumed mental phenomenon of identification-free
self-reference in thinking to the external phenomenon I-response that may occur as the result
of the former according to IR-type arguments. Strictly speaking, a formal belief attribution can
only encode—as opposed to merely indicating—an utterance disposition if at some place in its
formal semantics or the specification of its intended reading linguistic material is quoted or oth-
erwise referred to. Likewise, a formal notion of belief only encodes an extralinguistic behavioral
disposition, say the disposition to clean up this trail of sugar, if in its semantics or specification of
its intended reading in the target language it is semantically referred to this behavior. Here is for
example a belief attribution that directly expresses an utterance disposition in intended models.
(8.49) M, g, c, k 
( iota SUBJ ( A l i c e SUBJ))
( bel ieve C1 SUBJ)
( hungry C1 . SUBJ)
(DispU SUBJ a)
Hereby, (DispU C . X Y) is a ternary predicate with intended reading in context C, X is disposed
to utter Y and the constant JaKMg,k (c) =«I am hungry».19 Dealing with extralinguistic behavioral
dispositions is more complicated, since it requires quantification over possible I-responses, which
are hard to categorize in general. But IR-type arguments do precisely that; so in principle a
notion of de se belief based on extralinguistic dispositions doesn’t have to be less precise than
the IR-type arguments themselves that establish this very notion. For comparison, as far as de
dicto belief is concerned the analysis given in chapter 4 encodes utterance dispositions, although
it isn’t directly based on them. Nominal description theory is quotational, because it is based on
the property of being called such and such in the source language. Any additional identificational
criteria only indicate a disposition to use certain source language expressions, though. Likewise,
the non-rigid interpretations of indexicals in section 8.2 are only indirectly quotational, by virtue
of the fact that a competent speaker under normal conditions might use a corresponding source
language indexical to express his belief that the current speaker, the current time of utterance,
or the current place of utterance is such and such.
On one hand, subject uses of «I» and similar analyses of other indexicals are also quotational,
because they indicate utterance and acceptance dispositions of a speaker. On the other hand,
they point to the problem of extralinguistic self-reference in thinking, and this problem is not at
all a matter of natural language interpretation. IFRT tells us that certain behaviorally-relevant
self-references in thinking aren’t in any way achieved or performed by strong identification on
the basis of identification criteria, yet leaves the nature of the referent open. This referent can
19For the sake of simplicity, a constant is used here. In a more elaborate account source language expressions must
be available to the target language as objects constructed on the basis of a reasonable source language grammar. In
many linguistic applications this is possible; it is for example done on the basis of HPSG grammars in token-dependency
semantics (Dahllöf 2001, 2002), which is motivated by the paratactic view on indirect speech in (Davidson 1968).
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be taken as an I-thought, and then it must satisfy 8.39, or it can be taken as a complex entity
involving a Millian specification of the referent and an irreducible mode of being given. From
the point of view of description theory, there is yet another possibility. The referent can also be
taken as the thinking person de re, as a physical object, that is speaker-referred to in a special,
infallible way in that person’s thinking. This stipulation can be made for a de re attribution
like 8.43.Ia, when at the meantime the description theory of reference is used for analyzing
indexicals and proper names. 8.43.Ia doesn’t indicate any identification of the referent by means
of properties—the bound variable indicates infallible reference simply by virtue of being bound.
All of these attempts to specify a special way of attributing belief de se have in common
that they lead away from the real problem: What gives such a self-reference its special epistemic
status for the thinking person, as it is established by IFRT? Making a semiotic distinction between
discursive and presentational symbols is one way to tackle this problem. If episodal thinking,
insofar as it is relevant for the irreducibility thesis, indeed has to be a presentational symbolic
system, then speaking of an extralinguistic ‘self-reference in thinking’ is an unfitting metaphor,
since transferring the notion of speaker or semantic reference from discursive to presentational
symbolic systems means taking a presentational as a representational system. There might still
be other, good reasons for speaking about ‘self-reference in thinking’, and the distinction between
discursive and representational symbolic systems might itself be too general to be fruitful in a
more elaborate theory of cognition. But in any case such a theory is a matter of the philosophy
of mind, empirical psychology, and neurophysiology.
8.5.4 Concluding Remarks
Reference is not a homogeneous phenomenon. Figure 8.2 displays various aspects of reference
discussed so far. The more cognitive aspects of speaker reference are taken into account, the
more the notion of reference will be subject to empirical psychology and the investigation of
actual thought processes. Speaker reference in general is an idealization from individual pre-
sentations of objects in actual cognition of persons or animals. When these aspects of episodal
thinking start to involve linguistic, representational symbols, they may become relevant to lin-
guistic theory. De se attitudes live in a gray zone between aspects of actual cognition and aspects
of natural language meaning. Description theory is already more on the side of natural language
meaning and idealizes to a high degree from actual thought processes. On one hand, cogni-
tive aspects of a speaker’s reference to a particular can be caught by a description that includes
speaker-dependent identification criteria at each occasion of use of the linguistic expression in
question. These criteria can for example be taken to indicate and explain the speaker’s disposi-
tions to accept certain co-extensional terms, for example a definite description, as substitutes for
a term while other are rejected. On the other hand, target language descriptions are also part
of the condition for identifying reference. From an epistemic perspective, a speaker refers to the
semantic referent of a term if she successfully identifies that referent by means of the associated
identification criteria. At the rightmost edge of the scale is Millianism, which is adequate if fail-
ure of identifying reference is not an issue, neglectable, or simply ignored. This is appropriate
for semantic reference, as long as the pragmatic view on referential opacity is adopted.
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Figure 8.2: Aspects of Reference
As Perry (1997b, a) points out, various notions of semantic content resulting from any of the
above aspects of reference can live together and represent aspects of the truth-conditions of an
utterance. Whenever strong identification can be ignored, for example because the referents of
singular terms are known, a Millian specification of semantic content is adequate. Perry calls this
contentC or referential content and points out that it encodes the fact that two speakers may ‘say
the same’ by different utterances,20 for example when the Russellian proposition 〈a, P 〉 is used
to specify the truth-conditional content of Alice’s utterance of ‹I’m hungry› and Bob’s reporting
that ‹Alice is hungry›. To this it must be added that these utterances of course only say the same
as long as the speaker in the context of the former utterance is Alice. A purporter of the indirect
reference view might insist on making this condition explicit,21 but this choice is not mandatory.
There is no need to make such a condition explicit if epistemic and cognitive aspects of reference
are not the focal point, but the main interest is in a notion of truth-conditional content that
all utterances have in common that in a sense ‘say the same.’ Mapping ‹I› and ‹Alice› to the
same rigid target language constant can be desirable in this case. The description-theoretic point
of view will on the other hand be desirable, once epistemic and cognitive aspects of speaker
reference are focused on.22 Does this mean that the difference between direct and indirect
reference is merely a matter of choosing a level of idealization for semantic content? No. The
two views differ considerably in overall perspective and also for principal reasons. First, it has
20See (Perry 1997a, p. 603), (Perry 2005, pp. 322-3).
21For example, in FOLC the constraint would be expressed as follows, where tense is ignored:
M,g, c, k (iota X (Alice X)) (iota Y (Speaker Y)) (= X Y)
22What Perry calls contentM of indexicals is similar to the FOLC analyses provided here, but doesn’t involve a uniqueness
condition and is explicitly instead of implicitly utterance-based, i.e. contentM represents reflexive truth-conditions. See
(Perry 1997a, p. 601-2), (Perry 2005, p. 323). His view on proper names in (Perry 1997b) is closer to the direct
reference view than the one propagated here.
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been recognized, starting from chapter 4, that in nested attitude ascriptions de dicto readings of
proper names are relativized to the first attitude only. If this is so, just using non-rigid constants
is not adequate for expressing de dicto readings of proper names in attitude ascriptions. Either
a semantic mechanism for expressing relativized rigidity has to be implemented, as outlined in
chapter 4, or the syntax–semantics interface has to manage the scope appropriately, as presumed
in later chapters and exemplified in Appendix C. Still, with an appropriate binding mechanism—
such as quantification plus equality, or lambda abstraction—non-rigid constants can do the job.
There is, however, a second, crucial difference between Millianism and indirect reference theory.
Expressing semantic reference by means of Millian specifications is not the same as expressing
it by means of wide scope definite descriptions, because the former doesn’t assume any non-
trivial property the referent must satisfy uniquely. Nominal description theory says that the
meaning of a proper name is a set of linguistic conventions of being called by that name, and that
semantic reference is the fact that in a given conversational context there is exactly one object
that is actually being called by the name, or otherwise the name is empty by violation of the
presupposition of number. External description theory is the stronger claim that proper names
have an ideal, public language meaning that is fixed by groups of speakers on the basis of actual
social processes in addition to being called such and such in the weaker sense. A purporter of
EDT might for example claim, against Kripke, that we wouldn’t call Aristotle «Aristotle» if many
or all of the properties that experts believe him to have would turn out to be wrong. Say, in the
unlikely event that someone would show convincingly that Plato never had any scholars, that all
of Aristotle’s writings have in fact been written by a monk in the Early Middle Age, and that at the
time of Aristotle’s living only dogs were called «Aristotle» in Ancient Greek, i.e. according to the
Ancient Greek naming conventions that correspond to «Aristotle» nowadays, then we would not
say, according to EDT, that Aristotle must have been one of these dogs, but would rather say that
Aristotle didn’t exist. In both views, the relative rigidity of proper names is merely a linguistic
fact of how they are interpreted relative to specifications of counterfactual circumstances; it
has no metaphysical or otherwise philosophical relevance. These claims set both versions of
description theory far apart from the direct reference view, according to which ordinary proper
names have no meaning that is relevant for determining semantic reference. Third, going from
the Kaplanian character of an indexical to its (Millian) content and then taking belief as a relation
of the believer to this content is asking for trouble. Speaker reference by means of an indexical
is a speaker’s determining the purported referent by means of the indexical’s reference rule.
This subjective meaning can be expressed by diagonalization, but diagonalized content is not
Millian. It is descriptive in the same sense as the non-rigid descriptions used in the beginning
of this chapter. Fourth, essential readings of indexicals convey an infallible mode of ‘reference’
in thinking that is indeed direct and cannot be adequately encoded by means of descriptions
because of IFRT. However, as has been argued, speaking of reference in thinking and a language
of thinking are misleading metaphors for the cognitive phenomenas in question.
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I. FOML Specification
FOML Syntax. Let VAR be the set of variables containing x, y, z and all of their indexed vari-
ants, CON the set of individuals constants containing a, b, c and all of their indexed variants,
MID be a finite set of modality indices 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m, PRED := PRED0 ∪ · · · ∪ PREDk the set of
n-ary predicates 0 ≤ n ≤ k (n, k ∈ N0), and TERM = CON ∪VAR. Then the set of well-formed
formulasWFF of FOML is given by the following recursive rule, where the names of the sets just
defined serve as metavariables for any of the respective set’s members.
WFF := ∀∗VARWFF | ∃∗VARWFF | (WFF ∧WFF) | ¬WFF
| MIDWFF | PRED
n(TERM1, . . . ,TERMn) (A.1)
Redundant parentheses and parentheses around the arguments of unary predicates may be
left out or added for better readability.
FOML Model. Let D be a non-empty set (the total domain of all objects), W be a non-empty
set of possible states of affairs (‘worlds’) w1, w2, . . . , R be a set containing for each member of
MID a binary relation on W (written as Rpi for pi ∈ MID), and J.KMg (w) be an interpretation
function of model M from well-formed formulas into {1, 0} and from terms t ∈ TERM into D
with respect to a variable assignment function g from VAR to D, with respect to a world w. A
frame of FOML is then a tuple F = (W,R,D). A model of FOML based on frame F is the n-tupel
consisting of F and the interpretation J.KMg (w). A VAR-variant h of an assignment function g,
written as h ≈VAR g, is the same as g in all places except possibly for VAR.
FOML Term and Predicate Interpretation.
JVARKMg (w) := g(VAR) (A.2)
JCONKMg (w) ∈ D (A.3)
JPREDnKMg (w) ⊆ Dn (A.4)
FOML Truth in a Model.
(A.5) JPRED(TERM1, . . . ,TERMn)KMg (w)
=


1 if 〈JTERM1KMg (w), . . . , JTERMnKMg (w)〉 ∈ JPREDKMg (w)
0 otherwise
(A.6) J¬WFFKMg (w)
=


1 if JWFFKMg (w) = 0
0 otherwise
235
(A.7) JWFF1 ∧WFF2KMg (w)
=


1 if JWFF1KMg (w) = 1 and JWFF2KMg (w) = 1
0 otherwise
(A.8) J∃∗VARWFFKMg (w)
=


1 if there’s an h ≈VAR g such that JWFFKMh (w) = 1
0 otherwise
(A.9) J∀∗VARWFFKMg (w)
=


1 if for all h ≈VAR g it is the case that JWFFKMh (w) = 1
0 otherwise
(A.10) JMIDWFFKMg (w)
=


1 if in all u ∈W such that RMID(w, u) : JWFFKMg (u) = 1
0 otherwise
In addition to the above rules, we assume standard definitions of the other truth-functions
and of the dual modal operator ♦MID as ¬MID ¬. A modality index MID may be left out if
modal operators are discussed in general, different modalities aren’t compared, or it is clear
what kind of modality is meant. As an alternative notation M, g,w  WFF will sometimes be
used for JWFFKMg (w). Notice that the world parameter is sometimes also written as sub- or
superscript of the interpretation function, but it is written as a separate argument here in order
to accommodate the notation to the one used for double-index theories in chapter 6.
Existence Predicate. We assume a special unary predicate E whose intended interpretation is
x exists. Unless otherwise noted only models of FOML are considered in which E is given this
extralogical interpretation. Relativized quantifiers are introduced by the following abbreviations.
∃VARWFF := ∃∗VAR(E(VAR) ∧WFF) (A.11)
∀VARWFF := ∀∗VAR(E(VAR) ⊃WFF) (A.12)
Iota Quantifier. The possibilist iota quantifier is defined as follows:
(A.13) ι∗VAR1WFF1WFF2
:= ∃∗ VAR1(WFF1 ∧ ∀∗VAR2 (WFF1[VAR1/VAR2]
⊃ VAR1 = VAR2) ∧WFF2)
for new variable VAR2
Canonical Identity. We assume a special binary predicate = which is interpreted as the same
equivalence relation in any state of affairs and has the intended reading x is identical with y.
Unless otherwise noted, only FOML models are considered, in which = has this reading.
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Extension FOMLι. FOMLι is the logical system obtained from the above FOML by making
the following changes. (i) The syntax is augmented to include formulas of the form ιVARWFF
into the set of terms TERM. (ii) Term interpretation is changed such that JTERMKMg (w) ∈ D or
it is undefined, and a term of the form ιVARWFF is interpreted as follows.
(A.14) JιVARWFFKMg (w)
:=


h(VAR) if there is exactly one h ≈VAR g such that JWFFKMh (w)
undefined otherwise
(iii) The interpretation of simple predicative clauses is adjusted as follows.
(A.15) JPRED(TERM1, . . . ,TERMn)KMg (w)
:=


1 if JTERM1KMg (w), . . . , JTERMnKMg (w) are defined and
〈JTERM1KMg (w), . . . , JTERMnKMg (w)〉 ∈ JPREDKMg (w),
0 otherwise
II. Notes
1. FOML allows statements about objects to come out true at some state of affairs if they don’t
exist at that state, since the existence predicate can have arbitrary extension at a state.
2. Constants are non-rigid, but can be made rigid at anytime by a suitable constraint.
3. The quantifiers relativized to the existence predicate correspond to actualist quantifiers in a
normal varying-domain first-order modal logic.
4. FOMLι allows non-denoting constants and implements iota terms semantically. Notice that
the following holds.
FOMLι : PRED(ιVARWFF) (A.16)
m
FOML : ιVARWFFPRED(VAR)
Appendix B
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I. Soames’ First Argument
P Proposition 1 (FOML Equivalence of Soames’ C and C’). For any model M = {W,R,D, J.K}
of constant-domain FOML (Appendix A), any chosen w0 ∈ W , and any rigid constant n: If (B.1)
holds, then (B.2) holds if and only if (B.3) holds.
M,w0 
ι∗ x(Gx)(x = n) (B.1)
M,w0  [Fn ⊃ ∃
∗ x(Fx ∧Gx)] (B.2)
M, g,w0 
ι∗ xGx[Fx ⊃ ∃∗ y(Fy ∧Gy)] (B.3)
Proof. According to the rigidity condition on term n, (B.4) must hold.
∀w s.t. w0Rw : JnKMg (w0) = JnKMg (w) (B.4)
We further assume that (B.1) is the case. So there is an a ∈ D such that JGKMg (w0) = {a} andJnKMg (w0) = a. We show that given these assumptions, (B.2)⇔ (B.3) holds by evaluating (B.2)
and (B.3) to the same condition. Part 1. From (B.2) we get:
∀w s.t. w0Rw : if JnKMg (w) ∈ JF KMg (w),
then ∃h : h ≈x g s.t. M,h,w  Fx ∧Gx
(B.5)
Since by assumption ∀w s.t. w0Rw : JnKMg (w) = a we get:
∀w s.t. w0Rw : if a ∈ JF KMg (w),
then ∃h : h ≈x g s.t. M,h,w  Fx ∧Gx
(B.6)
Part 2. We continue by evaluating (B.3) and get from the definition of ι∗:
M, g,w0  ∃
∗ x[Gx ∧ ∀z(Gz ⊃ x = z) ∧[Fx ⊃ ∃∗ y(Fy ∧Gy)]] (B.7)
Because of assumption (B.1) we can set h(x) = a and know that the uniqueness condition is
fulfilled. Thus:
M,h,w0  [Fx ⊃ ∃
∗ y(Fy ∧Gy)], where h(x) = a (B.8)
By further evaluating, we get:
∀w s.t. w0Rw :M,h,w  Fx ⊃ ∃
∗ y(Fy ⊃ Gy), where h(x) = a (B.9)
and thus
∀w s.t.w0Rw : if a ∈ JF KMh (w),
then ∃h′ s.t. h′ ≈y h andM,h′, w  Fy ∧Gy, where h(x) = a
(B.10)
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Since x doesn’t occur in Fy ∧Gy, this expresses the same condition as (B.6).
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II. FOML Equivalence of Rigidified Descriptions with Rigid Terms
P Proposition 2 (FOMLι Rigidified Descriptions and Terms). For any constant-domainFOMLι
model M = 〈W,R,D, J.K , w0〉 with designated evaluation point w0 ∈ W (see Appendix A and
definition (ML 1) on page 53), arbitrary unary property P , any formula A, and any rigid term n:
if (B.11) holds, then (B.12) holds as well under arbitrary assignment and for arbitrary w ∈W .
M,w0  n = ιx@Px (B.11)
M,w  A ≡ A[n/ιx@Px] (B.12)
Proof. Proof is by induction on the complexity of formulas in FOMLι. Note that because of
B.11 and the canonical interpretation of identity we can assume that there is an a ∈ D such
that JnKM (w0) = a and JP KM (w0) = {a}. By rigidity condition (Kri 5) on page 45 we further
know that JnKM (w) = JnKM (w′) = a for any world w′ that is accessible from w. We use g for an
arbitrary assignment, omit g when it is irrelevant, and abbreviate t := ιx@Px for convenience.
[Case 1] A is a simple predication of the form R(u1, . . . , ui, n, ui+1, . . . , uj). We only consider
the unary case of the form R(n), since the n-ary cases are analogous.
M, g,w  R(n) ≡ R[n/t] (B.13)
m
JnKMg (w) ∈ JRKMg (w)⇔ Jιx@PxKMg (w) ∈ JRKMg (w) (B.14)
m
a ∈ JRKMg (w)⇔ ∃!h : h ≈x g s.t. J@PxKMh (w) = 1 (B.15)
and h(x) ∈ JRKMg (w)
m
a ∈ JRKMg (w)⇔ ∃!h : h ≈x g s.t. JPxKMh (w0) = 1 (B.16)
and h(x) ∈ JRKMg (w)
Since by assumption JP KM (w0) = {a}, it must be the case that h(x) = a, and therefore the above
holds by induction assumption.
[Case 2] A is of the form ¬B. We have to proof B.17. Since this is classically equivalent to B.18,
B.17 must hold by induction assumption.
M,w  ¬B ≡ ¬B[n/t] (B.17)
m
M,w  B ≡ B[n/t] (B.18)
241
[Case 3] A is of the form (B ∧C). We have to show B.19.
M,w  (B ∧ C) ≡ (B ∧ C)[n/t] (B.19)
m
M,w  (B ∧ C) ≡ (B[n/t] ∧ C[n/t]) (B.20)
By induction assumption, the following equivalences hold:
M,w  B ≡ B[n/t] (B.21)
M,w  C ≡ C[n/t] (B.22)
Therefore B.20 must hold as well.
[Case 4] A is of the form ∀∗ xB. We have to show B.23.
M, g,w  (∀∗ xB) ≡ (∀∗ xB)[n/t] (B.23)
m
M, g,w  (∀∗ xB) ≡ (∀∗ xB[n/t]) (B.24)
m
∀h s.t. h ≈x g :M,h,w  B ⇔ ∀h s.t. h ≈x g :M,h,w  B[n/t] (B.25)
Since the induction assumption holds for arbitrary assignment, the above equivalence must
also hold under assignment h.
[Case 5] A is of the form ∃∗ xB. This case is analogous to the previous one.
[Case 6] A is of the form pi B. We have to show B.26.
M,w  (pi B) ≡ (pi B)[n/t] (B.26)
m
M,w  (pi B) ≡ (pi B[n/t]) (B.27)
m
M,w  pi B ⇔M,w  pi B[n/t] (B.28)
m
∀w′ s.t. wRpiw′ :M,w′  B ⇔ ∀w′ s.t. wRpiw′ :M,w′  B[n/t] (B.29)
Since evaluation on both sides start from w, and we universally quantify over all worlds that
are pi-accessible from w, and furthermore the induction assumption holds for arbitrary w ∈ W ,
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the above must hold as well.
[Case 7] A is of the form ♦pi B. This case is analogous to the previous one.
Appendix C
A Generic Syntax–Semantics
Interface
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The interface translates a given syntactic derivation tree into a set of target language ex-
pressions based on rewrite rules and some information passed as tags from the syntax to the
interface. The input to the interface consists of an arbitrary-branching derivation tree whose
nodes contains lists of tags and target language schemes. The rules are tree rewriting rules. The
construction algorithm applies these rules to the given input tree, rewrites it by the rules to a set
of trees, and these are subsequently flattened.
I. Intermediate Language IML
Base Entities. A tag is a sequence of alphabetic letters and possibly an integer index and possi-
bly an integer substitution index. We write TAG1|2 for the tag TAG with index 1 and substitution
index 2. A tag starting with ‘:’ is local, any other tag is global. A tag ending in ‘?’ is an a-tag, any
other tag is a b-tag.1 A specification is one of the following form where SPEC is a specification
and JUN1 and JUN2 are the logical standard connectives as in FOLC:
(C.1) SPEC := (JUN1 SPEC) | (JUN2 SPEC SPEC) | TAG
A substitutionmarker is an integer number. A direction sign is either of the symbols ‘:’ (local),
‘/’ (right), or ‘\’ (left). A matcher is of the form dM−, sM=S−, dM, or dM=S, where M is a marker,
d is a direction sign, S is a specification, and −, = are taken as a literal symbols. A matcher
ending in ‘-’ is deleting, any other matcher is non-deleting. The type of a matcher is the type of its
direction sign, i.e. local, left, or right. A matcher without specification may not be local. A target
language scheme consists of sequences of one or more of the following: (1) arbitrary payload,
here written as target language strings, (2) tags, (3) markers, and (4) matchers. An expression is
a pair written as list [TAGS SCMS], where TAGS is a list of tags and SCMS is a list of schemes. Lists
are generally written here with round or square parentheses.
Matching. A tag t matches a tag u (Case 1) if t that has an index: t consists of the same letter
sequence as u, and t and u have the same index, or (Case 2) if t doesn’t have an index: t and
u consist of the same letter sequence. Otherwise t doesn’t match u. An expression e matches a
specification s if. . .
1. T matches any of the tags in e, in case s is a simple tag T
2. T matches neither of the tags in e, in case s is of the form (not T), where T is a simple tag
3. It is not the case that e matches A, in case s is of the form (not A), where A is a complex
boolean specification
4. e matches A and B, in case s is of the form (and A B)
The other cases are definable in the standard way for boolean connectives.
1The letters may be taken as shortcuts for anaphoric and binder respectively, which comes close to their purpose.
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II. Rules
There are four sorts of rules with domain DOM, and left LHS, and right hand side RHS specification
respectively.
1. DOM: LHS < RHS Maximal Left Shift
2. DOM: LHS << RHS Left Shift
3. DOM: LHS <<* RHS Permuting Left Shift
4. DOM: LHS <* RHS Permuting Maximal Left Shift
To ease understanding, Figure C.1 depicts some examples of how trees can be rewritten by
these rules, where for simplicity the node name is taken as a member in the list of tags at each
node.
III. Tree Rewriting
Figure C.2 lays out how the rules work. The dashed lines indicate that there may be intervening
child nodes, as long as the constraints given in round numbers aren’t violated, and the indices in
the figure are computed in ascending order from left to right and top to bottom. The Raise Left
rewriting step makes sure that an LHS (without intervening LHS, RHS, or DOM) that is embedded
into an RHS within the rule domain is moved outside the RHS directly under DOM and immedi-
ately before (Case 1) the RHS dominating LHS in case of an << rule, and (Case 2) the first RHS
within the domain in case of an < rule. The Shift Left rewriting step ensures that any LHS nodes
are moved immediately before (Case 1) the last RHS node which precedes them in case of an <<
rule, and (Case 2) the first preceding RHS within the domain in case of an < rule. If more than
one LHS is moved, the linear precedence order of the LHS nodes is preserved, except for the *
variants which yield all permutations of the LHS nodes at their respective locations. There may
be arbitrary sister nodes to any of the RHS or LHS nodes that aren’t specified in the diagrams; they
aren’t affected by rules unless they match one. Notice that a rule domain in a tree may not cross
its own matching nodes as boundary, i.e. for example the domain of a rule with rule domain S
at a given S node n1 in a given derivation tree will only extend down to the immediate parent of
the next lower S node n2 dominated by n1, but not further below. It is, however, possible that
RHS=DOM such that LHS is adjuncted leftmost immediately below DOM.
IV. The Algorithm
The following auxiliary accessor functions are assumed.
• spec(m) takes a matcher and returns its specification
• num(m) takes a matcher and returns its marker
• tags(e) takes an expression or a tree node and returns its tags
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Figure C.1: Examples of rule applications, where node names are taken as tags for simplicity.
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Figure C.2: Tree rewrite rules (a) Raise Left and (b) Shift Left..
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• scm(e) takes an expression and returns its list of schemes
• first(E) and last(E) return the first and the last position of a list respectively, nth(E, n)
returns the element at position n in E
Function Synsem. Comment: This is the main function that rewrites a tree into a set of possibly
nested IML expressions. First, local tags are indexed to the nearest matching tag, then global tags are
indexed to the previous matching tag, then the tree is rewritten according to the rules, global indices
are adjusted again since they might have moved, and the flattened result is composed according to
left/right/local matchers. The result is a set of lists of IML expressions whose schemes may possibly
contain other IML expressions. The final step of recursively extracting the list of possibly nested tar-
get language schemes out of each of those lists is omitted, since it is trivial.
Take a derivation tree φ and a list of rules R, return a set of lists of target language schemes.
The derivation tree must be a tree that contains a list of tags at some nodes and some target
language schemes at some lexical nodes.
Case 1: Each lexical node has only one or zero target language schemes. The result
of processing the input tree φ given a list R is then the following set, where nil
is the empty list.
{
ψ′ | ψ′ = Compose(Flatten(GlobalBind(ψ), nil))),
where ψ ∈ Rewrite({GlobalBind(LocalBind(φ))}, R)
}
(C.2)
Case 2: Some lexical nodes of the input trees contain more than one target language
scheme (semantical ambiguity). Then the result set has to be computed like in
Case 1 for all trees resulting from different combinations of target language
schemes at lexical nodes, where only one target language scheme is chosen at a
time at each lexical node.
Function Rewrite. Comment: Processes all trees in the input set and combines the result in a flat
set.
Take a set of trees Γ and a list of rules R, return the following set of trees:
⋃
φ∈Γ
RewriteT ree(φ,R) (C.3)
Function RewriteT ree. Comment: If a tag at a node n is a domain of a rule, then the rule is
applied to the trees that are the result of processing all the child trees of n, and respectively new trees
are constructed out of these results with n as the parent node. The tree is processed bottom-up, first
applying the rules with domains matching at lower nodes before applying those matching at higher
nodes, where the results at each level are combined into new trees.
Take a tree φ and a list of rules R, return a set of trees. Start with root node of φ.
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with node n in φ:
let Γ be the set of trees obtained by combining all the results inRewrite({m1}, R),
. . . , Rewrite({mi}, R) for the child subtreesm1, . . . ,mi of n into new trees
with n as root.
let R′ be the rules in R whose domain specification matches some tags at n.
if R′ is empty, then return Γ
else return the set ApplyRules(Γ, R′).
Function ApplyRule. Comment: Applies Reorder to all trees in the set of input trees. Reorder
yields a singleton in case of a non-permuting rule and may contain several trees in case of a permut-
ing rule.
Take a set of trees Γ and a rule, return the following set of trees:
⋃
φ∈Γ
Reorder(φ, r) (C.4)
Hereby, Reorder(φ, r) is the set of trees obtained by rewriting φ by the rule r according to
the rewriting steps in Figure C.2 and described above.
Function ApplyRules. Comment: Applies each rule in the input list once from left to right, so rule
order matters.
Take a set of trees Γ and a list of rules R, return a set of trees as follows:
ApplyRules(Γ, R) =


Γ if R = nil (or signal an error),
ApplyRule(Γ, r1) if R = [r1],
ApplyRule(ApplyRule(Γ, ri−1), ri) if R = [r1 . . . rn],
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
(C.5)
Function LocalBind. Preorder traverses the tree and destructively modifies tags, such that each
local a-tag gets the index of the b-tag that is nearest in the tree. A-tags correspond to variables not
yet bound, whereas b-tags correspond to variables introduced and bound by a binder target language
scheme.
Take a tree φ, return a tree. Let there be two storages A and B that stores pairs of tags and
integers with the tag as key. Let c be an integer counter.
with node n in φ from top to down, left to right:
let c := c+ 1
for each local tag t at n that doesn’t have an index yet:
if t is a b-tag, then give it a new, unique index and put 〈t, c〉 into B
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else put 〈t, c〉 into A
for each 〈a, n〉 ∈ A:
if there is a pair 〈b,m〉 ∈ B such that a matches b and min〈b,m〉∈B |n−m|, then
set the index of a to the index of b
else do nothing
Function GlobalBind. Comment: Gives each a-tag the index of the last preceding matching b-tag
if available. Destructively modifies the tags.
Take a tree φ, return a tree. Let B be a storage for tags that allows one to retrieve the latest
tag t1 (last in, first out) given some tag t2 that matches t1. Preorder traverse the tree and modify
tags as follows:
with node n in φ from top to down, left to right:
for each global tag t at n:
if t is a b-tag, then give t a new, unique index and store t in B
else if B contains a tag t′ such that t matches t′, then give t the index of t′,
else do nothing.
Function Flatten. Comment: Merges all tags at higher nodes into the list of tags of target lan-
guage schemes dominated by the higher nodes and flattens the tree (not optimized), returning a list
of IML expressions.
Take a tree φ and a list of tags T , return a list E of IML expressions. Preorder traverse the
tree and collect the result as follows, where ⊕ is list concatenation.
with current node n:
let T ′ := T ⊕ tags(n)
if n is terminal, then return the list [[T ′ S]], where S is the lexical schemes at n
else return Flatten(m1, T
′)⊕ · · ·⊕Flatten(mi, T ′), for all childrenm1, . . . ,mi
of n
Function Substitute. Comment: A helper function that replaces all instances of a matcher that
occur in the schemes of an expression e by an expression e′, where the sort of the matcher is taken
into account.
Take an expression e, an expression e′, a matcher m, and return an expression.
let S′ be the list of schemes obtained from scm(e) by replacingm and all occurrences
of (Case 1) \i ifm is a left matcher, (Case 2) /i ifm is a right matcher, and (Case
3) : i if m is a local matcher, by e′, where i = num(m)
return the expression [tags(e)S′]
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FunctionMatch. Comment: Destructively modifies a list of expressions E, if applicable, by going
through the list from left to right, finding expressions to the left, right, or nearest that match a
matcher at the given position, and replacing the matchee with the matching expression. For sim-
plicity, deleting matchers mark a position as deleted and it is assumed that this marking is done
internally and ignored by other list processing functions than the ones used here.
Take a list of expressions E and return a boolean value. Side effect: Destructively modify E
as follows.
let flag:=false
for i := i+ 1 from position first(E) to position last(E):
if there is an expression e in E at position i, then
let M be the list of matchers m1, . . . ,mk in scm(e) sorted by their marker
in ascending order
for each matcher m inM from left to right:
if m is a matcher with specification, then
let k be the position of the next e′ in E such that spec(m) matches e′
(Case 1) to the left if m is a left matcher, (Case 2) to the right if m
is a right matcher, or (Case 3) nearest either to the right or to the
left if m is a local matcher; −1 if no match was found.
else m is a plain matcher without specification, so
if m is a left matcher, then let k be the position of the next item to
the left that is not deleted, −1 if there is none
else let k be the position of the next item to the right that is not
deleted, −1 if there is none
if k > −1 then
let flag := true
let E be modified such that e at i is substituted by Substitute(e, nth(E, k),m)
if m is a deleting matcher, then mark position k in E as deleted, else
do nothing (non-deleting matcher)
else do nothing or signal an error (no match was found, but there was
a matcher requiring one)
else do nothing (the position has already been marked for deletion)
return flag
Function FinalReplace. Comment: This function replaces markers in the target language schemes
that are just an integer number with the respective tag that has the same substitution index. This is
done, because for simplicity some tag names are used as target language variable names.
Take a list of expressions E, return a list of expressions.
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let R := nil
for each e in E
let e′ be the expression [tags(e) s′], where s′ is the list of schemes that is like
scm(e), except that each simple marker n has been replaced by the substi-
tution tag in tags(e) with substitution index n and each expression e′′ in it
has been replaced by FinalReplace(e′′)
let E′ := E′ ⊕ [e′]
return E′
Function Compose. Comment: Substitutes matchers for the respective matching expressions, until
no more substitutions are applicable, and finally replaces substitution markers by the respective tags
with the same substitution index.
Take a list of expressions E, return a list of expressions.
let E′ be a copy of E
loop while Match(E′) = true
return FinalReplace(E′)
V. Examples
The following examples below are devised for demonstrating how the machinery works, not
as examples of an adequate part of a syntax–semantics interface for English. The rules used
below are chosen ad hoc, and, although they should be fairly compatible with contemporary
syntactic theory, no claim about the adequacy of the derivation trees is made either. For clarity,
the results will sometimes be given as lists of target language schemes already extracted from
the IML expressions.
Example 1. The following list of rules is used.
(R1) S : NP << VP ; s imp l e SVO ru l e
(R2) S : SOP << S ; o p e ra to r r u l e
(R3) S : NP < DCOMP1 ; de d i c t o r u l e
(C.6) Alice believes that it was necessary that Bob loved Carol.
Figures C.3–C.5 depict the tree transformations and initial binding steps.
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Figure C.3: Input derivation tree.
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Figure C.4: Input derivation tree after local and first global binding.
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Figure C.5: The only solution tree after rewriting and before second global binding.
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(R1 ’ ) S : NQ << VP ; SVO rul e , non−quan t i f i e r NP
(R2 ’ ) S : Q <<* VP ; SVO rul e , q u an t i f i e r NP
(R3 ’ ) S : SMOD << S ; s e n t e n t i a l mod i f i e r r u l e
(R4 ’ ) S : TEMP << S ; t e n s e r u l e
These yield the following solution.
(Pres C? . C1)
( iota C1? . : SUBJ1 ( Speaker C1? . : SUBJ1))
( bel ieve C1? . C2 : SUBJ1?)
(Pres C2? . C3)
(Here C3? . C4)
( Je tz t C4? . C5)
( iota C5? . : SUBJ2 ( Speaker C5? . : SUBJ2))
( a l l C5? . : IO1 ( s a i l o r C5? . : IO1 ))
( ex i s t s C5? . :DO1)
( BeerUnit C5? . :DO1)
(buy3 C5? . : SUBJ2? :DO1? : IO1?)
Another solution is this one:
(Pres C? . C1)
( iota C1? . SUBJ1 ( Speaker C1? . : SUBJ1))
( bel ieve C1? . C2 : SUBJ1?)
(Pres C2? . C3)
(Here C3? . C4)
( Je tz t C4? . C5)
( iota C5? . : SUBJ2 ( Speaker C5? . : SUBJ2))
( ex i s t s C5? . :DO1)
( BeerUnit C5? . :DO1)
( a l l C5? . : IO1 ( s a i l o r C5? . : IO1 ))
(buy3 C5? . : SUBJ2? :DO1? : IO1?)
The former solution is presumably preferred by the sailors.
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CP
DCOMP
C
dass
S
S
NP
NP NQ :SUBJ|1
Ich
(iota C? . 1 (Speaker C? . 1))
VP
VP
SADV
SMOD
jetzt
(Jetzt C? . C)
VP
NP
NP Q :IO|1
DET
allen
(all C? . 1 /1)
N
Seemännern
( sailor C? . 1)
VP
SADV
SMOD
hier
(Here C . C)
VP
NP
NP Q :DO|1
DET
ein
(exists C? . 1)
N
Bier
(BeerUnit C? . 1)
Vfin
V
kaufe
(buy3 C? . :SUBJ? :DO? :IO?)
T
TEMP
(Pres C? . C)
Figure C.6: Input derivation tree for example C.7.
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.
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1
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C
?
.
1))
Figure
C
.7:
Input
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x
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.
(C
.8)
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and
hates
B
ob.
O
rdinary
V
P-coordination
w
orks
in
FO
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out
of
the
box.
R
ules
used
are
R
1
and
R
2.
T
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analysis
is
m
ore
or
less
independent
ofthe
actualsyntactic
analysis
ofcoordination;the
S
y
n
sem
m
apping
w
ould
apply
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e
w
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any
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e
under
the
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the
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long
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V
P
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coordinated
V
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M
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the
tense
operators
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frontis
a
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as
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e
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V
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structures.
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input
tree
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Figure
C
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R
1
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R
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.
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1
))
(
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(
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e
C
2
.
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B
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?
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O
1
?)
(
h
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C
2
.
:S
U
B
J1
?
:D
O
1
?
))
E
x
a
m
p
le
5
.
(C
.9)
A
lice
loves
B
ob.
H
e
loves
her,too.
R
ules
used
are
R
1
and
R
2,and
only
the
last
steps
of
the
linear
case
are
considered.
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[(SOP) (Pres C1)]
[(NP SG FEM : SUBJ1|1) ( iota C1? . 1 ( A l i c e C1? . 1))]
[(NP SG MASK :DO1|1) ( iota C1? . 1 (Bob C1? . 1))]
[(VP) ( love C1? . : SUBJ1 :DO1)]
[(SOP) (Pres C1 C2)]
[(NP : SUBJ2|1) \1=(and NP SG MASK)]
[(NP :DO2|1) \1=(and NP SG FEM)]
[(VP) ( love C1? . : SUBJ2 :DO2)]
This yields the following result.
[(SOP) (Pres C1)]
[(NP SG FEM : SUBJ1|1) ( iota C1? . 1 ( A l i c e C1? . 1))]
[(NP SG MASK :DO1|1) ( iota C1? . 1 (Bob C1? . 1))]
[(VP) ( love C1? . : SUBJ1 :DO1)]
[(SOP) (Pres C1 C2)]
[(NP : SUBJ2|1) ( iota C1? . 1 ( A l i c e C1? . 1))]
[(NP :DO2|1) ( iota C1? . 1 (Bob C1? . 1))]
[(VP) ( love C1? . : SUBJ2 :DO2)]
VI. Comments
1. Parts of Synsem have been formulated as destructive algorithms. Purely functional, non-
destructive versions would be more desirable.
2. Permutations don’t have to be computed in memory. They can be computed on demand and
implemented efficiently, for example by using lazy streams or generators as data structures.
A more advanced version would implement ways to sort the permuted results according to
heuristics for getting preferred readings first. Dealing with semantic ambiguities ought to
be extended to take into account heuristics for getting preferred readings first, too.
3. If it can be shown for some source language and some set of rules that the global binding
mechanism outlined above is generally adequate, then all binders of context variables in
the target language could alternatively be implemented as modal operators. Yet it seems
likely that more complicated binding mechanisms are needed.
4. For a more realistic treatment of normal (non-E-type) pronouns replacements for all com-
binations of matching matchers instead of just the nearest ones need to be computed. If
there is more than one matching antecedent or subsequent, anaphora resolution heuristics
come into play that require ordering of possible results by a ranking.
5. Assuming rich enough sets of tags and rules, all expressions of the source language may be
reordered in any conceivable way. The goal is, however, to find a general and minimum set
of rules and tags for a given source language and a given target language that transforms
derivation trees into adequate target language expressions by using as much of the already
available syntactic structure as feasible.
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6. The above interface is not meant as a full-fledged solution, but only as a suggestion. Apart
from actually implementing it, some future research is needed to deal with more compli-
cated structures. For example, an NP-modifying relative clause cannot be dealt with easily
in the given framework, because there’s no simple means to put the whole semantics of a
relative clause into the NP’s quantifier restriction. This limitation shows that there is also
a need for semantic construction mechanisms that operate already at derivation tree-level,
i.e. there is a need for more complex tree rewriting steps.
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Index
acceptance
of utterance, 69, 81, 83, 89, 97, 211,
225
acquaintance, 21
actualism, 35, 45
actuality, 53, 124
operator, 53, 124
relativized, 89–90
actually, 123, 124, 187–188
in DIML, 152
ambiguity, 121
Amharic, 115, 159–162, 197–198
amnesia, 212
analytic, 34
anaphora, 107, 137
animacy, 131
are, 116, 133, 195
Aristotle, 44, 55, 74
attitude
attribution vs. ascription, 72, 83
de dicto, 33, 72, 74, 141, 179, 206–
211, 225–228
de re, 74, 225–228
de se, 214, 215, 225–228
in DIML, 153
in FOLC, 179
nested, 82
quotational, 32, 215
truth-asserting, 70
axis, 30, 118, 193
belief, see attitude
ambiguity theory of, 33
notions of, 215
self-locating, 214
bivalence, 10, 178
bundle view, see cluster theory
but, 9, 193
cartesian product, 5
case, 119
character, 146
stable, 147
Church-Langford translation test, 81, 215
circularity
in explication of senses, 27
in thinking, 219
prohibition (Kripke), 46, 52, 79–80
cluster theory, 29
co-extensionality, 13, 16
common ground, 136, 202
competence, 2, 7, 36, 37, 39, 40, 46, 48, 66,
76, 78, 80, 84, 133, 224
compositionality, 90–101
notion of, 91
of NDT, 91–100
test for, 91
conflation, 13, 16
constant
non-rigid, 75
rigid, 59, 63
content
cognitive, 7, 50, 221–228
partial, 72, 73
descriptive, 114
Kaplan’s, 146
non-descriptive, 50
stable, 147
truth-conditional, 7
context
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as designated reference point, 176
characterizations of, 137
conversational, 70, 142, 203
as parameter, 176
narrative, 112, 113, 176
eliminability, 201–202
endophoric, 107, 137
epistemic, 39
exophoric, 107
intensional ~, see referential opacity
of interpretation, 128
of thinking, 218–221
of utterance, 128–131, 142, 147, 175,
211
of utterance vs. conversational, 134–
137, 163–164
open context variable, 177
contrastivity, 9
Cooperative Principle, 44, 120, 136, 140,
192
Cresswell’s Argument, 162–163, 168
criteria
identification, 81–82
identifying, 73
definite description, 19
referential vs. attributive, 37, 139
definition, 6
deictic center, 108, 111, 112, 114, 118, 119,
130, 137, 142, 175, 182–188, 202
in modal domain, 123, 124
in person domain, 115
in social domain, 125
in temporal domain, 119
deictic projection, 112
deictica, see indexical, 107
deixis
am Phantasma, 112
discourse, 112
notion of, 107
social, 125, 133
demonstrative, 130–131, 156, 193
notion of a, 106
denotation, 11
description theory, 2, 19, 83–86
external, 67
implementation, 86–101
modal, 52–53
nominal, 67, 79
non-modal, 30–31
designation, 11
diagonalization, 109, 157–158, 160
operator, 153, 154
Dieri, 114
dimension
basic, 114
modality, 123–125
person, 114–116
social, 125
space, 116, 119
time, 119–123
Dimli, 122, 199–200
disquotation, 68–70, 83, 89, 97, 211, 223,
225
principle, 69
double vision problem, see referential opac-
ity
dthat, 153, 154, 157–158
dual aspect theory, 70–72
genuine, 67–68
egocentric particular, 106
egocentricity, 107, 108, 117, 185, 192
of time of speech, 180
Eipo, 117
ellipsis, 193
empirical perspective
on language, 8
epistemic argument
and NDT, 77–78
equality, 178
equivocation, 13, 16
event time, see time
Ewe, 215
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existence
as a predicate, 54, 155, 177, 235, 236
experience
phenomenal, see qualia
external description theory, 76
Finnish, 119
Frege
vs. Russell, 26
Fregean Sense, 22–25
French, 122
function, 5
gender, 115, 132–133
of proper name, 81
Gokana, 215
Gricean maximes, see Cooperative Principle
Hausa, 119
he, 114
here, 116, 136, 184–186, 210
non-rigid, 210
Hesperus, 34
I, 114, 186–187, 211
Amharic shifter, 115, 197
as accompanying feeling, 217
in thinking, see I-thought
synthetic, 218
I-response, 213, 224, 228
vs. non-I-response, 221
I-thought, 211, 213, 215, 217–218
ideal language, 8
identity, 32, 178, 235
statement, 34
immunity to error through misidentification,
218, 222
implicature
conventional, 133
index, 147
indexical
derived use, 112–113
essential, 109, 212–213, 225
in thinking, 219–221
mixed use of, 110–111
notion of an, 106
pure vs. impure, 111–112
indicator
complex, 188–193
compound, 139, 189, 192
notion of an, 106
quasi-, see quasi-indicator
unit vs. non-unit, 119
infallibility thesis, 109
informativity, 32
integer, 5
intuition, 83
iota operator, see iota quantifier
iota quantifier, 19, 155, 157, 235
irreducibility thesis, 109, 212–213
it, 114
Japanese, 116, 125
Javanese, 125
kore, 116, 133, 195
Korean, 125
Kuanua, 117
language
ideal, 101, 109
source, 224
target vs. source, 30, 40, 55, 59
Liar Paradox, 9
lie, 70
logic
DIML, 148–153
first-order, see FOL
FOL, 169
FOLC, 168–175
FOML, 44, 49, 56, 86, 234–236
FOML vs. FOL, 86
hybrid, 86
modal
double-index, 109
normal modal, 59, 63, 85
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notation, 6
of demonstratives (Kaplan), 146–148
SDML, 161–162
Malay, 114
mapping function, 171, 176, 185
Mates’ Puzzle, 72
MCP, see Most Certain Principle
meaning
descriptive, 114
literal, 40, 70
subjective, 72
meaning theory
representational, 71
mereology, 184
metavariable, 5
metonymy, 113
Millianism, 48–49, 73
modal argument, 42–44
modality
binder, 179
kinds of, 124
metaphysical, 55
nested, 82
mode of presentation, 73
monster operator, 159
mood
grammatical, 123
Most Certain Principle, 8
multiplicity
referential, 74–75
name, 2, 4, 14, 21, 28–30, 35, 36, 38, 39,
43, 46, 48, 66, 83–86, 179, 212,
228, 231
being called by a name, 79–80
cognitive significance of, 32
for myself, 220, 222
Frege’s view, 25–26
logical, 19, 21
Russell’s view, 19–21
Name Claim, 19, 30
negation
inner, 176
next, 120
nominal description theory, 76
now, 119, 182–184
in DIML, 152
in past, 122, 183
non-rigid, 137, 183, 206–210
NTPT, 168, 178
object
doxastic, 223
object-centricity, 118
Odysseus, 34
ostension
deferred, 113
parameter, 100
parameterization, 98
part of, 184
performance, see competence
person
1st versus 3rd person perspective, 211,
213, 215, 217, 218, 222
as a category, 114–116
Phosphorus, 34
place, 184
reference place, 185, 186
pointing gesture, 193
politeness, 133
possibilism, 14, 35, 45
possibilism vs. actualism, 54
powerset, 5
predication theory
non-traditional, see NTPT
presupposition, 132, 133
existence, 10
PRO, 215
proper name, see name
property
essential, 52
proposition
Russellian, 21
singular, 21
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structured, 109, 216
proprioception, 217
proximity, 195, 196
pudding, 186
qualia, 224
quantifier
possibilist vs. actualist, 54
quasi-indicator, 214–215
reading
narrow vs. broad, 116
object- vs. egocentric, 118–119
reference, 11
by speaker, 11, 35–36
direct, 42–46, 140, 147
extralinguistic, 11
gone astray, 14
identification-free, 217–219, 224
identifying, 36–40, 85, 141
immediacy of, 49–51
in thinking, 217
indexical, 141–142
indirect, 73
New Theory of, 46–48
rule, 113
saturation, 15
semantic, 12
speaker, 49–51, 75–76
successful speaker, 15
reference place, see place
reference rule
content of, 131–134
of a demonstrative, 131
of an indicator, 130
token-reflexive, 127
utterance-based, 127–130
reference time, see time
referent, see reference
doxastic, 73
referential multiplicity, 75
referential opacity, 32, 50–51, 153
pragmatic vs. semantic view, 33, 101
requirement
prescriptive vs. normative, 10
rigid designator, 43
obstinately rigid, 45
persistently rigid, 45
possibilist, 45
strong, 45
rigidity, 238, 240
and Millianism, 49, 51
of descriptions, 53–56, 73–74
of indexicals, 137–140
of names, 42–44
relativized, 83
implementation, 86–89
thesis, 43
Russell vs. Frege, 26
Russian, 122, 198
Samal, 114
semantic argument
and NDT, 77–78
semantics, 40
constant domain, 54
varying vs. constant domain, 54
sense, see Fregean Sense
she, 114
shifter, 107, 115–116, 122–123, 159–162,
197–200
sore, 116, 133, 195
speaker competence, see competence
speech
indirect, 153
speech time, see time
substitutability
blocked, see referential opacity
of co-referential terms, seeMost Certain
Principle
substitution
and explanatory power, 212
operator, 6
salva veritate, 7, 33, 50, 72, 109
Suomi, see Finnish
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Superman, 34
supermarket example, 212
symbol
discursive, 219, 220
presentational, 221
representational, 126, 216
representational vs. presentational, 219–
220
syntax–semantics interface, 89, 189, 195, 203,
244–261
synthetic, 34
Tagalog, 114
tense, 119, 121–122, 184
binder, 180–182
complex, 182
future, 180
in future, 182
in past, 182
perfect, 182
relative, 181
past, 180
relative, 181
pluperfect, 181
present, 180
relative, 181
Russian, 122, 198–199
term
empty, 14, 154
individual, 15
singular, 2, 11–15, 18, 22, 23, 25, 28,
33, 36, 45, 67, 68, 73, 87, 156,
158, 221, 222, 231
that, 116, 193
then, 123, 183
thinking
episodal, 28, 32, 35, 50, 63, 216–221
third realm, 28
this, 116, 138, 193
thought
indexical, 219–221
thought insertion, 218
time, 119
of event, 180
of speech, 180
of utterance, 180, 183
reference time, 180
today, 120
token, 193
persistent, 211
reuse, 128
token-reflexivity, 126–127
Tolai, see Kuana
tomorrow, 120, 189
trope theory, 109
truth-value
gap, 10
two days ago, 122, 155
in DIML, 152
type, see token
vs. token, 126–127
undersaturation, 132
unification, 101
uniqueness condition, 19
use
calendric vs. non-calendric, 120
canonical, 113
usually, 9
utterance, 128–130
disposition, 70, 72, 81, 83, 85, 216, 228
utterance time, see time
vagueness
of reference rules, 129
we, 190–192
inclusive vs. exclusive, 114–115
wide scope theory, 33, 55–60, 63
arguments against, 57–58
relativized, 88–89
world
actual, 53, 124, 140
yesterday, 120, 188–189
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in DIML, 152
Yidiny, 131
yonder, 116
you, 114
generic use, 114
impure use, 111
Zazaki, see Dimli
Zeus–Jahwe example, 214
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